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in the field of cyber defence operations for all NATO bodies across the Alliance. 
The Centre is staffed and financed by its member nations - Austria, Belgium, the 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, 
Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, the 
United Kingdom and the United States. NATO-accredited centres of excellence are 




Rethinking the Data Wheel: Automating Open-Access,  9
Public Data on Cyber Conflict
Christopher Whyte, Brandon Valeriano, 
Benjamin Jensen, Ryan Maness
The Cyber Deterrence Problem  31
Aaron F. Brantly
Offensive Cyber Capabilities: To What Ends?  55
Max Smeets, Herbert S. Lin
Understanding and Countering Cyber Coercion  73
Quentin E. Hodgson
Targeting Technology: Mapping Military  89
Offensive Network Operations 
Daniel Moore
Drawing Inferences from Cyber Espionage  109
Martin C. Libicki
The Topography of Cyberspace and  123
Its Consequences for Operations 
Brad Bigelow
Net Neutrality in the Context of Cyber Warfare  139
Kim Hartmann, Keir Giles 
The Cyber Decade: Cyber Defence at a X-ing Point 159
Robert Koch, Mario Golling
Aladdin’s Lamp: The Theft and  187
Re-weaponization of Malicious Code 
Kārlis Podiņš, Kenneth Geers
Cyber Law and Espionage Law as Communicating Vessels  203
Asaf Lubin
Internet Intermediaries and Counter-Terrorism:  227
Between Self-Regulation and Outsourcing Law Enforcement 
Krisztina Huszti-Orban
From Grey Zone to Customary International Law:  245
How Adopting the Precautionary Principle May Help 
Crystallize the Due Diligence Principle in Cyberspace 
Peter Z. Stockburger
Pressing Pause: A New Approach for International  263
Cybersecurity Norm Development 
Cedric Sabbah
Developing Collaborative and Cohesive  283
Cybersecurity Legal Principles 
Jeff Kosseff
Utilizing Air Traffic Communications for OSINT on  299
State and Government Aircraft 
Martin Strohmeier, Matthew Smith, Daniel Moser, 
Matthias Schäfer, Vincent Lenders, Ivan Martinovic
FeedRank: A Tamper-resistant Method for the Ranking  321
of Cyber Threat Intelligence Feeds 
Roland Meier, Cornelia Scherrer, David Gugelmann, 
Vincent Lenders, Laurent Vanbever
HTTP Security Headers Analysis of Top One Million Websites 345
Artūrs Lavrenovs, F. Jesús Rubio Melón 
On the Effectiveness of Machine and  371
Deep Learning for Cyber Security 
Giovanni Apruzzese, Michele Colajanni, Luca Ferretti, 
Alessandro Guido, Mirco Marchetti
Screen Watermarking for Data Theft  391
Investigation and Attribution 
David Gugelmann, David Sommer, Vincent Lenders, 
Markus Happe, Laurent Vanbever
Neural Network and Blockchain Based Technique  409
for Cyber Threat Intelligence and Situational Awareness 
Roman Graf, Ross King
Mission-Focused Cyber Situational  427
Understanding via Graph Analytics 
Steven Noel, Paul D. Rowe, Stephen Purdy, 





CyCon X is the tenth iteration of the annual International Conference on Cyber 
Conflict, organised by the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence 
and taking place in Tallinn from 29 May to 1 June 2018. Over the years, CyCon has 
become a world-recognised conference addressing cyber conflict and security from 
the perspectives of technology, strategy, operations, law, and policy. We are always 
glad to see our friends in Tallinn again – a number of them have been involved with 
CyCon since its origins a decade ago –  and we also welcome newcomers, who can 
discover the cyber debates and ‘white night’ walks in Tallinn’s Old Town. We are 
proud to offer them all the opportunity to meet and learn something new from each 
other. If CyCon has been able to contribute to interdisciplinary understanding of cyber 
conflict and security throughout the years, then it has achieved its main goal.
CyCon X’s core topic is ‘Maximising Effects’. Since the very beginning, cyberspace 
has provided unparalleled opportunities to achieve effects in new and novel ways. 
Today, cyberspace provides a technological platform and an environment for diverse 
actors, with both good and bad motivations, to influence everyone and everything. 
Maximising effects in the cyber realm is important for business, media, governments 
and military, and even private users. However, how will this be achieved and what will 
the consequences be? How will AI, machine learning and big data help to maximise 
effects in cyberspace? How will international law develop in light of the serious 
effects of state-sponsored operations that may or may not be hard to attribute? The 
effects generated through cyberspace, including new instabilities and vulnerabilities, 
will require new policies, legal frameworks and technological solutions to maximise 
security.
In response to the Call for Papers in June 2017, almost 200 abstracts were submitted 
in October. After a careful selection and peer review by the Academic Review 
Committee, this book contains 22 articles whose authors were invited to present at 
the conference.
Christopher Whyte, Brandon Valeriano, Benjamin Jensen, and Ryan Maness 
describe the prospects for open-source, public data collection for cyber security 
events and present an initial data collection and analysis of interstate cyber conflict 
incidents involving the United States. Aaron F. Brantly examines the applicability of 
deterrence in the digital age and for digital tools, based on examples from both within 
and beyond cyberspace. Max Smeets and Herbert S. Lin aim to explain if (and how) 
offensive cyber capabilities have the potential to change the role of military power 
and argue that these capabilities can alter the manner in which states use their military 
power strategically. Quentin E. Hodgson seeks to develop an understanding of how 
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states use cyber capabilities to coerce others for political objectives and examines the 
use of cyber operations by North Korea and Russia in recent years as part of their 
broader strategies. Daniel Moore argues that military offensive network operations 
can be usefully cast into a two-part taxonomy: event-based attacks and presence-
based attacks – these two types offer different solutions, encompass varying risks, and 
may require different resources to accomplish.
Martin C. Libicki shows how cyber espionage between state adversaries can ‘alter 
the balance of a confrontation’ and ‘shape the inferences that the other side draws 
about one’s intentions’ in cyberspace. Brad Bigelow suggests that ‘cyberspace’ as 
a label for a domain should not be confused with the individual networks – some 
interconnected (‘open’) and some relatively isolated (‘closed’) – involved in military 
operations; and illustrates the importance of precision in describing the composition 
of cyberspace. Kim Hartmann and Keir Giles investigate the potential opportunities 
and challenges of an adjustment to the principle of net neutrality to facilitate defensive 
action by legitimate actors; how this adjustment could contribute to regaining control 
in congested cyber domains in the case of national or international cyber incidents; 
and the associated risks. Robert Koch and Mario Golling analyse the development 
of both cyber threats and defence capabilities during the past 10 years, evaluate the 
current situation and give recommendations for improvements, including an overview 
of upcoming technologies that will be critical for cyber security. Kārlis Podiņš and 
Kenneth Geers describe the technical aspects of malware re-weaponisation and the 
implications and ramifications of this phenomenon for a range of strategic concerns, 
including weapons proliferation and attack attribution. 
Turning to the legal perspective, Asaf Lubin provides his view of how low-intensity 
cyber operations and peacetime espionage operations should be subjected to a 
single regulatory framework: that cyber law and espionage law should be viewed 
as ‘communicating vessels’. Krisztina Huszti-Orban explores the division of 
responsibilities between the public and private spheres in countering terrorism and 
violent extremism, focusing on ways to ensure that Internet intermediaries follow 
international human rights standards in the process. Peter Z. Stockburger examines 
the precautionary principle in international law and argues that its application can 
help crystallise the due diligence principle in cyberspace. Cedric Sabbah suggests a 
shift in the approach to cyber norms development: due to the lack of consensus in the 
UN GGE process, the international community should support the discussions that 
are already occurring between cybersecurity regulators and authorities. Finally, Jeff 
Kosseff proposes and elaborates on four goals of common international principles 
for cybersecurity law: modernisation of cybersecurity laws; uniformity of legal 
requirements; coordination of cooperative incentives and coercive regulations; and 
supply chain security.
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There are seven articles with a technological viewpoint, the first being a case 
study authored by Martin Strohmeier et al. exploring the collection of air traffic 
communication data via open source intelligence methods, for tracking mission 
critical military and governmental movements. Next, Roland Meier et al. present a 
threat-intelligent feed that exhibits a robust resistance to tampering attempts in order 
to provide organisations and individuals with the most original, most valuable and 
newest feed entries. In their article, F. Jesús Rubio Melón and Artūrs Lavrenovs 
provide an examination of HTTP security headers of one million most popular websites 
to assess web security policy implementation rates compared to its HTTP equivalents. 
Giovanni Apruzzese et al. present an in-depth analysis of adopted machine and deep 
learning algorithms and their usability for intrusion detection, malware analysis, and 
spam detection. Regarding insider threat and malicious agents, David Gugelmann 
and David Sommer et al. explore a novel hidden screen watermarking technique for 
infiltrated organisations to more rapidly identify and reduce threats after document 
leaks have occurred. Roman Graf and Ross King’s contribution explores an 
automated approach for incident reports management, using neural networks and smart 
contracts. Finally, Steven Noel et al. highlight a prototype tool aimed at improving 
network security while simultaneously supporting the protection of mission-critical 
assets in enterprise or military environments.
All the articles in this book have gone through a double-blind peer review by, at 
minimum, two members of CyCon’s Academic Review Committee. We greatly 
commend the members of the Committee for guaranteeing the academic quality of 
the book by reviewing and selecting the submitted papers.
Academic Review Committee Members for CyCon 2018:
 • Siim Alatalu, NATO CCD COE
 • Dr Elie Alhajjar, Army Cyber Institute, United States
 • Prof Robert E. Barnsby, Army Cyber Institute; 
  United States Military Academy
 • Prof Col Daniel Bennett, Army Cyber Institute, United States
 • Prof Giuseppe Bianchi, University of Rome Tor Vergata, Italy
 • Bernhards Blumbergs, CERT Latvia
 • Václav Borovička, National Cyber and 
  Information Security Agency, Czech Republic
 • Maj Pascal Brangetto, French Ministry of Defence
 • Dr Russell Buchan, University of Sheffield, United Kingdom
 • LtCol Joshua Bundt, Army Cyber Institute, United States
 • Dr Joe Burton, University of Waikato, New Zealand
 • Dr Steve Chan, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, United States
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 • Prof Thomas Chen, City, University of London, United Kingdom
 • Prof Michele Colajanni, University of Modena and Reggio Emilia, Italy
 • Torsten Corall, NATO CCD COE
 • Dr LtCol Christian Czosseck, NATO CCD COE Ambassador; CERTBw
 • Prof Dorothy E. Denning, Naval Postgraduate School, United States
 • Dr Kenneth Geers, NATO CCD COE Ambassador; Comodo
 • Keir Giles, Chatham House, Conflict Studies Research Centre, 
  United Kingdom
 • Rudi Gouweleeuw, Netherlands Organisation 
  for Applied Scientific Research (TNO)
 • Prof Michael Grimaila, Air Force Institute of Technology, United States
 • Dr Jonas Hallberg, Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI)
 • Dr Jakub Harašta, Masaryk University, Czech Republic
 • Jason Healey, Columbia University, School of International 
  and Public Affairs, United States
 • Prof David Hutchison, Lancaster University, United Kingdom
 • LtCol Daniel Huynh, Army Cyber Institute, United States
 • Prof Gabriel Jakobson, Altusys Corp; CyberGem Consulting
 • Cpt Raik Jakschis, NATO CCD COE
 • Taťána Jančárková, National Cyber and Information Security Agency, 
  Czech Republic
 • Prof Eric Talbot Jensen, Brigham Young University Law School, 
  United States
 • Dr Jan Kallberg, Army Cyber Institute, United States
 • Maj Harry Kantola, Finnish Defence Forces
 • Prof Sokratis K. Katsikas, Norwegian University of Science & Technology
 • Dr Panagiotis Kikiras, European Defence Agency
 • Markus Kont, NATO CCD COE
 • Jarkko Kuusijärvi, VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland
 • Clare Lain, NATO CCD COE
 • LtCol Franz Lantenhammer, NATO CCD COE
 • Dr Scott Lathrop, Soar Technology, Inc
 • Artūrs Lavrenovs, NATO CCD COE
 • Dr Sean Lawson, University of Utah
 • Dr Corrado Leita, Lastline Inc.
 • Dr Lauri Lindström, NATO CCD COE
 • Dr Kubo Mačák, University of Exeter, United Kingdom
 • Prof Olaf Manuel Maennel, Tallinn University of Technology, Estonia
 • Dr Matti Mantere, Nordea Bank AB
 • Prof Evangelos Markatos, University of Crete, Institute of Computer Science, 
  Greece
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 • Dr Paul Maxwell, Army Cyber Institute, United States
 • Maj Markus Maybaum, Bundeswehr Cyber Security Centre; 
  NATO CCD COE Ambassador; Fraunhofer FKIE
 • Roy Mente, Netherlands Organisation for Applied Scientific Research (TNO)
 • Tomáš Minárik, NATO CCD COE
 • Maarja Naagel, NATO CCD COE
 • Dr Jose Nazario, Fastly Inc.
 • Dr Lars Nicander, Swedish National Defence College
 • Maj Erwin Orye, NATO CCD COE
 • Dr Anna-Maria Osula, NATO CCD COE
 • Dr Nikolas Ott, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
 • Dr Rain Ottis, Tallinn University of Technology, Estonia
 • Prof Stephanie Pell, Army Cyber Institute, United States
 • Piret Pernik, International Centre for Defence and Security, Estonia
 • Mauno Pihelgas, NATO CCD COE
 • Cpt Roy Ragsdale, Army Cyber Institute, United States
 • Tarmo Randel, NATO CCD COE
 • LtCol Glenn Robertson, Army Cyber Institute, United States
 • Prof Gabi Dreo Rodosek, Bundeswehr University Munich, Germany
 • Henry Rõigas, Guardtime
 • Prof Juha Röning, University of Oulu, Finland
 • Ragnhild Siedler, Norwegian Defence Research Establishment
 • Dr Max Smeets, Stanford University, Center for International Security 
  and Cooperation (CISAC), United States
 • Dr Edward Sobiesk, Army Cyber Institute, United States
 • Dr Daniel Spiekermann, FernUni Hagen/German Police Forces
 • Dr Tim Stevens, King’s College London, United Kingdom
 • Dr Kris Stoddart, Aberystwyth University, United Kingdom
 • Morta Strazdaitė, Paris School of International Affairs, France
 • Dr Michail Sulmeyer, Harvard Kennedy School, United States
 • Prof Bradley Thayer, Tallinn University, Estonia
 • Dr Jens Tölle, Fraunhofer FKIE, Germany
 • Lorena Trinberg, German Armed Forces
 • Krista Jean Tuthill, Booz Allen Hamilton
 • Prof Risto Vaarandi, Tallinn University of Technology, Estonia
 • Ann Väljataga, NATO CCD COE
 • Matthijs Veenendaal, Ministry of Defence (Defence Cyber Command), 
  the Netherlands
 • Prof Ari Visa, Tampere University of Technology, Finland
 • Prof Col David Wallace, United States Military Academy
 • Prof Bruce Watson, Stellenbosch University, South Africa
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 • Prof Sean Watts, Creighton University Law School, United States
 • Cdr Mike Widmann, NATO CCD COE
 • Prof Stefano Zanero, Polytechnic University of Milan, Italy
We would like to thank the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE) 
and its Estonia Section for again serving as a technical co-sponsor for CyCon and 
this publication. In addition, we highly appreciate the NATO CCD COE staff for their 
excellent organising skills and assistance during the publication process. 
Special thanks are due to Dr Joe Burton from the University of Waikato, New Zealand, 
(16846.304 km away from Tallinn, according to Google) for his contribution to the 
work of the CyCon 2018 Programme Committee and to the Conference Proceedings.
Finally, we thank all the authors of the papers in this publication for their outstanding 
submissions, their friendly cooperation, and their efforts in advancing research on 
cyber security.
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Rethinking the Data 
Wheel: Automating Open-
Access, Public Data on 
Cyber Conflict
Abstract: To date, researchers studying cyber conflict through publicly available 
information sources have either selected on the actor or selected on the intrusion 
method when coding events. Both approaches lead to distinct challenges when it 
comes to result validation and the avoidance of selection bias. This article describes 
prospects for open-source, public data collection for cyber security events. We 
present an initial data collection and analysis effort of interstate cyber conflict 
incidents involving the United States as a pilot study. Using a tailored collection of 
more than 155,000 documents from print-only media sources, we describe a method 
to process data, parse document elements, and populate an event dataset. Human 
coders are then tasked with validation of incident information, after which the search 
code is updated to ensure greater accuracy in subsequent runs. In the study, the data 
produced are compared with previously available data on cyber conflict involving the 
United States. We demonstrate that the method can effectively capture and describe 
cyber conflict incidents for researchers to study in a broad range of research efforts. 
Moreover, this method captures greater granularity within cyber conflict episodes, 
which are inherently multi-faceted. This approach to cyber conflict analysis carries 
with it several distinct advantages over alternative research designs, in that it promises 
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1. IntroductIon
Researchers analyzing the scope and scale of global cyber conflict face significant data 
collection challenges. In particular, the process of determining who is responsible for 
observed cyber incidents that are often covert by design produces research constraints 
for researchers seeking to describe modern competition, conflict and confrontation 
empirically (Gartzke and Lindsay, 2015; Rid and Buchanan, 2015). How can 
researchers systematically study cyber incidents globally and document recurrent 
patterns and trends, given inherent restrictions on coding what are essentially covert 
operations? 
Such challenges are pressing for scholars and practitioners alike insofar as both aim to 
develop a sophisticated body of knowledge regarding the drivers, determinants, and 
effects of conflict waged via networked information and communications technologies 
(ICT). To date, the cyber security field tends to rely on thin case study descriptions of 
cyber incidents, using crucial cases to make inferences about actor motivation and the 
larger context of the cyber conflict, as well as using deductive reasoning to produce 
a foundation of theoretical knowledge regarding cyber conflict. For example, major 
work on the Stuxnet attack tends to take this form, with scholars debating the efficacy 
and larger implications of the series of espionage and degradation intrusions launched 
by multiple states against Iranian targets (Lindsay, 2013; Slayton, 2017; Kello, 2017). 
With respect to deductive reasoning, major studies use a series of anecdotal examples 
to work through a series of logical claims about cyber deterrence and crisis escalation 
in cyberspace, even including paralyzing cyber first-strikes and offensive action 
(Libicki, 2012; Gompert and Libicki, 2014; Whyte, 2016; Nye, 2017). Despite its 
classified nature, most intelligence analysis of cyber events likely replicates these 
methods. Faced with a poverty of data, analysts and scholars alike use individual 
incidents and deductive reasoning to illuminate emerging threats and opportunities in 
cyberspace.
To date, research that systematically collects data on cyber incidents is scarce. 
Outside of work on cyber rivalry and limited studies of denial of service attacks 
within a conflict setting, both of which limit the sample under investigation, most 
of the cyber security literature lacks large databases and robust samples (Valeriano 
and Maness, 2014; Valeriano and Maness, 2015; Kostyuk and Zhukov, 2017; Whyte, 
2017; Valeriano, Jensen, and Maness, 2018). The absence of large datasets limits 
the development of inductive meta-theories about cyber conflict. Policy makers and 
scholars cannot determine whether an intrusion event is an isolated and insignificant 
incident, or consistent with a larger correlate of cyber conflict, without understanding 
the true scope of cyber interactions. 
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For scholars interested in the cyber domain, assessment of information derived from 
publicly-available outlets is an option that is as attractive as it is problematic. The 
capture and treatment of massive amounts of published data pertaining to cyber conflict 
promises a unique resource for those seeking to assess the context of cyber security 
engagements. Nevertheless, such approaches often garner broad criticisms pertaining 
to generalizability and methodology. If much of what constitutes cyber conflict is 
covert, how can data produced from information found in the public sphere offer 
researchers the opportunity to generalize? Even if that hurdle were to be cleared, how 
can researchers reconcile attribution challenges in determining the sources, targets 
and technical shape of varied cyber interactions? Without some notion of reliability as 
a measurement of the value of such information, open source data efforts are likely to 
run into serious problems.
This article addresses the data challenge at the core of cyber security. First, we address 
the utility of open-source data collection on cyber conflict processes for scholars and 
practitioners alike. In addition to being the most promising route available for academic 
researchers to develop a robust knowledge foundation from which to undertake 
sophisticated analyses, assessing open access materials both allows researchers to 
look at the context of cyber conflict and provides opportunities for use of advanced 
analytic methods that can parse signal from immense noise. Second, we describe an 
approach – commonly found in research on political violence, and in recent efforts 
to build comprehensive conflict event data – for producing cyber conflict data that 
draws from public-facing information sources and allows the researcher to address 
validation shortcomings inherent to such an approach. Then, we demonstrate the value 
of this approach by employing a tailored collection of more than 155,000 documents 
from print media sources in the United States, in order to produce data on interstate 
cyber interactions across a two-year period. This approach performs on par with data 
previously produced via traditional collection approaches and, insofar as different 
elements of episodes are captured, produces a more granular picture than has been 
produced in prior large-N work on cyber conflict. Likewise, opportunities to enrich 
such data via additional treatment of surrounding text and linked documentation 
promise further value to researchers seeking to understand the sociopolitical context 
of cyber conflict (Schrodt, Beieler, and Idris, 2014).
The article proceeds in five sections. First, it considers the state of cyber conflict 
data production, describes the few attempts that have been made to date to produce 
systematic accounts of warfare conducted online, and outlines enduring challenges. 
Then, we make a case for the clear utility of data produced from publicly-available 
information sources. Third, we describe the requirements for robust, replicable efforts 
to develop such data resources for scholarly use, before demonstrating this via the 
presentation of two years’ worth of event data on interstate cyber conflict involving 
12
the United States. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of our arguments, 
and a demonstration for both researchers and policymakers as well as practitioners.
2. cyber conflIct data: PrIor efforts
and endurIng challenges
The incidence of cyber conflict dates back to the early 1980s with episodes such as 
the Farewell incident, in which the CIA targeted KGB technology transfer programs, 
and the Cuckoo’s Egg hack-back, in which private network operators identified Soviet 
operatives (Stoll, 1988; Healey and Grindal, 2013). In spite of this, systematic and 
comprehensive resources describing cyber conflict incidents are virtually non-existent. 
Major political science efforts to catalogue different forms of interstate conflict and 
political violence fail to include cyber actions, either owing to their ambiguous origins 
or to difficulty attributing the incident. Stuxnet, for example, although a crucial case 
in descriptive treatments, is often not represented in major databases due to attribution 
issues, difficulty dating the start and end of the incident, and the question of whether it 
was the United States or Israel that launched the action (Radford, 2016). 
This general lack of focus on cyber conflict issues in the context of broader efforts to 
record and problematize international security dynamics is troubling for a number of 
reasons. Foremost among these is the fact that there is arguably a consensus among 
political scientists that cyber instruments work as adjunct modifiers – essentially force 
multipliers – of conventional and asymmetric warfare (Gartzke, 2013, Valeriano et al., 
2018). This suggests that cataloguing cyber incidents is useful not only as a means 
of assessing conflict restricted to that domain, but also as a means of understanding 
a critical variable in broader conflict processes. Without better understanding of the 
nature of cyber conflict, scholars and security practitioners of all stripes are (and will 
be) hard pressed to describe accurately how digital actions and possibilities intersect 
with existing mechanisms of human interaction. Indeed, without such a development, 
it is likely that we inject bias – from using data obtained only from select stakeholders 
or employing methods that misunderstand the significance of different actors – into 
our continued efforts to construct knowledge of macro global security processes.
The main reason that no comprehensive data resource to describe cyber conflict exists 
is that the attribution of cyber incidents is not always feasible (Rid and Buchanan, 
2015; Lindsay, 2015). This is true on two fronts. Firstly, the method is covert: while 
there are often observable outputs of cyber conflicts, where victims (or, in rare 
instances, observers) report on incidents or attackers broadcast their involvement, this 
is not always true. Indeed, anecdotal evidence and simple recognition of the scope of 
the domain to be canvassed by researchers suggests that this is true only infrequently. 
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Bound up in this problem is the manner in which the digital world operates. Whereas 
with other forms of conflict – terrorist attacks, for instance – it may be possible 
to adjudicate reasonably on the frequency of otherwise invisible attacks based on 
knowledge of past actions, analytic breakdown of capabilities, or journalistic efforts 
to validate rumor, the same is not generally accepted in cyberspace. Even where 
indicators suggest the existence of incidents to researchers, validation usually requires 
the cooperation of victims or infrastructural stakeholders (i.e. backbone operators or 
non-backbone ISPs). Thus, particularly where relevant actors are motivated by the 
possibility of reputational, financial or political costs, confirmation of the full scope 
of cyber conflict is difficult for those operating in the public domain.
Added to these challenges are the dual problems of bounding scale and controlling 
for negative cases. With respect to scale, a successful cyber operation might involve 
thousands of individual intrusion incidents. For example, spear phishing campaigns 
that resulted in the compromising of the German Bundestag and, more recently, the 
U.S. Senate, involved hundreds of e-mails sent to unsuspecting elected officials and 
staffers.1 Does each e-mail constitute an individual cyber intrusion, or can researchers 
include them all as one campaign? Regarding negative cases, researchers must 
acknowledge the fact that cyber security firms, journalists, and governments tend to 
report only successful intrusions or attempts that nevertheless cause at least some 
measure of disruption (Brodsky, 2008). Unsuccessful intrusions, which likely are 
significantly larger by count, are thus under-reported. 
Similarly, the second facet of the reporting problem lies with the value of information 
that can be obtained. Though such challenges are often surmountable, as we describe 
below, it is certainly true that gathering enough detail on a given incident to allow 
sociopolitical attribution is possible but difficult. Despite the clear imperative social 
scientists have to use any and all information available in attempting to understand the 
world around them, efforts to understand cyber phenomena better regularly run into 
criticism, as operating in a covert domain will generate no observable data (Lewis, 
2002). This point fundamentally misunderstands the meaning of covert action, 
however, which implies a difficulty in determining responsibility, but not whether or 
not the event occurred. 
Datasets are routinely released in the broad international relations field cataloguing all 
manner of security phenomena.2 Among these, a small number are broadly focused 
on conflict with a relatively unlimited remit. Rather than focus solely on the efforts 
of terrorist non-state actors, insurgent movements, social activists or state militaries, 
such data collection efforts aim to catalogue the full spectrum of conflictual incidents 
1 See inter alia http://www.zeit.de/digital/2017-05/cyberattack-bundestag-angela-merkel-fancy-bear-hacker-
russia and http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/368671-russia-linked-hackers-targeting-us-senate.
2 See, for instance, the Militarized Interstate Dispute dataset (http://cow.dss.ucdavis.edu/data-sets/MIDs) at 
the Correlates of War project, the International Crisis Behavior project (https://sites.duke.edu/icbdata/) and 
the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (http://ucdp.uu.se).
14
around the world. Over the past few years, such efforts have rapidly become more 
sophisticated. Efforts like Phoenix3 and the Integrated Conflict Early Warning System 
(ICEWS)4 provided extremely granular information on the nature of security events 
worldwide using a series of automated data scraping, parsing and treating methods, 
often in tandem with human validation inputs. Such approaches constitute the new 
normal for political science researchers in terms of the resources being made available 
to study international conflict. And yet, these macro efforts to describe global security 
matters do not systematically aim to capture all manner of cyber incidents (though 
they may include individual, prominent events) as part of their approach. This is 
possibly because the various attack chain elements that constitute the wide array of 
techniques of interest to cyber conflict scholars are not obviously conflictual in nature, 
and thus present a challenge when determining inclusion.
To date, there is only one dataset that accounts for all actors, states, and regions in 
the world available to scholars interested in the contours of global cyber conflict. The 
Dyadic Cyber Incident and Dispute dataset (DCID) describes interstate cyber conflict 
over more than fifteen years and employs a Correlates of War (CoW)-style coding 
scheme to describe the character of cyber warfare campaigns among rival states. The 
authors of DCID, Valeriano and Maness (2014, 2015), include a range of information 
on the type of instruments involved in observed cyber events, the impact of such 
events, and more. The data collected originates from publicly-available descriptions 
of cyber conflict incidents, including news stories, industry and government reporting, 
and expert testimony. Nevertheless, as the authors freely admit and others note 
(Radford, 2016), DCID was designed as an initial effort to scope the cyber conflict 
domain by selecting on rival states most likely to engage in cyber conflict. It is not 
aimed at the production of cross-domain conflict data, and does not draw from the 
universe of possible information on cyber incidents in a comprehensive sense. While 
outputs of the project might describe contours of cyber conflict between rival actors, 
any comprehensive effort to produce cyber conflict data must inevitably drop such 
selection parameters in order to ensure generalizability. Thus, the need to address 
the role of future open source data collection on cyber conflict is twofold, insofar as 
researchers must grapple with both absent resources and limited foundational efforts 
from which to begin their investigations.
Briefly, the data collection approach we describe below addresses these dual needs 
and goes a step further than previous social science projects. We rethink prior 
approaches to data collection in line with work undertaken in political violence and 
terrorism research programs, and expand beyond a limited focus rival states. In doing 
so, we provide for reliability checks that have been absent – or hard to effect – in past 
efforts, and argue that sophisticated data collection in this vein must turn to human 




both large and relatively free of the errors common to other large event databases, 
such as ICEWS (Boschee et al., 2015) or IDEA (King and Lowe, 2003). Part of the 
reason we argue that this will be the case is the fact that projects like ICEWS and 
IDEA aim to capture all events between all actors annually. A cyber conflict effort 
would include a significantly reduced scope of inquiry, and would make the parsing of 
signal from noise a more feasible task. In short, though we cede the point that there are 
limitations to any open-source data collection effort on cyber conflict patterns in the 
form of lagged information about cyber threats that occur in clandestine settings, such 
an effort would regardless lead to a useful resource useful to cyber-security scholars 
across a range of disciplines, upon which others can build in the future. 
3. the utIlIty of oPen source data collectIon
Open-source collection of information on cyber conflict processes represents the 
future of data generation in the field, but also presents many challenges. Whereas 
most open source data collection seeks to parse signal from noise, a cyber conflict 
effort will miss things simply because not all of the signals are observable from the 
public sphere. 
Why should researchers even attempt to undertake open-source collection of 
information on cyber conflict trends, given the inherent problems in doing so? We 
argue that there are three reasons. First, social science research on cyber conflict 
requires a foundation of knowledge from which to build and infer. Second, assessing 
open-access description of cyber conflict allows researchers to look at both the 
content and context of cyber interactions. Third, there are distinct benefits to a 
scaled-up approach to studying cyber conflict over traditional small-n approaches, as 
there is additional clarity and opportunity to use advanced analytic methods to parse 
observable relationships.
The Need for a Knowledge Foundation 
Most simply, there is a clear need for foundational knowledge about cyber conflict. 
At present, there is a relative lack of empirical work in the domain that presents a 
comprehensive and systematic description of the global impact of the information 
revolution. One clear argument in favor of scholarly attempts to build a representation 
of such processes via collection of public-facing information is quite simply that 
scholars are duty-bound to utilize any resource available in trying to contribute to the 
condition of knowledge on a given topic.
More pressing than the duty of social scientists, however, is the need to develop 
knowledge foundations in order to spur the development of a robust research 
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program. The nature of the development of research programs is a source of hot 
debate among both classical and current philosophers of the social science enterprise. 
It is generally acknowledged, however, that research programs are layered bases 
of theoretical knowledge where peripheral hypotheses linked to core suppositions 
are appraised with the aim of advancing the state of a given field (Jackson, 2008). 
Often, hypothesis testing results in rapid rethinking of specific assumptions such that 
there is a revolution in macro knowledge. In the debate about progress in the field 
of International Relations, Lakatos is often invoked as the exemplar for establishing 
which theoretical ideas are of value over others (Vasquez, 1997). This view requires 
the development of a theoretical and empirical core, which then is investigated with 
the purpose of seeking advances over prior investigations. Advances can be examined 
in the context of providing more theoretical and empirical context over past efforts 
(Lakatos, 1970). 
At present, the research program on cyber conflict is still in its infancy. The condition 
of general core knowledge at the heart of the research program is remarkably unclear, 
which suggests that there is a strong imperative to articulate macro-theoretical 
perspectives. Given this, the need for projects that aim for comprehensive modeling 
of the scope of global cyber conflict is particularly pronounced. 
The Context of Cyber Conflict 
Building from the perspective that meaning emerges from the interaction of empirical 
dynamics and the human treatment thereof, researchers should attempt to undertake 
open-source collection of cyber conflict trends. Such an approach will inevitably 
capture more than just the actuarial detail of cyber incidents offered by thick case 
descriptions; specifically, open-source data collection allows researchers the 
opportunity to understand the context and content of cyber conflict dynamics more 
fully. Via the capture of textual metadata, cataloguing of adjacent conflict phenomena, 
and more (Hopkins and King, 2007), open source data modeling of cyber conflict 
trends (given relevant controls for duplication of information) offers the ability to 
understand the nature of information about cyber conflict that exists in the public 
sphere. Social science scholars of cyber conflict are, for instance, naturally interested 
in how framing of conflict influences the discourse and deliberation of policymakers, 
practitioners, and the general public. Is a particular cyber event over-reported in 
news media? What kinds of information are used in public discourse to construct 
attribution cases, and do these assessments vary given the context of, say, ongoing 
foreign policy spats with particular foreign countries? Do certain kinds of attacks 
receive more negative coverage, and how are relevant stakeholders discussed in 
such coverage? Understanding such dynamics is critical to efforts that aim to gain a 
systematic understanding of public reactions to cyber threats, the manner in which the 
citizenry ascribes responsibility for cyber security to public or private sector actors, 
17
and more. Public-facing data promises an ability to answer fundamental questions 
about the relationship between cyber conflict and the sociopolitical environment in 
which foreign policymaking and strategy development take place. Answering such 
questions should be of paramount importance to scholars. 
The Benefits of Scale  
Finally, efforts to scale up data collection using computer coding, web scrapping, and 
machine learning exponentially increase the available data. This universe of big data 
provides an empirical foundation from which to sort signal from noise in a way that is 
difficult to do where less input data is involved. This effort requires narrowing search 
terms based on automated construction of parameters and machine learning, followed 
by subsequent Bayesian updating of the process based on human review and validation 
of subsets of input data (as described in Hopkins and King, 2010; Ward, Beger, 
Cutler, Dickinson, Dorff, and Radford, 2013). At the level of the research project, the 
benefits of such an approach are obvious. With ICEWS, researchers reported a 50% 
increase in accuracy with semi-supervised approaches using large amounts of input 
information over those that had previously attempted only to have machines sort raw 
data. In essence, sophisticated application of an ontological understanding of conflict 
processes in coding massive amounts of data allows dissection of information in a 
way that is not possible with small samples.
At the level of the research program on cyber conflict processes itself, the clear benefit 
of scale is clarity. Given inherent attribution issues associated with cyber incidents, 
researchers need to cast their net as wide as possible to include not just major media 
outlets, but also government documents and cyber security reporting. Cyber security 
firms in particular are a critical source of reporting. These third-party firms have a 
financial and reputational incentive to report on the nefarious acts of government 
operatives online. They are constantly monitoring and looking to expose major 
intrusions (see, for instance, Kaspersky, 2015). Shifting to a machine-coding scheme 
that collects disparate sources brings these perspectives together in building a cyber 
security incident database. The combined observations, even if still imperfect, are 
orders of magnitude better than any one reporting line.
Put together, each argument for the construction of a larger-event based dataset of 
cyber interactions is not only needed, but prudent and responsible. The production 
of knowledge is a process fraught with friction, but we can reduce the hindrances 
common at the start of such enterprises by seeking to establish an empirical baseline 
early in the lifespan of a research program. Now we move to a formal description of 
how such a process of data collection takes place, and observe our results in the pilot 
study. 
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4. buIldIng a large-scale data collectIon 
and treatment PIPelIne
Machine-coded event datasets such as Phoenix or ICEWS are developed using 
publicly-available resources.5 To date, most efforts in political science have used news 
stories scraped from RSS feeds, repositories like Factiva, and outlet websites. It is, 
however, possible to draw information from any text resource. Although researchers 
are likely to favor news stories of various kinds for event data production, it is possible 
to utilize social media data feeds and information like industry reports.
The production of event data from large corpora is relatively straightforward. 
Unstructured information is taken from feeds and repositories using the researcher’s 
favored method of text crawling and fed into a database program. From there, 
information can be sent in a specified format to a program that produces structured, 
usable event data. A number of such programs exist, but the most well known 
are TABARI/PETRARCH/PETRARCH2, a series of Python-based programs 
that treat text and produce data. The function of these programs is also relatively 
straightforward. Text inputs are broken down to the level of individual sentences and 
are parsed to produce an XML input that includes both the original text and a language 
element breakdown. From there, files are passed through the main program, which 
references a series of preset dictionaries to produce structured data. The dictionary 
inputs represent the expected vocabulary pertaining to a given topic and are designed 
by the researcher.6 The resultant structured data are then usable by researchers or 
are available for further enrichment. Up to the point described here, data output by a 
program like TABARI would include event description, source and target information, 
and metadata (date, source of information, etc.). Further enrichment of this data 
for the purposes of understanding the context or surrounding content can then be 
achieved via further application of a range of text modeling, entity extraction, and 
topic modeling tools, with human interaction only required when specifying input text 
or when making a particular effort to enrich descriptive event data. 
5 The same is true for both data based on the Conflict and Mediation Event Observations (CAMEO) 
framework (Gerner, Schrodt, Yilmaz, Abu-Jabr, 2002) and the Global Database of Events, Language, and 
Tone (GDELT) (Leetaru and Schrodt, 2013). These efforts, and earlier ones like the Conflict and Peace 
Data Bank (COPDAB) and the World/Event Interaction Survey (WEIS) (Azar, 1980), provide granular 
information on human behavior drawn from an immense collection of available public sources of input 
data. CAMEO and other frameworks are employed for the purposes of structuring and making sense of the 
resultant information for analytic purposes. 
6 Recently, some advances have been made in automatically generating dictionaries based on the input text 
(Radford, 2016) specifically in the context of cyber security.
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5. the unIted states’ exPerIence wIth 
Interstate cyber conflIct, 2013-14
In order to demonstrate the utility of such a machine-coded event data production 
approach to comprehensively scoping the cyber domain, we supplement our arguments 
here with an application of  PETRARCH27 to a limited corpus of news stories pertaining 
to cyberspace and information security issues published in the United States. After 
discussing our data production effort, we present data below on incidents involving 
the United States and other countries, and compare our results to those of the only 
existing cyber conflict data resource (DCID). Though this demonstration is a limited, 
proof-of-concept effort that focuses on two years and one country’s relationships with 
other countries, we note that results match and arguably outperform those of DCID. 
Given that this data emerges from a relatively small scrape of available information 
on national cyber security events, the opportunity for expanded efforts seems clear.
Constructing a Demonstration Dataset Using Machine-Coding
The foundation of our demonstration dataset is a corpus of documents downloaded 
from LexisNexis. The documents that make up our corpus were selected based on two 
sets of criteria. First, we select on only United States-based print and wire publications 
so that we can effectively gauge the viability of a machine coding approach to event 
data production at the level of an individual country. Second, we collate all news 
articles that correspond to an extensive formula of keyword collocations that aim 
to capture all coverage of cyber security issues. The result is an extensive corpus 
of more than 155,000 news stories across more than thirty years. For purposes of 
matching outputs to DCID and assessing the viability of a machine-coding approach 
in the context of the contemporary landscape of cyber conflict, our construction of the 
demonstration dataset presented below focuses on a two-year period between 2013 
and 2014. Specifically, data is drawn from 859,423 input text files at the level of 
individual statements (sentences).
Raw text taken from LexisNexis is passed through several stages of treatment prior to 
the output of structured event data. First, text is parsed using the Stanford Core Natural 
Language Processing (NLP) suite of available programs, which tag named entities 
and parts of speech (i.e. nouns, adjectives, verbs, etc.) found in the text (Manning, 
Surdeanu, Bauer, Finkel, Bethard, and McClosky, 2014). The parsing process outputs 
an XML file that details a breakdown of different language elements. This provides the 
constituency tree parse necessary for event coding using PETRARCH2. Then, a glue 
program is used to format raw text chunks and the parsed language information into 
a file format specified by the authors of PETRARCH2 (see inter alia Beieler, 2016). 
Finally, these files are passed to PETRARCH2 for analysis. Analysis of text fragments 
at the level of sentences works via reference to a series of dictionaries to which the 
7 See https://github.com/openeventdata/petrarch2.
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program refers. These dictionaries contain vocabulary for types of conflict actions to 
be coded, agent types to be considered, and actors that might specifically be identified; 
the dictionaries can be automatically generated (Schrodt, Beieler, and Idris, 2014; 
Radford, 2016) but are generally updated manually by the researchers, as was the 
case here. The resultant data output includes information on the type of conflict action 
recorded, the source of that action, the target of that action and metadata pertaining to 
the incident (date, type of agent in the context of a particular actor, etc.).
Resultant Data on U.S. Experience with 
Interstate Cyber Conflict, 2013-14
Our demonstration set of incident records includes 512 distinct events for the two-year 
period between January 1, 2013 and December 31, 2014. Of those events, 279 events 
pertain directly to the United States insofar as the machine-coding process identifies 
either the originator or target as being American. This is not to say that the United 
States government or a particular federal entity is linked with every event; rather, 
this number refers to any actor (often named but sometimes an unknown hacker) that 
is identified as having a relationship with the United States (i.e. an American firm, 
individual or domestic person, for instance). Of events that link an incident directly 
to the United States (as a discrete entity) or the U.S. government, the U.S. is coded 
as the originator of a cyber conflict incident in 151 instances, and as the target in 91 
instances. 
FIGURE 1. NUMBER OF CYBER CONFLICT INCIDENTS INVOLVING THE U.S. (TOTAL), 2013-14. 
Figure 1 presents the raw count of incidents involving the United States (total 
attribution, not only government or national attribution) captured in our demonstration 
machine-coding effort for the years 2013 and 2014. Of these 279, the bulk are identified 
from March through July of 2014. This is perhaps unsurprising, as this constitutes 
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the period of time immediately following data breaches at Target, Inc. The Target 
hacking episode stands as one of the first major instances of a major private firm in 
the United States going public with the theft of information pertaining to millions of 
consumers. This period also follows the release of information by Edward Snowden 
at the end of 2013 pertaining to U.S. cyber operations and electronic surveillance 
programs, as well as intrusions at the Office of Personnel and Management (OPM) 
which would stay secret until early 2015. It is worth noting, however, that this data 
includes both government and non-government activity as captured in open-source 
reporting, potentially including criminal actions and espionage.
FIGURE 2. TYPES OF CYBER CONFLICT EVENTS CAPTURED 
INVOLVING THE UNITED STATES, 2013-14.
Our test dataset also captures information about the nature of different conflict 
actions. At the highest level, our approach presents the researcher with six categories 
of cyber actions – denial of service, vandalism, generic cyber intrusion, malware 
usage/infection, information doxing, and the apprehension of an involved actor. The 
denial of service and vandalism categories capture events that specifically reference 
the terminology of defacement and DDoS. The infection category captures incidents 
that reference the discovery or presence of a piece of malware based on a set of 
preset terms and specific malware instances (added to the program dictionary). Cyber 
intrusions generically refer to cyber actions linked with terminology indicating 
use of force (‘attacked,’ ‘hacked,’ ‘breached,’ ‘infiltrated,’ etc.) and can therefore 
cover a wide array of incident types. Apprehension events include instances where 
perpetrators of an act are caught, arrested or identified. Doxing events include those 
wherein information is intentionally leaked or released.
Figure 2 breaks down the set of incidents we found involving U.S. actors (as either 
originators or targets) in 2013 and 2014. By far, the most common incidents recorded 
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are the apprehension of actors and generic cyber intrusions. Apprehension incidents are 
coded in a relatively straightforward fashion in that PETRARCH2 identifies language 
elements pertaining to the arrest and capture of people. Again, cyber intrusions are 
coded in such a way that a broad number of methods and techniques can produce a 
cyber intrusion event (such as hacking, intruding, gaining access, injecting code, etc). 
By contrast, denial of service attacks and digital vandalism are rare in this data set, 
whilst the leaking of information and incidence of malware (wherein input text does 
not suggest an attacking action) are uncommon.
FIGURE 3. SOURCE COUNTRIES FOR CYBER OPERATIONS TARGETING
THE UNITED STATES (GOVERNMENT/MILITARY TARGETS).
By means of demonstrating the manner in which machine-coding approaches are 
useful for capturing attribution within dyads (i.e. where one actor can be seen to 
have engaged with another), Figure 3 outlines originator countries for all actions 
on targets coded as either U.S. government/military targets or ‘the United States.’ 
As above, these originator countries are not necessarily identified as government/
military/intelligence targets, although many are. It is worth noting that the largest 
category is ‘unknown’, where the program is unable to identify a country with which 
to link a cyber conflict action; this result in itself highlights the attribution challenge 
faced by researchers in this vein. In almost no instances does this mean that there is 
no information on the originators of actions; rather, source information is most often 
tagged at the level of agent types, meaning that no country or specific threat actor 
can be identified, but the program identifies the originator as a foreign individual or 
criminal organization. Following this category, the next categories of action are linked 
with the Russian Federation, the People’s Republic of China, and countries linked in 
analytic work on global cyber conflict with both these countries, such as Moldova and 
Malaysia. A relatively high percentage of attacks attributed to the U.S. were incidents 
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where U.S. individuals or groups were involved in cyber conflict actions (mostly 
being apprehended by authorities).8
FIGURE 4. TYPES OF CYBER CONFLICT ACTIONS FOR ATTACKS 
ON THE UNITED STATES FOR CHINA, RUSSIA AND UNATTRIBUTED INCIDENTS.
Among the three largest originators of conflict actions targeting the United States 
and its government or military-intelligence apparatus, cyber intrusions are the most 
common type of event for both China and nationally un-attributable actors. Intrusions 
might include a wide range of possible techniques, but generally refer to a forceful 
infiltration without permission, as exemplified in incidents like the OPM hack. With 
Russia, however, although a substantial percentage of actions linked with the country 
are generically coded as cyber intrusions undertaken against the U.S., the bulk of coded 
cyber conflict actions are coded as malware infections. Though such a conclusion 
is purely speculative, this trend does fit with the narrative of existing research on 
the nature of global malware distribution, the role of Eurasian organized criminal 
enterprises in underwriting major ransomware, denial of service and phishing attacks, 
8 Regarding the methodological challenges facing the researcher in assessing cyber conflict processes, 
another point worthy of note off this finding is the degree to which offensive deception is not only 
possible, but normal. Operators may take steps to mask their point of origin when launching offensive 
or exploitative actions. See, for instance, http://www.star-telegram.com/news/nation-world/national/
article96062667.html. 
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and on the unique character of the Russian cyber ecosystem that leverages third-party 
criminal enterprises (Valeriano, Jensen, and Maness, 2017). 
Capturing Major Events 
The data described above represent only a limited demonstration of how a machine-
coding approach to open-source data collection can furnish scholars with unique 
information about the scope of global cyber conflict. But does the method of approach 
really function better than traditional human equivalents? Can automated coding of 
event data match or outperform the research skills of human coders wading through 
similar information in order to parse signal from noise?
Here, we briefly consider these questions by comparing the results of our demonstration 
dataset to the preceding DCID cyber conflict data collection effort. Specifically, we 
ask if incidents involving the United States during 2013 and 2014 that are catalogued 
in DCID were captured by our initial coding of cyber conflict incidents using an input 
set of information drawn from all U.S. newspaper sources. Given that our selected 
input source is news reports, the band of incidents we are most interested in assessing 
here is those cyber conflict interactions that begin within the period covered (i.e. on 
or later than January 1, 2013). DCID contains 21 such incidents, which are detailed 
in Table 1. 
























Our demonstration dataset produced and presented here records events pertaining 
to 14 of the 21 cyber conflict interactions beginning after January 1, 2013 in the 
DCID dataset (see Table 2). Importantly, incidents not captured by the machine-
coding treatment of news stories from the United States largely fall at the end of 
the period covered. This implies that non-capture is the result of a delay in reporting 
cyber incidents, and that this issue will be alleviated by a larger time span examining 
disclosures that happen at a later date (as with the OPM hack, which was revealed in 
2015). Moreover, the demonstration dataset contains 1.301 events for each interaction 
described in DCID, meaning that the average incident described there is matched 
by more than one reported interaction (even after controlling for duplicates) in the 
machine-coded version. For instance, the University of Connecticut hack in 2013 was 
caught twice, with one event annotation describing the infection of computers at the 
institution, and a later report describing a purposive cyber intrusion aimed at stealing 
user information.
TABLE 2. CYBER CONFLICT INTERACTIONS IN DCID
(BEGINNING AFTER JANUARY 1, 2013) CAPTURED BY DEMONSTRATION SET.
Given these basic results, we argue that it is reasonable to expect that machine-coding 
of cyber conflict information can at least match human coder efforts. Indeed, since 
automated coding of cyber conflict incidents invariably captures the detail of particular 
actions, it seems reasonable to say that event data production using programs like 














































is much more comprehensive than a selection on rivals. Specifically, the capture of 
unique features of different elements of a cyber conflict campaign is a natural byproduct 
of the heuristic-style approach taken by such programs to describing conflict.
Moreover, machine coding of large quantities of publicly-available and publicly-
produced textual information stands to help researchers significantly in addressing 
attribution challenges with cyber conflict research. Though political attribution of 
cyber attacks is not always feasible and technical attribution is enduringly challenging 
– if not actually impossible – the use of open source documentation offers researchers 
advantages on two fronts. First, scale brings with it options for verifying the existence 
of a particular event (and agency therein) in the form of replicable coding rules that, 
for instance, only report an incident feature that appears in multiple independent 
reports. Second, open source data collection generates information that is contextually 
defined. Regardless of whether or not one considers an effort along these lines to be 
100% accurate or not, it is indisputably the case that data collected will reflect the 
state of public knowledge on a given incident. This is significant because much of 
what social scientists aim to study with cyber conflict patterns is based on context and 
perception.
Next Steps 
No data collection program of approach is perfect. Both this research team and 
others attempting to produce a reasonably comprehensive data on global cyber 
conflict using machine-coding of open source information must grapple with distinct 
methodological issues over and above the macro challenges of such an approach, as 
described in the sections above. In addition to this challenge, we must also grapple 
with the construction of additional independent variables in the composition of cyber 
security data such as indicators of severity, effects, efficacy, actors, cascades, malware 
tools, and other associated variables. 
From our experience in producing the demonstration dataset employed in this section, 
we argue that two specific methodological challenges in particular are worthy of 
attention. First, any major effort to leverage state-of-the-art event data production 
approaches in this vein must consider the fact that available tools remain relatively 
dumb. That is to say that tools like TABARI and PETRARCH are entirely focused on 
extracting meaning from a relatively simple understanding of how language works at 
the level of the statement. This inevitably leads to errors that need to be checked by 
human coders when, for instance, the program fails to recognize that a particular event 
is being offered as a hypothetical. 
Correcting such errors might take one of several forms. Simply put, however, the 
idea for researchers moving forward – the gold standard approach – should be a 
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hybrid approach consisting of what has been presented here alongside relevant 
human reliability coding for the purposes of more effectively training algorithms for 
automated coding. Far from suggesting that researchers use preset understandings 
of cyber conflict ontologies expressed in dictionaries set by scholarly panels, future 
work should construct and continually reconstruct the tools of event detection from 
the collections of information being processed. Doing so will allow researchers 
to control for several things, not least potential problems with the irrelevance of 
robustness checks as work is scaled upwards, and the shifting terminology – and even 
the changing nature – of cyber conflict.
Of course, this first challenge leads to additional work for the researcher that might, in 
the future, be remedied with increased reliance on machine learning augmentations of 
current approaches. The second (related) major challenge is that researchers aiming 
to produce event data must recognize that incident capture is often only meaningful 
alongside the relevant capture of contextual metadata. Enrichment of event data with 
information about its construction, framing and more stands to benefit researchers 
from many disciplines and provides deep detail that compensates for the necessary 
position researchers must take in producing data that will – at least in terms of how 
much of cyber conflict can truly be observed – be good, but perfect. Moreover, in the 
research program on cyber conflict, addressing the attribution problem effectively 
means providing for uncertainty in empirical investigations. Without appropriate 
efforts to ensure that quality and certitude metrics are provided by researchers 
alongside a host of metadata on the presentation of raw information pertaining to 
cyber conflict, efforts to produce comprehensive resources for the research program 
will be enduringly limited.
6. conclusIon
Though the scope and scale of cyber conflict has grown exponentially over the past 
four decades, scholarly efforts to examine the domain in a comprehensive fashion 
remain lacking. To some degree, as we have outlined above, this makes sense as 
there are real challenges for researchers in the form of attribution difficulties, timing 
of disclosures, and self-interested gatekeepers of useful data. Given these barriers, 
lack of enthusiasm for and interest in setting up open source efforts to produce cyber 
conflict event data is understandable. 
We have argued, however, that there is both a clear need and a compelling set of 
reasons for the development of machine-aided, large-scale data production efforts 
that utilize public-facing information. Though some argue that open source coding 
of cyber conflict incidents is impossible due to the covert nature of many acts in 
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the domain, we both argue and demonstrate that this misstates the issue for security 
researchers. Data coding carried out in this way both (1) parallels the contours of 
previous data produced on the subject and (2) additionally provides information on the 
sociopolitical context of cyber operations. In short, not only does the scope of such an 
approach to data collection promise an ability for researchers to generalize and cross-
validate; it also provides the tools to study cyber conflict in its proper international 
context, examine the tools utilized in each attack, and understand the nested socio-
political dynamics at work during cyber conflicts.
Over and above other factors, an effort to provide comprehensive data on the scope of 
global cyber conflict as it presents in public-facing information sources stands to give 
researchers the tools needed to build a robust knowledge foundation. At present, the 
research program on cyberspace and international security lacks an extensive set of 
core theses and assumptions that can be challenged. Part of the reason that such a core 
has been slow to develop is that building bridges between otherwise disparate efforts 
to flesh out specific topics within the research program is extremely difficult without 
such a comprehensive data foundation. Even if such a foundation were to contain flaws, 
it would still function as a common platform upon which researchers could situate 
meaningful research questions and assumptions, contextualize small-n research, 
and critique methodological approaches. Naturally, this kind of methodological 
approach will not include – but rather will stand to augment understanding of – the 
‘thick’ context of cyber conflict, from strategic and institutional cultures to cognitive 
processes. As projects from Correlates of War to those of the Political Instability Task 
Force have demonstrated on numerous fronts, however, event data and inferences 
made from them are necessary elements of field-defining research.
Finally, such an effort to build open source data resources also directly stands to benefit 
policymakers and practitioners. In addition to the clear added value that comes with 
improved scholarly knowledge of a given topic, academic data resources might be 
used by both public and private sector actors as a reference to help excise conjecture 
from the discourse. An academic basis of knowledge on cyber conflict, founded on a 
common data resource, affords practitioners the opportunity to involve themselves in 
scholarly and public debate on issues that can be corroborated without surrendering 
private information advantages.
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Abstract: What is the role of deterrence in an age where adept hackers can credibly 
hold strategic assets at risk? Do conventional frameworks of deterrence maintain 
their applicability and meaning against state actors in cyberspace? Is it possible 
to demonstrate credibility with either in-domain or cross-domain signaling or is 
cyberspace fundamentally ill-suited to the application of deterrence frameworks? 
Building on concepts from both rational deterrence theory and cognitive theories of 
deterrence this work attempts to leverage relevant examples from both within and 
beyond cyberspace to examine applicability of deterrence in the digital age and for 
digital tools in an effort to shift the conversation from Atoms to Bits and Bytes.
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1. IntroductIon
The challenge of the digital era is not to define deterrence. Deterrence is a well-
defined concept that has been studied and practiced throughout history and to an 
even greater depth following the advent of nuclear weapons. The present challenge 
it is to understand the role digital technologies play in the broader scope of interstate 
deterrence. Deterrence in one domain rarely if ever operates independently of other 
domains. Much of the literature on cyber deterrence focuses on within domain 
deterrence. Yet, this is a dangerous constraint that elevates risks and minimizes the 
probability of success. This paper seeks to draw out the literature on deterrence and 
identify its applicability within a newly delineated domain of interactions, cyberspace. 
The resultant analysis strives to encompass the complexity of deterrence and advance 
an argument beyond within domain modeling. 
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Classical deterrence centers on a potential adversary’s cost-benefit calculus to 
dissuade specific actions and differs from compellence by focusing on ex-ante 
behavior manipulation through a priori uses of force or other tools of state power. 
Both compellence and deterrence are forms of coercion, however, the former employs 
both hard and soft power both in the present and future with continued or escalated 
actions, while the latter threatens use of force (power) absent their employment. The 
focus below is on ex-ante actions by states and sub-state entities that threaten, but that 
do not use the tools of state against an adversary to manipulate their decision-making 
calculus. Additionally, actions undertaken independent of threats that can, ex-ante, 
reduce the benefits associated with a given attack are examined. 
Focusing on classical deterrence and deterrence by denial helps illustrate the 
similarities and differences between deterrence in the pre- and post-delineation of 
cyberspace as a domain of military operations. Deterrence in cyberspace has been 
addressed by a variety of scholars across the subfields of International Relations.1 
Many examinations of cyber deterrence rely on direct applications of IR theory absent 
robust technical understandings of how the domain functions. The development 
and application of classical deterrence theories to a domain necessarily requires an 
understanding of how state and non-state actors achieve, develop, and assess costs and 
benefits within this domain. 
This work proceeds in three sections. First, it examines some of the relevant literature 
on deterrence and identifies some of the gaps within the field and provides a trajectory 
for the subsequent sections to examine a more dynamic theory of deterrence in 
cyberspace. The second section focuses on the technical, tactical, operational, and 
strategic aspects of the domain in an effort to identify those areas where deterrence can 
alter the costs-benefit analysis of adversaries. Third, the work concludes by providing 
a discussion on national strategy development for integrated cyber deterrence 
incorporating the lessons from the first two sections. 
2. from atoms to bIts and bytes
Deterrence is not a novel concept. The classical IR cannon on deterrence can be traced 
back to the Peloponnesian War and the threat of violence in response to adversary 
actions.2 Yet, more modern formulations of deterrence are largely rooted in the 
nuclear world following World War 2. The most common form of deterrence known 
as conventional deterrence was established by Bernard Brodie, Thomas Schelling and 
1 Mandel, Robert. 2017. Optimizing Cyberdeterrence: A Comprehensive Strategy for Preventing Foreign 
Cyberattacks. Georgetown University Press; Jasper, Scott. 2017. Strategic Cyber Deterrence the Active 
Cyber Defense Option. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
2 Thucydides and Rex Warner. 1968. “The Sixth Book, Chapter XVIII”. In History of the Peloponnesian 
War. Baltimore, MD: Penguin Books.
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others and focuses on the ex-ante dissuasion of adversaries through the threat of ex-
post costs in response to potential adversary actions. 
Robert Jervis identified three “waves” of deterrence theorizing to which a potential 
fourth wave has been added by Jeffery Knopf.3 First wave deterrence theory rested 
on the rise and consequences of nuclear weapons. Bernard Brodie et al. asserted that 
the use of nuclear weapons had almost no innate strategic or tactical value outside of 
being a threat against an adversary.4 The consequences of nuclear weapons use, even 
in limited strike situations, would quickly and dramatically escalate. This escalation 
made the limited use of such weapons untenable in all but the most extreme situations. 
Lawrence Freedman summarized the second wave as the realization that “total war 
could now only be threatened, but never fought”.5
Second wave deterrence posited how nuclear weapons could be threatened and the 
dynamics of those threats.6 Thomas Schelling and others posited a series of conditions 
in which states could develop deterrence in the nuclear era. As Jervis noted, second 
wave theorizing became extremely popular because of its abstraction and logical 
structuring.7 Game theory and other rational models were used to illustrate rational 
costs and benefits, creating models suited to rigorous concepts of rationality.8 The 
second wave arose under stable bi-polar conditions in which it was assumed states 
engaged in rational decision-making in matters of foreign policy and national security. 
Schelling found deterrence largely dependent upon credibility and rationality.  He 
illustrated that signaling potential costs to an adversary absent credibility creates 
deterrence failure. By using divergent game-theoretic structures from prisoner’s 
dilemma to chicken – theorists developed arguments about deterrence. Despite 
rigorous theory, this abstraction contained systemic flaws and gave rise to a third 
wave of deterrence. 
The third wave of deterrence theory in the 1970s addressed challenges beyond game 
theoretic models, including the failing rationality. Irving Janis and Graham Allison, 
both, but with different perspectives, illustrated the weaknesses of rationality in 
decision-making.9 The third wave led to extensions into cognitive psychology and 
behavioral studies. Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janis Stein provided insight 
into the general problems associated with parsimonious use of rationality through 
case analyses. Specifically, Jervis et al. identified the potential for over-valuation of 
3 Jervis, Robert. 1979. “Review: Deterrence Theory Revisited”. World Politics 31(2): 289–324; Knopf, 
Jeffrey W. 2010. “The Fourth Wave in Deterrence Research”. Contemporary Security Policy 31(1): 1–33. 
4 Brodie, Bernard, Frederick Sherwood Dunn, Arnold Wolfers, Percy Ellwood Corbett, and William T. R. 
Fox. 1946. The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co.
5 Freedman, Lawrence. 2004. Deterrence. Cambridge: Polity Press: 21.
6 Ibid: 22.
7 Jervis. Review: 291-292.
8 Schelling, Thomas C. 1966. Arms and Influence. New Haven: Yale University Press: 36-40.
9 Janis, Irving L. 1982. Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes. Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin; Allison, Graham T. 1971. Essence of Decision; Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. 
Boston: Little, Brown.
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10 Berejikian, Jeffrey D. 2004. “International Relations Under Risk: Framing State Choice”. Albany: State 
University of New York Press; Kahneman, Daniel, and Amos Tversky. 1979. “Prospect Theory: An 
Analysis of Decision Under Risk”. Econometrica 4(2); Jervis, Robert, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice 
Gross Stein. 1985. Psychology and Deterrence. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
11 Mearsheimer, John J. 1990. Conventional Deterrence. Ithaca: Cornell University Press: p 23.
12 Freedman. 2004.
13 Ibid. 
14 Hopf, Ted. 1994. Peripheral Visions: Deterrence Theory and American Foreign Policy in the Third World, 
1965-1990. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 
certain attributes of classic deterrence that might inadvertently make conflict more 
and not less likely.10
Jeffrey Berejikian incorporated Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky’s analysis of 
prospect theory into the deterrence calculus and challenged parsimonious rational 
thought by illustrating cognitive dimensions associated with decision-making beyond 
groupthink and bureaucratic processes. His work highlighted issues related to risk in 
cognitive decision-making that undermine rationality. Concepts such as sunk costs or 
tying hands fit well within parsimonious deterrence theory, yet the mechanisms that 
made them effective were not well understood prior to the third wave. 
Although modern deterrence theory encompasses a spectrum from pure rational 
modeling to cognitive models, the objective of deterrence as identified by John 
Mearsheimer remains the development of fear of the consequences (in particular of 
“military action”) or a “function of costs and risks”.11 Developing shared knowledge 
about costs and risks for nuclear events differs from non-nuclear conflicts. Early 
deterrence models relied heavily on rationality and parsimony but did not underestimate 
the clarity provided by the use and subsequent impact of the weapons themselves. The 
generation of fear or knowledge of consequences to assess costs and risks loses clarity 
the as analyses shift away from nuclear weapons. Lawrence Freedman defines single 
weapon or type of warfare deterrence as “narrow deterrence”.12 Narrow deterrence is 
less effective when expanded beyond single weapon or type warfare. 
General or broad deterrence covers a range threatened actions to dissuade an adversary. 
Freedman writes: “broad deterrence involves deterring all war”.13 Ted Hopf explains: 
within deterrence there is a need to expand deterrence beyond the scope of military 
tools to the entire range of options available to actors.14 Extending analysis further, 
scholars also emphasize concepts of direct deterrence and extended deterrence. Direct 
deterrence is concerned with actions against “your” state and its immediate interests 
as opposed to extended deterrence – dissuasion of adversary actions against a third 
party or non-immediate interests. Delineating between these two types of deterrence 
in a globalized world is difficult. Cyberspace compounds the challenge of delineation 
because attacks on foreign infrastructure can and do have ramifications globally. 
Concepts of the means to achieve deterrence or more simply how to deter are 
often contested. Threats can be narrowed to weapon type or category, or include 
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interdependent relationships such as diplomatic, informational, military and economic 
effects. Threats signaling a potential response to adversary action should provide 
clear, unambiguous consequences. The ex-ante threat should causally lead to an ex-
post consequence; punishment. 
Often left out of traditional international relations literature, deterrence by denial 
has seen a surge of interest in the years following the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Alex 
Wilner defines deterrence by denial as “reducing the perceived benefits an action is 
expected to provide a challenger”.15 Deterrence by denial in the physical world often 
includes hardening targets by building higher walls, adding security mechanisms, or 
other tactics to reduce the susceptibility of targets to attack. If the Strategic Defense 
Initiative (SDI – also known as Star Wars) had been successful, it would have been a 
deterrence by denial strategy to limit the effect of Soviet nuclear weapons. Commonly 
used forms of deterrence by denial in conflict zones include land mines, razor wire, 
surface to air missiles (SAMs) and fortifications. 
Deterrence by punishment and denial are intended to manipulate the cost-benefit 
analysis of an adversary. To function they must both be credible. Credibility requires 
undertaking ex-ante costs by the deterrer. Threats absent ante impetum costs lack 
credibility. A state without nuclear weapons cannot credibly threaten nuclear 
retaliation. If a state wishes to deter it must provide demonstrable evidence that it is 
able to carry out its threat. 
Likewise, deterrence by denial fails when it lacks the material capabilities to deny. 
The Maginot Line built by the French following World War I stands an example of 
failed deterrence by denial. The French system of fortifications on portions of their 
northern territory failed because the line itself only covered one vector of attack into 
France. The elevation of costs to a potential attacker must be complete and provide 
no reasonable alternatives to achieve the attacker’s intended utility. Both strategies 
require ex-ante costs by the defender to alter the ex-post perceived benefits of an 
attacker. Punishment strategies increase adversary costs after a violation and denial 
strategies increases adversary costs in advance of a violation.
Deterrence by denial is a successful strategy in many instances; SAMs effectively deter 
enemy aircraft. The relative costs of upgrading certain denial tools is comparatively 
less than the costs of surmounting them. In the case of SAMs, the United States 
spent billions of dollars to defeat the S-300 missile system (~$100 million/system).16 
Following the development and use of stealth, S-300 designer Almaz upgraded its 
15 Wilner, Alex S. 2015. “Deterrence Theory: Exploring Core Concepts”. In Deterring Rational Fanatics. 
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press: 16-36.
16 Grazier, Dan. 2015. “The Price of the New B-21 Stealth Bomber? Sorry, That’s a Secret”. The National 
Interest. June 15, 2015. http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-price-the-new-b-21-stealth-bomber-
sorry-thats-secret-16604; 2015. “Program Dossier S-300 Surface-to-Air Missile System”. Aviationweek.
com. August 6, 2015. http://aviationweek.com/site-files/aviationweek.com/files/uploads/2015/07/
asd_08_06_2015_dossier.pdf.
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systems to the S-400 variant with greater accuracy and anti-stealth technology.17 The 
cost ratio between the denial tool and offensive weapon system is approximately 1 to 
1,000. The defensive and offensive capabilities, industrial, and financial resources of 
these two states exceed most other nations. Even with a $18.5 trillion GDP a $1 to 
$1,000 cost to benefit ratio is high and demonstrates how denial can be a remarkably 
effective strategy. 
Deterrence by denial is not always successful as illustrated by the Israel – Hamas 
conflict. In response to Hamas’ use of Katyusha rockets, Israel developed the Iron 
Dome System. Iron Dome batteries cost $100 million and each rocket costs $50,000.18 
To intercept an incoming Katyusha rocket, the Israelis launch 2 interceptor rockets.19  
By contrast, Hamas spends between $500 and $1,000 per rocket launch.20 If the cost 
of the battery is ignored, the cost of deterrence by denial is still between 100 to 1 and 
200 to 1. 
Denial strategies are not passive. They require continuous modification relative 
to adversary capability development. Static denial strategies in cyberspace or in 
conventional conflict are likely to have limited credibility over time. Similarly, 
punishment strategies also require constant updating in relation to adversary 
capabilities and geopolitical considerations. In cyberspace, this involves adapting 
denial strategies to technological advances such as artificial intelligence, polymorphic 
malware and the Internet of Things, to name just a few.
Punishment strategies also require ex-ante costs. Below the nuclear threshold, threats 
of force are common, yet the credibility of these threats is difficult to establish. 
Alexander George and Richard Smoke identify three attributes important for signaling 
in conventional deterrence: “(1) the full formulation of one’s intent to protect a 
nation; (2) the acquisition and deployment of capacities to back up that intent; (3) the 
communication of intent to a potential aggressor”.21 These three aspects are also at 
times limited in their ability to convey commitment to fulfill the intent.22
Charles Glaser, writing on cyber deterrence, established four components of basic 
deterrence: 
17 Rogoway, Tyler. 2015. “Here’s Russia’s S-400 Missile System in Action, and How the US Would Deal 
with It”. Foxtrotalpha.Jalopnik.com. December 6, 2015. https://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/heres-russias-s-
400-missile-system-in-action-and-heres-1746490022.





21 George, Alexander L, and Richard Smoke. 1974. Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and 
Practice. New York: Columbia University Press: 64.
22 Ibid: 558.
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“1) the benefits of taking the action—the larger the benefits, the 
harder the adversary is to deter; 2) the probability of achieving the 
benefits—the higher the probability, the harder the adversary is to 
deter; 3) the costs the defender will impose if the adversary takes 
the action—the higher the costs, the more likely the adversary is 
to be deterred; and 4) the adversary’s assessment of the probability 
that the defender will inflict these costs—the higher this probability, 
the more likely the adversary is to be deterred”.23
George and Smoke and Glaser acknowledge the challenge of establishing not just 
threats of punishment, but the credibility associated with carrying out that threat. 
Creating material capability (i.e. weapon systems capable of carrying out a given 
threat) and clear signaling might occur and yet the utilization of this capability in 
response to an adversary’s action will lack credibility (fulfillment of commitment) 
unless it contains what James Fearon refers to as hand-tying within a sunk costs 
framework.24 Credibility and hand-tying are most closely associated with extended 
deterrence, yet when expanding deterrence to cyberspace it also finds relevance. The 
establishment of credibility through hand-tying establishes a forcing mechanism for 
decisions, indicating costs have already been incurred or are likely to occur. This 
subsequently alters the cost-benefit calculus of retaliation. The stationing of US 
forces in West Berlin serves as an example of hand-tying through prospective costs.25 
An attack on West Berlin would have resulted in sunk costs and provided a strong 
inducement or “tripwire” to actuate US retaliatory threats. Nearly all forms of kinetic 
attacks against the direct interests of a nation implicitly include hand-tying. It is 
unclear how to effectively signal prospective costs within cyberspace to an adversary.
Charles Glaser identifies several problems associated with deterrence by punishment 
specific to cyberspace that extend beyond basic credibility issues. First, he notes that 
deterrence often relies on the attribution of an adversary’s actions.26 In cyberspace, 
this can be difficult and time-consuming.27 Although the attribution problem is 
decreasing as more data becomes available, it does not eliminate uncertainty.28 
Second, hands-tying and other forms of credibility enhancing measures are likely 
lacking in cyberspace. Moreover, the ability to respond within domain simply might 
not be possible within certain conditions.29 Third, Glaser identifies potential spillovers 
23 Glaser, Charles. 2011. “Deterrence of Cyber-attacks and US National Security”. GW-CSPRI-2011-5. 
Washington, DC: Cyber Security Policy and Research Institute: 2. 
24 Fearon, James D. 1997. “Signaling Foreign Policy Interests”. Journal of Conflict Resolution 41(1): 69–90.
25 Kydd, Andrew H, and Roseanne W McManus. 2017. “Threats and Assurances in Crisis Bargaining”. 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 61(2).
26 Glaser. 2011: 3.
27 Ibid.




in which limited within domain options result in cross-domain, kinetic responses.30 
To date there is limited evidence of cross-domain responses and therefore lacks in 
credibility. Moreover, cross-domain retaliation alters the escalation framework 
from digital to kinetic or other and poses a challenge for states wishing to establish 
credibility while controlling potential escalatory behaviors.
Deterrence is more than simply threatening punishment. Deterrence requires 
substantial target relevant costs and the development of mechanisms to establish that 
further costs are credibly wagered to provide clarity for an adversary. The goal of 
this clarity is to establish within an adversary’s calculus that their expected gains are 
less than any potential losses incurred. Reassessments of rational modeling and the 
increasing importance of cognitive modeling increase the value of tailored deterrence 
strategies predicated on the uniqueness of conditions and actors. Paul notes that 
deterrence is complex and is most logically broken down into five ideal types:
“(1) deterrence among great powers; (2) deterrence among new 
nuclear states; (3) deterrence and extended deterrence involving 
great powers and regional powers armed with chemical, biological 
and nuclear weapons; (4) deterrence between nuclear states and 
non-state actors (5) deterrence by collective actors”.31
It follows that tailored deterrence for cyber actors is also one potential avenue of 
exploration. 
The potential for tailored deterrence strategies could be highlighted in numerous 
significant cyber incident cases. The 1998 cyber attack code-named SOLAR 
SUNRISE discovered by US Air Force Computer Emergency Response Team 
(AFCERT) stands as a prime example. The three-week hack affected more than 500 
systems across the US Air Force, Navy, NASA, Lawrence Livermore Labs, MIT, 
Harvard, and UC Berkeley. The attack coincided with increased tensions between 
the United States and Iraq and resulted in high-level governmental meetings to 
identify a proper response action.32 At the time, the attack was believed to be state-
sponsored cyber attack focused on degrading US military capabilities. Subsequently, 
it was discovered that the attack was conducted by two California teenagers with 
guidance from Israeli hacker Ehud Tenebaum. The incident is relevant to tailored 
deterrence because it highlights challenges faced in developing a deterrence strategy. 
The adversaries were domestic, yet foreign inspired and attacked the operational 
infrastructure of the Department of Defense. No form of deterrence by punishment 
delineated above could have appropriately accounted this challenge. The only realistic 
30 Ibid.
31 Wirtz, James J, Patrick M Morgan, and T V Paul. 2009. Complex Deterrence: Strategy in the Global Age. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press: 9.
32 Healey, Jason. 2013. A Fierce Domain: Conflict in Cyberspace, 1986 to 2012. Vienna, VA: Cyber Conflict 
Studies Association. 
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deterrence frameworks for SOLAR SUNRISE would have been deterrence by denial 
or punishment in cooperation with allies.
Richard Kugler writes that a strategy or general framework for deterrence in cyberspace 
must necessarily be tailored to differing threats, situations, and objectives.33 The 
threats, situations, and objectives in cyberspace differ from the concerns addressed 
by first wave theorists. While the potential for physical damage through cyberspace 
has been demonstrated in tests such as the Aurora generator experiment that resulted 
in the destruction of a multi-ton diesel generator, or the Stuxnet attack that destroyed 
segments of a centrifuge cascade in Iran’s Natanz nuclear facility, many attacks do not 
have kinetic parallels.34 Building on Kugler, Jeffrey Cooper identifies three important 
factors that frame concepts on deterrence in cyberspace. First, there is a wide range of 
actors each with different capabilities and attributes as well as cost benefits structures; 
second, cyberspace is a unique operational domain that carries with vastly different 
concepts of risk and reward; third, to develop deterrence, models must be applicable 
to the virtual and physical aspects of the domain.35
This section has provided a summary of a large and robust literature on deterrence. The 
concepts that need to be carried forward include, the type of deterrence, the credibility 
of that deterrence and the attributes of the environment in which deterrence occurs, 
and who and what actors and weapons are to be deterred. The next section builds on 
the literature above, with a specific emphasis on the technical, tactical, operational 
and strategic attributes of cyberspace. 
3. one sIZe doesn’t fIt all
To deter adversaries in cyberspace it is helpful to first define what cyberspace is and 
what types of actions and actors a state would like to deter. The US Department of 
Defense defines cyberspace in the following way:
“Cyberspace consists of many different and often overlapping 
networks, as well as the nodes (any device or logical location 
with an Internet protocol address or other analogous identifier) 
on those networks, and the system data (such as routing tables) 
that support them. Cyberspace can be described in terms of three 
33 Kugler, Richard L. 2009. “Deterrence of Cyber-attacks”. In Cyberpower and National Security. Edited 
by Larry K Wentz, Franklin D Kramer, and Stuart H Starr. Washington DC: National Defense University 
Press: 309–42.
34 US Department of Homeland Security. 2014. “FOIA Documents: Control Systems Security Aurora Update 
Brief”. Washington, DC. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1212530/14f00304-documents.pdf; 
Zetter, Kim. 2014. Countdown to Zero Day: Stuxnet and the Launch of the World’s First Digital Weapon. 
New York: Crown Publishers.
35 Cooper, Jeffrey R. 2012. “A New Framework for Cyber Deterrence”. In Cyberspace and National Security 
Threats, Opportunities, and Power in a Virtual World. Edited by Reveron, Derek S. 2012. Washington: 
Georgetown University Press: 105–20.
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layers: physical network, logical network, and cyber-persona. 
The physical network layer of cyberspace is comprised of the 
geographic component and the physical network components. It 
is the medium where the data travel. The logical network layer 
consists of those elements of the network that are related to one 
another in a way that is abstracted from the physical network, i.e., 
the form or relationships are not tied to an individual, specific path, 
or node. A simple example is any Web site that is hosted on servers 
in multiple physical locations where all content can be accessed 
through a single uniform resource locator. The cyber-persona 
layer represents yet a higher level of abstraction of the logical 
network in cyberspace; it uses the rules that apply in the logical 
network layer to develop a digital representation of an individual 
or entity identity in cyberspace. The cyber-persona layer consists 
of the people actually on the network”.36
The inclusion of the full definition illustrates the complexity within which defense 
strategists and operators in the various services engage. Because the domain spans 
the physical, logical, and persona layers, deterrence strategies can reasonably occur 
within and across all three. This fundamentally differs from the conceptualization 
of deterrence in physical domains of land, sea, air, and space. Physical domain 
deterrence might include physical and cognitive aspects analogous to the cyber 
persona and physical network layers, however, the logical layer is wholly absent. 
The cyber persona layer also diverges significantly from personas within the physical 
domain as individuals and states have the capacity to alter their attributes within the 
persona, logical, and network layers.
To construct a meaningful model of deterrence in cyberspace we must first ask what 
it is we wish to deter. Herein lies the largest distinction between deterrence in the 
physical world and in cyberspace. Whereas in the physical world deterrence is directed 
most commonly against physical attacks against specific assets or categories of assets 
that when attacked provide strong, largely non-repudiable forms of attribution, in 
cyberspace deterrence is directed against manipulations of the elements within the 
environment and the environment itself. Manipulation of elements of cyberspace and 
the environment itself can be examined in multiple ways. Simplifying cyberspace 
operations into three broad categories, there are cyber attacks, cyber espionage, and 
cyber theft. Despite simplification, it is important to note these categories are not 
entirely discrete in process or function. Cyber attacks are those acts in cyberspace 
that degrade, deny or destroy. Acts of cyber espionage steal information for state or 
corporate intelligence gain. Cyber theft is the stealing of information for financial 
gain with no direct state utility. Attacks, espionage, and theft occur across all levels 
36 US Department of Defense. 2013. “Joint Publication 3-12: Cyberspace Operations”. Washington, DC. 
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_12R.pdf. 
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of actors from script kiddies to the military units of states – a problem which will be 
examined more below. States are most commonly concerned with cyber attacks and 
espionage at the national level, and theft at lower-jurisdictions. 
Because attacks, espionage, and theft are perpetrated by a variety of actors against 
almost any target in cyberspace, sending an overt signal from one state to another, 
while still applicable, might not deter attacks at other levels that are of equal or greater 
significance. Moreover, research by Shawn Lonergan and Erica Borghard indicate 
a high prevalence of proxy37 usage by states to maintain plausible deniability.38 
Using proxies to engage in cyber acts against targets deflects deterrence by threats 
of punishment unless sufficient evidence is present to indicate involvement by the 
instigating state rather than the third-party proxy. The use of proxies to engage in 
attacks, espionage and theft against target states outside of cyberspace has been the 
practice of states since Katulaya and Sun Tzu.39 However, unlike the difficulties 
of non-repudiability within conventional conflicts, cyber attacks are frequently 
repudiable. Attackers might use Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), proxies or other 
means by which to engage in an attack. 
Additional problems in cyberspace not frequently encountered in conventional 
physical domains are second and third order effects. As noted by Herbert Lin, the 
results of a cyber attack itself might not be identifiable, rather it is second or third 
order effects that generate an intended outcome.40 Classical deterrence and tailored 
deterrence strategies used against terrorist organizations are unable to account for 
disconnected action and reaction pairs commonly found in cyberspace. The time to 
punish a violation can be weeks, months or years based on discovery and attribution 
challenges, a problem not present in classical deterrence. 
Cyber attacks are incidents occurring in or through cyberspace that degrade, deny 
or destroy. Attacks in cyberspace can and are perpetrated by all levels of actors. The 
differentiation between actors is most closely correlated with targets and outcomes 
of attacks.41 For example, criminal actors may use phishing attacks to ingress into 
a hospital’s computer systems to install Cryptolocker or a similar ransomware 
malware on the hospital’s systems. Cryptolocker is an attack that degrades civilian 
critical infrastructure, denies user access and has the potential to destroy critical 
37 Here proxy usage refers to the authority to represent someone else not the technical usage of the term in 
information communications. 
38 Borghard, Erica D, and Shawn W Lonergan. 2016. “Can States Calculate the Risks of Using Cyber 
Proxies?” Orbis 60(3): 395–416.
39 Kautalya and L. N. Rangarajan. 1992. The Arthashastra. New Delhi: Penguin Books India; Griffith, 
Samuel B, and Sun Tzu. 1971. The Art of War. New York: Oxford University Press.
40 Lin, Herbert. “Operational Considerations in Cyber-attack and Cyber Exploitation”. In Cyberspace and 
National Security Threats, Opportunities, and Power in a Virtual World. Edited by Reveron, Derek S. 
2012. Washington: Georgetown University Press.
41 Brantly, Aaron F. 2015. “Aesop’s Wolves: The Deceptive Appearance of Espionage and Attacks in 
Cyberspace”. Intelligence and National Security 31(5): 674-685.
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information.42 Very few states have national deterrence strategies aimed at sub-state 
actors, criminal organizations or individuals. State deterrence strategies aimed at non-
terrorist sub-state actors are confined to criminological models of deterrence. Yet, 
if a soldier or spy from an adversary state walked into the server room at the same 
hospital and threatened to detonate a bomb and destroy all the files unless he was paid 
a ransom, the act would align more closely with a conventional deterrence framework 
of state-to-state deterrence by threats of punishment or tailored deterrence against 
terrorist actors. 
Most scholars and practitioners are likely to contend that it is not the responsibility of the 
state to deter non-state actors (excepting terrorists), particularly criminals from cyber 
attacks against non-federal infrastructure outside of a criminological framework.43 
Yet, the same tool used by a criminal is available to the state and presents the same 
challenges associated with attribution irrespective of the perpetrator. What actions 
could a state undertake to deter an adversary state actor from engaging in this behavior 
and would these actions have a measurable effect on non-state actors as well? 
Examples of cyber attacks abound and include the destruction, denial or degradation 
of military or civilian communications platforms. Attacks such as the Mirai (malware) 
botnet attack in 2016 are capable of being directed at both critical and non-critical 
infrastructure by both state and non-state actors. A botnet using Mirai was able to 
generate in excess of 1Tbps of traffic and degrade dozens of websites in the United 
States on 20 September 2016.44 This same form of attack could be directed towards 
IP addresses of the FAA and emergency service providers or any number of Internet-
enabled systems found on Shodan.io or similar services.45 
Although DDoS attacks are generally considered to be among the least complicated 
forms of cyber attacks they still challenge state and sub-state entities both public and 
private. DDoS attacks have been used against US government infrastructure, against 
Estonia in 2007 and the Republic of Georgia in 2008.46 To date, DDoS attacks against 
the US government or critical infrastructure have received little attention in discussions 
on deterrence in cyberspace. On 21 January 2016 a grand jury in the Southern District 
of New York indicted 7 Iranian Hackers in absentia for their involvement in DDoS 
42 Winton, Richard. 2016. “Hollywood Hospital Pays $17,000 in Bitcoin to Hackers; FBI Investigating”. 
Los Angeles Times. February 18, 2016. http://www.latimes.com/business/technology/la-me-ln-hollywood-
hospital-bitcoin-20160217-story.html.
43 Akers, Ronald L. 2017. “Rational Choice, Deterrence, and Social Learning Theory in Criminology: The 
Path Not Taken” Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 81(3): 1–25.
44 Bonderud, Douglas. 2016. “Leaked Mirai Malware Boosts IoT Insecurity Threat Level”. 
securityintelligence.com. October 4, 2016. https://securityintelligence.com/news/leaked-mirai-malware-
boosts-iot-insecurity-threat-level/.
45 Bodenheim, Roland, Jonathan Butts, Stephen Dunlap, and Barry Mullins. 2014. “Evaluation of the Ability 
of the Shodan Search Engine to Identify Internet-Facing Industrial Control Devices”. International Journal 
of Critical Infrastructure Protection 7(2): 114–23.
46 Klimburg, Alexander. 2011. “Mobilizing Cyber Power”. Survival 53(1): 41–60; Hollis, David. 2011. 
“Cyberwar Case Study: Georgia 2008”. Small Wars Journal, http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/
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attacks against US financial sector interests and a variety of other US companies 
occurring from 2011-2013.47 These indictments are: (a) not deterrent threats or 
denials, but criminological deterrents; (b) temporally distant from the time of attack 
as to be ineffective at signaling deterrence; and (c) impose little to no costs on Iran or 
the individual perpetrators or organizers of the attack. 
Beyond DDoS attacks, Russian attacks against Ukrainian electric infrastructure and 
US political organizations also resulted in no or weak responses that offer no indication 
that deterrence is making headway in cyberspace.48 In response to massive influence 
operations perpetrated by the Russian Federation against the United States and its two 
major political parties during the 2016 Presidential election the United States expelled 
35 suspected Russian intelligence operatives and placed sanctions on Russia’s two 
leading intelligence services, the FSB and the GRU.49 The US response imposed 
insignificant costs in comparison to the utility achieved by the Russian Federation. 
The latter case of Russian influence and hacking during the 2016 election cycle 
provides a case study for why deterrence by threat in cyberspace is so difficult to 
achieve. The first indications of Russian interference in the 2016 election were 
identified by the FBI in September 2015 more than a year before the election.50 
The FBI phoned the DNC to try and alert them to a potential attack, but the call 
was not considered credible and was subsequently ignored by DNC staffers.51 The 
progression of hacking attempts against the DNC continued and President Obama 
was notified in the summer of 2016. Moreover, the “attack” against the DNC was not 
an attack, but espionage or theft and therefore falls outside conventionally defined 
deterrence frameworks. Yet the impact of the espionage and the later release of private 
DNC emails was substantial as indicated in a declassified report by the Office of 
the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI).52 The report assessed that information 
warfare conducted following the espionage campaign substantially degraded the DNC 
and engendered a loss of confidence in the US electoral system.53 Cyber deterrence 
has fundamental problems including the realization that the most valuable assets in 
cyberspace might not be destroyed or degraded, but rather stolen and used. 
47 US Federal Bureau of Investigation. 2016. “Iranian DDoS Attacks: Conspiracy to Commit Computer 
Intrusion”. https://www.fbi.gov/wanted/cyber/iranian-ddos-attacks.
48 US Department of Homeland Security. 2016. “Cyber-Attack Against Ukrainian Critical Infrastructure | 
ICS-CERT”. Washington, DC; Rid, Thomas. 2016. “How Russia Pulled Off the Biggest Election Hack 
in US History”. Esquire. October 20, 2016. http://www.esquire.com/news-politics/a49791/russian-dnc-
emails-hacked/.
49 Sanger, David E. 2016. “Obama Strikes Back at Russia for Election Hacking”. The New York Times. New 
York. December 29, 2016. https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/29/us/politics/russia-election-hacking-
sanctions.html.
50 Lipton, Eric, David E Sanger, and Scott Shane. 2016. “The Perfect Weapon: How Russian Cyberpower 
Invaded the US”. The New York Times. December 13, 2016. https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/13/us/
politics/russia-hack-election-dnc.html.
51 Ibid.
52 US Office of the Director of National Intelligence. 2017. “Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions 




Even in instances where specific code is used to achieve damage such has Iranian 
efforts to hack a spillway dam54 or malware implants in critical infrastructure such 
as a German steel mill,55 there are no formal mechanisms by which to signal a threat 
within cyberspace or beyond other than by referencing responses to kinetic effects. 
Current deterrence by threat signaling for attacks occurring in or through cyberspace 
is ambiguous. Efforts by the NATO CCD COE through the production of the Tallinn 
Manuals have begun to outline the frameworks in which deterrence could legally take 
place, yet the application of threats is still uncertain.56 
Deterrence by threat within cyberspace is realistically only applicable to cyber 
operations that result in direct physical effects that are non-repudiable and attributed 
quickly. Using formal modeling in the Decision to Attack: Military and Intelligence 
Cyber Decision-making I found that most cyber attacks, with the notable exception of 
DDoS, operate under varying conditions of anonymity.57 The anonymity associated 
with attacks is usually necessary for attacks to be successful in bypassing deterrence 
by denial frameworks found in the perimeter defenses of networks such as intrusion 
detection and prevention systems found in the logical or physical network layers of 
cyberspace. Threats of punishment could impact the persona layer of cyberspace as 
well, but as will be examined below there are some fundamental challenges unique to 
cyberspace posed by anonymity.
4. technIcal challenges: threats of 
PunIshment wIthIn domaIn
Punishing an adversary in cyberspace is not cheap or fast outside of pre-established 
botnets or damage done to physical infrastructure. Punishment in or across any of 
the layers cyberspace requires what the US Department of the Army refers to as 
intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB):
“IPB is a systemic, continuous process of analyzing the threat and 
environment in a specific geographic area. It is designed to support 
staff estimates and military decision making”.58
54 Cylance. 2014. “Operation Cleaver”. https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pages/operation-
cleaver/Cylance_Operation_Cleaver_Report.pdf.
55 Lee, Robert M, Michael J Assante, and Tim Conway. 2014. “German Steel Mill Cyber-attack”. SANS 
Industrial Control Systems. December 30, 2014. https://ics.sans.org/media/ICS-CPPE-case-Study-2-
German-Steelworks_Facility.pdf. 
56 Schmitt, Michael N. (Ed.). 2013. Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare: 
Prepared by the International Group of Experts at the Invitation of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence 
Centre of Excellence. New York: Cambridge University Press.
57 Brantly, Aaron Franklin. 2016. The Decision to Attack: Military and Intelligence Cyber Decision-Making. 
Athens: University of Georgia Press.
58 US Department of the Army. 1994. FM 34-130 Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield. Washington, DC.
45
In response to a nuclear attack on a city in the US, the proportional response would 
be a counter attack on an adversary city. The city itself is geographically fixed and 
immovable both logically and physically. Threatening in-kind retaliation is both 
plausible and technically feasible with ballistic missiles or air assets. The same logic 
does not hold in cyberspace. 
Why are in kind retaliations or other forms of punishment not viable solutions for most 
retaliations in cyberspace? First, a state must fulfill the burden of proof in identifying 
the perpetrator of an action. All the above IPB and potential for retaliation still depends 
upon attribution of who, what, and potentially why an attack occurred.59 Retaliation 
absent strong evidence is likely to lead to misidentification and unnecessary escalation. 
Second, a state must retaliate within a proximate temporal range. If state X does not have 
detailed intelligence on the asset it wishes to retaliate against, developing intelligence 
along with a cyber weapon to target it increases the time horizon of response such 
that it is days, weeks, months or even years out from the original attack for which it is 
retaliating. Due to this temporal disconnect, the threat to punish in response to a given 
action falls into a category of what economists refer to as hyperbolic discounting. 
The risk of punishment for an attack is possible but so temporally, distant as to be 
discounted to the point of irrelevance. 
Third, deterrence by punishment requires proportionality. It is necessary to have 
comparable assets to punish to prevent escalation or violations of international 
law.60 Comparable assets are not a given within cyberspace and are often difficult 
to identify.61 To punish an asset within a domain requires pre-established access or 
knowledge of that asset beyond its location. Whereas a city is immovable and likely 
to be as susceptible today as it will be tomorrow to a missile or bomb, a computer 
system that is penetrated today for prepositioned access, might be patched, upgraded 
or taken offline tomorrow. 
Fourth, a state must possess a specific cyber weapon system tailored to its target. 
If state X alerts state Y that it is going to punish an asset or state X uses a repeated 
cyber weapon to attack state Y’s system, it is likely to be ineffectual the longer it is 
used due to updated perimeter defenses, such as intrusion detection and prevention 
systems (IDPS), antivirus programs or a variety of other security measures. If state X 
wants to punish state Y it must have knowledge of the attributes of the asset it wishes 
to retaliate against and what the status of that asset is. State X must also develop new 
exploits to achieve effects or be confident that State Y has not accounted for previous 
exploits that have been used. 
59 Brantly. 2016.
60 Schmitt, Michael N. (Ed.) 2017. Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations: 
Prepared by the International Group of Experts at the Invitation of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence 
Centre of Excellence. New York: Cambridge University Press: Kindle Location: 4530.
61 Libicki, Martin C. 2016. Cyberspace in Peace and War. Naval Institute Press: 262.
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The challenges of signaling deterrence by punishment are numerous within cyberspace 
whether the conflict is contained within domain or crosses over domains. Advances in 
attribution within a timely manner and the availability and reasonable assumption that 
proportional assets of an adversary can be held at risk need to be improved to credibly 
threaten punishment. This is a challenge not isolated to within domain retaliation. 
While proportional target selection might be slightly easier in cross-domain retaliation, 
the first three issues raised above are still relevant. 
Deterrence by punishment in cyberspace is possible, but it is not a reliable or credible 
option under most conditions absent sufficient and sustained intelligence. This 
assessment is not unique and is borne out in the analysis of Valeriano and Maness, who 
find that deterrence via punishment is generally ineffective and likely more dangerous 
than other means of preventing attacks.62 Moreover, sustained invasive intelligence 
into adversary networks creates its own unique problems, including a security 
dilemma.63 The more states engage in highly invasive intelligence via cyberspace, 
the more their actions are likely to be misinterpreted. Differentiating between various 
forms of cyber actions are difficult and can lead to miscalculation.64 
Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between attacking and defending forces and area 
where both forms of deterrence function. 
FIGURE 1. TIMELINE OF CYBER ATTACKS AND DEFENSE
62 Valeriano, Brandon, and Ryan C Maness. 2015. Cyber War Versus Cyber Realities: Cyber Conflict in the 
International System. New York: Oxford University Press: 57-60.
63 Buchanan, Ben. 2017. The Cybersecurity Dilemma Hacking, Trust and Fear Between Nations. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
64 Brantly. 2016.
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As seen in Figure 1, deterrence by threat of punishment and denial operate within 
the same temporal ranges, yet while attribution matters a great deal for threats of 
punishment they are generally unimportant for denial. In their initial stages both 
denial and punishment focus on ante-impetum means of dissuasion, yet deterrence by 
punishment necessarily needs post-impetum attribution for it to be used. Based on the 
technical realities of cyberspace and of international relations deterrence by threat of 
punishment is more complicated and difficult to effectively establish.
5. technIcal challenges and 
oPPortunItIes: deterrence by denIal
Both deterrence by denial and punishment require ante-impetum costs by the defender. 
The allocation of resources between denial and deterrence and the efficiency with 
which they deter adversaries differ. The establishment of credible deterrence by denial 
often starts with the allocation of financial capital to purchase technical resources and 
provide human capital sufficient to continually update, enhance, audit and manage 
complex network infrastructure.65 Network-based and host-based defenses such as 
intrusion detection and prevention systems, anti-virus products and similar systems are 
some of the variety of overlapping expenditures that can be undertaken to increasingly 
make the intrusion of adversaries into a given network more difficult.66 
In cyberspace, such expenditures are regularized and often included as overhead 
costs, however they are deterrent in nature.67 Although they are not glamorous, they 
substantially decrease the probability of penetration. The same types of deterrence 
strategies are used by stores in placing electronic tracking tags on their products and 
detectors at doors, by banks in the construction of vaults, silent alarms and dyed 
packets of money, by critical infrastructure in extending the perimeter of security 
outward to prevent vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices, increased numbers 
of security guards, cameras and the use of razor wire or other physical structures. 
These devices signal to adversaries both criminal and terrorist alike that the costs 
of successfully perpetrating an attack are high and that the likelihood of success is 
low, although both terrorist and criminal deterrence models include deterrence by 
punishment through criminal proceedings and potential lethal actions against terrorist 
they rely far more heavily on preventive measures that deny would be adversaries. 
Sceptics might contend denial mechanisms are unlikely to deter a state, yet this is in 
and of itself not accurate. The vast majority of probes by states do not translate into 
successfully attacks. The US Department of Defense suffers from millions of probes 
65 Riggs, Cliff. (2004). Network Perimeter Security. New York: Auerbach Publications.
66 Buecher, Axel, Per Andreas, and Scott Paisley. 2009. “Understanding IT Perimeter Security”. IBM. http://
www.redbooks.ibm.com/redpapers/pdfs/redp4397.pdf.
67 Filkins, Barbara. 2016. “IT Security Spending Trends”. SANS. https://www.sans.org/reading-room/
whitepapers/analyst/security-spending-trends-36697. 
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a day. Yet nearly 99.99% of them are unsuccessful.68 Moreover, in the face of a global 
onslaught of cyber attacks and espionage the United States re-architected much of its 
military network infrastructure. This restructuring allows the initial point of contact 
with adversaries to be chosen. In military parlance, it allowed the defenders to choose 
the terrain of the battle. While it did not obviate the need for denial mechanisms within 
the network infrastructure, it did signal increased cost imposition on adversaries and it 
did allow for more efficient resource allocation. 
Unlike in any other battlespace, whether conventional kinetic terrorism, conventional 
kinetic or mass destruction military force, the opportunities for deterrence by denial 
are substantial in cyberspace and unique. While denial opportunities in land, sea, air, 
and even space are predicated on the control of a given geospatial area, the party 
establishing deterrence by denial has limited abilities to manipulate the nature of the 
domain itself. The same is not true within cyberspace. Every aspect of a defender’s 
cyberspace from the structure of the network, to the hardware, firmware, and software 
within a network, to the access of individuals within and external to that network is 
manipulable. At every stage of an attack an adversary is always attempting to operate 
on or against the defender’s cyberspace over which it has no control and has limited 
visibility. 
For denial, the historical literature of deterrence theory remains relevant, in particular 
the second and third stages of deterrence which focused on rational game theoretic 
and cognitive modeling. While in conventional deterrence the emphasis was on 
punishment, here these same modeling techniques find applicability in deterrence by 
denial. Although the games might be the same, the payoffs in cyberspace manipulable 
and favor the defender. In few other applications of deterrence are the payoff matrices 
of deterrence so favorable to the defender. Despite the favorability of conditions, the 
ability to manipulate the potential payoff for attackers remains difficult. Although 
possible for defenders to reduce the probability of attack success, the potential payoff 
for a successful attack can remain large. 
Despite conditions favoring defenders, the potential payoffs are often not affected 
by deterrence by denial. Minimizing the potential payoffs from attacks on data 
repositories requires disaggregation of data. These types of denial mechanisms 
come with efficiency or financial costs. Although denial offers more potential than 
punishment, it is not a silver bullet to the cyber deterrence problem. Denial decreases 
the probability of success for attackers and is likely to reduce classes of actors focused 
on certain targets. Despite efforts to signal through the purchase and implementation 
of various defensive measures, the re-architecting of network infrastructure, the cyber 
deterrence problem remains. 
68 Howard, Travis, and Jose de Arimateia de Cruz. 2017. “The Cyber Vulnerabilities of the US Navy”. The 
Maritime Executive. January 31, 2017. https://maritime-executive.com/article/the-cyber-vulnerability-of-
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6. beyond the deterrence Problem
If punishment and denial are unable to fully remediate the cyber deterrence problem, 
are there any meaningful solutions? The core debate remains, with no simple and 
readily apparent solutions. The search for a single solution is likely to remain fruitless 
for the foreseeable future. Deterrence has never been the single tool within the 
toolbox of the state to dissuade or shape adversary behavior. Rather, it has always 
been combined with efforts that extend beyond traditional concepts of deterrence 
to include geopolitical and technical practices including norm development, 
entanglement, cumulative deterrence, research and development, policies and laws, 
liability structures for software and hardware, training for users and human capital 
development within information technology and cybersecurity.69 
Efficient and effective cyber deterrence should extend international politics and 
include fields such as criminology, immunology and public health.70 The capacity 
of states to punish criminals is high and the credibility of punishment actions in 
developed nations is strong. Despite a capacity to punish criminal behaviors, they 
still occur. Extending beyond punishment, states also focus on denying criminals 
opportunities to commit crimes. Yet crime still occurs. The root causes of crime 
are not simple nor isolatable to a single phenomenon. Likewise, states engage one 
another in cyberspace for a variety of reasons. Some reasons fit within conventional 
deterrence frameworks of denial and punishment and do not suffer from challenges 
with attribution. For instance, larger and more harmful attacks increase the probability 
of attribution. However, many states remain perturbed by the death by a thousand cuts 
phenomena which falls below thresholds and required to provide timely attribution. 
Shifting the focus away from within domain deterrence focused solely on punishment 
and denial and changing the emphasis to a basket of strategies focused on reducing 
incentives, availability and anonymity fosters an environment less conducive both to 
hostile actions and potential malicious actors. The solution to the deterrence problem 
is not abandoning it, but expanding the range of alternative strategies not presently 
considered. By acknowledging the failures and inadequacies of deterrence strategies 
and the potential places where novel strategies found in other fields are applicable the 
intractable problem of cyber deterrence becomes more manageable. 
69 Nye. 2017: 45-69; Tor, Uri. 2017. “‘Cumulative Deterrence’ as a New Paradigm for Cyber Deterrence”. 
Journal of Strategic Studies 40(1-2): 92–117.
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Capabilities: To What Ends?
Abstract: There is a growing interest in the use of offensive cyber capabilities (OCC) 
among states. Despite the growing interest in these capabilities, little is still known 
about the nature of OCC as a tool of the state. This research therefore aims to understand 
if (and how) offensive cyber capabilities have the potential to change the role of 
military power. Drawing on a wide range of cases, we argue that these capabilities can 
alter the manner in which states use their military power strategically in at least four 
ways. OCC are not particularly effective in deterring adversary military action, except 
when threatened to be used by states with a credible reputation. However, they do 
have value in compellence. Unlike conventional capabilities, the effects of offensive 
cyber operations do not necessarily have to be exposed publicly, which means the 
compelled party can back down post-action without losing face thus deescalating 
conflict. The potential to control the reversibility of effect of an OCC by the attacker 
may also encourage compliance. OCC also contribute to the use of force for defensive 
purposes, as it could provide both a preemptive as well as preventive strike option. 
Finally, its symbolic value as a ‘prestige weapon’ to enhance ‘swaggering’ remains 
unclear, due to its largely non-material ontology and transitory nature.
Keywords: offensive cyber capabilities, compellence, defense, deterrence, military 
power, swaggering
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1. IntroductIon
There is a growing interest in the use of offensive cyber capabilities (OCC) among 
states. A diverse group of states across the world including Belgium, Columbia, 
Germany, Finland, India, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Vietnam have all said 
they are exploring options for cyber warfare.1 In turn, there are signs that the states 
such as the United States, China, Russia, Israel, the United Kingdom, Iran and North 
Korea continue to further develop their offensive cyber capabilities.2 Concurrently, 
many states have adopted cyberspace as a new operational domain of warfare, 
alongside land, air, space and sea.3 Also NATO, following the Warsaw Summit, has 
acknowledged cyberspace as a military domain.4
Despite the growing interest in these capabilities, little is known about how states use 
(or expect to use) OCC to further their national goals. In a recently published report, 
former US Secretary of Defense, Ashton Carter, expressed his disappointment in the 
‘cyber component’ of US efforts to destroy ISIS.5 The report highlights an important 
1 This is not a comprehensive list of newcomers. On Germany see: Nina Werkhäuser, “German army 
launches new cyber command”, DW, (April 1, 2017). Retrieved from: http://www.dw.com/en/german-
army-launches-new-cyber-command/a-38246517; on Finland see: Secretariat of the Security Committee, 
“Finland’s Cyber Security Strategy”, (2013). Retrieved from: https://www.defmin.fi/files/2378/Finland_s_
Cyber_Security_Strategy.pdf; on Vietnam see: Jim Dao, Giang The Huong Tran and Tu Ngoc Trinh, “New 
Law on Cyber Security in Vietnam”, Tilleke & Gibbins (2016, June 3). Retrieved from: http://www.tilleke.
com/resources/new-law-cyber-security-vietnam; on India see: Vivek Raghuvanshi, “New Indian Cyber 
Command Urged Following Recent Attacks”, Defense News, (2016, June 6). Retrieved from: https://www.
defensenews.com/2016/06/06/new-indian-cyber-command-urged-following-recent-attacks/; on United 
Arab Emirates see: Bindiya Thomas, “UAE Military To Set Up Cyber Command”, (2014, September 30), 
DefenseWorld. Retrieved from: http://www.defenseworld.net/news/11185/ UAE_Military_To_Set_Up_
Cyber_Command#.WW4nJYjyiUk; on Turkey see: Israel Defense, “Turkey Launched Cyber Warfare 
Command”, (2014, April 13). Retrieved from: http://www.israeldefense.co.il/en/content/turkey-launched-
cyber-warfare-command; on Columbia see: Christoffer Frendesen “Colombia sends officials to Estonia for 
cyber defense training”, Columbia Reports, (2014, September 2). Retrieved from: http://colombiareports.
com/colombias-govt-sends-security-forces-estonia-cyber-defense-training/.
2 On Russia see: Eugene Gerden, “Russia to spend $250m strengthening cyber-offensive capabilities”, 
SC Magazine UK, (2016, February 4). Retrieved from: http://www.scmagazineuk.com/russia-to-spend-
250m-strengthening-cyber-offensive- capabilities/article/470733; on the United States see Sean Lyngaas, 
“Pentagon Chief: 2017 budget includes $7Bn for cyber”, FCW (February 2, 2016). Retrieved from: https://
fcw.com/articles/2016/02/02/dod-budget-cyber.aspx; on Iran see: Bozorgmehr Sharafedin, “Iran to expand 
military spending, develop missiles”, Reuters, (January 9, 2017). Retrieved from: https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-iran-military-plan/iran-to-expand-military-spending-develop-missiles-idUSKBN14T15L; on 
North Korea see: David E. Sanger, David D. Kirkpatrick and Nicole Perlroth, “The World Once Laughed 
at North Korean Cyberpower. No More”, The New York Times (October 15, 2017). Retrieved from: https://
www.nytimes.com/2017/10/15/world/asia/north-korea-hacking-cyber-sony.html.
3 For a critical analysis on this branding see: Chris McGuffin and Paul Mitchell, “On domains: Cyber and 
the practice of warfare”, International Journal, 69:3 (2014):394-412 .
4 NATO CCD COE, “NATO Recognises Cyberspace as a ‘Domain of Operations’ at Warsaw Summit”, 
(2016, July 21). Retrieved from: https://ccdcoe.org/nato-recognises-cyberspace-domain-operations-
warsaw-summit.html.
5 At the inaugural US Cyber Command Symposium, a more positive view of the US cyber operations 
against ISIS was provided. As one senior policymaker stated: “We are hitting every target, every time”. 
Ashton Carter, “A Lasting Defeat: The Campaign to Destroy ISIS”, Report, Belfer Center for Science and 
International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, (October, 2017). Retrieved from: https://www.belfercenter.
org/LastingDefeat; Max Smeets, “US Cyber Command: An Assiduous Actor, Not a Warmongering Bully”, 
The Cipher Brief, (March 4, 2018). Retrieved from: https://www.thecipherbrief.com/us-cyber-command-
assiduous-actor-not-warmongering-bully.
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set of issues. It rings alarm bells about the current organizational efforts of US Cyber 
Command.6 It confirms findings of several scholars that the development of effective 
cyber capability is by no means an easy feat.7 It also reveals the importance of 
contextualizing the US Cyber Command within a larger organizational structure, each 
component of which has its own institutional interests. Finally, Carter’s statement 
suggests that these capabilities, even though they are very malleable and refer to a 
broad category of tools, may not be equally valuable in all situations against all types 
of actors.
The former Secretary of Defense is of course not the first senior policy maker to note 
disquiet about cyber weapons. In 2012, when Keith Alexander was still heading the 
NSA and US Cyber Command, he stated that there is “much uncharted territory in the 
world of cyber-policy, law and doctrine”.8 More recently, referring to Herman Kahn’s 
classic 1959 text on nuclear strategic concepts, Michael Hayden states that “[n]o one 
has yet begun to write the On Thermonuclear War for cyber conflict”.9 
The purpose of this paper is therefore to explore the following question: How and to 
what extent, if any, do offensive cyber capabilities have the potential to affect the roles 
of military power? We do not intend to provide a highly detailed policy prescription, 
nor a detailed description of the requirements for the military to conduct a specific 
operation. Instead, this paper deals with the basic principles and aims to parsimoniously 
capture which goals can be realized through the use of OCC. After all, as military 
theorist Charles Ardant du Picq noted in the mid-19th century, “[t]he instruments of 
battle are valuable only if one knows how to use them”.10 As a starting point of our 
analysis, we use the framework developed by Robert J. Art almost four decades ago 
on the ends of military power. Art distinguished between four strategic roles that force 
can serve: i) defense, ii) deterrence, iii) compellence and iv) ‘swaggering’.11
Our central claim is that OCC can alter the manner in which states use their military 
power. Offensive cyber capabilities are not particularly effective in deterring 
adversary military action, except when threatened to be used by states with a credible 
6 “I was largely disappointed in Cyber Command’s effectiveness against ISIS. It never really produced any 
effective cyber weapons or techniques. When CYBERCOM did produce something useful, the intelligence 
community tended to delay or try to prevent its use, claiming cyber operations would hinder intelligence 
collection. This would be understandable if we had been getting a steady stream of actionable intel, but 
we weren’t. The State Department, for its part, was unable to cut through the thicket of diplomatic issues 
involved in working through the host of foreign services that constitute the Internet. In short, none of our 
agencies showed very well in the cyber fight”.
7 Jon Lindsay, “Stuxnet and the Limits of Cyber Warfare”, Security Studies, 22: 3 (2013)365-404.
8 Keith Alexander, US Senate, Committee on Armed Services, (2014, April). Retrieved from: http://www.
eweek.com/security/nsa-director-says-cyber-command-not-trying-to-militarize-cyberspace.
9 Michael Hayden, Playing the Edge: American Intelligence in the Age of Terror, (New York: Penguin Press: 
2014).
10 Charles Ardant du Picq, Battle Studies: Ancient and Modern Battle, trans. John Greely and Robert C. 
Cotton (New York: Macmillan, 1920).
11 The categories selected by Art are not analytically exhaustive. The categories are described in more detail 
below. Robert J. Art, “To What Ends Military Power?”, International Security, 4:4 (1980)3-35.
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12 This is partially because the prefix ‘cyber’ acts like a sponge absorbing meaning. See: James Shires and 
Max Smeets, “The Word Cyber Now Means Everything—and Nothing At All”, Slate, (December 1, 2017). 
Retrieved from: http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2017/12/01/the_word_cyber_has_lost_all_
meaning.html.
13 Max Smeets, “A Matter of Time: On the Transitory Nature of Cyberweapons”, Journal of Strategic 
Studies, (2017)1-28; For alternative definitions see: Thomas Rid and Peter McBurney, “Cyberweapons”, 
The RUSI Journal, 157:1 (2012):6-13, p. 7; Trey Herr, “PrEP: A Framework for Malware & Cyber 
Weapons”, The Journal of Information Warfare, 13:1(2014) ; Dale Peterson. “Offensive Cyber Weapons: 
Construction, Development and Employment”, Journal of Strategic Studies, 36:1(2013).
14 A detailed analysis of each case goes beyond the scope of this paper. For an excellent overview on Ukraine 
see: Kim Zetter, “Everything We Know About Ukraine’s Power Plant Hack”, Wired, (20 January 2016). 
Retrieved from: https://www.wired.com/2016/01/everything-we-know-about-ukraines-power-plant-hack/; 
Kaspersky Lab’s Global Research & Analysis Team, “BlackEnergy APT Attacks in Ukraine employ 
spearphishing with Word documents”, Securelist, (28 January 2016). Retrieved from: https://securelist.
com/blackenergy-apt-attacks-in-ukraine-employ-spearphishing-with-word-documents/73440/; Kim Zetter, 
“Inside the Cunning, Unprecedented Hack of Ukraine’s Power Grid”, Wired, (3 March 2016). Retrieved 
from: https://www.wired.com/2016/03/inside-cunning-unprecedented-hack-ukraines-power-grid/;E-ISAC, 
SANS ICS. “Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukrainian Power Grid” March 18, 2016, 4. http://www.
nerc.com/pa/CI/ESISAC/Documents/E-ISAC_SANS_Ukraine_DUC_18Mar2016.pdf.
reputation. However, offensive cyber capabilities do have value in compellence. Unlike 
conventional capabilities, the effects of OCC do not necessarily have to be exposed 
publicly, which means the compelled party can back down post-action without losing 
face thus deescalating conflict. The potential opportunity for the attacker to control 
the reversibility of effect of an OCC may also encourage compliance. At the same 
time, the use of OCC has escalatory potential. Cyber capabilities also contribute to the 
use of force for defensive purposes, as it could provide both a preemptive as well as 
preventive strike option. Finally, its symbolic value as a ‘prestige weapon’ to enhance 
‘swaggering’ remains unclear, due to its largely non-material ontology and transitory 
nature. 
The remainder of this paper consists of three parts. A study on the unique value of 
cyber capabilities has to start with an analysis of its distinct features. The next section 
therefore briefly discusses the ‘rise’ of OCC and assesses its characteristics. Section 
III, in turn, lays out the four possible functions of cyber capabilities as a tool for the 
state. The final section concludes and considers the implications of these findings.
2. the rIse of offensIVe cyber caPabIlItIes
The term ‘offensive cyber capability’ can have a host of different meanings.12 We 
define OCC as “a capability designed to access a computer system or network to 
damage or harm living or material entities”.13 Adopting this definition, it also means 
that we exclude espionage, information warfare and information operations from our 
analysis. OCC encompasses a wide range of capabilities. Indeed, the cyber means 
used against the Ukrainian regional electricity distribution company in December 
2015 are very different to those used in the DDoS attacks that swamped websites of 
various Estonian organizations in April 2007.14 Rather than compile an exhaustive 
list of purposes and examples, we have selected three categories based on the damage 
59
caused by an OCC: denial of service, file damage and physical damage.15 Table 1 
provides an overview of some of the most important cases reported by a reputable 
cyber security firm.
TABLE 1. IMPORTANT INSTANCES OF OCC
* We listed year of disclosure rather than year of compromise. **The table does not include cases of which there 
is no public cyber security report available, like Sands Casino in 2014. 
The deployment and use of OCCs is generally extended over multiple stages. It is 
common to distinguish between the following four stages for advanced operations: 
i) reconnaissance; ii) intrusion; iii) privilege escalation; and iv) payload delivery.16 
These stages can be explained through a simple analogy of a burglar trying to get into 
a house. The burglar first scans the neighborhood and sees which security measures 
(camera system, dog, locks) the homeowner has taken (reconnaissance). The burglar 
then tries to get in, normally taking the path of least resistance (intrusion). When 
entering a specific room, they try to gain access to other rooms and hope to find 
the cabinet with all the keys to the cars, vault etc. (privilege escalation). Finally, the 
burglar decides what to do with the obtained level of access. They may not only steal 
the belongings of the homeowner, but also move or destroy some of the furniture in 
the house. Considering these stages reveals that there are close similarities between 
OCC and cyber espionage capabilities or, in intelligence jargon, Computer Network 
15 These categories were adopted from: Steven M. Bellovin, Susan Landau and Herbert S. Lin, “Limiting 
the undesired impact of cyber weapons: technical requirements and policy implications”, Journal of 
Cybersecurity, 3:1 (2017)59–68.
16 For example, see: FireEye, “Advanced Targeted Attacks: How to Protect Against the Next Generation of 
Cyber Attacks”, WhitePaper, (2012). Retrieved from: http://www.softbox.co.uk/pub/ reeye- advanced-
targeted-attacks.pdf; S. Mathew, R. Giomundo, S. Upadyaya, M. Sudit and A. Stotz, “Understanding 
Multistage Attacks by Attack-Track based Visualization of Heterogeneous Event Streams,” VizSEC ‘06, 











































Exploitation (CNE) and Computer Network Attack (CNA). Indeed, it is often said 
that there is no other weapon so strongly anchored in intelligence as cyber weapons.17
3. the uses of cyber force
Having developed a better understanding of the nature of OCC, we can now turn to 
potential function of these capabilities. Numerous works in security studies have been 
devoted to the use of force. We used the classic study of Robert J. Art – To What Ends 
Military Power? – as a starting point for our analysis. Art distinguishes between four 
categories that force can serve: defense, deterrence, compellence and ‘swaggering’.18
A. Defense
The defensive use of military force serves to do two things: avert an attack or minimize 
damage of an attack. As Art states:
“[f]or defensive purposes, a state will direct its forces against 
those of a potential or actual attacker, but not against his unarmed 
population. For defensive purposes, a state can deploy its forces in 
place prior to an attack, use them after an attack has occurred to 
repel it, or strike first if it believes that an attack upon it is imminent 
or inevitable”.19
We commonly distinguish between a preemptive and preventive strike. A preemptive 
strike is when a state believes an attack upon it is imminent by an adversary. A 
preventive strike is when an attack is perceived to be inevitable but not imminent or 
known to be planned.20 
Two prominent cases of preventive strikes in the late Cold War include Operation 
Scorch Sword, an airstrike by the Iranian air force in September 1980 that damaged 
an almost-complete nuclear reactor near Baghdad, Iraq and Operation Opera, the 
more successful bombing by the Israeli air force of the same nuclear reactor, almost a 
17 This in turn leads to an important set of questions surrounding the organizational integration of intelligence 
and military capabilities. See: Max Smeets, “Organisational Integration of Offensive Cyber Capabilities: A 
Primer on the Benefits and Risks”, 9th International Conference on Cyber Conflict, (Tallinn: NATO CCD 
COE Publications: 2017); Hayden, Playing the Edge.
18 In practice, these categories are expected to overlap and may not always be easily disentangled. Also, 
unlike Art, we do not explicitly distinguish between the physical and peaceful use of military power. Art, 
“To What Ends Military Power?”.
19 Ibid. Though note that even for offensive purposes, states are prohibited from attacking unarmed 
populations.
20 For an excellent overview on the need to legitimize preventive and pre-emptive use of force see: Tom 
Sauer, “The Preventive and Pre-Emptive Use of Force: To be Legitimized or to be De-Legitimized?” The 
Hoover Institution. Retrieved from: http://www.ethical-perspectives.be/viewpic.php?TABLE=EP&ID=493.
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year later. Stuxnet can be similarly described as a preventive strike.21 As Kim Zetter 
notes, in the lead up to the cyber attack, technicians at Natanz had begun to install 
new centrifuges again at a rapid rate and with their performance improving.22 Stuxnet 
was presented as an ‘extra option’ to President George W. Bush, as Sanger notes, to 
effectively deal with a seemingly escalating situation, especially in the eyes of the 
Israeli government.23 Stuxnet was a masterpiece of work, “[b]ut Stuxnet might only 
have been the beginning”, as Ben Buchanan notes.24 Indeed, there was also an option 
developed for a large scale pre-emptive strike. In case the situation in Iran worsened, 
the United States had a contingency planned, reportedly code-named NITRO ZEUS. 
As The New York Times reported:
“Nitro Zeus was part of an effort to assure President Obama that he 
had alternatives, short of a full-scale war, if Iran lashed out at the 
United States or its allies in the region. […] [T]he plan […] was 
devised to disable Iran’s air defenses, communications systems and 
crucial parts of its power grid and was shelved, at least for the 
foreseeable future, after the nuclear deal struck between Iran and 
six other nations last summer [2016] was fulfilled”.25
Although NITRO ZEUS is the only pre-emptive cyber strike option known to date, it 
is likely that military forces have considered the use of OCC in this manner for other 
situations as well, albeit on a more modest scale. Indeed, the use of a cyber capability 
to, for instance, neutralize the launch of an operational ballistic missile is conceivable.
B. Deterrence
The deterrent use of military force aims to dissuade an adversary from doing 
something by threatening him with unacceptable punishment if he does it. Deterrence 
hinges upon the credible threat of retaliation to dissuade an enemy from attacking. As 
Bernard Brodie wrote in 1958, a credible deterrent, “must be always at the ready, yet 
21 Ralph Langner indicates that Stuxnet is actually not one weapon, but two. The earliest version, also 
referred to as Stuxnet 0.5, was in development prior to November 2005. This early version is considered 
to be the most sophisticated of the two, focusing on the closing the isolation valves of the Natanz uranium 
enrichment facility. The latter, better-known version followed a different modus operandi as it aimed to 
change the speeds of the rotors in the centrifuges. Ralph Langner, “Kill a Centrifuge: A Technical Analysis 
of What Stuxnet’s Creators Tried to Achieve”, (2013, November). Retrieved from: https://www.langner.
com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/to-kill-a-centrifuge.pdf; Operation Orchard led by the Israeli air force 
could be seen as an example of a combined preventive strike with kinetic and cyber means.
22 Kim Zetter, Countdown to Zero day: Stuxnet and the Launch of the World’s First Digital Weapon, (New 
York: Crown Publishing: 2014).
23 David Sanger, Confront and Conceal: Obama’s Secret Wars and Surprising Use of American Power, (New 
York: Broadway Paperbacks: 2012).
24 Ben Buchanan, The Cybersecurity Dilemma: Network Intrusions, Trust and Fear in the International 
System, (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2017).
25 David E. Sanger and Mark Mazetti, “US Had Cyberattack Plan if Iran Nuclear Dispute Led to Conflict”, 
The New York Times, (2016, February 16). Retrieved from: https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/17/world/
middleeast/us-had-cyberattack-planned-if-iran-nuclear-negotiations-failed.html; James Ball, “US Hacked 
Into Iran’s Critical Civilian Infrastructure For Massive Cyberattack, New Film Claims”, BuzzFeed, (2016, 
February 16). Retrieved from: https://www.buzzfeed.com/jamesball/us-hacked-into-irans-critical-civilian-
infrastructure-for-ma?utm_term=.ile5noYzJy#.kyVJaBdP87.
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never used”.26 Defense does not necessarily buy deterrence, nor deterrence defense.27 
Where defense dissuades the adversary by means of presenting an unvanquishable 
military force, deterrence dissuades by presenting the certainty of a retaliatory 
devastation.28
Few cyber conflict topics have received more attention than cyber deterrence. For the 
most part, the existing literature uses the term to refer to deterrence of cyberattacks by 
an adversary, and can be grouped into three buckets. The first group of scholars argue 
that cyber deterrence does not have distinctive problems and works (or occasionally 
fails) like conventional deterrence. Dorothy Denning believes that cyberspace strongly 
resembles traditional domains.29 According to her, cyber deterrence can therefore be 
achieved through existing regimes.30 The second group of scholars believes that cyber 
deterrence has its unique set of issues, but as long as we further specify the issue 
area, the problems can largely be solved. Joseph Nye Jr.’s discussion of deterrence 
is a prominent example.31 He notes that conventional cyber deterrence is difficult, 
but we could instead focus on deterrence by economic entanglement and norms to 
overcome barriers.32 Lucas Kello argues that cyber deterrence does not work as a 
strategy, but we could aim for punctuated deterrence instead; we should not deter 
individual actions but a series of actions.33 The last group of scholars argues that cyber 
deterrence does not work and will never work. Richard Harknett argues that cyber 
deterrence is impossible due to the structure of cyberspace.34 In his view, we need to 
move away from the deterrence paradigm and consider different forms of strategy, 
such as persistence.35 This paper does not address cyber deterrence as defined above; 
instead, it focuses on the use of a cyber capability to deter a certain type of (military) 
means of an adversary. 
26 Bernard Brodie, “The Anatomy of Deterrence”, RAND Corporation, (1958, July 23). Retrieved from: 
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_memoranda/2008/RM2218.pdf.
27 Art, “To What Ends Military Power”, p. 7.
28 Ibid. Some scholars instead distinguish between deterrence by detail and deterrence by punishment.
29 The scholars note that “Studies of ‘cyber deterrence’ raise as many problems as would be raised by 
a comparable study of ‘land deterrence.’ Dorothy E. Denning, “Rethinking the Cyber Domain and 
Deterrence”, JFQ, 77 (2015)8-15. Retrieved from: http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-
77/jfq-77_8-15_Denning.pdf, p. 15.
30 Ibid.
31 Joseph S. Nye, “Deterrence and Dissuasion in Cyberspace”, International Security, 43:3 (Winter, 
2016/2017)44-71.
32 Ibid.
33 Lucas Kello, Virtual Weapon and International Order, (Yale: Yale University Press: 2017); also see: Uri 
Tor, “‘Cumulative Deterrence’ as a New Paradigm for Cyber Deterrence”, Journal of Strategic Studies, 
40:1-2(2017)92-117.
34 Richard J. Harknett and Joseph S. Nye, “Is Deterrence Possible in Cyberspace?” International 
Security, 42:2 (2017)196-199; Also see: Brad D. William, Meet the scholar challenging the cyber 
deterrence paradigm, (July 19, 2017) The Fifth Domain. Retrieved from: https://www.fifthdomain.com/
home/2017/07/19/meet-the-scholar-challenging-the-cyber-deterrence-paradigm/; Richard J. Harknett and 




OCC tend to be transitory in nature, meaning they only have the “temporary ability to 
access a computer system or network to cause harm or damage to living and material 
entities”.36 The transitory nature of a capability is determined by both technical (e.g. 
type of vulnerability, access and payload used) and non-technical (e.g. the number 
and type of actors the capability is used against) factors.37 This feature, combined 
with their clandestine nature, makes it difficult to prove you have a specific type 
of capability pre-deployment. Hence, state actors can talk about offensive cyber 
capabilities whether or not they actually have them; such talk is intended to convey 
to other actors the impression that the talking nation does have the talked-about 
capabilities. But since the fact of possession cannot be verified by those other actors 
nor demonstrated by the talking state, such talk is cheap talk.38
Cheap talk, however, is not by definition meaningless and may under certain 
circumstances still have an impact. One of the key factors which is said to affect 
the effectiveness of cheap talk is reputation.39 More specifically, post-hoc revelations 
about an actor’s capability – either intentionally or non-intentionally – can add to 
the reputation and credibility of the actor’s cheap talk on the intention and ability 
to conduct an offensive cyber operation. This has led to a number of paradoxical 
dynamics for cyber conflict.
The release of the classified National Security Agency (NSA) documents by Edward 
Snowden has been described as the most embarrassing episode in the history of 
the secretive US intelligence agency. It revealed how the NSA maintained a mass-
surveillance program over its own citizens, accessed data from companies, intercepted 
data from global communications networks and stored information of millions of 
people. Yet, it also exposed the impressive arsenal of the agency. Not least from the 
Snowden disclosures, The Washington Post reported that the US government mounted 
at least 231 offensive cyber operations in 2011.40 As Gompert and Libicki note, in 
36 Max Smeets, “A Matter of Time”.
37 OCC exploiting software vulnerabilities are both quantitatively and qualitatively different from 
conventional weapons in their transitory nature. They are quantitatively different as the introduction 
of countermeasures - that is, the remediation (patching) of vulnerabilities - occurs on a very rapid 
and continuing basis. They are also qualitatively different; patching does not only prevent successful 
exploitation against one system but against any administrator uploading the patch. Even though there are 
different ways in which patches can be distributed after a software vulnerability is exploited, a defense for 
one creates a defense for all. Ibid.
38 Joseph Farrell and Matthew Rabin, “Cheap Talk”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10:3 (1996):103-118; 
Clayton L. Thyne, “Cheap Signals with Costly Consequences: The Effect of Interstate Relations on Civil 
War”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 50:6 (2006)937-961; Joseph Farrell and Robert Gibbons, “Cheap 
Talk with Two Audiences”, The American Economic Review, 79:5 (1989)1214-1223.
39 Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (Yale: Yale University Press: 1966), p.124; Alexandra Guisinger 
and Alastair Smith, “Honest threats: The interaction of reputation and political institutions in international 
crises”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 46: (2002)175-200; Anne Sartori, “The Might of the Pen: A 
Reputational Theory of Communication in International Disputes”, International Organization, 56 
(2002)121-50.
40 Barton Gellman and Ellen Nakashima, “US spy agencies mounted 231 offensive cyber-operations in 2011, 




this way, the leaks have ironically “helped it to broadcast how deeply the NSA can 
supposedly burrow into the systems of others”.41
Overall, it is more difficult to use OCC as means to deter compared to most other forms 
of military force. However, it does not mean that it is impossible at all. Especially if 
an actor is able to show repeatedly what is capable and willing of doing through cyber 
means it can benefit from this reputation in the future.42
C. Compellence
The term compellence in International Relations originates from Thomas Schelling, 
conceptualizing it as the second form of coercion alongside deterrence.43 The 
compellent use of military force serves one of two purposes: i) to stop an activity 
undertaken by an adversary, or ii) to get an adversary to do something he has not yet 
undertaken. 
The difference between deterrence and compellence hinges upon initiative and timing. 
The deterrent use of force is based on a promised reaction following an action of the 
adversary, the timing of which is in principle automatic. The compellent use of force, 
in turn, is based on a more active strategy of the threatener. For compellence, timing 
is a critical factor: “too strict a deadline makes compliance impossible, while one too 
lenient makes compliance unnecessary”.44 Deterrence is usually said to be easier to 
achieve than compellence; as the deterred party need not to do anything visible, it 
does not suffer from any reputational damage and can simply argue or imply that it 
never intended to conduct the activity. 
Cyber capabilities have a distinct advantage in this respect. Its effects do not 
necessarily have to be exposed publicly, which means the compelled party can back 
down post-action without losing face. More specifically, the compelled actor can deny 
that the effect was caused by OCC. For example, a three-day disruption of computer 
systems at an airport leading to massive financial losses and delays could be attributed 
to a ‘general system failure’ (a company mistake) whilst in reality it was due to a cyber 
attack.
This opens up new opportunities for the use of force, although it is dependent on a 
number of conditions. Not least, the cyber attack needs to cause significant levels 
of harm or damage to be perceived as a substantial enough cost to change action 
and delineate the action from the ‘constant state’ of cyber activity. Whereas plausible 
deniability is often an advantage to the attacker, in this case the actor should find a 
41 David C. Gompert and Martin Libicki, “Waging Cyber War the American Way” Survival, 57:4 (2015)7-28; 
also see: Martin Libicki, Cyberspace in Peace and War, (Annapolis, Naval Institute Press: 2016), p. 198.
42 It remains unclear however whether the Snowden revelations helped deterrence or not.
43 Schelling, Arms and Influence, p. 69–91.
44 Gregory F. Treverton, “Framing Compellent Strategies”, RAND Corporation (2000). Retrieved from: 
http://slantchev.ucsd.edu/courses/pdf/treverton-compellence.pdf.
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way – either through the design of the weapon or other means – to show that it is 
conducting this cyber attack in response to the adversary’s activity.45 Finally, in case 
a compelled actor does not want to reveal it has been attacked, a cyber security firm 
could instead write a public report exposing the activity.46 As much of the attribution 
capability lies with private companies, oftentimes having a strong incentive to publish, 
this could be a serious concern for states.47
OCCs have another distinct advantage when it comes to the compellent use of military 
force. Unlike kinetic weapons, the attacker can sometimes control the reversibility 
of the effects of cyber capabilities. Control is based on two dimensions: i) “the 
adversary’s inability to stop or revert the effects of the cyber attack”; and ii) “[the] 
attacker’s ability to stop or revert the effects of the attack at any given time desired”.48 
The most detailed account on how reversibility may be achieved is provided by Neil 
Rowe describing four techniques: i) reversible cryptography, where data is encrypted 
to prevent use, but can be decrypted after adversary complies; ii) system obfuscation, 
in which a computer is obfuscated in a reversible manner; iii) data retainment and 
restoration, where important data is withheld but can be restored; and iv) compromise 
deception in which adversaries mistakenly think that their system is compromised, but 
after compliance find out they have been deceived.49
The potential reversibility of effect of an OCC may encourage compliance. The 
adversary may know that, if it backs down, the ‘old’ situation can be restored. A 
simple characterization of a conventional situation may be: ‘I will keep bombing 
your critical infrastructure until you stop attacking me’. In this situation, the utility 
the attacker gains by ceasing the attack is that no further costs (i.e. damage to its 
critical infrastructure) will be incurred. But the attacker still has to take in its earlier 
infrastructure losses that were caused during the initial stages of the conflict. In the 
45 See discussion on ‘loud cyber weapons’, which has primarily been about how to “possibly deter future 
intrusions”. Yet, as this discussion suggests, it should also be considered for the compellent use of force. 
Chris Bing, “US Cyber Command director: We want ‘loud,’ offensive cyber tools”, FedScoop, (2016, 
August 3). Retrieved from: https://www.fedscoop.com/us-cyber-command-offensive-cybersecurity-nsa-
august-2016; Herb Lin, “Developing “Loud” Cyber Weapons”, Lawfare, (2016, September 1). Retrieved 
from: https://www.lawfareblog.com/developing-loud-cyber-weapons; Herb Lin, “Still More on Loud 
Cyber Weapons”, Lawfare, (2016, October 19). Retrieved from: https://www.lawfareblog.com/still-more-
loud-cyber-weapons.
46 In the case of Stuxnet, for example, the Iranian government has for a long time denied its systems were 
compromised. Instead, it was researchers from VirusBlokAda, Symantec and the Langner group which 
initially reported on the sophisticated attacked.
47 Also see: Max Smeets, “The Strategic Promise of Offensive Cyber Operations”, Strategic Studies 
Quarterly, Forthcoming.
48 Ibid.
49 Neil Rowe, “Towards Reversible Cyberattacks”, Proceedings of the 9th European Conference on 
Information Warfare and Security, ed. J. Demergis (Reading: Academic Publishing Ltd: 2010), 261-267. 
Note, however, that reversibility is often a question of time scale. The kinetic destruction of a bridge can 
be “reversed” by rebuilding the bridge, albeit over a time scale of weeks or months rather than minutes. 
And in any case, a human death that results from a “reversible” cyberattack on a critical system will 
not be resurrected when the effects of that cyberattack are reversed. That is, while the direct effects of a 
cyber capability may be reversible, the consequential effects are almost never reversible. The key issue 
of reversibility lies in the fact that the reversibility can be implemented by the attacker rather than the 
defender.
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case of a cyber attack, the scenario may be characterized as follows: ‘I will corrupt 
data on ‘X’ amount of your critical computer systems for every day you keep attacking 
me’. In this situation, the incentive structure for the attacker has changed; if the actor 
backs down it will no longer incur costs in the future and retrieves earlier corrupted 
data.
D. Swaggering
Whereas defense, deterrence and compellence are widely used concepts, ‘swaggering’ 
is not part of the common political science vocabulary.50 As Art indicates:
“[s]waggering is in part a residual category, the deployment of 
military power for purposes other than defense, deterrence, or 
compellence. Force is not aimed directly at dissuading another 
state from attacking, at repelling attacks, nor at compelling it to 
do something specific. The objectives for swaggering are more 
diffuse, ill-defined and problematic than that. Swaggering almost 
always involves only the peaceful use of force and is expressed 
usually in one of two ways: displaying one’s military might at 
military exercises and national demonstrations and buying or 
building the era’s most prestigious weapons. The swagger use of 
force is the most egoistic: it aims to enhance the national pride 
of a people or to satisfy the personal ambitions of its ruler [...] 
Swaggering is pursued because of the fundamental yearning of 
states and statesmen for respect and prestige”.51 
OCC seem to be less valuable for swaggering purposes.52 Cyber capabilities have a 
largely non-material ontology, making it difficult to publicly showcase or ‘parade’ 
these capabilities. Second, the transitory nature of cyber capabilities is also a 
problem for swaggering. Cyber capabilities’ transitory nature is primarily due to the 
malleability of cyberspace affecting the life-cycle of a vulnerability and effectiveness 
of an OCC. The life cycle of vulnerabilities is subject to three delays: i) the awareness 
delay; ii) the patching delay; and iii) the adaptation delay.53 The moment actors reveal 
their capability, it inevitably increases the likelihood of a vendor learning about the 
vulnerability and assigning a high level of priority to developing a patch (i.e. reducing 
the awareness and patching delay).54 Overall, as a document from the East West 
Institute concludes:
50 The concept has been used once before in relation to cyber attacks by Neuman and Poznansky. They 
however misapplied the concept as swaggering is not a form of coercion. Craig Neuman and Michael 
Poznansky, “Swaggering in Cyberspace: Busting the conventional wisdom and cyber coercion”, War 
on the Rocks, (2016, June 28). Retrieved from: https://warontherocks.com/2016/06/swaggering-in-
cyberspace-busting-the-conventional-wisdom-on-cyber-coercion/.
51 Art, “To What Ends Military Power”, p. 10-11.
52 However, this does not mean that a cyber command or program cannot be established for prestige 
purposes.
53 Smeets, “A Matter of Time”.
54 Ibid.
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“[m]ilitary forces will have distinct interests in keeping cyber 
weapons secret. [...] Those nations that are developing the most 
advanced weapons have a strong interest in being able to protect 
the intelligence surrounding such capabilities”.55
4. conclusIon
Considering the growing interest in the use of offensive cyber capabilities as a tool 
for the state, this study assessed to what degree these capabilities have the potential 
to change the role of military power. We have shown that OCCs have the potential 
to significantly affect how states use their military power in several ways. First, 
OCCs have downgraded the role of deterrence, except for those states with a credible 
reputation for being able and willing to conduct offensive cyber operations. However, 
we indicated that compellence is no longer ruled out as a function of military power 
considering several features of cyber capabilities. Unlike conventional capabilities, the 
effects of offensive cyber capabilities do not necessarily have to be exposed publicly, 
which means the compelled party can back down post-action without losing face. 
The potential to control the reversibility of effect of a cyber capability by the attacker 
may also encourage compliance. As OCCs can be used as both a preemptive and a 
preventive strike option, it reemphasizes the potential to use of force for defensive 
purposes. Finally, due to its largely non-material ontology and transitory nature, its 
symbolic value as a prestige weapon to enhance swaggering remains unclear. 
Major powers reap benefits from their nuclear arsenal without using them physically 
and risk high costs when they are used. This in turn incentivizes the avoidance of 
warlike behavior and exploitation of peaceful use. Yet, this logic breaks down for 
cyber capabilities: the benefits from non-use are lower given the limits of deterrence 
and swaggering; the costs of non-use are higher due to the transitory nature of these 
capabilities; and the risks of using cyber capabilities are lower. Overall, it means less 
powerful incentives exist for restraint.
As we have only provided a primer on the topic, there are several avenues for future 
research. This paper was consciously limited to only assess the role of OCCs with 
regard to state power. Given that OCCs are normally part of a broader arsenal of 
capabilities, it is important to discuss the military use of OCC in relation to military 
capabilities. Further research may therefore conduct a comparative analysis of other 
assets (nuclear weapons, drones, covert actions) to gain a more holistic understanding 
of the military contribution of each capability. Also, it has been noted that the growth 
of the private sector market for OCC leads to new opportunities for states to acquire, 
55 EastWest Institute, “Working Towards Rules for Governing Cyber Conflict Rendering the Geneva and 
Hague Conventions in Cyberspace”, (2011). Retrieved from: https://www.eastwest.ngo/sites/default/files/
ideas-files/US-Russia%20(1).pdf.
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deploy and use these capabilities. It remains unclear, however, to what degree this 
trend also changes the way in which OCCs can be strategically used by states as a 
function of military power.
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Abstract: The past decade has seen the rise of cyberspace as a topic of popular, 
political and scholarly discourse, from the highest reaches of government to the movie 
screen. States are grappling with how to address the rising tide of cyber threats to their 
economies, to their citizens’ personal information and increasingly to political and 
social cohesion. States are using cyber capabilities as a tool of statecraft to achieve 
political objectives. This paper seeks to develop an understanding of how states use 
cyber capabilities to coerce others for political objectives. Cyber coercion is defined 
as the use of cyber capabilities to compel an opponent to undertake an action it would 
not normally wish to perform and avoid an undesirable outcome. The paper seeks to 
address: how a state can employ cyber capabilities to compel another state (or non-
state actor) to accommodate its ambitions; how cyber coercion might take place; and 
ways that the United States and its partners can recognize, respond to and counter 
attempts at cyber coercion. The paper examines the use of cyber operations by North 
Korea and Russia in recent years as part of their broader strategies to exert influence 
over their neighbours, showing how the context in which such operations occur is 
critical.
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1. IntroductIon
The past decade has seen the rise of cyberspace as a topic of popular, political and 
scholarly discourse, from the highest reaches of government to the movie screen. 
Military organizations from the United States to the People’s Republic of China 
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have grappled with issues from how to address threats emanating from cyberspace 
to how to integrate cyberspace capabilities into military doctrine (US Department of 
Defense 2015; Stefan-Gady 2015). In this time, the general public has been exposed 
to a growing body of reporting on cyberspace issues from the hacking of government 
agencies, hospitals, public transportation systems and beyond. The US Defense 
Science Board has issued several reports calling into question both the resilience of 
military systems to cyber threats (Defense Science Board 2013) and outlining how 
to deter cyber attacks (Defense Science Board 2017). Government authorities worry 
that adversaries and others may use cyber means to attack critical infrastructure 
(Rogers 2017), and more recently the prospect of adversaries undermining democratic 
processes through disinformation campaigns and even outright corruption of electoral 
processes has come to the fore. 
At the same time, the use of cyber capabilities in a variety of contexts to further 
nation state interests has grown, from the US’ purported targeted operations against 
Iranian nuclear facilities and North Korea’s ballistic missile programme to Iranian-
attributed campaigns against Western banks and its regional neighbours. This gives 
rise to questions about how states are using cyber capabilities as yet another tool of 
statecraft, including to intimidate, coerce and compel others to do their bidding. This 
paper seeks to address the question of how states have used cyber capabilities to 
coerce other states or non-state actors either to pursue courses of action they might 
not otherwise pursue or to refrain from such actions.1 More importantly, it compares 
two actors – Russia and North Korea – which have used cyber operations against their 
neighbours and others to understand the dynamics of cyber coercion and attempt to 
isolate factors that indicate when cyber coercion may occur.2 The paper begins with 
a discussion of cyber coercion and how it fits into broader deterrence and coercion 
strategies, followed by an examination of examples from Russia and North Korea. 
The paper will then suggest some ways that countries can seek to prevent or lessen the 
impact of cyber coercion.
2. what Is cyber coercIon?
Any discussion of coercion naturally begins with Thomas Schelling’s classic writing 
on the topic, particularly his seminal work Arms and Influence. Schelling described 
two forms of coercion: active coercion, or compellence, and passive coercion, or 
deterrence (Schelling 1966). The former involves the active use of force in some form 
to compel action by another, while the latter involves the threatened use of force to 
motivate an action or restraint from an action. In reality, the distinction is more of a 
1 The focus of this paper will be on state-to-state interactions, but the author acknowledges Travis Sharp’s 
valuable contribution to the literature that a state may seek to coerce a non-state actor and vice versa. See 
Sharp 2017.
2 These case studies are intended to inform a broader research project to develop a framework for cyber 
coercion that ties into response and defensive actions to thwart attempts to coerce through cyber means.
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continuum, as some states may combine compellence actions with the threat of more 
devastating consequences to accomplish their ends. The literature has often focused 
on the use of force by states, not necessarily because these concepts do not apply to 
other actors, but rather because the motivation for examining these concepts in the 
20th century was to understand the nature of state-to-state relations. As one author 
recently noted, scholars have often used analogies to more localized conflicts, such as 
Schelling’s reference to teenager hot-rodding and Robert Jervis’s reference to village 
stag-hunting (Sharp 2017).
In recent years, popular, political and academic discourse has tried to find appropriate 
analogies or comparable historical instances from other domains to explain cyberspace 
operations, to clarify the concepts of deterrence, or to distinguish cyberspace from 
everything else (Nye 2011). This paper begins with the premise that, although 
cyberspace is indeed a man-made domain, its characteristics are more a matter of 
distinction rather than fundamental difference from other domains when it comes 
to international relations. States will seek to use cyber capabilities as one tool of 
statecraft, just as they seek to use other forms of military force, economic power or 
social and humanitarian influence to further their interests. The same applies to the 
use of cyber capabilities as a means to exert influence or pressure on others to shape 
behaviour, deter adverse actions and even compel another actor (either another state, 
a multinational organization, or even a single individual). As one scholar has noted, 
coercion is “the use of threatened force, including the limited use of actual force to 
back up the threat, to induce an adversary to behave differently than it otherwise 
would” (Johnson, Mueller and Taft 2003). This definition does not require a certain 
level of force, so cyber weapons do not have to have the same potential impact as 
nuclear or even conventional weapons to be credibly used to exert influence, nor does 
the threatened use of cyber capabilities need to be explicit to have a coercive effect.
Coercion in international relations is not the same as it is with, for example, an 
abduction, although some of the literature uses formulations that more closely 
resemble abduction than the dynamics of inter-state relations. This is important for 
two reasons: 1) context is critical to understanding whether coercion is occurring; 
and 2) the potential for miscommunication between the coercer and the coerced can 
be significant, even if there is a long-standing relationship between states, as we shall 
see in the two case studies in this paper. In an abduction, there is usually an explicit 
demand for action, whether it is demanding a monetary ransom or some other form 
of compensation such as the release of political prisoners. The scholarly literature 
describes a logic for the dynamic between coercer and coerced: “if you do not do X, I 
will do Y” (Borghard and Lonergan 2017). Another form this takes is when a coercive 
action or threat “demands clarity in the expected result… [and] be accompanied by 
some signal of urgency” (Whyte 2016). But in reality, the demands are not always 
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so clear. The threat actor may not make a clear threat or identify itself explicitly. To 
express this difference, we can articulate the theoretical ideal and observed practice 
as follows:
Theory: coercion = ƒ (clear threat + actor claims responsibility + explicit desired 
behaviour)
Observed practice: = ƒ (vague threats + implied actor + implicit desired behaviour)
The observed practice is not always a combination of all three; it could involve a clear 
attribution and explicit desired behaviour, but the threat could be vague. This reality 
complicates the ability to understand when a state is seeking to coerce another and 
take steps to counteract or blunt the threat. This paper will return to the differences 
between theory and observed practice shortly to address whether cyber coercion is 
successful.
The coercer and coerced may not perceive the messages in the same way (Jervis 
1976). Some scholars have noted that cyber coercion is less likely to achieve 
objectives because the coercive message will signal the threat and allow the coerced 
to respond or to defend itself, reducing the effectiveness of the coercive measure 
(Gartzke 2013), but these conclusions are based on a couple of assumptions that do 
not hold up under scrutiny. Their first assumption is that the coercive measure will be 
explicit and specific enough to provide the coerced the opportunity to pre-empt the 
action or prepare its defences. But this is rarely the case, and growing vulnerability 
to cyber attacks, particularly in more technologically advanced societies, means that 
the prospective attack surface is so large that adequate preparation is unlikely. The US 
government, for example, has focused on the protection of critical infrastructure from 
cyber attack for more than 20 years, starting when President Bill Clinton’s Commission 
on Critical Infrastructure Protection issued its report in 1997 (President’s Commission 
on Critical Infrastructure Protection 1997). The insecurity of critical infrastructure has 
grown, not diminished, since then.
Their second assumption is that the coercer will signal the means they will use to 
threaten an opponent. Coercion, however, does not have to state the exact means that 
will be employed to be credible. The coerced merely has to believe that the coercer 
has the capability to inflict harm; they do not need to specify “and I will do so with my 
cyber armies”. States are aware of their opponents’ capabilities, or they become aware 
of them over time, and can intuit the potential outcomes. For example, it is highly 
likely that most states and relevant non-state actors have very little real insight into 
US cyber capabilities, and in fact may have an inflated picture based on Hollywood 
movies and the stature of the US civilian technology sector. Couple that with the public 
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belief that the United States probably employed these capabilities to attack both the 
Iranian nuclear programme and the North Korean ballistic missile programme, and we 
can see that the actual capabilities that the United States possesses are less important 
than the perception of them3 (Sanger and Broad 2017). 
This paper is not advancing an argument about the likely success of cyber coercion; 
several scholars have addressed its apparently low rate of success (Jensen, Valeriano 
and Maness n.d.; Borghard and Lonergan 2017). A successful attempt at cyber coercion 
should result from a combination of a successful cyber operation, in which the targeted 
system or network was disrupted, with a change in behaviour by the coerced. Even in 
cases where the operation itself achieves its aims, it appears that behavioural changes 
are few, whether because the actor carrying out the operation overestimated the impact 
or underestimated the capacity of the adversary to withstand pain. Despite this poor 
track record, however, states persist in developing cyber capabilities and appear to 
believe, rightly or wrongly, that the promise of cyber coercion exists. Therefore, we 
can expect states to continue to pursue coercive actions through cyberspace.
3. north Korea
Of any state, North Korea is arguably the most likely to employ cyber capabilities as 
part of a coercive strategy. Despite broad consensus about the country’s technological 
backwardness,4 the North Korean regime has shown a remarkable astuteness and 
dedication in investing in militarily relevant technologies, most prominently in 
its nuclear and ballistic missile programme, but also in recent years in its cyber 
capabilities (Ball 2017). North Korea has a long history of coercive action, from 
shooting down a US spy-plane in the 1960s to shelling off-shore islands and sinking 
a South Korean naval vessel in 2010 (Terry 2013). For North Korea, these actions 
have largely paid off, resulting in concessions and economic aid from South Korea 
and the United States as often as more economic sanctions. Sharp (2017) has argued 
that the North Korean attack on Sony Pictures Entertainment in 2014 was a form of 
cyber coercion aimed at destabilizing Sony’s leadership, imposing costs and seeking 
to retaliate for perceived insults to the regime with the impending release of a comedy 
film, The Interview, the plot of which is focused on an attempt to assassinate the Dear 
Leader (Sharp 2017). 
The case of North Korea’s reaction to the film has been the subject of several analyses, 
but it is worth briefly reviewing the timeline of events and the broader context in 
which this case occurred. The proximate cause of the events was the impending 
release of the film and the North Koreans’ strong objections to it. As early as June 
3 One could argue that this is one area where cyber weapons and nuclear weapons are more alike. The 
United States has not used a nuclear weapon in conflict since 1945 and has not conducted a nuclear test 
since 1992, but few states if any are likely to doubt the US nuclear arsenal’s size or capabilities.
4 Including reportedly only 28 registered websites. See http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-37426725.
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2014, the North Korean government condemned The Interview in a Foreign Ministry 
statement and subsequently sent a letter to the UN Secretary General accusing the 
United States of terrorism and an act of war (Brzeski 2014). After postponing release 
of the film until December, Sony received emailed demands for money from a group 
calling itself God’sApstls, followed by a malware attack that resulted in corruption of 
the master boot records of numerous computers, rendering them inoperable. A group 
called Guardians of Peace claimed responsibility for the attack and began releasing 
embarrassing emails and yet-to-be released films in the Sony library (Roman 2014). 
This was followed by threats of violence against movie theatres and “doxing” of Sony 
executives through release of internal documents that showed them in a bad light. 
The North Korean government denied responsibility for the attacks or the threats 
but referred to the acts as “righteous deed[s]” and speculated that “supporters and 
sympathizers” of the North Korean regime were involved (Reuters 2014). Sony pulled 
the movie from theatres, but later reversed its decision after coming under criticism, 
including from the President of the United States, for appearing to capitulate to threats. 
It is important to take a moment to reflect on this point, since if we take the critiques of 
cyber coercion to heart, the fact that the North denied its involvement would appear to 
undermine the argument that it was intended as a coercive measure. But the timing of 
this case is important, as is the context. North Korea clearly indicated its displeasure 
with the film for several months prior to the events. In the summer, the North Korean 
Foreign Ministry said “[if] the US administration connives at and patronizes the 
screening of the film, it will invite a strong and merciless countermeasure” (Brzeski 
2014). Totalitarian regimes often fail to understand how western countries operate 
and conduct their own mirror-imaging. North Korea could very well have believed 
that The Interview was part of an official US government propaganda campaign 
against the regime. North Korea has a long history of strong rhetoric, but it has also 
shown itself willing to use force of various kinds with little compunction, whether 
through directly attacking military targets like soldiers along the Demilitarized Zone 
and South Korean naval vessels, or civilian targets in the South. From North Korea’s 
perspective, it possibly felt it had conveyed its message clearly and publicly through 
official channels. The fact that it chose to then follow up on its (failed) coercive 
rhetoric with cyber attacks through proxies does not detract from the original intent of 
the threats. The first phase of coercion, which did not explicitly state the form in which 
subsequent pain would be inflicted, simply failed to achieve the desired outcome of 
stopping the film, so the North had to escalate from threats to action. At that point, 
the North Koreans were transitioning from the threat of consequences to seeking to 
impose those consequences, and who delivered the effects is less important. At the 
same time, US officials noted that they were not clear on how the threat against the 
movie theatres was intended to be carried out, which nevertheless did not deter them 
from treating it as a serious threat (Sharp 2017). 
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Whether the North Koreans truly believed that the use of proxy fronts (likely for the 
Reconnaissance General Bureau and the Korean People’s Army) would obfuscate the 
origins of the threats is an interesting question, but currently unanswerable. If the 
North Koreans had sought to hide their direct involvement, then it is questionable 
whether it would contribute to the credibility of future coercive threats. That said, 
North Korean has routinely denied physical attacks, such as the sinking of the South 
Korean naval vessel Cheonan in 2010, when no other credible perpetrators have 
presented themselves (Terry 2013). It is conceivable that North Korean denies its 
involvement as a pro forma matter as opposed to truly seeking to avoid blame. It also 
plays to their domestic audience, for whom the regime has to portray itself constantly 
as the victim rather than the aggressor. Sharp concludes that, while not necessarily 
achieving all of its aims, the Sony case shows a successful use of cyber capabilities, 
coupling cyber exploitation (stealing data) with offensive cyber capability to disable 
computers, coerce Sony’s leadership and even lead to the downfall of several senior 
leaders there (Sharp 2017). Whether the coercive actions were intended to shape 
other actors is unclear, but North Korea has not limited itself to using cyber to attack 
private companies. In recent years, it has also employed cyber operations as part of 
its coercive campaign against the Republic of Korea. Suspected North Korean cyber 
operations against the South have included targeting the financial, media and energy 
sectors, as well as government agencies. In some cases, including the attack on a 
virtual currency exchange in Seoul in May 2017, financial interests may have been the 
stronger motivation (Perper 2017). The 2013 attacks against South Korean television 
stations, a bank and bank machines, however, may have been part of an escalatory 
exchange following a two-day Internet outage in the North (Branigan 2013). These 
cases are less clearly overt acts of attempted coercion, but they show a willingness to 
engage in a cyber tit-for-tat and to inflict damage on the South. 
North Korea’s cyber capabilities are not exclusively retaliatory, nor does the regime 
likely see them as a replacement for other forms of coercion (Jun, LaFoy and Sohn 
December 2015). The nuclear and missile programmes are probably still seen as 
guarantors of regime survival, but cyber capabilities provide a flexible new tool to 
achieve a variety of ends: theft to improve the regime’s finances, espionage and the 
ability to threaten and inflict pain and damage on its adversaries. The recent cyber 
events also establish a track record of use that could play a role in future coercive 
scenarios. Returning to the theoretical construct for coercion (coercion = ƒ (clear 
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4. russIa and uKraIne
Russian cyber activity has gained in prominence, beginning with the denial of service 
attacks against large segments of the Estonian economy and government in 2007 and 
as part of the conflict with Georgia in 2008, which some sources have attributed to the 
Russian government or to patriotic hackers acting on the government’s behalf (Davis 
2008; Hollis 2010). More recently, the focus has turned to Russian disinformation 
campaigns and alleged interference in elections in the United States, Germany and 
France, among others (FireEye January 2017). Russian actors, some more closely 
affiliated with the government and others playing a more ambiguous role, have 
established online personas on multiple Internet platforms, including Twitter and 
Facebook, to disseminate falsified news stories and develop narratives sympathetic to 
Russia’s views (Coats 2017). In the midst of such campaigns, it appears that Russia has 
also started to use cyber capabilities as a coercive tool. Here we will focus on Russian 
activity in Ukraine, but this is not intended to downplay or diminish Russian activity 
in other countries. It is also important to acknowledge that Russian disinformation 
campaigns, although not the focus of this analysis, could very well be coercive 
measures intended to destabilize its neighbours and seek to either promote more pro-
Russian parties and social movements or motivate current elites to accommodate 
Russian demands.
The dynamics of Russian-Ukrainian relations are complex and long-standing, which 
underscores the importance of understanding the context in which the events of recent 
years have occurred. The Russians have historically seen Ukraine as a part of the border 
region of Russian territory, rather than as a separate geographic and political entity 
(in Russian, Ukraine roughly means “on the border”). The Russian military campaign 
in 2014 to seize Crimea was seen domestically more as a means to correct a quirk of 
history than an invasion, as Crimea was a gift to Ukraine during Nikita Khrushchev’s 
tenure as leader of the Soviet Union (McCauley 1993). The Crimea also serves as 
the home port for the Russian Navy’s Black Sea Fleet, which makes it strategically 
important for Russia. Russia’s apparent actions to destabilize Ukraine through various 
means, including cyber operations, supporting proxy fighters and sending military 
forces into Eastern Ukraine, stem from a desire to maintain Ukraine in Russia’s orbit 
and prevent further integration with the West (Treisman 2016). Ukraine’s negotiations 
in 2013 to conclude a political and trade deal with the European Union also threatened 
to put Ukraine more squarely in the West’s camp. 
After then-President Viktor Yanukovich reversed course, protests erupted in Kiev. 
Police moved in to confront the protesters and violence ensued, resulting in dozens 
of deaths (Applebaum 2017). In the aftermath of these protests, pro-Russian groups 
in Eastern Ukraine began to seize control of government institutions, prompting the 
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government to respond militarily. Following the change of President in May 2014, 
fighting continued and, despite a negotiated ceasefire in February 2015, the conflict 
continued throughout the year. 
In the midst of the horrific fighting and civilian suffering, particularly in Eastern 
Ukraine, the country suffered the first significant cyber attack on its electric grid 
in December 2015. The attack affected approximately 250,000 customers for some 
hours, but appeared to cause no lasting damage despite targeting the Supervisory 
Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) controllers in addition to business system 
workstations and servers (SANS Institute 2016). The malware employed was a set of 
tools including the BlackEnergy Trojan and the KillDisk eraser and targeted at least 
three geographically dispersed regional power sub-stations (Greenberg 2017). The 
impact on the energy sector received the most attention, particularly coming during the 
winter, but the cyber attacks against Ukraine had also impacted other sectors including 
media, finance and transportation in the preceding months. Security researchers 
have attributed the BlackEnergy tool and the actions in Ukraine to the Sandworm 
intrusion set, which many believe is a Russian hacker group (Hultquist 2016). The 
Ukrainian government has been more explicit in tying this activity to Russian security 
services. Attacks on various sectors continued in 2016, including another attack on the 
energy sector almost exactly a year after the December 2015 attacks that hit the Kiev 
transmission station; this time the outage lasted barely an hour.
The Russian government has not claimed responsibility for these cyber attacks 
and routinely denies involvement in cyber operations against other countries, 
reminding audiences of evidence that the United States in particular has engaged in 
the widespread use of cyber operations (Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2016). 
The Russian government did not appear to make explicit demands of the Ukrainian 
government or public, either in advance of the attacks or afterwards. In the context 
of the broader conflict, however, the Russian strategy appears to include: establishing 
facts on the ground through the manoeuvre of military forces and the use of proxies; 
spreading disinformation to portray the West and pro-western Ukrainians as enemies 
of the Ukrainian people; and using cyber operations to reinforce that messaging. Cyber 
operations in this context appear to be intended to broadly destabilize the political and 
social cohesion in Ukraine.5 The ultimate outcome, therefore, is predicated on the 
Ukrainian government acquiescing to Russian influence on the country and halting its 
integration with the West. In that sense, the coercion appears focused less on seeking 
to promote specific actions and more towards shaping Ukrainian behaviour for the 
long term.
5 There is also speculation that the Russians are using the conflict with Ukraine to ‘test’ its cyber capabilities 
in a real-world laboratory as a prelude to potential use against other countries such as the United States. 
Although this may be a collateral benefit, there is little public evidence to support this as the primary 
reason. 
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Russian cyber operations against Ukraine show the importance of understanding the 
context in which conflict occurs. Analysis that examines cyber operations in isolation 
will fail to identify the implicit outcomes that the instigator seeks, which often go 
unstated because the parties already know what they are. It is also evident that the 
Russians are not looking for the Ukrainians to undertake a single, specific action to 
forestall future cyber coercion, but that it is conducting a broader campaign to prevent 
Ukraine’s integration with the West. The theoretical framework would therefore 
appear in this case to be as follows:
5. what can we do about It?
The North Korean and Russian cases demonstrate that states may indeed be using 
cyber capabilities to attempt to coerce others, but that the ambiguous nature of these 
campaigns, with their unclear threats, ambiguous attribution and lack of clarity of 
desired behaviour, makes it less likely that the coercion will succeed, although that 
has not appeared to diminish their occurrence. That said, these coercive campaigns 
are not without cost to the victims, which would indicate that some work is needed to 
counter or mitigate them. Traditional deterrence theory postulates two primary means 
for response: a threat of punishment for an action that is credible and (one presumes) 
unacceptable to the opponent, and denial of gains from an action. Professor Joseph 
Nye (2016/7) has added to these two by postulating that entanglement and normative 
taboos can play a role. Addressing the threat of cyber coercion will have to account for 
these mechanisms, but there are practical difficulties in implementing them that need 
to be addressed. Before addressing these means, however, we should examine how to 
recognize that cyber coercion is occurring.
The two case studies presented in this paper highlight two key points when seeking to 
assess whether cyber coercion is occurring. The first is to recognize that the instigator 
will not always present explicit demands; there may not be the equivalent of a ransom 
demand. In many cases of state-on-state conflict, the relationship is long-standing and 
complex, and therefore the nature of the demands may be more implied than explicitly 
stated. The Sony Pictures case shows a counter-example, where it appears that the 
demand was clearly stated: do not release the film. But in that case the second point 
comes to the fore, that the demand will not state explicitly in all cases the form in 
which threatened consequences will come. In fact, the Sony case included threats of 











to instil fear with no prospect of the threat ever being carried out; of course, US law 
enforcement authorities could not take that chance and treated the threat seriously. 
North Korea may have used the subsequent cyber operations as a means to destabilize 
Sony Pictures’ leadership, as one scholar claimed, but it is just as likely that it presented 
a tangible way for North Korea to inflict pain when other options were not open to it 
or would have proved too costly.
These considerations give rise to a set of questions to consider in similar circumstances:
• Does a state’s adversary have demonstrated or emerging cyber capabilities 
that it should track seriously? This has implications not only in terms of 
intelligence collection and analysis, but also in challenging basic assumptions. 
Both Iran’s and North Korea’s cyber capabilities took Western governments 
off-guard because they had simply assumed that these countries did not have 
the technological capabilities.
• What is the broader context in which conflict is developing? Thinking about 
a country’s cyber capabilities in isolation risks missing emerging signals that 
a coercive campaign is beginning or potentially entering a new phase where 
cyber operations could occur.
• Does the coercer have long-standing demands? Identifying these contributes 
to understanding what potential outcomes the coercer may seek and could 
assist in anticipating potential cyber coercive actions.
The threat to impose costs on others for using cyber capabilities has not prevented 
state use of cyber, though it is impossible to prove an assertion that perhaps current 
US and Western policies have prevented more egregious actions. It is far more likely 
that countries such as Russia or North Korea see little reason to fear retaliation at 
apparently low thresholds of cyber use because the consequences have been spread 
out over time and have not resulted in loss of life or significant damage to property 
that would normally invite such a response. The case studies in this paper indicate, 
however, that there is significant ambiguity around coercive actions using cyber 
capabilities, which complicates a state’s response. States that may be subject to cyber 
coercion will have to carefully examine the circumstances in which they perceive 
threats and determine whether a lower threshold for response or even pre-emption 
may be required. This carries escalation risks, of course, and could even lead to action 
against an entirely innocent state (at least in the particular situation evaluated).
Given the broad attack surface and the thousands, if not millions, of targets that present 
themselves in cyberspace, denial of an adversaries’ objectives seems an impossible 
task. The US government identifies 16 critical infrastructure sectors (with “elections” 
being an ambiguous addition in 2016) that encompass some 1,000,000 owners and 
operators. Even if a small portion of these are truly critical, such as the list of entities 
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deemed at greatest risk and potentially causing greatest harm (the so-called “section 
9” list, referring to the Obama administration’s cyber security executive order which 
was adopted by the Trump administration in its first cyber security executive order), 
adequately defending them against a vast array of threats is no easy task. That being 
said, there is evidence that states seeking to coerce others underestimate their capacity 
to endure pain, and therefore improving resiliency (as opposed to simple defence) is 
likely a vital component of a counter-coercion strategy (Jensen, Valeriano and Maness 
n.d.).
In Nye’s formulation, entanglement “refers to the existence of various interdependences 
that make a successful attack simultaneously impose serious costs on the attacker 
as well as the victim” (Nye 2016, p. 58). It is possible that this consideration has 
influenced states such as Russia and China to pursue a less integrated Internet; indeed, 
Russia has announced plans to create its own form of domain name system to undo its 
entanglement with the United States (Tucker 2017). Given that, this approach may be 
useful as a supporting line of effort but is unlikely to prove decisive. 
Finally, norms of state behaviour were a central thrust of the Obama administration’s 
work in the UN Group of Governmental Experts (UN GGE) and in its bilateral 
discussions with the Russian and Chinese governments (Finnemore 2017). For 
a period of time, this path seemed to have achieved some success, with consensus 
reports emerging over several years. However, the 2016-2017 UN GGE group 
failed to achieve consensus and concluded its work without a report on which the 
25 participating countries could agree (Korzak 2017). Of course, the establishment 
of norms as statements of principle are only the first step. Much like customary law, 
norms gain stature as nations demonstrate through their actions that they are adhering 
to these norms. The failure of the UN GGE does not in itself signal the death of cyber 
norms; it simply highlights the challenge of gaining consensus on these issues in a 
diverse group of countries that do not all necessarily trust each other to negotiate in 
good faith.
Each of these four proposed approaches has a role to play, but clearly there is no 
miracle cure that addresses the potential for states to use cyber capabilities to threaten 
and coerce those whom they seek to bend to their will. The first step is to develop 
the ability to recognize when cyber coercion could come to pass and seek to head it 
off, including with explicit warnings and leveraging the four methods Professor Nye 
identified, with particular focus on improving resiliency in the face of cyber threats. 
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6. conclusIon
This paper has argued that cyber capabilities can indeed be used as coercive tools of 
statecraft, but recognizing when they may be used and how a state can reduce their 
impact is no easy task. The context in which cyber coercion may occur is important, 
as are the capabilities that a state may develop. The increasing commodification of 
cyber attack tools, the growing legitimate, grey and black markets for these tools and 
the increasing attack surface all make cyber coercion an increasingly attractive tool 
for states. 
The case studies presented here demonstrate that cyber coercion often occurs in 
contexts of significant ambiguity. The threat actor may not make an explicit threat, 
may choose to work through proxies or deny involvement outright, or the desired 
behaviour may not be clearly stated. In the case of North Korea’s attack on Sony, there 
were vague threats at the beginning from the North Korean government, followed by 
more specific threats from an apparent proxy. The desired outcome was clear from the 
beginning, although the coercive campaign ultimately failed to prevent the release of 
the film. In the denial of service attacks on South Korean television and banking, there 
was no specific threat, nor a clear claim of responsibility in the immediate aftermath. 
Indeed, the North Korean government never made a specific demand of the South, 
but a broader examination of North Korean behaviour over decades indicates that 
the threats and desired response are long-standing and understood. Similarly, in the 
Russia-Ukraine context, Russian cyber actors are not explicitly tied to the Russian 
government, although many observers believe they are at least loosely linked. The 
desired outcome – Ukraine’s drawing back from Western integration and remaining in 
Russia’s orbit – is long-standing. In each of these examples, cyber capabilities appear 
to have played a role in a broader strategy. Examining them as stand-alone cases 
misses the broader context in which cyber capabilities are used. More work is needed 
to develop this context for states of concern to detect, respond and mitigate the effects 
of cyber coercion. 
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Targeting Technology: 
Mapping Military Offensive 
Network Operations
Abstract: State-sponsored network intrusions are publicly and frequently exposed 
but assessing how militaries conduct offensive network operations remains difficult. 
Data can be transmitted near-instantaneously, yet cyber-attacks can take months or 
even years to mature, complicating attempts to integrate them into joint operations. 
What challenges, risks, opportunities and advantages are associated with attacking 
networks? This paper argues that military offensive network operations can be usefully 
cast into a two-part taxonomy: event-based attacks and presence-based attacks. These 
are then applied to practical use-cases drawn from existing strategies, case studies 
and current military platforms. Event-based operations include all instances in which 
the target is directly and in real time attacked by compromise of its software and may 
appear roughly analogous to physical weapons. Presence-based operations include 
all network intrusions in which the attackers traverse compromised networks until 
targets are located, assessed, and weaponized for later activation, more analogous to 
a clandestine sabotage operation. Distinguishing between these two types is crucial; 
they offer different solutions, encompass varying risks, and may require different 
resources to accomplish. Event-based attacks can offer a tactical advantage against 
a single adversary platform or network. A successful presence-based operation may 
result in a strategic advantage against a stronger force. Each of the two operation types 
is broken into phases as defined by the US Department of Defense Common Cyber 
Threat Framework. The model envisions four steps in the network operation life-
cycle: preparation, engagement, presence and effect. By anchoring the assessment 
using the framework, the unique characteristics of both operation types become easier 
to analyze.
Keywords: cyber warfare, network operations, cyber attacks, offensive cyber
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1. IntroductIon
Military use of offensive network operations (MONOs) epitomizes the desire for 
cleaner, quicker, and less violent conflict. If strategic adversary coercion can be 
achieved by targeting the digital infrastructure used for both national security needs 
and daily life, enemy resolve should theoretically decrease to the point of surrender. 
This is an understandably appealing concept, but not entirely accurate. Network 
operations can assist both tactical and strategic combat efforts if all their particular 
advantages and disadvantages are accounted for. While nations occasionally release 
slivers of information on how they employ offensive network capabilities, doctrine 
and strategy remain understandably murky on how operational success is achieved in 
and through networks. 
At the core of this work is the argument that MONOs can broadly be grouped into two 
classes; presence-based and event-based. Presence-based operations are offensive 
network activities which include a lengthy intrusion component meant to establish 
a persistent presence within adversary assets, and then traverse networks and locate 
objectives. Event-based operations primarily include direct attacks intended to cause 
immediate effect against a targeted platform. Many of the currently known state-
sponsored network attacks would fall into the former category, while many network 
attacks against military hardware and software in the battlefield would fit the latter. 
All can be carried out for military objectives.
A typology for network warfare matters. When all offensive operations are assessed 
together, the results often seem muddled and difficult to translate to military doctrine.1  
Examined separately, presence- and event-based operations are shown to have 
distinctive characteristics embodying unique advantages and disadvantages. They 
require different manpower, resources and operational approaches, and can be applied 
against different targets for different effects. Some may be more easily relegated 
to battlefield use, while others are best kept for strategic maneuvers. Activating a 
presence-based operation may entail losing a crucial source of intelligence, while 
event-based attacks are inherently suitable for recurring military use. By identifying 
the parameters under which an operation or capability can be relegated to each of the 
categories, it empowers decision-makers to “release” some capabilities to battlefield 
commanders, while retaining sensitive measures within the higher echelons.
Event-based operations are roughly analogous to firing a weapon. When such an attack 
is launched, virtual ordnance traverses one or more networks, where it connects with 
the adversary’s defenses. Impact on the target – if successful – is immediate or near-
immediate. They are meant to be reusable, and the attack may be launched by a local 
fire team, a warfighting platform or from remote territory. These types of attacks – like 
1 For an example of the deliberations around these challenges, see Atkin, McLaughlin, and Moore (2016).
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their kinetic counterparts – often have localized effects meant to augment or support 
kinetic strikes (US Army 2014, 31). They may disrupt an aircraft’s onboard systems, 
degrade radar functionality or impair a regional network by way of a destructive worm 
that wipes endpoints and servers. As a corollary, such tactical network warfare works 
well in a combined arms package, jointly deployed alongside kinetic capabilities. 
Presence-based operations are roughly analogous to clandestine sabotage operations. 
A precursor successful intelligence operation results in sustained remote access to an 
adversary’s networks. From that point, attacker assets are maneuvered to enumerate 
servers and endpoints, gathering information and identifying weak points that may 
subsequently be attacked for effect. Specialized implants are fielded where needed, 
with the intent to activate when the order to do so arrives. This can manifest as a 
multi-year intrusion campaign into an adversary’s command and control network, 
logistics framework or critical infrastructure. The potential risks to friendly weapons 
and capabilities of discovery are far greater due to the extended presence “behind 
enemy lines”, as is the chance of failure. But the potential benefit is commensurately 
immense, possibly resulting in an advantage of strategic proportions. These operations 
may serve as the surprise prelude to an offensive campaign or as a means of exerting 
pressure on adversary governments. 
This article offers an in-depth analysis of MONOs for both event-based and presence-
based attacks. The model chosen as the theoretical scaffolding is the US Department 
of Defense’s Common Cyber Threat Framework (US DNI 2013), which capably 
aggregates different industry and public-sector models to provide a useful approach 
towards assessing wider network campaigns rather than focusing on individual 
intrusions. The four primary phases presented in the Common Cyber Threat 
Framework – preparation, engagement, presence, and effect – are assessed for both 
presence and event-based operations. 
While official information on MONOs is scarce, this does not imply a dearth of 
sources. The increasing tenacity of the information security industry in unravelling 
nation-state cyber capabilities provides a useful window into well-resourced network 
operations. Industry network defenders working to deconstruct organized adversaries 
have generated useful analytical models such as Lockheed Martin’s Cyber Kill 
Chain (Hutchins, Cloppert, and Amin 2011) and the Diamond Model (Caltagirone, 
Pendergast, and Betz 2013). Official publications do indeed exist, and include tactical 
accounts of how units operate on the field (Kimmons 2017), joint publications 
on doctrine (US Joint Chief of Staff 2013), strategic guidelines (Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff 2006), oversight reports (US DoD 2017) and even operational 
integration roadmaps (US DoD 2003). Although employed cautiously, even leaks 
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2 There were at least three separate leaks in the US alone. These include NSA leaks by former contractor 
Edward Snowden and by a group calling itself the Shadow Brokers in 2016, and a purported CIA leak in 
2017, see Wikileaks (2017, 7).
of highly-classified materials from network operations units such as the NSA2 can 
contribute information on context and capabilities. 
Military network operations do not exist in a vacuum. In contrast to some existing 
models, they do not begin with target reconnaissance and do not end after activating 
offensive payloads (Hutchins, Cloppert, and Amin 2011, 4–5). There are several 
strategic and tactical phases predicating the operation itself, and several that follow 
it. Similarly, there are processes that run concurrently to the network intrusion, 
interacting with work carried out by network operators to facilitate their success and 
feeding off it. These additional components are not peripheral; they are instrumental 
to an operation’s success and are an integral part of understanding offensive military 
capabilities in cyberspace. 
Some limitations accompany the scope of this work. Firstly, while the sources and 
case studies below are not limited to the US, they do favor them significantly due 
to their relative availability. Secondly, the proposed distinction is meant as a useful 
generalization for the allocation of resources and division of forces rather than a 
catch-all classification. Some niche cases may not fall neatly within one category or 
the other, and some attacks may present elements of both, such as a presence-based 
intrusion which is then used to launch subsequent event-based attacks.
2. PreParatIon
Preparation encompasses all efforts preceding contact with the enemy. The Cyber 
Threat Framework defines preparation as all collective efforts to identify targets, 
develop capabilities, assess victim vulnerability and define the scope of the operation 
(US DNI 2013, 2). Each of these processes reflects months and perhaps years of 
investment in resources, both material and operational. Thus, while it is the least 
discussed, the preparation phase of any offensive network operation may often be its 
longest. 
Before operators first interact with adversary networks, planners must first initiate 
a targeting cycle. This may seem deceptively trivial; an actor seeking to target an 
adversary will simply pursue its networks. In reality, locating, identifying and 
enumerating relevant networks for attack can be difficult (Monte 2015, 20). Modern 
militaries employ dozens of disparate networks even within a single organizational 
entity (Burbank et al. 2006, 39–42). Identifying which to attack is no negligible 
feat. It requires in-depth intelligence and an understanding of the adversary’s order 
of battle. In many cases, sensitive or operational networks do not interface directly 
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with the Internet or perhaps even with any other networks.3 This makes the notion of 
identifying them and securing access that much harder. The force commander will 
choose to pursue a target through networks only if it is deemed to be the most effective 
means of attaining the objective (Ducheine and van Haaster 2014, 313–14).
Targeting cycles are decidedly different for presence and event-based operations. 
Targeting for presence-based operations is most commonly conducted by the 
strategic intelligence entities that have network intrusion capabilities. Traditionally, 
it is within the remit of signals intelligence (SIGINT) organizations, which in 
varying jurisdictions are either civilian or military.4 As such, it is often a derivative 
component of those entities’ prioritized intelligence requirements (PIRs). PIRs form a 
fundamental national security agenda towards which agencies are expected to work, 
whether by collecting intelligence or preparing for eventual network attacks (US DoD 
2013, 24–25). Targeting is therefore a long-term process in which intelligence on the 
adversary is accumulated, increasingly providing information required to properly 
prioritize between networks by balancing feasibility and relevance to the objectives at 
hand. The result is a highly curated list of specific targets. 
Targeting for event-based operations would reasonably take place in proximity to 
the attack itself (Conti and Raymond 2017, 181–82). As a result, this cycle could 
commonly be conducted by the theatre force commander, or perhaps even a tactical 
unit lead against a limited objective. This, alongside the employment of pre-packaged 
network capabilities, entails that the decision-making process is both faster and 
conducted with far available resources. In order to identify which networks should 
be selected for subsequent engagement, the commander must identify the adversary’s 
local centers of gravity which, if compromised, would reduce enemy effectiveness. To 
accomplish this, reconnaissance assets conducting spectrum analysis and automated 
network mapping procedures may identify adversary networks in the region, possibly 
even auto-assigning ordnance against them. 
Some targets may be chosen for both event and presence-based operations, reflecting 
varying goals and opportunities. Over the last two decades, the United States has 
gradually modernized battlefield connectivity for its deployed forces. A part of 
this process, titled Warfighter Information Network – Tactical, or WIN-T, is a 
prime example of how saturated the network landscape can be. A combination of 
dedicated line-of-sight radios and satellite-communication terminals (Coile 2009, 5) 
services a host of networks including the general-purpose NIPRNet, SIPRNet5, and 
local compartmentalized data and voice networks (Epperson 2014). Many of these 
3 The idea of separating a network from all other networks is called “air-gapping” and is a widely accepted 
methodology of reducing a network’s potential attack surface.
4 In the United States, the NSA is a civilian agency. In the Israeli example, it is military unit 8200.
5 Non-Secure Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNet) and Secure Internet Protocol Router Network 
(SIPRNet): US Department of Defense networks used for unclassified and classified communications 
between and within partner organizations.
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networks enable unclassified, ancillary functions that are not mission critical. Others 
carry sensitive targeting information, communications or intelligence data. Some of 
these networks may be inaccessible as they are transmitted over a medium to which 
the attacker has little hope of gaining access. Others rely on commercial satellites and 
even the Internet as their transmission medium. Completing the targeting process by 
successfully classifying which networks both matter and are pragmatically reachable 
is therefore a challenge. In some cases, these networks may be subjected to long-
term compromise in the form of a presence-based operation. In other cases, locally 
accessible datalinks such as a regional network cell might be the target of an event-
based attack. Interestingly, the WIN-T project has now been officially terminated by 
the US military, citing concerns that the project’s architecture is indeed too vulnerable 
to a determined, well-resourced adversary (Crawford, Mingus, and Martin 2017, 6–8). 
One crucial pre-operation process is capability acquisition and development. 
Capabilities in network warfare include all hardware and software used to affect 
enemy platforms. There is some limited merit in downplaying the complexities of this 
process; unlike actual weapons, network intrusion tools can ostensibly be developed 
by anyone. Similarly, the development cycle for a potent so-called “cyber-weapon” 
is also typically deemed to be much shorter (Rattray 2001, 171), easier and cheaper 
(Nye 2010, 5). Again, there is some reason to this assertion. However, the unique 
circumstances of developing capabilities to attack networks are well worth examining. 
Each supposed advantage is mirrored by an equal or greater disadvantage. 
Presence-based attack tools must be stealthy, agile, and modular. They must be stealthy 
as the majority of their life-cycle will be spent clandestinely embedded in adversary 
networks. They must be agile to enable operators to use them creatively to traverse 
adversary networks, collect intelligence and weaponize valuable targets. Finally, they 
must often be modular to allow operators to only deploy necessary capabilities at any 
given moment, thereby reducing the footprint of the tool, a further operational security 
mechanism (Monte 2015, 124). Each deployment of a highly engineered network 
attack tool must be carefully managed to include only the components currently 
needed to facilitate success. The expectation that presence-based operational tools 
must be stealthy introduces a significant weakness: these tools become quite brittle 
in use. The pervasive notion that offensive network tools are single-use stems from 
this very issue (Libicki 2009, 83). The defensive cycle for a network adversary is 
demonstrably shorter, as detected malware can result in detection signature within 
days of its discovery by a capable defender. It is not just the particular deployment 
that is threatened; detection of an offensive platform risks its compromise against all 
targets against which it is currently employed. That is a momentous risk of capabilities, 
which explains in part why intelligence agencies often guard them so carefully. 
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It is almost inconceivable that network attack tools could enjoy the same operational 
longevity as their kinetic counterparts. One of the longest known offensive network 
operations platforms – codenamed Regin by its private-sector discoverers – was 
ostensibly operating from at least 2003 (Kaspersky Lab 2014, 3) and widely attributed 
to the NSA (Rosenbach, Schmundt, and Stöcker 2015). At the time of its discovery in 
2014, security company Kaspersky claimed that it was “…one of the most sophisticated 
attack platforms we have ever analyzed” (Kaspersky Lab 2014, 23). Once publicized 
and with its various mechanisms for communication and stealth thoroughly mapped 
and defended against, NSA operators would have had to immediately cease all 
intrusion activity until sufficient changes could be made and new evasion mechanisms 
deployed. Such an event is both an enormous investment in time and resources and 
also potentially a major operational compromise. 
Conversely, event-based attack tools must be robust, aggressive, fool-proof and 
intuitive to operate. As they would likely be deployed by frontline units, no expertise 
must be needed to wield them effectively. They must be able to operate against a wide 
range of targets in a slew of contingencies, while generating similarly predictable 
effects. Battlefield operators will not have time to dynamically redeploy modules 
or carefully orchestrate network traversal. The weapon must therefore be capable 
of autonomously completing its objectives without further assistance. Resource 
exhaustion attacks, such as the often-seen denial of service attack or generic destructive 
payloads, are common examples of event-based capabilities. 
Both presence and event-based capabilities require investment in vulnerability 
research. This entails all efforts to locate exploitable flaws in software and hardware 
used by the adversary: flaws that can be subverted to compromise the target and get 
it to either behave unexpectedly or preferably to run arbitrary code. Vulnerability 
research runs the gamut from generic-use software such as Microsoft Windows to 
dedicated software used by military hardware and other niche platforms. It is a crucial 
component in most network attack tools.
Software vulnerabilities are difficult to find both for attackers and defenders. From the 
offensive perspective, effectively exploiting critical software in a manner conducive 
to intrusions is increasingly difficult (Symantec 2017, 16). At the same time, there 
is no shortage of vulnerabilities, as data indicates that publicly disclosed, high 
severity submissions have nearly doubled in 2017 (NIST 2017). From the defender’s 
perspective – as a RAND report indicated in 2017 – unless the tool weaponizing them 
is somehow discovered, vulnerabilities last an average of almost seven years without 
being exposed (Ablon 2017, 11). Thus, maintaining an expert workforce entrusted 
with continuously hunting for new useful vulnerabilities is paramount. 
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For event-based operations, the final component of preparation is integrating 
capabilities for use with forward-deployed warfighting platforms. Presence-based 
operations are often handled by remote operators, much like drones. However, in 
many cases, especially those involving segregated networks used to communicate 
sensitive data, proximity or line-of-sight access is required. In these cases, military 
forces may find themselves delivering fire directly in the field, be it by aircraft, naval 
vessel, ground vehicle or actual boots on the ground. 
There are recent examples of event-based attacks in which network capabilities were 
supposedly integrated into battlefield platforms. The United States military operates 
infantry cyber teams to work alongside electronic warfare assets to map out enemy 
networks and identify targets (Kimmons 2017). The Russian military has, allegedly, 
disrupted Royal Air Force sorties over Syria by way of a network attack launched 
from a deployed electronic warfare vehicle (Giannangeli 2017). Developing a reliable, 
robust, battlefield-deployable offensive cyber capability is increasingly becoming 
viable, albeit expensive. Thus, while attacking networks may seem to be low-cost, 
attaining battlefield readiness and conducting event-based offensive operations may 
include hefty development, targeting and intelligence cycles. 
3. engagement
The Cyber Threat Framework defines the initial engagement phase as: “Threat 
actor activities taken prior to gaining access but with the intent to gain unauthorized 
access to the intended victim’s physical or virtual computer or information system(s), 
network(s), and/or data stores” (DNI US 2013, 4). Put simply, this phase embodies 
the attempts to intrude upon the enemy; it is the first active contact with its networks, 
intent on establishing a digital beach-head. What the framework obfuscates is the 
characteristics of this phase. Adopted from the operational typology used by Buchanan, 
the engagement phase may occur months in advance for presence-based operations or 
adjacent to the desired effect for event-based attacks (Buchanan 2017, 76–84). Not all 
cases are created equal, but all share one notable commonality; the engagement phase 
starts the operational clock. 
A ubiquitous approach to network intrusion is compromising an internet-facing server 
or device. Identifying and compromising these may be easier than directly penetrating 
segregated networks, but not all such targets are inherently useful. Operations may 
also commence by interacting with an individual rather than a machine. Strategic 
network operations intended to gain entry to sensitive networks may first need to 
compromise those who routinely use them and hold trusted access to their assets. 
The reason for this is two-fold: first, there may not be a viable technological intrusion 
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vector, as many sensitive networks are cut off from external inputs; and second, the 
users are often the most vulnerable element in an otherwise secure network (Barrett 
2003). They are prime targets for social engineering as an intrusion vector, but that 
does not mean it is always a trivial endeavor. Successfully getting individuals to 
usefully compromise their own security without arousing suspicion often requires 
expertise, preferably provided by dedicated personnel. 
In event-based operations, the engagement phase can occur in seconds. As the 
targeting cycle is similarly shortened, there is no time to craft phishing emails tailored 
to human targets or set up elaborate honeypots. Instead, the engagement phase will 
focus on compromising accessible targets by exploiting remote software and hardware 
vulnerabilities. Particularly when using automated capabilities to target warfighters or 
other connected devices, it is sometimes possible to directly attack the software to 
gain entry. The engagement phase for event-based operations may not always result 
in full access to the target, but depending on what the desired effect is, that may 
not be necessary. For example, simply attempting to exhaust available resources or 
corrupt a target’s means of communication may be possible without ever being able 
to execute code directly on the target and if the goal is to prevent the target from 
functioning as intended, that may be sufficient. Such scenarios are more easily placed 
within a military context; see for example denial of service attacks, which bear some 
similarities to conventional electromagnetic jamming.6 
The potential perpetrators for event-based operations are far more varied than their 
presence-based counterparts. In many cases, these could be forward-deployed 
offensive cyber units, such as both the US and the UK are increasingly using (US 
Army 2014, 30–32). In other instances, field staff such as human intelligence assets or 
specific warfighters may be required to facilitate the actual engagement. As Edward 
Snowden revealed in a leaked top-secret document in 2013, the NSA’s GENIE program 
to facilitate semi-automated network operations would at times rely on such assets. 
When necessary, field operators would physically infect adversary devices, plant 
hardware, or conduct short-range offensive SIGINT (NSA 2013). SIGINT agencies 
with global or regional reach could also deliver payloads from remote facilities. 
4. Presence
The presence phase is where most of the friction occurs between intruder and target. 
It is where persistent malicious software is continuously employed to understand, 
dissect, and establish a hold within the targeted network or networks, gradually 
extending the intruder’s access until it locates servers or devices suitable to achieve 
the task at hand (US DNI 2013, 5). It is the process of extending and cementing 
6 This aligns nicely with US military doctrine that situates Cyber and Electromagnetic Activities (CEMA) as 
a unified operational function, see US Army (2014).
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the reach into the adversary’s networks, two processes respectively called lateral 
movement and persistence.
The presence phase embodies the biggest discrepancy between the two operational 
categories – time spent on target. Where presence-based operations unsurprisingly 
spend most of their lifecycle in the presence phase, event-based operations may have 
an inconsequential or even non-existent presence phase. When nation-state intrusion 
campaigns are analyzed and reported to take months prior to detection, this primarily 
refers to the presence phase. The key difference in timespan reflects applicability to 
two wholly different operational tempos. For presence-based operations, the presence 
phase is essentially a cyclical process of expanding micro-intrusions in which 
additional nodes in the network are scanned, breached and subsequently assessed for 
mission relevance. This is represented well in the Kill Chain model, which threads 
multiple compromises on targeted networks into a single campaign with shared 
features (Hutchins, Cloppert, and Amin 2011, 7–8). Each intrusion must be handled 
with care to avoid tripping any alarms or informing network defenders of an active 
intrusion against them. 
Presence-based offensive operations are first intelligence operations. Until such a time 
as a more active measure is needed, malicious software is tasked with either remaining 
dormant or collecting information, identical to the behavior in an intelligence mission 
(Lin 2010, 64). As a corollary, operators in the presence phase must rely extensively 
on the assistance of intelligence analysts to assist in further targeting and dissection of 
materials exfiltrated from the target (Malone 2010, 16). In some cases, the offensive 
is carried out entirely by the intelligence agency (GCHQ 2012). The presence phase is 
thus both assessing the independent intelligence value of the target, and simultaneously 
gathering information needed to help steer the operators towards the server or servers 
where attacking would result in achieving the desired objective. 
When Russian operators initially infiltrated the Ukrainian power grid in 2015, they did 
not immediately wreak havoc on all they encountered. Instead, earlier intrusion efforts 
cleverly used the specialized protocols unique to these industrial networks to traverse 
the network, map its layout and glean the information required to develop robust 
offensive capabilities (Dragos 2017, 9). In a subsequent operation, the presence phase 
included pivoting from the power company’s corporate network onto its industrial 
network, leveraging an attack against both to simultaneously cripple the grid and 
prevent operators from fixing it (Dragos 2017, 10). Finally, advancements eventually 
allowed the operators to “…de-energize a transmission substation on December 17, 
2016” (Dragos 2017, 4) by way of the CRASHOVERRIDE malware tailored to affect 
even relatively well-defended energy grids. The Russians had achieved a malware-
induced blackout, but they had done so after a considerable amount of time from the 
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initial engagement phase. Success would not have been possible without expertise and 
accrued experience. 
For event-based offensive operations, the presence phase is nearly imperceptible. 
This is intrinsic to the attack vector; capabilities employed in an event-based attack 
are meant to impact the target directly and then disappear, leaving as few lingering 
artefacts as possible. Were tell-tale indicators to remain, such as residual code left 
running or files persisting in the target’s file system, it would simplify subsequent 
efforts by the adversary to develop future countermeasures. Thus, it is significant for 
an event-based capability to be only minimally present on enemy assets. 
A cascading effect – intentional or otherwise – may result in an event-based attack 
having a limited period of network presence. For example, an automated network 
attack tool designed to propagate through networks and rapidly destroy all infected 
endpoints and servers would require a limited presence to ensure subsequent infections 
of additional targets. A good example of such an attack is the NotPetya destructive 
malware, which in 2017 heavily affected Ukrainian networks before cascading 
beyond its scope to adversely affect various other entities globally (Perlroth, Scott, and 
Frenkel 2017). The attack, which resulted in extensive damage to victims worldwide, 
was unusually publicly attributed by numerous Western intelligence agencies to the 
Russian military.7 
The potential cost incurred in discovery is arguably the most meaningful deterrent to 
attacking via cyberspace. In recent years, a growing trend amongst large vendors in 
the information security market has been to uncover massive nation-state surveillance 
efforts, often facilitated by highly sophisticated malicious software. The immediate 
result of this compromise is an attempted rollback of all deployed assets, both by the 
original offender attempting to effect damage control and the victims who enjoy updated 
configurations for their defensive products. The product of this is a partial collapse 
of the aggressor’s intrusion infrastructure and, more importantly, the defender’s near-
immediate inoculation against future attempts to use the same tool in an offensive 
capacity. The presence phase is thus the most sensitive component in many offensive 
network operations. The continuous friction with different adversary networks and the 
need to collect intelligence means that discovery and eventual inoculation are a big 
risk to attackers. Presence operators must therefore continuously work to conceal their 
moves, clean up evidence and establish stable, covert communication channels that 
would reliably allow decision-makers to activate positioned offensive payloads when 
necessary (Peterson 2013, 123). 
7 See, for example, US Press Secretary (2018).
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5. effect
The final effect phase is where triggers are pulled. Ordnance is activated, disabling, 
disrupting or manipulating targets. Effects either translate into objectives, fizzle 
uselessly, or have unintended and potentially disastrous collateral effects. For 
presence-based operations, the effect phase is the culmination of possibly months 
of planning, targeting, intelligence collection, infection attempts and dedicated 
development (Rattray and Healey 2010, 79). For event-based operations, the effect 
phase represents the primary thrust of the attack. When Richard Clarke declared in 
2009 that “strikes in cyber war move at a rate approaching the speed of light” (Clarke 
2009, 32), he was not referring to the entire span of an operation, but rather to the 
period of time between the activation of the ordnance and its detonation on the target, 
the manifestation of the effect phase. Even so, ordnance may be instantly triggered but 
may still take time to deliver its intended effect. 
Distilling various official definitions, there are three “attack” types when targeting 
networks – disruptive, manipulative, and destructive.8 Disruptive, or suppressing, 
attacks inflict “temporary or transient degradation by an opposing force of the 
performance of a weapon system below the level needed to fulfil its mission objectives” 
(US DoD 2017, 229). Their utility increased with the rise of electronic warfare, where 
electromagnetic transmissions could be jammed to produce a temporary but potent 
effect (Army Headquarters 2003, 7). The concept of disruptive attacks has made a 
natural transition to cyberspace, where temporarily degrading the capacity of military 
resources can adversely affect the efficacy of an adversary force (US Army 2014, 9). 
Disruptive network attacks are commonplace even outside military scenarios. So-
called denial-of-service attacks capable of levying massive throughput of network 
traffic routinely disrupt the functionality of online services, big and small. The targets 
range from global gaming communities such as the Sony PlayStation Network 
(Samit 2016) to major banks (Hamill 2014). Typically, these attacks either exploit 
an implementation flaw in the targeted technology or simply attempt to overwhelm 
its available resources. No legitimate connections can interact with the platform as 
intended, rendering it temporarily disabled for its original purpose. Similar approaches 
may be applied to military technology, platforms and protocols. 
Manipulation effects attempt to alter information or functionality in the adversary 
networks, thereby deceiving operators or preventing intended system functionality. 
Such attacks attempt to alter perception, preventing an adversary from acting 
properly to further its own objectives. A scenario could include introducing a nearly 
imperceptible deviation to a weapon’s targeting process, causing strikes to miss due 
8 Adapted from the US Military’s taxonomy of “…deceive, degrade, deny, destroy, or manipulate…”, see 
US Army (2014, 17). Libicki similarly speaks of attacks aimed at eruption (target illumination), disruption, 
and corruption. See Libicki (2009, 145).
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to what could appear to be a technical glitch. Kinetically, this is hard to accomplish 
but could be roughly analogized to physically tampering with a missile’s warhead to 
secretly render it inert. When the missile fires, it seemingly behaves as normal until 
impact, when the warhead does not detonate. During the heat of conflict and until it 
happens repeatedly and consistently, it would be difficult to identify the fault as an 
attack. By the time it is discovered, it would likely already be too late. As the Stuxnet 
campaign demonstrated (Falliere, Murchu, and Chien 2011; Farwell and Rohozinski 
2011), masking a manipulative effect to increase its longevity can cause an effect to be 
repeatedly successful over time. Hiding an effect does, however, require incrementally 
introducing it; an immediate and blunt change of circumstance markedly increases the 
probability of detection.
Destructive attacks are intended to inflict damage on adversary networks, either on 
hardware, software or both. These types of attacks are firmly rooted in conventional 
warfare, where destruction of enemy assets and personnel is often seen as the 
primary method of reducing its combat effectiveness.9 When applied to network 
operations, a destructive attack could cause permanent software damage, such as in 
the case of malware which completely erases all critical files on target servers,10 or 
even permanent hardware damage, such as the previously mentioned Stuxnet worm 
targeting the Iranian nuclear project (Langner 2011).
6. challenges and oPPortunItIes
Delineating between event-based and presence-based operations allows a discussion 
on how militaries are integrating these capabilities into doctrine and strategy. They 
are markedly different in characteristics, duration, challenges, and opportunities and 
thus must not be lumped together, but fundamental similarities exist between the 
two categories and are certainly helpful in understanding networks as a medium for 
warfare; but useful observation of military capabilities will remain limited unless we 
recognize that not all capabilities must be treated the same. 
Event-based operations represent the instances in which network attacks are somewhat 
analogous to the kinetic. Like firing a weapon, an event-based operation entails sending 
a payload from attacker to target in the hope of immediately reducing its integrity or 
capacity to operate. As a result, these capabilities are often more tactical in nature, 
easier to integrate with existing military OODA loops,11 and are promising candidates 
for joint warfare. They are, however, limited in scope, may require extensive research 
9 The classic approach to warfare - most commonly codified by Prussian strategist Carl von Clausewitz 
– favours destruction as the sole means of achieving military coercion. See Clausewitz (1873) for the 
original school of thought.
10 See, for example, the 2012 Shamoon attack, in which a presumably Iranian attacker wiped thousands of 
computers at Saudi’s national gas company, Aramco (Bronk and Tikk-Ringas 2013).
11 OODA loop – A process in which combatants Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act. Military vernacular for 
conceptualising decision-making process in combat. See Boyd (1995).
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and development, and could be limited to a specific subset of adversary equipment. 
A weapon suitable for disabling a US Navy destroyer may exploit hardware-
specific vulnerabilities,12 rendering it unsuitable against other targets. Consequently, 
battlefield operators deploying such weapons must have immaculate understanding of 
their adversary and a firm control of their own options. 
Presence-based operations are intelligence missions with an offensive finisher; a form 
of digital sabotage. They may initially appear indistinguishable as operators infect 
networks and gather information necessary to craft an attack. In these phases, even if 
the target detects the malware present in its assets, it is very difficult to assess motive 
and intent. Only once offensive modules are deployed can confidence in hostile intent 
increase. This adds an unfortunate layer of political nuance, as overly successful 
network intrusions may be misconstrued by the target as unduly aggressive. The risk of 
potentially undesired escalation has been aptly covered by Buchanan when discussing 
the “cybersecurity dilemma” (Buchanan 2017), an application of the classic security 
dilemma to network intrusions between nations. 
Presence-based operations can potentially be high-risk, high-reward capabilities. 
Successfully pre-positioning assets in military or otherwise critical networks may 
potentially have meaningful impact on the course of conflict if used to facilitate 
strategic surprise or large-scale reduction in enemy capacity to operate. At the same 
time, presence-based operations are notoriously brittle, and their discovery can undo 
years of focused labor. By nature, such operations require tight, intensive, unyielding 
support of friendly intelligence assets to map the threat, generate initial persistent 
access, and successfully maneuver through complex tangles of military networks until 
the right targets are found. It is therefore understandable why these campaigns are 
often spearheaded by intelligence agencies with core expertise on network intrusions 
rather than deployed military forces. 
The Lockheed-Martin F-35 Lightning II fighter aircraft is a fascinating example of 
a platform potentially vulnerable to both presence-based and event-based attacks. 
After two decades of development, the aircraft had started active deployment 
accompanied by a host of issues with its onboard software.  These included major in-
flight failures of the radar system (Gallagher 2016), issues with its onboard avionics 
(US DoD 2016, 35), and “…276 deficiencies in combat performance [designated] as 
‘critical to correct’…” (US DoD 2017, 48). Additionally, both the onboard systems 
and the logistical software used to manage the F-35 have demonstrated numerous 
vulnerabilities during security testing procedures, many yet to be addressed as of 2017 
(US DoD 2017, 103–4). While onboard systems are unlikely to be directly connected 
to the internet (Lin 2010, 66), targeting one or more of the F-35’s prized array of 
sensory inputs and communication methods is possible for a knowledgeable adversary. 
12 These vulnerabilities do indeed exist, see for example US DoD (2017, 3).
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An event-based attack might try to overwhelm or otherwise compromise some of the 
F-35’s tactical data links, used to share data with allied assets in the air and on the 
ground. For compatibility purposes, this communication commonly occurs via the 
Link-16 protocol, an encrypted legacy protocol used by NATO forces since 1975. 
While it has undoubtedly undergone improvements over its lifecycle, the limitations 
in encrypting reliable airborne tactical traffic and the vast array of opportunities for 
US adversaries to intercept, analyze and exploit Link-16 protocol vulnerabilities raise 
the option that it may be compromised during an attack. Link-16 includes targeting 
information, location of friendly forces and directives from command forces (Hura 
et al. 2000). Interestingly, even oversight reports have indicated some issues with the 
Link-16 data that forced pilots to revert to voice communication (US DoD 2017, 70). 
Others have indicated intermittent problems with the Multifunction Advanced Data 
Link (MADL) system used to communicate between fifth generation stealth aircraft,13 
causing pilots to ‘lose tactical battlefield awareness’ (US DoD 2017, 71). Successfully 
compromising the F-35’s data links is thus not unfeasible and may severely degrade 
aircraft battlefield performance. 
The effects phase in this particular instance could include one of several options. As 
an example, a manipulation attack could alter the pilot’s perception of the battlefield 
by adding, removing, or moving specific targeting points fed to the radar subsystem 
by external channels. A disruptive attack could try to overwhelm sensory input or 
prevent the aircraft from awareness of being acquired by a ground-based air-defense 
battery. The effects would thus be nearly instantaneous, limited in scope to the targeted 
aircraft, and tactical in nature. 
A presence-based attack against the F-35 could take months to prepare, culminating in 
an elaborate effects phase saved for evoking strategic surprise or in dire need. Rather 
than targeting a single aircraft or sortie, attackers would instead target the peripheral 
networks that interface with the F-35 during its operational life cycle. These could 
be on-base networks, maintenance forces or third-party software providers. By doing 
so, an adversary may temporarily degrade or completely disable a large number of 
aircraft. 
One supposed innovation in the F-35’s software is the Autonomic Logistic Information 
System, or ALIS. With one ALIS station present at each unit operating F-35s, it allows 
semi-automated fleet management, mission management, logistics, and maintenance 
(Lockheed Martin 2009). As with other parts of the Joint Strike Fighter program, ALIS 
has been plagued with critical faults which are instructive in two relevant aspects: how 
ALIS might be vulnerable to presence-based operations; and how exploiting these 
vulnerabilities could lead to a strategic advantage when triggered in the effects phase. 
13 Currently for the US, the F-22 and the F-35. 
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The issues in ALIS are varied. Attempts to deploy it in test environments have forced 
support personnel to lower network security settings to allow users to log on (US 
DoD 2017, 96). Incorrectly handled maintenance data has resulted in one instance 
in “major damage to a weapons bay door” (US DoD 2017, 96) from an incorrectly 
loaded bomb that got loose and struck the aircraft. In June 2017, a software error 
in ALIS grounded an entire F-35 unit until the issue was addressed (Freedberg Jr. 
2017). It would therefore seem that the system can both be a boon to aircraft operators 
and an attack vector for offensive network operators. A single warfighting platform 
now presents a diverse, varied attack surface that can potentially be exploited during 
wartime. 
All military offensive network operations can be a tremendous boon to military 
objectives across all levels of operation. Each type has unique characteristics, requires 
different support staff, and may weave into doctrine at varying locations. Where 
event-based operations may assist in crippling a local adversary network to facilitate 
joint strikes, a well-placed presence-based capability may sufficiently delay adversary 
decision-making and resource martialing to strategically diminish the capacity for 
effective response. From sowing tactical chaos to deceiving a carrier strike group, 
the potential is vast – if each category is understood, respected, and contextually 
integrated.  
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Drawing Inferences from 
Cyber Espionage
Abstract: To survive a confrontation, it helps to understand other side’s capabilities 
and intensions. Estimates of opposing capabilities rest on an empirical basis but 
understanding the other side’s intentions is inferred from words and deeds.
Therein lies a dilemma common across all military domains: acts to alter the balance 
of a confrontation can also shape the inferences that the other side draws about one’s 
intentions. The dilemma also operates in cyberspace, but in unique ways.
First, efforts by one side to acquire information on the other can be read by the other 
side as preparations for a cyber attack prefatory to a military attack.
Second, others may draw inferences from the fact of cyber espionage alone, even 
though the basis for believing in a cyber security dilemma is weak. 
Third, there are ways of carrying out cyber espionage that can mitigate inferences 
that others draw about the imminence of cyber attack by, for example, limiting which 
components within a network are targeted for eavesdropping or by using penetration 
methods that do not leave arbitrary code behind.
Fourth, defenders themselves can also modulate their reactions in ways that limit 
drawing unnecessary inferences.
Fifth, expectations of how well modulating cyber espionage can convey peaceful 
intentions should be very modest.
All these are complicated by difficulties in the target’s ascertaining a penetration’s 
date, characterization, and authorship. We conclude with a call for those who would 
penetrate military-related systems to think about the inferences that the other side may 
draw if such penetrations are discovered.
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1. IntroductIon
To survive a confrontation, it helps to be mindful of the other side’s capabilities and 
intentions. Estimates of opposing capabilities often take painstaking work, but at least 
rest on an empirical basis. But understanding the other side’s intentions is something 
that needs to be inferred from words and deeds.1 
Therein lies a dilemma present across conflict domains. Acting can alter the terms of 
a confrontation to the actor’s advantage, but it can also shape the inferences that the 
other side draws about one’s intentions. Some inferences can both help and harm. 
One side may want to signal its resolve to attain and defend some objective. It does 
so by demonstrating capability, readiness, and a willingness to put people and assets 
in harm’s way. It hopes that the other side backs off. But the other side may infer not 
only that its potential foe is prepared and willing, but also that it is facing a now higher 
level of aggression. Perhaps the objective has grown or the willingness to take risks 
to achieve it has risen. So, the other side sees a growing threat – one that forces it to 
do something to recover its former level of security. Therefore, it decides to bolster 
its own capability, readiness, and willingness to fight.2 The advantages that one side 
reaps from its actions can be thereby nullified by the indirect disadvantages because 
the other side is drawing unhelpful inferences about its adversary’s intensions. 
We contend that the dilemma operates in cyberspace, but in a unique way – efforts 
by one side to acquire information on the other can be read by that other side as 
preparations for a cyber attack prefatory to a military attack.3 It hardly helps stability 
when the high degree of ambiguity present in cyberspace combines with the thin 
experience base of cyber attacks and its non-physical (hence non-intuitive) nature. 
Perhaps needless to add, what happens in cyberspace matters to conventional military 
affairs more than it used to.
This essay walks through the problems and issues that may arise when inferences 
are drawn from activity in cyberspace, particularly those that take place during a 
crisis or confrontation. One might imagine, for reference purposes, that China and 
the United States are at odds over the South China Sea; neither is certain what the 
other side wants or how far it is willing to go, even if each has a good idea of what 
physical assets are to hand. So, what considerations should go into each side’s rules 
of engagement in cyberspace?
1 The classic treatment being Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, 
Princeton NJ (Princeton University Press), 1978.
2 Elsa Kania, “Cyber Deterrence in Times of Cyber Anarchy: Evaluating the Divergences in U.S. and 
Chinese Strategic Thinking,” November 11, 2016; unpublished paper.
3 The logic that links a cyber attack to a kinetic attack is that because many of the effects of a cyber attack 
are temporary and reversible, carrying one out is pointless unless the intent is to exploit a temporary 
interruption or degradation of the other side’s information services by using kinetic forces to make 
permanent changes in the military balance or outcomes.
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In addressing this question, this paper distinguishes cyber espionage, which is 
unauthorized access to systems in order to acquire information, from cyber attack, 
which entails accessing systems in order to disrupt their operations or corrupt their 
information. To put this in the language of the CIA triad: cyber espionage affects only 
confidentiality while cyber attacks affect integrity and availability. Unfortunately, 
popular use generally applies “cyber attack” to a broad array of mischief in cyberspace, 
including the manipulation of social media. Cyber attack, in this paper, is also 
distinguished from “attack,” which is used to mean kinetic attack using physical force.
2. InferrIng cyber attacKs
from cyber esPIonage
Cyber espionage can create knowledge and  help set up cyber attacks; yet, if discovered, 
it may alter the target’s assessment of the intruder’s capabilities and intentions. The 
first is generally helpful. The second is generally harmful, in that the target may 
conclude that the intruder is preparing to fight and to do so soon. 
Although caution is therefore advised in penetrating systems whose disturbance 
may enflame the other side, in a crisis a country may want to carry out more cyber 
espionage in order to determine the status, readiness, and intentions of the other side’s 
armed forces. Indeed, as with spy satellites in the 1960s whose imagery persuaded 
U.S. leaders not to panic over the size of Soviet ICBM arsenals, or as former British 
intelligence officials would argue,4 better intelligence tends to foster stability. It 
substitutes fact for doubt in situations in which leaders believe they must assume 
the worst, and hence gird for conflict. Some risk is inescapable. Even if traditional 
espionage uses tools clearly different from those used in warfighting, the heightened 
effort to collect intelligence prefatory to bolstering defense is nearly indistinguishable 
from efforts to collect intelligence prefatory to offense. Thus, any discovery of 
heightened intelligence efforts may lead the target to react badly. 
Moreover, because a malware implant designed for cyber espionage is often identical 
to one designed for cyber attack, discovering and attributing5 one in a critical system 
could easily be viewed as a direct precursor to attack. This normally would lead the 
target to raise its alert levels, which, in and of itself may exacerbate tensions.6 In a 
crisis, not only are alert levels high to begin with, but so is suspicion of the other side’s 
motives.
4 Based on remarks by Nigel Inkster (personal communications) and Sir David Osmand (http://
carnegieendowment.org/2017/03/20/concurrent-session-i-cyber-weapons-and-strategic-stability-
pub-67884).
5 Although attribution can be uncertain, the paper focusses on two countries in a confrontation at the time of 
discovery. Thus, the target is probably more apt to blame the intrusion on the other side (because it is easier 
to impute a motive) than if there were no confrontation.
6 Paul Bracken described how ominous signs could make the other side raise its alert level in his “Strategic 
War Termination,” in Ashton B. Carter, John D. Steinbruner, and Charles A. Zraket, eds., Managing 
Nuclear Operations (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1987), pp. 197–214.
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7 The fact, for instance, that intrusions against the DNC started in the summer of 2015 strongly suggests 
that their motivation was more anti-Clinton than pro-Trump, whose nomination was hardly assured at that 
point.
8 The DNC had been penetrated for roughly a year before discovery (Dmitri Alperovitch, “Bears in the 
Midst: Intrusion into the Democratic National Committee”, June 15, 2016: At the DNC, COZY BEAR 
intrusion had been identified going back to summer of 2015, while FANCY BEAR separately breached 
the network in April 2016). Yet the FBI still argued, “The most startling exchange at this week’s hearing 
involved questions about why Russian hackers were so indiscreet when they stole e-mails from the 
Democratic National Committee and from the head of the Clinton campaign. That ‘loudness’ looks 
deliberate, Mr Comey replied.” (source: “The FBI says it is investigating the president’s campaign,” 
March 23, 2017; http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21719491-slice-country-hears-president-
victim-government). See also Julian Borger, “Trump-Russia collusion is being investigated by FBI, Comey 
confirms”, March 20, 2017; https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/mar/20/fbi-director-comey-
confirms-investigation-trump-russia: “The Russian intervention in the election was ‘unusually loud’, as if 
Moscow did not care about being caught.” 
9 Presumably, intrusions that are discovered are those that are easiest to discover. Their discoverability may 
not characterize the discoverability of the average intrusion (unless all of them are eventually discovered).
One important facet in drawing inferences from an implant is that its implantation 
would reflect conditions true at the time of its implantation rather than at the time of its 
discovery. Good forensic teams working on well-monitored networks can often figure 
out when an intrusion took place, and hence shed light on why.7 If the penetration 
predated the crisis, it may be deemed not to be part of a dynamic of escalating alert 
levels. Nothing, of course, prevents one country from implanting malware against the 
day it might be needed for attack, but discovery alone cannot support the supposition 
that any such attack will take place imminently. 
However, because many countries lack access to good forensics or fail to monitor 
their networks assiduously, the age of the intrusion may not be obvious to them. And 
until the other side figures out when the first penetration that resulted in a system’s 
compromise took place, it may, in fear, conclude that the penetration was recent 
enough to have been motivated by the crisis itself.
The target need not be not forced into one conclusion. Perhaps what looks like cyber 
espionage was just fact-finding. Yet even cyber espionage unrelated to any possible 
cyber attack is not necessarily innocent. If the compromised system tracks military 
units in real time, an implant into it is still cyber espionage, but can also be used for 
later adversary targeting. Discovering that such a system was compromised regardless 
of how long ago, should raise concerns, just not ones that require going onto a war 
footing.
Now, what if the target infers that the intrusion was meant to be seen?8 Granted it is 
difficult to distinguish between: (1) the desire to be seen; (2) an indifference to being 
seen which leads to a relaxation of operational security, thereby raising the likelihood 
of being seen; and (3) simple bad luck on the intruder’s part. The target, in drawing 
inferences from what it has discovered, may also forget that the characteristics of 
discovered intrusions are not necessarily characteristics of undiscovered ones.9 
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Still, the target’s perception that the intruder was brandishing its capabilities by 
allowing its implants to be discovered – when spies normally go to great lengths to 
hide theirs – may persuade it to see coercion taking place. It could then ask: for what 
purpose? And why now? This could have been a periodic reminder and hence not 
indicative of an imminent threat. Logically, it should not indicate an imminent attack, 
since the attacker should be at pains to mask its intentions until they are suddenly 
revealed. But it could be a warning to back down, by containing the implicit message 
that failure to do so would be dangerous.
Another complicating factor with cyberspace operations arises from the question: how 
can countries underscore the credibility of deterrence instruments (such as retaliatory 
cyber attacks) without revealing the particulars of such capabilities and thereby 
inducing countermeasures?10 Because countermeasures do not emerge immediately 
when systems prove broadly vulnerable, the target may infer that the other side is 
signaling its urgency by revealing what it can do and that it will not be needing such 
capabilities for long. If the target concludes from the intruder’s presumed willingness 
to burn exploits that the intruder needed to make a quick impression, the target may 
then ask what the occasion is or will be. 
The target may also conclude that the intrusion was undertaken to test the efficacy of 
and reaction to a cyber attack to be launched at some later date. This conclusion would 
be reinforced if it was a cyber attack, albeit a small one, that had taken place. Evidence 
for that may include the location of the intrusion, the identity of the affected systems, 
or the presence of attack code within the implant. Its placement or characteristics 
may persuade the target that the attacker has little confidence of being able to access 
the implant once the system goes to war.11 But even such a discovery would not 
be particularly good evidence of an imminent attack, especially if the characteristics 
of the implant suggested the attacker’s confidence that it could persist indefinitely 
without discovery. 
Conversely, if the target concludes that a nominal cyber attack was carried out primarily 
as a final test prior to deployment, it may expect that use to be imminent. Its fears may 
rise if the implant’s placement, characteristics and, especially, its implantation date 
suggest that the attacker was risking a high likelihood of discovery to validate or 
characterize a particular type of cyber attack. It is but a short step for the target to infer 
that discovery is evidence of discoverability, and thereby conclude that detonation is 
coming sooner rather than later. Further evidence of imminent use may be an implant’s 
fragility, in that it is not robust against the run of changes that systems undergo. Other 
indications are recent rises in the frequency or scale of communications between the 
10 See, for instance, Austin Long, Brendan Green, “Clandestine Capabilities and Deterrence in World 
Politics”, unpublished.
11 This raises the question of how to activate the cyber attack if the implant is unreachable, but the answer 
may be that activation – a one-bit decision – can be triggered on the malware’s assessment of network 
events in cases where malware cannot build attack code on the fly.
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implant and its controller, or tests of the ability of the implant to support a certain 
payload. The latter can sometimes be inferred from reading logs. 
Finally, any particular intrusion may serve several purposes. Concluding that one 
purpose may have been relatively benign hardly proves that more malign purposes 
are absent.
3. Inferences from the fact 
of cyber esPIonage alone
A country’s reaction to having simply been spied on may reflect its take on the security 
dilemma. Countries that believe that someone else’s gain is automatically their loss 
are apt to interpret intrusions more darkly than those that believe that both sides can 
simultaneously be more secure. Those inclined to believe that the other is implacably 
hostile will read events as proof of dark design; those inclined to impute a mix of 
motives to the other side will hold many differing interpretations and delay imputing 
malevolence to system intruders pending further evidence. Some will see Munich 
in 1938; others, Sarajevo in 1914. The usual caveats apply: countries with different 
political cultures may draw inferences differently, the various bureaucracies within 
a single country may disagree with one another, and members of the public, elite 
opinion, and private organizations may each have their own opinion.
Furthermore, what seems innocent after the crisis has passed may seem otherwise 
during the crisis. The human tendency to impute intent to random circumstance may 
lead to conclusions that because the discovery of implants happened to produce fear, 
they were meant to induce fear and their discovery was part of that plan. 
That noted, the technical basis for imagining a security dilemma in cyberspace is weak, 
particularly compared to contests such as nuclear missiles versus nuclear missiles 
or WWI-era land forces versus similar land forces. There are several reasons why. 
First, the contest in cyberspace is asymmetric: the best measures against cyber attack 
are cyber defenses, not an opposing cyber attack capability used for counterforce 
purposes.12 Most measures that increase defense do not allow one’s own attackers 
to enjoy greater success.13 Second, because the element of surprise is intrinsic to the 
12 In other words, the cost-effectiveness of carrying out cyber attacks on the attackers themselves would be 
low, in large part because the primary assets used in cyber attacks, computer code and intelligence, are 
essentially indestructible, and the hardware used is easily replaced. This consideration has nothing to do 
with the relative cost-effectiveness of offense versus defense, or with deterrence in cyberspace.
13 Ben Buchanan (in The Cybersecurity Dilemma: Hacking, Trust and Fear Between Nations, Oxford 2017) 
has argued that NSA intrusions have provided information on adversary intrusion (and hence attack) 
capabilities that have permitted stronger defenses. Thus, stronger defenses by potential attackers against 
penetration would have yielded weaker defenses on the part of defenders allied with the penetrators. But 
even if true, information is available only on some actors not all, such information is only part of what it 
takes for defense, and networks that benefit from NSA-acquired information are only a fraction of the total 
networks in the United States (albeit perhaps disproportionately important ones).
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success of a cyber attack, it would take great confidence in such defenses before one 
side is sufficiently emboldened by the prospect of impunity to launch its own cyber 
attacks. Third, even if all system defenses were perfect, the logic that in cyberspace 
impunity emboldens aggression must also presume that the other side will not escalate 
into physical combat. This presumption is valid only if the stakes involved are too 
small to merit violence. Fourth, the strong commercial consensus on the need for 
better cyber security in general means that actions that improve cyber security for one 
(e.g., the discovery of a vulnerability that leads to a patch, an improved understanding 
of cost-effective practices) often improve cyber security for all.
Cyber espionage, like espionage in general, also permits information to be transmitted 
in particularly credible ways. If one side in a confrontation were to aver that it 
lacked active planning for aggression, the other side may well dismiss its avowals 
as motivated. But if one were to steal corroborating information from potential foes, 
one would have to be very suspicious indeed to conclude that such information was 
deliberately planted there, particularly if finding it was hard. 
Such deception could  happen,14 but carrying on ostensibly confidential communications 
under the assumption they were wiretapped and would therefore be transmitted to the 
other side’s leadership requires either giving up all confidential channels or knowing 
in advance which channels would stay confidential and which would be penetrated. 
The same holds with even more weight if the deception involved physical evidence, 
such as the disposition of military forces. Thus, however irritated one side may be 
at being penetrated, a salve on this irritation is the presumption that one’s peaceful 
intentions have been more credibly communicated than mere narrative would allow.
4. how to KeeP on wIth cyber 
esPIonage wIthout so much rIsK
How might cyberspace spies suppress unhelpful inference-making? One way is to
loosen the correlation between being spied on and being attacked. Presumably, countries 
will not credibly promise never to attack in cyberspace; doing so forgoes a potentially 
significant military advantage and anyway would not be believed. Nevertheless, the 
correlation between espionage and attack can be weakened by copious acts of cyber 
espionage not correlated with a cyber attack. But this may backfire if the other side 
thinks that this is being done deliberately – that is, to inhibit the target from raising its 
guard after discovering intrusions that really were prefatory to cyber attack. Besides, 
being caught spying a lot tends to make one look unfriendly to begin with.
14 A great deal depends on how widely system owners start using deception. One case is France’s then-
candidate Emmanuel Macron suspecting that Russia would penetrate his campaign’s networks and lacing 
false documents in his networks. See Adam Nossiter, David Sanger, and Nicole Perlroth, “Hackers Came 
but the French were Prepared,” May 9, 2017; https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/09/world/europe/hackers-
came-but-the-french-were-prepared.html. 
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Another possible way to reduce the risk is to ensure that one’s cyber espionage 
implants lack the characteristics that would permit leveraging them for cyber attack. 
The implant may be placed, say, in a router for the purpose of capturing messages 
from an internal office system; a cyber attack launched against a router would, at 
worst, be an inconvenience that lasted no longer than it takes to round up and install a 
replacement. So, no reasonable inference about a future cyber attack could be made. 
In practice, making such fine distinctions requires: (1) that the target has systems 
worth eavesdropping on that can be distinguished from those worth attacking; (2) 
that the intruder knows which are which; (3) that the target (the network owner) also 
knows which are which and believes the intruder may want to make that distinction; 
and (4) that such differences can and will be communicated correctly to the target’s 
leadership. The first condition is clearly not up to the penetrators. The second is an 
assumption that requires a great deal of prefatory cyber espionage in the first place, 
reintroducing the very risks of discovery that the strategy was attempting to modulate. 
The third may require insight into the intruder, since the point is to understand whether 
the intruder meant simply to spy or to also set up a cyber attack. As for the fourth, one 
can only guess. 
The target’s technical experts may point out that a penetration in, say, a well-guarded 
albeit Internet-linked network is no indication of how well the more critical and hence 
often air-gapped (i.e., electronically isolated) military systems can survive attack. This 
is particularly true for a cyber attack whose effectiveness depends on good timing, 
hence on an ability to exercise real-time command and control over the implants. 
But might such leaders also remember the same technical experts arguing that these 
dearly-acquired guards would protect their conversations? And while technical experts 
may remind leaders of the many caveats that follow all assessments of cyber security, 
lay-folk often disregarded them or view them as attempts to evade responsibility for 
being wrong. Leaders may therefore be skeptical of arguments that a penetration here 
does not mean an attack there. Again, the essential role played by surprise in cyber 
operations erodes assurances of all sorts.
Lastly, is it in one country’s interest to improve another country’s confidence in the 
resilience of its armed forces in the face of cyber attack? Success at calming the other 
side would reduce the risks of overreaction that might follow penetrations into the 
networks of its military. Confidence makes it easier to dismiss the implications of 
having found the implants, because the target will conclude that they cannot affect 
a military force resilient to cyber attack. But feeding such confidence also obviates 
the value of brandishing one’s weapons in cyberspace and vitiates the corresponding 
deterrence value of one’s cyberspace capabilities. Furthermore, unless the argument 
is generic – we are resilient to such attacks, so you probably are also resilient – 
demonstrating the resilience of another side’s military systems with any credibility 
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would have to show a level of insight into the details of their systems which would be 
anything but reassuring. 
So, increases in cyber espionage unavoidably create risks if getting caught raises fears. 
5. the defender’s oPtIons
Although the target of a discovered intrusion may well infer an imminent attack and 
raise its alert levels in ways that lead to mutual escalation which culminates in war, 
nothing compels defenders to act that way. Wars are costly and risky and actions such 
as raising alert levels are not risk-free. The questionable value of running these risks 
because intrusions might be precursors to attack and pre-emption might improve the 
odds of surviving an attack suggests a place for alternative reactions. 
A great deal depends on whether such intrusions are an indicator of future aggression 
(specifically, evidence that the odds of physical aggression need to be revised upward) 
or just an enabler. If an indicator, then countries need to attend to what happens on the 
ground, so to speak. If an enabler, then policies to stop intrusions merit consideration, 
as they always should. 
Warning against further intrusions may bolster deterrence; it signals discovery, 
displeasure, and, most importantly, that the target takes these intrusions as indicators 
of potential attack. Although the standard cyber deterrence challenges apply, such as 
what constitutes an infraction that merits a response and what the response should 
be, the issue of grandfathering also merits note. Contrast cyber attacks with cyber 
espionage; if you warn the other side to stop immediately, then later attacks can be 
assumed to reflect acts of volition that took place after the warning; attacks tend to 
announce themselves at the time. Intrusions, however, do not announce themselves. 
An intrusion discovered tomorrow may have been carried out yesterday. Thus, being 
able to time-stamp the last hostile volitional activity (not simply the first intrusion) is 
important in a coherent deterrence posture.
Unfortunately, correct characterization of the intruder’s post-warning activity is not 
trivial, and the problem is worse if the intrusion leaves behind an autonomous implant, 
one that takes some actions on its own. The intruder can try to erase or deactivate the 
implant, but then imagine a target’s ire in discovering the intruder’s post-warning 
footprints. Even if discovery does not activate reprisals, it could provide a clue as to 
how the intruder penetrated otherwise inaccessible systems. After all, if the intruder 
was confident that, even in wartime, it could command and control the intrusion in 
real-time, then the implanted code would not need autonomous capabilities. Thus, 
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the existence of such capabilities suggests that the system is hard to access. Telling 
the target about the intrusion so that the target can de-activate it runs into similar 
problems and connotes an obeisance that one rival may not wish to convey to another. 
So, unless the target wants to build a narrative that would justify fighting the intruder, 
it needs to exercise forbearance or even forgiveness when it catches what look like 
violations following a warning. 
6. delIberatIng sIgnalIng
Similar issues bedevil using cyber espionage to signal broader intent, in contrast to 
using it to brandish capabilities. A 2016 study15 suggests that, if given what they think 
is the opportunity, policy-makers will try to signal their intentions through cyberspace. 
In the words of then-CIA-director John Deutsch, they may believe that the “electron is 
the ultimate precision-guided munition”,16 allowing precision signaling. Or, they may 
conclude that signaling in cyberspace is far cheaper than moving, say, warships. In 
one war game examined by the study:
Strict rules of engagement—to include no network exploitation 
of strategic command and control and limited military command 
and control—were placed on computer network exploitation with 
the assumption that these activities would be detected and would 
be interpreted as signals of the United States’ [lack of] desire to 
escalate the crisis. 
There are two reasons for being skeptical that such signaling would have the desired 
effects.
One is general to all signaling: there is no guarantee that they will correctly infer 
what you imply.17 Some inferences are contrary to fact; for example, that you have 
forces hidden when in fact you do not. Other inferences are contrary to what you 
were signaling: you brandish cyber attack capabilities to show how prepared you 
are, but they think you emphasized non-lethal capabilities because you are afraid to 
use lethal capabilities. A litany of fairly prosaic reasons can be adduced to explain 
inaccurate inference, but the simplest is that people make mistakes: they do not see 
all the evidence or they do not know how to evaluate everything they see. Being busy, 
as decision-makers typically are, they fail to pay the requisite attention to what they 
15 Jacquelyn Schneider, U.S. Naval War College, Cyber and Crisis Escalation: Insights from Wargaming, 
unpublished paper, January 2017.
16 U.S. Senate Committee on Government Affairs on the subject of “Foreign Information Warfare Programs 
and Capabilities.” June 25, 1996.




do see. Being people, they have confirmation bias: they see what they want to see and 
when evidence comes along they emphasize their prior perceptions and discard what 
contradicts it. They themselves may be good evaluators but work for organizations 
that, collectively, exercise confirmation bias. People also tend to mirror-image: if they 
see you doing something that they could have done, they may well infer that you 
are doing it for the same reasons they would have. Leaders with a high regard for 
their own personal perspicacity (which is reinforced by sycophantic assistants) may 
rely on their intuition over the painstakingly-generated insights of their intelligence 
community. Finally, the signal’s receivers may be aware of things that signalers are 
not – and they, in turn, may be aware of things that they think the receivers should 
have been aware of but were never exposed to. What you see as a signal of yours, they 
interpret as arising from internal machinations at their end. 
Unfortunately for clarity, signalers may have too little idea of what things look like 
from the perspective of receivers (who, themselves, often take pains to keep others 
in the dark). Signalers have too little idea of why recipients would think the signal 
should be read in a certain way. In the end, the signaler may be wrong, but error is 
beside the point. The reactions of those receiving the signal are entirely determined 
by facts and circumstances as they see them. Neither reality nor what the signaler 
intended to signal count, if the point is to influence their thinking. 
The other set of reasons is specific to cyberspace. Even though cyber espionage 
may be misinterpreted as preparations for cyber attack, the failure to discover cyber 
espionage may not necessarily be correctly interpreted as a lack of desire to carry out 
a cyber attack. Such an interpretation would require that the other side expects to find 
evidence of cyber espionage and then concludes that an absence of a discovery means 
the absence of activity. It also assumes that they do not find cyber espionage from 
third parties and erroneously conclude that it came from their potential foes, the most 
likely guess under the circumstances. They may easily conclude that penetrations 
carried out because of the crisis would not be discovered, because advanced persistent 
threats even from countries as casual about operational security as China has been can 
linger undiscovered for several months. Those from more careful penetrators such as 
Russia or the United States may linger undetected far longer. Even if the penetrators 
made themselves easy to find in the more benign parts of the other side’s network and 
scarce in the more sensitive areas, the more likely conclusion may be that they took 
greater pains to be stealthy in the latter case.
Hostile signals – look at us in your system – should have a greater fidelity than non-
signals. At least there is something to work with. And penetrators should want to take 
more pains going in than going out, lest they be blocked prematurely. But, to reverse 
all the cautions noted above, unless the penetration was found where it would clearly 
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be prefatory to a cyber attack, the other side could interpret their finding as evidence 
of mere cyber espionage, which may imply nothing out of the ordinary. 
Perhaps the difficulty of drawing the correct inferences from discoveries of penetrations 
in general, or implants in particular, may be eased as cyberwar examples accrete. But 
would they? While cyberspace is a very dynamic place, few cyber attacks have taken 
place at nation-state scale, as distinct from cyber espionage and cybercrimes.18  Thus, 
by the time enough incidents have accumulated to support conclusions, years may 
have passed and, more importantly, the world that such incidents describe may have 
changed so much that earlier evidence is immaterial. The problem is not that the 
technological basis of computation and communication is so fluid – with the possible 
exception of what artificial intelligence might bring, there is a fair degree of year-
to-year stability – but that the interaction between people and markets and between 
attackers and defenders is constantly evolving. Consider the many ways of creating 
flooding attacks: volunteers on their own computers, large botnets (involuntarily 
recruited zombie computers), medium-sized botnets amplified by packet reflection, 
web servers (e.g., those that support WordPress), cloud servers, and networked 
devices (e.g., video cameras) – with no guarantee that novel techniques may not be 
added to the list. The technology behind ransomware was largely available twenty 
years ago, but did not take off19 until someone showed that it could work; then many 
others jumped into the business aided, in part, by the emergence of digital currencies 
such as Bitcoin. Because measures beget countermeasures which beget counter-
countermeasures, techniques may morph rapidly in the hothouse environment that 
is cyberspace. Meanwhile, other tricks die off. Spam is no longer the problem for 
consumers that it once was,20 and changes in Microsoft Windows over the last ten 
years have complicated any strategy that relies on USB sticks as an infection vector. 
Correctly interpreting any one penetration against such a dynamic background is 
difficult.
Speculatively, future years may see a shift from first-order attack methods (the 
insertion of arbitrary executable code into target systems) to second-order (shaping 
inputs to yield unexpected outputs in the target system). This could arise because 
preserving the integrity of a system’s code base is a workable problem (e.g., by 
burning instructions into hardware, if nothing else) while ever-increasing system 
complexity leads to an exponential increase in the interaction space. Furthermore, the 
NSA at least (according to the former head of its Tailored Access Office, Rob Joyce21) 
tends to rely on hijacking credentials as much as or more than inserting malware into 
18 Notably, system intrusions for the ultimate purpose of getting money, the best example of which was 
the theft of $81 million from the Bank of Bangladesh, putatively by North Korea (which has also been 
associated with bitcoin-related theft).
19 For instance, Dan Bilefsky and Yonette Joseph, “Cyberattack in U.K. Hits 16 Health Institutions,” May 12, 
2017; https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/12/world/europe/uk-national-health-service-cyberattack.html.
20 “Spam email levels at 12-year low,” July 17, 2015; http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-33564016.
21 See his address to the USENEX Enigma 2016 conference: https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=bDJb8WOJYdA.
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systems, and hijacked credentials are less useful for cyber attack because the damage 
you can do with them is limited to the damage that the credential’s true owner can 
carry out. So, credentials may be good enough for tapping the flow of information but 
not for altering it. If so, the methods used for cyber espionage and cyber attack may 
diverge, making the world free for cyber espionage.
7. conclusIons
In a crisis, countries will be looking at indicators of all sorts, not just from within 
their network. But, as with all things cyberspace, intrusions into networks are likely 
to garner greater importance over time. As long as the methods of cyber espionage 
– notably implants – look like the methods of cyber attack, the discovery of one will 
raise fears about the imminence of the other. Unfortunately for stability, the link 
between the two is unpredictable. Discovery may or may not happen, but it is more 
likely to happen in a crisis when systems are being scrubbed more diligently. Figuring 
out when the intrusion took place (the earlier, the more benign) is a forensic art not 
possessed by all, and without such information the target may assume the worst. 
The target’s reaction, in turn, may be colored by its understanding of the security 
dilemma in cyberspace. If so, the course of wisdom may be to counter with one’s own 
signals, perhaps deterrent signals. Conversely, signaling through the manipulation of 
cyber espionage traces likely offers less fidelity than other signaling methods, which 
themselves have often been misread.
The lesson is to consider what message you want your cyber espionage to carry if 
and when it is discovered. If you do not want to inflame tensions, double down on 
operational security, but do not assume success. Thus, also avoid adding military 
targets to spy on when in crisis, or at least approach them with techniques that 
look very different from those used to set up cyber attacks. If you are brandishing 
capabilities or signaling intent, generate a narrative that anticipates discovery. But 
think this through beforehand. 
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The Topography of 
Cyberspace and Its 
Consequences for 
Operations*
Abstract: For all the focus on cyberspace as a source of security threats and a domain 
of military operations, there has been little progress on establishing a consistent 
approach to describing what constitutes cyberspace. Dozens of definitions of the term 
“cyberspace” have been developed, but consensus on its essential attributes has yet 
to be achieved. Similarly, a number of different models have been offered to describe 
cyberspace in terms of layers, such as the physical, logical and cyber persona layers 
used in US Joint Publication 3-12, Cyberspace Operations. This paper argues that 
cyberspace as a label for a domain should not be confused with the individual networks 
– some interconnected (“open”) and some relatively isolated (“closed”) – involved in 
military operations. As illustrated by the STEADFAST COBALT exercise, military 
operations often involve a complex set of networks. The paper then uses the example of 
the Internet to illustrate the need to take a topographical approach – one that identifies 
the features of the objects or entities and their structural relationships – to enable 
effective military operations. This more detailed topographical view of the Internet is 
used to illustrate how cyberspace considerations relate to existing operational doctrine 
such as concepts from the operational environment (Joint Operational Area and Area 
of Interest). Some considerations fit well within this framework. Others require some 
adaptation, such as shifting some responsibilities to a centralized and persistent 
function such as the Cyberspace Operations Centre (CyOC) being established by 
NATO. Others fall outside military control and are better addressed through civil-
military cooperation. This example also illustrates how precision in describing the 
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For all the words that have been written about cyberspace, the lack of a consistent 
definition and approach to describing it remains one of the biggest obstacles to 
achieving an effective foundation upon which to advance the state of theory and 
practice. When the NATO heads of state and government recognized cyberspace as a 
domain of military operations at the Warsaw Summit in 2016, they managed to do so 
without actually defining what cyberspace constitutes. While constructive ambiguity 
might be a useful tool in political negotiations, it becomes an impediment when trying 
to develop techniques, tactics and procedures for military operations. 
The lack of precision in defining what cyberspace comprises undermines the 
development of effective military responses to its threats and risks because it leads 
to generalizations that are inaccurate at best and misleading at worst. In a 2015 paper 
titled “On Cyberwarfare”, for example, Fred Schreier postulates five characteristics 
that make cyberspace unique, including that “the cost of entry into cyberspace is 
relatively cheap.” Because of this, he argues: “The resources and expertise required 
to enter, exist in, and exploit cyberspace are modest compared to those required for 
exploiting the land, sea, air, and space domains” (Scheier, 2015). This point about 
the low cost of entry is often repeated in discussions of cyberspace and its security. 
For example, the US Army’s most recent edition of one of its most basic doctrine 
publications, Field Manual 3-1, Operations, states that:
Cyberspace is highly vulnerable for several reasons, including 
ease of access, network and software complexity, lack of security 
considerations in network design and software development, and 
inappropriate user activity (US Army, 2017).
The official NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions (AAP-6) does not yet offer 
a definition of the term “cyberspace”. The US Department of Defense issued at 
least twelve different definitions over the years before issuing its joint doctrine on 
cyberspace operations in 2013 (Singer, 2014). In its list of cyber definitions, the 
NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCD COE) has collected 
composition of cyberspace is essential if military operations in and through cyberspace 
are to develop into a mature discipline with a solid base of concepts, terminology, 
techniques, tactics and procedures.
Keywords: cyberspace, cyberspace operations, cyberspace topography
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29 examples for “cyberspace”– some identical, some similar, some very different 
(CCD COE, 2017). It is not surprising, then, that as significant a figure as General 
Michael Hayden, who as Director of the National Security Agency and Director of 
Central Intelligence was at the center of the initial development of US cyberspace 
operational capabilities, has written that: “Rarely has something been so important 
and so talked about with less clarity and less apparent understanding….” (Hayden, 
2011).
2. cybersPace, networKs and 
cybersPace lIttorals
One of the basic misunderstandings of cyberspace is the assumption that it is 
synonymous with the “global grid” of the Internet and public telecommunications 
networks. By at least three orders of magnitude, the Internet is certainly the largest 
instance of cyberspace. The Internet Protocol version 6 address space has the capacity 
to encompass 2128 addresses, or something on the order of ten million trillion times 
the total number of grains of sand on all the beaches in the world. It has also reached 
many more users than any other network ever developed. It is estimated that, as of 
mid-2017, over 50% of the world’s population are able to access the Internet (World 
Internet Users and 2017 Population Stats, 2017). 
While the Internet is certainly the largest network in cyberspace, it is not the only one. 
There are still many networks that do not interconnect with the Internet. Closed networks 
such as classified intelligence, law enforcement and military networks are perhaps the 
most obvious examples. Others include such closed networks as that operated by the 
Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) to provide 
secure messaging to support international financial transactions. In discussions of 
the application of international law to military operations in cyberspace, such as the 
Tallinn Manual 2.0, “public, internationally and openly accessible” networks, such 
as the Internet, are explicitly distinguished from “closed military” networks, in part 
because this distinction can be important, for example, in determining the appropriate 
rules of engagement (Schmitt, 2016). Further, as Dror Kenett and his colleagues have 
written, “In most real-world systems an individual network is one component within a 
much larger complex multi-level network”– a network within a network of networks 
(Kenett, et al., 2014).
Each of these networks of networks is an instance of cyberspace. Within a single 
network there is, at least in principle, the possibility of end-to-end connections: the 
ability to transfer data, enable transactions, disseminate information, or, from the 
standpoint of cyberspace operations, create effects. The sum of all the networks that 
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exist equates to what is referred to as cyberspace in conceptual discussions, but it 
quickly becomes problematic to make assertions that there are characteristics – such 
as ease of access – that apply universally across all known networks. Ease of access 
may be a characteristic of the Internet, but it is certainly not a characteristic of a highly 
secure network and largely isolated network such as SWIFT.
This distinction between cyberspace as a label for a domain of military operations and 
individual networks as particular instances of cyberspace is no different from how 
the term domain has been applied in the context of air, land and maritime operations. 
While the Earth is wrapped in an atmospheric blanket we refer to as air or aerospace, 
much of it is divided into airspaces (plural) that are under some level of control – 
usually national – for such purposes as air safety and national security. Armies concern 
themselves with land operations, but these must always be tailored to the conditions 
of a particular location (desert, mountain or jungle). And even the simple distinction 
between surface and subsurface has profound implications for maritime operations. 
Indeed, the term “waterspace management” is specifically used for the coordination 
between submarine and anti-submarine operations.
The need to recognize that cyberspace is more than just the Internet is of critical 
importance when it comes to planning, organizing and carrying out military operations. 
In a complex, communications-intensive coalition operation such as that simulated in 
STEADFAST COBALT – NATO’s annual command and control (C2) interoperability 
exercise – myriad networks, information systems and communications transmission 
systems are employed. These networks include NATO’s unclassified Intranet and 
its classified network as well as the national equivalents for most of the coalition. 
The classified networks are then federated through a mission network as a primary 
interoperability and C2 environment. In addition, the operation will often employ 
other classified networks handling intelligence or other sensitive data. 
The information systems for these operations range from what are termed “core 
services” – electronic mail, websites, collaboration and office automation – to 
functional services such as Common Operational Picture and Order of Battle 
managers. Numerous support applications, such as logistics, movement and spectrum 
management and external communications tools, such as public affairs, strategic 
communications and social media, will also be involved. These information systems, 
along with voice and video traffic, are connected through transmission systems that 
include both wired and wireless media. Wireless communications span radio frequency 
bands reaching from VLF (Very Low Frequency) through HF (High Frequency) 
and VHF (Very High Frequency) to UHF (Ultra High Frequency) and SHF (Super 
High Frequency). And no military operation today can be carried out without heavy 
reliance on Positioning, Navigation and Timing (PNT) services such as the Global 
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Positioning System (GPS), almost entirely carried over portions of a very crowded 
radio spectrum.
If one looks at the networks at static military facilities, this complexity only increases. 
The number of networks and information systems in static facilities, as well as the 
variety of classifications and handling controls of the information they support, 
typically exceeds that in deployed operations, if only because of the much wider 
range of functions supported. Some of these are directly connected to the Internet 
and some are “air-gapped” – isolated from the Internet and other networks through 
a combination of physical separation, personnel clearances, classification, handling 
restrictions and encryption. Fewer and fewer military organizations, however, are 
finding it possible to operate effectively with completely isolated networks, and 
the pressure to share information is driving them to close the “air gaps” by means 
of security mechanisms such as guards, gateways, diodes, or encryption, thereby 
introducing potential vulnerabilities.
Many of the networks, information systems and transmission systems used in deployed 
operations are anchored through reachback links to these static facilities, which are 
themselves linked through numerous wide area networks, operating at different levels 
of classification. Here again, some of these wide area networks are connected to the 
Internet, directly or indirectly, and some operate over dedicated transmission systems. 
Because dedicated radio and cable transmission systems tend to play a much smaller 
role in the interconnection of static facilities than they do in deployed operations, most 
wide area network connections between static facilities are reliant on commercial 
leased circuits or tunneled IP services. 
Every network also connects to what Paul Withers has termed “cyberspace littorals” 
– the places where individual instances of cyberspace meet other domains (Withers, 
2015). These cyberspace littorals include: the physical infrastructure, including fences, 
buildings, gates and transportation networks, within which any equipment providing 
the cyberspace resides; the radio frequency spectrum through which the cyberspace 
transmissions are carried; the critical infrastructures such as electrical power and water 
that support the equipment and its supporting personnel; the cyber-physical systems 
used to control critical infrastructures, force protection systems, industrial systems 
and even cars and trucks; and finally, the cognitive dimension of decision-making, 
doctrine, perceptions and even the attitudes shaped through mass and social media. 
The term “littoral” should be familiar to military personnel from its use in describing 
the zone in which the responsibilities of land and maritime forces converge in such 
operations as amphibious assaults. Applying this term to cyberspace helps to identify 
those areas in which the responsibilities of cyberspace operators converge with 
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those of existing military disciplines such as physical security, force protection, area 
defense, electronic warfare and psychological operations (PSYOPS). It can be useful 
in better understanding the roles a particular network plays in a military operation 
and in determining how it can be defended. Indeed, protection of the electromagnetic 
littoral through spectrum management and electronic countermeasures, for example, 
can be more critical to the success of a deployed operation that is heavily dependent on 
radio and satellite communications than any combination of cyber security measures. 
In the same way, understanding an adversary’s cyberspace littorals can help identify 
effective ways to exploit or disrupt an adversary’s use of cyberspace (although this 
paper does not address offensive considerations). 
3. the toPograPhy of one Instance of 
cybersPace: the Internet
Accurately identifying and understanding the characteristics of any particular network 
as an instance of cyberspace requires a closer look at its topography – the features 
of its objects or entities and their structural relationships (Merriam-Webster, 2018). 
What networks connect to it? Where and how do they connect? How big is it? What 
types of communications and transactions does it support? And what are the specific 
features of its littorals? Although the Internet is just one of the networks involved in 
a military operation, an overview of its topography provides useful insights into how 
it can be approached in the context of a military operation. It also reveals aspects that 
military operations are ill-prepared – and arguably ill-suited – to address. 
Let us consider, then, the Internet as it might be employed in support of an operation 
in which a NATO command element and a coalition of forces from NATO and 
partner nations deploy to an operational theater under the mandate of an operational 
plan approved by the North Atlantic Council. As with the STEADFAST COBALT 
exercise, classified networks are still the primary networks employed to support 
NATO operations. Indeed, for these operations, the reliance on classified networks 
remains perhaps the single most effective protection against not only conventional 
military threats, but also threats from the Internet. As standard practice, however, the 
NATO Unclassified network, which is connected to the Internet through managed 
gateways hosted in static NATO command structure facilities, is extended to support 
the NATO command element and eligible parts of national forces. Many nations do 
much the same, deploying equipment forward to enable access to one or more national 
networks that are also connected to the Internet. 
So, the Internet, the direct and indirect dependencies of his mission on it, and 
the resulting risks are all considerations for the operational commander. From a 
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topographical standpoint, every device that can connect to the Internet – directly or 
indirectly – shares access to a common space defined by an Internet Protocol address 
(whether version 4 or version 6) and the core Internet link, internet, transport and 
application protocols (IETF, 1989; IETF, 1989). This is the common plane or elevation 
(to use a topographical term) on which all Internet-connected devices converge. 
This is the part of the Internet for which ease of access is indeed its most salient 
characteristic, and it is understandably the space in which vulnerabilities and attacks 
that exploit them are most frequently experienced. 
As has often been noted, these protocols were designed primarily for fault tolerance 
and not for trustworthiness or the presence of malicious actors. Consequently, it 
is also the space where most cyber security efforts are focused. With the growing 
sophistication of the threats (as one recent Cisco (2016) report puts it: “the time of 
amateur hackers is long over, and hacking is now an organized crime or state-sponsored 
event”), however, some in the field of cyber security are arguing that their goal must 
shift from intrusion prevention to intrusion tolerance – to what has been called the 
“assume breach” paradigm (Cisco, 2016; Pompon, 2016). While this approach may 
be new to the Internet, military personnel will recognize it as an example of operating 
in a contested environment.
Every point of interconnection between information systems supporting military 
operations and the Internet is a point of exposure to such attacks. Even if such 
interconnections are minimized or eliminated, these measures do not address the extent 
to which the Internet has become embedded into most individuals and organizations in 
the developed world – any of which can, directly or indirectly, represent a dependency 
for the operation. As Dan Geer has put it, “If […] you are dependent on those who are 
dependent on the Internet, then so are you” (Geer, 2013). 
The risks arising from the use of the Internet in industrial control systems (ICS) and 
supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems to manage critical national 
infrastructure such as electrical power generation and distribution is of growing 
concern for military operations. Combat and direct support units typically bring their 
own critical infrastructure in the form of power generation, water treatment, field 
medical units and other support functions when they deploy. However, this level of 
autonomy is rare at the reachback command and support facilities to which they are 
connected, and even the autonomy of deployed units is constrained if this reachback 
support is disrupted for more than a short time.
If one digs into the Internet below the link layer and looks at the next layers down – 
what in the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model are referred to as the data link 
layer and the physical layer – ease of access can no longer be taken for granted. Access 
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to traffic at these layers requires access to the physical transport medium, meaning the 
radio frequency signal or telecommunication cable carrying the data. It requires the 
attacker to be within the range of the WiFi access points or to have physical access to 
the actual cable plant of a local area network or to the cabling carrying traffic across 
the wide area network through the services of telecommunications providers. The first 
two – access to WiFi networks and local cable plants – are well within the control of 
most military commanders. While WiFi vulnerabilities are well known and frequently 
exploited, so are relatively cheap and effective methods to defend against common 
threats. However, WiFi availability remains problematic, as WiFi jammers can be 
easily purchased or manufactured, unless the commander can assure the physical 
security of all space within jamming range. 
Most of the physical transport media carrying Internet wide area traffic, on the 
other hand, lies outside a commander’s control. For short-term deployed operations 
this is not an issue, because any extension of Internet access to the theater is likely 
carried over military radio or satellite communications links rather than leased lines. 
These links are typically protected against a wide range of threats through the use of 
encryption and anti-jamming mechanisms.
For static facilities, however, the risks arising from dependence on external 
telecommunications infrastructure are a fact of life, frequently demonstrated 
through the phenomenon known as “backhoe fade” – damage to underground 
telecommunications cabling caused by construction equipment. In its 2016 Damage 
Incident Reporting Tool (DIRT) Analysis and Recommendations Report, for example, 
the Common Ground Alliance (2017) reported that nearly 130,000 events (breaks or 
damage to telecommunications cabling) occurred in the United States and Canada. 
The potential to exploit or disrupt submarine telecommunications cables is one that 
has long been known to, and used by, nation states with sufficient technical and 
operational means (Khazan, 2013).
The Internet also depends on the whole infrastructure of intermediaries involved 
in any end-to-end communication: foremost, the applications, equipment, facilities 
and personnel of the Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and Tier 1 (settlement-free 
interconnection) network providers. The days of the “ISP in the garage” are long 
past and the vast majority of Internet traffic is carried by a small number of Tier 1 
providers. According to the Center for Applied Internet Data Analysis, the top 10 Tier 
1 providers support interconnections for over 4.8 billion IPv4 addresses (CAIDA, 
2016). In addition, commercial data centers, including those supporting cloud services, 
have already overtaken the size and capacity of private enterprise on-premise server 
rooms and data centers, and an increasing number of public and military organizations 
are shifting applications and services to external data centers and cloud providers. 
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Finally, this infrastructure also provides much of the intermediary transport media for 
long-distance telecommunications, which have largely been migrated from circuit-
switched to IP transport services. 
These providers operate the core physical infrastructure of the Internet that a Belfer 
Center report recently described as “too connected to fail” – in other words, whose 
failures could have widespread and potentially global impacts (Snyder, 2017), 
although these providers have also recognized that high availability and effective 
physical and personnel security are integral to a viable business model in a highly 
competitive market. Top-end hyperscale data centers feature security and resiliency 
measures that equal or exceed those of the most secure military command posts 
(Branscombe, 2016). These data centers illustrate one of the paradoxes of security on 
the Internet: while they are protected by many layers of physical security and maintain 
low profiles to avoid drawing attention to themselves – that is, they fit the profile of 
a “closed” network facility – many of the services they host are available to anyone 
with an email address, a valid credit card and access to a device running the essential 
IP protocol stack – in other words, they host “open” services.
Moving up from the core IP protocol layers of the Internet, one encounters the diverse 
set of software applications – core and functional services – that play a role in a 
military operation. Here again, ease of access varies widely and should not be taken 
as a “one size fits all” measure. For those applications that are available as open source 
or commercial off-the-shelf, the attack surface and the potential threats tend to be 
closely related: the more people using an application, the better the chance that attacks 
have been developed to exploit their vulnerabilities. For the many custom-developed 
applications employed in military operations, on the other hand, access to source or 
executable code, development and test documentation, and especially operationally 
relevant data, is much more limited. However, the simple cost of developing custom 
military software applications tends to prevent rigorous vulnerability testing.
Finally, moving up from the applications layer in the Internet, one leaves the man-
made technical environment and enters what Withers calls the cognitive dimension: 
decision-making, doctrine, norms, perceptions and attitudes. This is easily the most 
complex dimension, but it is also not a new consideration for military operations. What 
is new is the role the Internet plays in enabling access to the cognitive dimension, 
both through new applications such as social media and streaming video and through 
new outlets for old applications such as electronic mail, chat, news reporting and 
psychological operations. 
Even in the complex cognitive dimension, however, ease of access is neither universal 
nor something that can safely be taken for granted. At the simplest level, language is 
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still an effective barrier to entry. English might be the predominant language on the 
Internet, but it still ranks behind Mandarin and Spanish in number of native speakers. 
Context is another: although spearphishing still succeeds in fooling some users to 
click on links in untrustworthy emails, it would be much more difficult to convince a 
military operator to trust an email pretending to be a fragmentary order (FRAGO), if 
only because such communications are usually confined to military message handling 
systems. Finally, just because there is content on the Internet, it does not mean that 
anyone is looking at it. With over 1.3 billion websites alone, let alone social media 
services aimed at mobile users, there are a lot of opportunities to miss the audience.
Revelations about Russian manipulation of social media and its role in the 2016 US 
presidential election have certainly demonstrated how effective social media can be 
in advancing state aims. A recent report from Freedom House stated that: “Online 
manipulation and disinformation tactics played an important role in elections in at 
least 18 countries over the past year” (Freedom House, 2017). Skillfully positioned 
and executed, social media can be highly effective. Just six Facebook pages intended 
by Russian operators to sway US voter perceptions stimulated over 18 million 
interactions with other Facebook users before being shut down (McCarthy, 2017). As 
Michael Schmitt, editor of the Tallinn Manual and Tallinn Manual 2.0, has written, 
the Russian example illustrates the potential for states to exploit “grey zones” – areas 
where “international law principles and rules… are poorly demarcated or are subject 
to competing interpretations” (Schmitt, 2017).
4. the Internet and the 
oPeratIonal enVIronment
Part of the task of integrating cyberspace as a domain of military operations is that of 
fitting into an existing framework of operational doctrine. One aspect of this doctrine 
is that of the operational environment. NATO’s basic doctrine for military operations, 
AJP-3(B), Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations, sets out the operational 
environment in terms of areas and boundaries. In particular, the Joint Operational Area 
(JOA) is defined as the “temporary area defined by the Supreme Allied Commander, 
Europe (SACEUR), in which a designated joint force commander plans and executes 
a specific mission at the operational level” (NATO, 2011 p. 1-23). While AJP-3(B) 
recognizes that “the operational environment is expanding, becoming more dispersed 
and non-linear”, the intent of the definition of the JOA remains to ensure that all 
elements of a joint force “have a common understanding of its principal boundaries” 
(NATO, 2011 p. 1-22). 
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AJP-3(B) also establishes the concept of an Area of Interest (AOI), which it defines 
as “the area of concern to a commander relative to the objectives of current or 
planned operations, including his areas of influence, operations and/or responsibility, 
and areas adjacent thereto” (NATO, 2011 p. 1-23). These operational environment 
constructs have traditionally been defined in geographic terms and are intended to 
help the commander and operational planners to bound the area within which forces 
are employed and effects achieved. The operational environment also helps delineate 
the boundaries of command and control authorities and the rules of engagement.
Taking the topographical overview of the Internet as it relates to a NATO operation 
as above, there are aspects that fit well within the existing concept of the operational 
environment. The actual equipment used to access these Internet-connected networks 
and the troops supporting it in the operational theater – the cyber boots on the ground 
– clearly fall within the JOA. The equipment is an asset that must be protected as any 
other physical asset belonging to the forces in theater, and the troops are under the 
joint force commander’s force protection responsibilities. In the same manner, the 
joint force commander would be expected to exercise operational control to ensure the 
availability, confidentiality and integrity of the information processed by these assets, 
whether against kinetic weapons, electronic warfare capabilities or cyber effects. This 
responsibility also extends to the data link and physical layers described above, so 
cabling and WiFi signals must be protected as well.
Interconnection to the Internet, however, is a primary reason for deploying this 
equipment to the theatre, and the gateways in the reachback facilities that provide 
those interconnections likely fall outside the geographical boundaries of the JOA. 
These anchor points and gateways may also fall outside the joint force commander’s 
direct operational control. NATO is not alone in assigning the responsibility to run 
the information systems and networks supporting static military facilities to a civilian 
organization outside a direct military chain of command. For these reasons, the 
command and control (C2) arrangements between the joint force commander and the 
organization(s) providing his reachback support can be complicated and problematic. 
The commercial service providers responsible for the interconnections between these 
gateways are certainly both outside the JOA and outside the commander’s operational 
control, as are the vast number of Internet users, devices, applications, data and 
services and the physical infrastructure supporting them that lie on the other side of 
the NATO and national static gateways. This also applies to most, if not all, of the 
Internet-connected critical infrastructures that might be supporting the operation of 
the static command and support facilities.
Given the prevalence of threats against the Internet and the networks that interconnect 
with it, it should also be clear that all of these aspects fall within what NATO doctrine 
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would consider the joint force commander’s AOI. Each presents a greater or lesser 
risk to the success of the operation. Understanding and managing such risks, however, 
presents a significant challenge for a deployed commander. The already difficult 
task of situational awareness in cyberspace is further complicated by limitations on 
bandwidth to the theater and on the tools and expertise of the analysts in theater. 
This is one reason why NATO, following the example of numerous nations, is 
centralizing its support for cyberspace situational awareness and operational planning 
support in the Cyberspace Operations Center (CyOC). It is far more effective to 
concentrate the technical, intelligence and operational expertise required for a credible 
cyberspace situational awareness capability than to attempt to replicate them in one 
or more operational theaters. However it is organized, this capability – even given 
the limitations of existing tools, models and data sources – is essential for effective 
military operations. Another reason is that Internet threats and their risks to operations 
often arise outside the JOA, not just in terms of geographical boundaries but also 
in terms of timeframe. Indeed, some of the most significant risks arising from the 
Internet are those we refer to as advanced persistent threats. Establishing a centralized 
and persistent situational awareness, planning and coordination capability is perhaps 
the single most important way in which existing NATO operational doctrine is being 
adapted to accommodate the unique aspects of cyberspace as a domain.
The delineation of the operational environment geometry also needs to extend to the 
littorals of the Internet-connected networks supporting an operation. Protection against 
physical and electronic threats has already been mentioned and is generally within the 
scope of established capabilities. Likewise, long-standing military practices developed 
well before the rise of the Internet, such as the use of radio silence, minimize, visual 
signaling and operational security (OPSEC), can still be of use to mitigate or avoid 
risks presented by Internet-based threats.
The cognitive dimension, however, still presents challenges. Clearly within the JOA 
and the commander’s operational control are the troops in theater: their decisions, 
perceptions and actions, and how they communicate them, including over the Internet, 
are his responsibility. In the same way, he is responsible for how the joint force 
influences the perceptions of the adversary and affected populations, which is why 
psychological operations, information operations and strategic communications are 
integral to military operations. The Internet represents both a medium for conveying 
his messages and for assessing perceptions among targeted audiences.
As the examples of state-sponsored manipulation of social media demonstrate, 
however, Internet-based threats are emerging that are difficult to fit into the 
traditional concept of the operational environment geometry. Indeed, it could be 
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argued that military operations are not the appropriate mechanisms to target what 
are purely civilian objects (Harrison-Dinniss, 2015); but the key problem in applying 
the operational environment geometry is that these threats currently fall into what 
Schmitt calls the “grey zone,” where boundaries of operational control are informed 
and guided by international law. As Schmitt has put it: “The brighter the redlines of 
international law as applied to cyber activities, the less opportunity states will have to 
exploit grey zones in ways that create instability.” (Schmitt, 2017) And the easier it 
will be to delineate how to draw the lines of military responsibility and interest.
The closed networks required to support an operation tend to have far fewer cyber 
defence considerations for a commander than the Internet. The example of the 
Internet’s topography is offered, however, to illustrate that it is certainly possible 
to sort these considerations into three rough categories: those within the JOA and 
under operational control; those within the AOI and within some level of control, if 
indirect; and those that fall well outside both military authority and the means of any 
commander to control. By sorting the cyberspace considerations for an operation into 
these three categories, commanders can begin to identify where effective military 
response options exist and where they do not.
Those considerations that are within the JOA and within the commander’s operational 
control are those for which existing doctrine is most suitable. Considerations in 
this category must clearly take first priority for operational planning and situational 
awareness. This is the area where planners need most to be informed by intelligence 
about the physical, electronic and cyber threats to be expected in theater. This is also 
where the commander needs to assess the value of such tried and true practices as the 
use of radio silence, alternate communications and minimize to mitigate or avoid the 
risks these threats might present. Finally, this is where the protection – or vulnerability 
– of cyberspace littorals can have the greatest direct impact on the operation.
The next category covers those considerations that are within the commander’s AOI 
and within some type of C2 arrangement, however problematic. From a planning 
standpoint, considerations in this category are better addressed by a central and 
strategically-placed function such as the CyOC for the reasons noted above: theater-
based limitations (bandwidth, tools and personnel) and the fact that many of these 
considerations derive from conditions that are persistent and not tightly coupled to the 
specifics of the operation, and which likely span multiple operations.
The third category covers those that are within the AOI but outside operational control, 
even via C2 arrangements. Most of these considerations, such as the protection of 
critical infrastructures, the security of Tier 1 Internet providers and hyperscale data 
centers, and state manipulation of social media and other examples of what Schmitt 
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terms the “grey zone” are wholly outside the military span of control. These challenges 
can only be addressed through political, diplomatic, legal or regulatory channels. 
Such liaison falls well outside the current scope of Civil-Military Co-operation 
(CIMIC), which is typically focused on liaison between the joint force commander 
and civilian authorities in theater. Another important adaptation of existing doctrine 
to accommodate cyberspace may be in developing persistent versions of CIMIC 
between centralized military capabilities like the CyOC and their civil counterparts.
5. conclusIons
There has been no shortage of sweeping generalizations in much that has been written 
on cyberspace operations and cyber security. As NATO and national militaries work 
to establish cyberspace as an operational domain, precision is essential to developing 
a mature discipline with a solid base of concepts, terminology, techniques, tactics 
and procedures. One such precision is to recognize that operations in the domain of 
cyberspace always involve specific networks of networks, of which the Internet is 
only one. Another is to recognize that the characteristics, threats and risks associated 
with any particular network vary depending on which aspect of its topography 
is considered. The ease of access that exists on one plane or elevation, such as the 
common core set of Internet Protocols, might not characterize another, such as that of 
submarine telecommunications cables.
This precision is also important to integrating cyberspace into existing doctrine. 
Cyberspace considerations that fit well within existing constructs such as the JOA and 
operational control can, for the most part, be addressed by the operational commander 
in theater. Others are better addressed by a central cyberspace operational planning and 
situational awareness function such as the CyOC being established in NATO. Finally, 
there are considerations that either fall clearly outside the scope of military control, or 
for which such demarcation is still difficult. For these, effective mechanisms for civil-
military co-operation need to be established. Such a framework can channel efforts 
in a practical way and help speed the process not only of implementing cyberspace as 
an operational domain but of better defending the Alliance against the threats arising 
from the Internet and the other networks it depends upon.
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Net Neutrality in the 
Context of Cyber Warfare
Abstract: Real or potential connections between infrastructure of different security 
levels, from relatively unprotected individual users up to interfaces with critical 
national infrastructure, have made cyberspace a highly contested and congested 
domain. But operating conditions within this domain strongly favour malicious 
actors over legitimate operators seeking to provide security and protect systems and 
information. Technical capabilities to establish dominance and cause damage in this 
domain are widely distributed, but legal and ethical constraints prevent legitimate 
actors from using them to their full potential. 
Within this context, net neutrality presents a limiting factor on the capability of legitimate 
actors to respond to harmful activity in cyberspace whose common aim is to install and 
uphold a technical imbalance. Under the principle of net neutrality, each data packet 
must be transmitted with equal priority, irrespective of its source, destination, content 
or purpose. This is disadvantageous to cyber defence. Comparisons to jungle or arctic 
warfare, where operating conditions are neutral and degrade the performance of each 
combatant side equally, are invalid, as malicious operators are capable of technically 
manipulating data traffic to their favour. While both malicious and legitimate actors 
may have comparable capabilities, legitimate actors are bound to legal and political 
restrictions, making them immobile in several cyber warfare scenarios. Transferring 
the principles of net neutrality to real life scenarios corresponds to depriving military, 
police and emergency operators from any privilege that allows them to respond to an 
incident – in effect, depriving them of their blue lights and emergency powers even in 
severe incidents targeting critical infrastructure that may threaten civilian lives.
This paper investigates the potential opportunities and challenges of an adjustment 
to the principle of net neutrality to facilitate defensive action by legitimate actors; 
how this adjustment could contribute to regaining control in congested cyber domains 
Kim Hartmann
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1. IntroductIon
The long-running debate over net neutrality gained unprecedented prominence 
in public attention during the autumn of 2017 as United States Communications 
Commission (FCC) chairman Ajit Pai proposed the repeal of policies dating from 2015 
that safeguarded net neutrality in the US. The public discussion on net neutrality was 
primarily concerned with potential abuse and the prospect of forming and protecting 
positions within specific markets such as the telecommunications sector; a situation 
exacerbated in the United States in particular by limited consumer choice resulting 
from a small number of major telecommunications companies already enjoying 
near-monopoly status.1 This threat would not only affect the telecommunications 
market and its service providers, but also any other market or services depending 
on communication through Internet Service Providers (ISPs) – in effect, any area of 
modern business. The most prominent and intensively discussed examples of services 
which faced severe disruption were social media and streaming platforms, both of 
which derive clear benefits from neutral treatment of Internet traffic because of their 
data-heavy nature and vulnerability to any increase in the cost of data transfer. 
It is likely that the involvement of these platforms in the debate, augmented by their 
substantial presence in everyday civil life, ignited the mainly emotion-driven debate 
on the ‘freedom of the Internet’. This topic rapidly eclipsed the technical aspects of 
net neutrality overhaul. Comparisons were often made to regulations on water and 
electricity prices. The suggestion that Internet access is an essential service, and 
therefore should be protected from open market forces, illustrated how net neutrality 
discussions focus on matters of principle while neglecting technical aspects that 
challenge a universally connected, digital society.
The concept of net neutrality has predominantly been associated with constraining ISPs 
from throttling transmission rates and limiting Internet access for end-users. However, 
1 Brian Fung, ‘FCC plan would give Internet providers power to choose the sites customers see and use’, 
Washington Post, November 21, 2017.
in the case of national or international cyber incidents; and the risks associated. 
The different ways of dealing with net neutrality in cyber defence situations in the 
EU, UK and Russia are compared. Particular focus is put on the organisations and 
capabilities needed to establish technical sovereignty in multi-domain networks, 
including consideration of the acceptability of outsourcing the task of upholding 
cyber sovereignty to external institutions.
Keywords: net neutrality, cyber defence, cyber security, net regulation
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this article will consider how net neutrality influences the way data is transferred in 
cyberspace in a number of other ways. The abolition of net neutrality principles in one 
country or more provides both opportunities and challenges, affecting the nature of 
both offensive and defensive computer network operations (CNO) during peacetime 
as well as overt hostilities. 
Real or potential connections between infrastructures of different security levels are 
established through networking devices and the individuals or organisations that own 
them. Security levels ranging from relatively unprotected Internet of Things (IoT) 
appliances, through individual user devices and interfaces up to critical national 
infrastructure may easily and unnoticeably become interconnected, rendering 
cyberspace a highly contested and congested domain. But operating conditions within 
this domain strongly favour malicious actors over legitimate operators, especially 
as security standards may be legally binding but not technically enforced. This is 
also observable for net neutrality principles: it is common practice to provide an 
equal level of Internet service availability to end-users by ISPs and legislation may 
require compliance with according policies, but there is no technical enforcement. 
Consequently, malicious actors can abuse net neutrality principles through different 
attack vectors and use it to hide their actions. While the technical capabilities to 
establish dominance in the cyber domain are widely distributed, legal and ethical 
constraints prevent legitimate actors from utilising them to their full potential. 
A key common aspect to many CNO attacks is establishing, maintaining and protecting 
privileged access to systems or processes. Cyber attacks can seek to establish an 
imbalance between the attacker and the defenders in terms of prioritised access to 
data, components or networks. As such, net neutrality presents a limiting factor on 
the capability of legitimate actors to respond to harmful activity in cyberspace. Under 
the principle of net neutrality, each data packet should be transmitted with equal 
priority, irrespective of its source, destination, content or purpose. This means that 
cyber defence, or responses to critical incidents, will not receive any prioritisation 
over ‘normal’ traffic, and consequently present an advantage to an attacker seeking to 
isolate the target of the attack. However, the ability to respond to cyber attacks from 
any location is crucial to efforts by NATO member states to set up cyber defence units 
capable of cooperating in live cyber operations.2 Officials must be aware that net 
neutrality principles may compromise this effort unless other methods are established 
to uphold cyber dominance among allies. Examples of such alternative methods 
may range from dedicated private networks, through hidden network entry points, to 
organisational and administrative measures.
In effect, interdiction of remote cyber defence efforts by an attacker poses an analogous 
problem in cyberspace to hostile actors seeking to isolate areas of planned operations 
2 NATO, ‘Cyber Defence’, December 14, 2017, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_78170.htm.
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3 Daniel Fiott, ‘Towards a “military Schengen”?’, EU Institute for Security Studies, November 2017, https://
www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Brief%2031%20Military%20Schengen.pdf.
4 National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), last access: January 7, 2018, https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/index/
alerts-and-advisories.
5 Thomas A. Johnsson (Ed), Cybersecurity: Protecting Critical Infrastructures from Cyber Attack and Cyber 
Warfare, 1st Edition, CRC Press, April 16, 2015, ISBN: 978-1482239225.
by means of advanced anti-access and area denial (A2AD) systems, preventing 
access by NATO reinforcements seeking to defend them. But while in air, sea or land 
operations, friendly forces can take advance steps to ensure privileged access in time 
of crisis,3 in cyberspace the principles of net neutrality prevent any such pre-emption. 
While communications transferred through separate networks independent of civilian 
ISPs are unlikely to be affected (such as would be expected in military operations), 
CNO against critical infrastructure and cyber espionage have already been conducted 
through the public Internet, open for access to all.4 With critical infrastructure a likely 
target in cyber warfare, legitimate cyber actors must be capable of effectively and 
remotely counteracting sophisticated cyber attacks.5 This remote access to attacked 
network components could be enabled by physically separate communication lines 
as physical backdoors to the network (economically unfeasible in almost all cases) 
or allowing data traffic to be tunnelled. However, the latter does not guarantee that 
communication is possible in a congested domain as components and routes may be 
inoperative or compromised. Prioritising traffic through ISPs, by contrast, could allow 
network administrators to identify the tunnelled communication and install in advance 
packet-based rules that enable critical communication even during attacks.
Comparisons to jungle or arctic warfare, where operating conditions are neutral 
and degrade the performance of each combatant side equally, are invalid since the 
operating conditions in cyberspace can be adapted by one side or the other. Skilled 
cyber actors are capable of ensuring that their data traffic is prioritised or that the 
opponent’s traffic is downgraded or blocked. Additionally, the opponent in a cyber 
warfare scenario may not only target military components but also potentially attack 
civilian critical infrastructures, forcing governments to respond immediately to 
ensure the safety of their citizens and prevention of crippling or catastrophic damage. 
Therefore, transferring the principles of net neutrality to real life scenarios would rather 
correspond to depriving military, police and emergency operators of any privilege that 
allows them to respond promptly to an incident – in effect, taking away their blue 
lights and emergency powers even in military operations or severe incidents targeting 
critical infrastructure that may threaten civilian lives. A more appropriate analogy 
would be a car chase where criminals can run red lights and set up roadblocks, but the 
police must still observe traffic rules and speed limits.
Net neutrality is currently not technically enforced, nor has it ever been. There are 
no central authorities capable of monitoring and enforcing net neutrality on global 
networks. Additionally, even when legislation demands the enforcement of net 
neutrality policies, no guarantees can be given once traffic is routed outside national 
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borders. The management of data traffic has always been the responsibility of 
telecommunication organisations and network administrators. Routing rules based on 
packet origins, content, frequency and general network load are common practice in 
most networks. This has not been a problem as long as fast communication appeared 
cheap and unlimited, and large-scale cyber attacks remained the preserve of science-
fiction novels or far-fetched ‘cyber Pearl Harbor’ predictions. While some corporate 
entities may very plausibly have the intention of abusing the new regulatory situation 
in the United States for financial benefit, there is also a need for a rational and problem-
oriented discussion on how to handle network traffic management in the future with 
the rising challenges of cyber warfare in mind.
Hence the remainder of this paper investigates the potential opportunities and 
challenges of an adjustment to the principle of net neutrality to facilitate defensive 
action by legitimate actors; how adjustments may allow actors to gain control in 
congested cyber domains in the case of national or international cyber incidents; and 
risks associated with weakening of net neutrality principles. The different ways of 
dealing with net neutrality in the EU, UK and Russia are considered. Particular focus 
is put on the organisations and capabilities needed to establish technical sovereignty 
in multi-domain networks, including consideration of the acceptability of outsourcing 
the task of upholding cyber sovereignty to external institutions.
2. net neutralIty In the eu, uK and russIa
This section explores principles under which ISPs may legitimately interfere with 
network traffic by technical means in order to illustrate the opportunities and challenges 
of weakening net neutrality overall. Three different regulatory environments (the EU, 
UK and Russia) are compared to illustrate the wide variations in philosophy and 
enforcement between different jurisdictions. 
A. Net Neutrality
In simplistic terms, net neutrality means that network providers must treat all 
network traffic equally and may not interfere with data traffic in a way that affects 
the traffic of selected parties only. Net neutrality is a set of principles, not a technical 
implementation. In fact, due to the need of modern networks to be able to cope with 
data transmission errors and delays, most communication protocols are designed to 
deal with limitations without end-users noticing. In other words, their design renders 
them capable of hiding net neutrality violations. This is part of what opens network 
communications to abuse in hidden cyber operations and creates the huge imbalance 
between legitimate actors bound to net neutrality on the one hand, and malicious 
actors with no effective constraint by the rule of law on the other. 
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Computer networks consist of components, which in turn have physical and logical 
entities, all of which can communicate between themselves. In order to be able to 
connect components of completely different architectures, purposes, languages and 
communication types, the ISO OSI standard was developed.6 This is a conceptual 
model that defines how ‘data’ is organised and communicated on different abstraction 
layers, moving from physical representations to logical units. An ISP provides the core 
physical components within a network7 and as a result has access to the complete OSI 
stack. ISPs are capable of interfering with traffic on any layer: cutting the physical 
connection, dropping packets, filtering for services and (unencrypted) content in data, 
and more.
Net neutrality advocates have been concerned with ISPs throttling down transmission 
rates, while their opponents put forward counter-arguments of innovation of better 
bandwidth distribution techniques and networking technologies that are incompatible 
with net neutrality principles. It is currently impossible to predict how ISPs will 
handle traffic in the future if net neutrality principles are weakened, but the status quo 
leads to educated guesses on future network management techniques, such as:
• The pure ‘throttling’ of data traffic based on origin or destination is commonly 
associated with dropping packets. By dropping packets, the quality of the 
single connection may go down, while the overall bandwidth is improved: 
the ISP regains some of its bandwidth by not servicing one of its customers. 
• Another way of gaining bandwidth is by queuing packets. Packets are not 
‘lost’ but take longer to be delivered as they are not forwarded immediately. 
Again, the ISP gains bandwidth by reducing processing time.
Selection of which traffic to interfere with may be based on packet, service or 
content information. Depending on the type of information chosen, the interference 
is performed on different layers of the network stack and may require additional 
methods such as deep packet inspection (DPI). DPI has been associated particularly 
with Internet censorship,8 but is also a common tool for cyber forensics and network 
administration.
However, methods that alter bandwidth distribution merely by dropping or queuing 
are not suitable to guarantee privileged data transmissions for selected customers or 
services, as solutions exist to avoid dropping, queuing and DPI. The most prominent 
example known to be adopted to avoid censorship (which is usually also based on 
these methods) is the use of virtual private networks in combination with so-called 
6 Andrew S. Tanenbaum, David J. Wetherall, Computer Networks, 5th Edition, Pearson, January 9, 2010, 
ISBN: 978-9332518742.
7 Barry Raveendran Greene, Philip Smith, Cisco ISP Essentials, Cisco Press – Networking Technology 
Series, April 16, 2002, ISBN: 978-1587050411.
8 Ralf Bendrath. ‘Global technology trends and national regulation: Explaining Variation in the Governance 
of Deep Packet Inspection.’ International Studies Association Annual Convention. Vol. 15. No. 18. 2009.
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‘onion routing’ networks such as the Tor network.9 It is therefore more than likely that 
alternative methods will be used.
The relevance to cyber warfare lies in the fact that, in addition to simple destructive 
potential, cyber attacks commonly serve the purpose either of gathering information or 
of exerting power through the medium of the Internet. This can be through achieving 
and demonstrating interdiction or malfunctioning of networks and their associated 
services. While current attacks tend to aim at specific network components, it is likely 
that future attacks will be directed against bandwidth distribution technologies. 
Several already-common attack types include methods that abuse net neutrality 
principles to ensure a larger portion of bandwidth is available to the attacker. This 
provides a number of secondary effects for any botnet or distributed attack. It allows 
an attacker to undertake further activities in parallel, unaffected by the ongoing attack 
itself; it demonstrates power in the domain; it creates an impression of omnipresence 
of the attacker; it hijacks the bandwidth of legitimate actors; it disables the attacked 
components; and finally, and most significantly for the current discussion, it hampers 
external interference by legitimate cyber defence actors as the attacked components 
may become inaccessible.
B. EU
In September 2013, the European Commission published a draft set of regulations 
for the telecommunications single market. This draft was heavily criticised for not 
sufficiently addressing net neutrality regulations and for introducing differentiation 
between ‘communications access’ and ‘specialised services access’ without specifying 
these services adequately. The draft was adjusted and approved by the EU parliament 
in April 2014.10 
The adjusted draft specifically declares that Internet service access:
 ‘means a publicly available electronic communications service that provides 
connectivity to the Internet in accordance with the principle of net neutrality, 
and thereby connectivity between virtually all end points of the Internet, 
irrespective of the network technology or terminal equipment used’.11
9 The Tor project, https://www.torproject.org/, last access: January 8, 2018. See also McCoy, D., Bauer, K., 
Grunwald, D., Kohno, T. & Sicker, D. ‘Shining light in dark places: Understanding the Tor network’. In 
Proceedings of the 8th International Symposium on Privacy Enhancing Technologies (pp. 63-76). Springer, 
Berlin, Heidelberg, July 2008.
10 EU Parliament, ‘Draft on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
laying down measures concerning the European single market for electronic communications and to 
achieve a Connected Continent, and amending Directives 2002/20/EC, 2002/22/EC, and Regulations (EC) 




Net neutrality is defined as the:
 ‘principle according to which all Internet traffic is treated equally, without 
discrimination, restriction or interference, independently of its sender, 
recipient, type, content, device, service or application’.12 
Specialised services are allowed for that are:
 
 ‘provided over logically distinct capacity, relying on strict admission control, 
offering functionality requiring enhanced quality from end to end, and that is 
not marketed or usable as a substitute for Internet access service’.13 
In other words, specialised services are considered as supplementary offers to Internet 
access services. Examples of such services could be real time applications, sensory 
data aggregations or distributed computing services.
Following heated discussion, the 2014 draft was further adjusted and approved in 
November 2015 as EU Regulation 2015/2120.14 The guidelines for implementation 
of the April 2014 draft no longer included the term ‘net neutrality’. ISPs are still 
required to follow the ‘best effort’ principle, requiring all packets to be treated equally 
(in other words, a core aspect of net neutrality). However, permission for ‘zero rating’ 
and a specification of ‘sufficient data traffic management’ methods have both been 
criticised. Although violations of net neutrality principles through the use of DPI is 
possible, several ISPs in EU states are known to use DPI in varying contexts. DPI is 
known to be carried out by governments and their legitimate actors. The inspection 
results are used for further processing, prosecution and surveillance.
Zero rating refers to the practice of not imposing additional costs for access to 
selected online services, while all others incur such charges. The application of this 
approach varies widely across Europe. The Netherlands enforced a strict net neutrality 
policy, but at the other extreme, in Portugal ISPs offer a strictly limited connection 
service with additional charges for access to a wide range of common applications.15 
These charges are usually in the form of purchasing specific packages, named for 





0281+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN Chapter 1, Article 2 (15) in reference 10.
14 Official Journal of the European Union, Regulation 2015/2120 of The European Parliament and Council, 
November 25, 2015, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32015R2120&r
id=2, last access: January 8, 2018.
15 The Guardian, ‘Net neutrality enshrined in Dutch law’, June 23, 2011, https://www.theguardian.com/
technology/2011/jun/23/netherlands-enshrines-net-neutrality-law, last access: January 7, 2018; Alex Hern, 
‘Net neutrality: why are Americans so worried about it being scrapped?’, The Guardian, 22 November 22, 
2017, https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/nov/22/net-neutrality-internet-why-americans-so-
worried-about-it-being-scrapped, last access: January 7, 2018.
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for selection include the profitability of each service, since the service providers pay 
a sum to the ISP for inclusion. The ‘social’ package can, therefore, include Facebook 
and WhatsApp, while all other social media platforms are not available. The less 
profitable services cannot be blocked by the ISP, since this would clearly violate net 
neutrality principles, but they can be de facto excluded by pricing policies. This could, 
for example, take the form of imposing an indirect cost penalty on users of Telegram 
by ensuring that data transferred via that app counts against the user’s strictly limited 
‘free’ quota, while WhatsApp data has a much higher limit as part of a package. 
The ‘traffic management’ stipulation means that ISPs may adjust data flow rates, 
for instance to avoid service disruption due to traffic overload. ISPs are reported 
to have throttled throughput during evening hours (when most customers use their 
streaming services) to ‘encourage’ users to stagger demand. Consequently, instead 
of all customers starting to stream video at, for example, 8 p.m. they do so earlier or 
later. This allows the ISP to avoid specific traffic peaks, and therefore economise on 
investment in new hardware that would otherwise be necessary only during a once-
a-day data throughput peak. However, this form of management has been criticised 
as potentially offering a back door to abandoning net neutrality by preferring specific 
services or traffic.
C. UK
In direct contrast to current developments in the US, the UK government has taken 
a regulatory approach to ensuring that all UK homes and businesses should have a 
minimum standard of access to high-speed Internet by 2020.16 This in itself, however, 
does not currently prevent the UK’s leading ISPs from filtering and blocking Internet 
content.
In 2014, the Enemies of the Internet annual report published by Reporters Without 
Borders (RSF) listed the UK among the top 14 states where data traffic is monitored, 
blocked or manipulated.17 Yet in its 2017 report to the European Commission on 
compliance with net neutrality regulations, the UK communications regulator Ofcom 
claimed that ‘there are no major concerns regarding the openness of the Internet in the 
UK.’18 Those areas identified were minor concerns related primarily to choice of end-
users’ terminal equipment and zero rating. This apparent contradiction derives from 
limitations in the EU regulations. In addition to introducing ‘sufficient data traffic 
16 Paul Sandle, ‘Britons will have legal right to high-speed broadband by 2020’, Reuters, December 20, 2017, 
https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-britain-broadband/britons-will-have-legal-right-to-high-speed-broadband-
by-2020-idUKKBN1EE0RS.
17 Reporters Without Borders, annual Report ‘Enemies of the Internet 2014’, 12 March 12, 2014. See also 
James Vincent, The Independent, ‘UK Branded an “Enemy of the Internet” for the first time by Reporters 
Without Borders’, March 17, 2014, https://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/uk-branded-
an-enemy-of-the-internet-for-the-first-time-by-reporters-without-borders-9196571.html, last access: 
January 7, 2018.
18 ‘Monitoring compliance with the EU Net Neutrality regulation: A report to the European Commission’, 
Ofcom, June 23, 2017, p. 2, https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0018/103257/net-neutrality.
pdf.
148
management’ and ‘specialised services’, the EU also leaves decisions on whether 
actions are compliant with the regulations with national courts. As a result, while the 
Commission may have drafted a regulation on the telecommunications single market 
that seems to prohibit general filtering, blocking and monitoring of data packets due to 
net neutrality considerations, in practice implementation of these regulations depends 
on national jurisdiction. In other words, varying standards of net neutrality can be 
applied that are still compliant with the EU Regulation and with national law. While 
Ofcom followed the Commission’s regulatory guidelines, RSF applied an ideal image 
of net neutrality not defined by the EU.
The fact that the landing points of several of the submarine cables that form the 
backbone of the Internet, especially between Europe and the US, are in the UK is 
particularly noteworthy. If European net neutrality standards are not carried across 
into UK law on the withdrawal of the UK from the EU, this will mean that the UK 
is free to apply its own standards to a substantial proportion of the data that passes 
between the United States and the EU. Unlike internal developments in the US, this 
could have a direct effect on the uninterrupted throughput of packets intended for 
delivery to Europe. 
D. Russia
Russia has taken a significantly different approach to net neutrality and to privileging 
defensive measures compared to the UK, Europe or the US.19 Most Russian ISPs 
provide clients with cost-free access to certain websites and services, such as 
Facebook, Vkontakte, Odnoklassniki, LiveJournal and Yandex Maps.20 But in 
addition, governmental privilege is a significant factor in determining access. Many 
government websites are free to access by law,21 and by contrast the government 
has the legal and technical power to disrupt or entirely block access to other Internet 
resources. According to Russian prosecutor-general Yuriy Chaika, by 2017 around 
1,200 websites had been officially blocked under this legislation.22
In March 2017 legislation was reported to be under preparation under which Russian 
courts would be able to punish both domestic and foreign corporations for failing 
to comply with Russian law by ordering that access to their websites be slowed 
down.23 The storage of Russian users’ data on Russian servers by foreign Internet 
companies has been required by law since September 2015, when Law No. 242-FZ, 
19 Roman Mirov, ‘Конец нейтралитета: как США проиграли битву за интернет,’ Lenta.ru, January 3, 
2018, https://www.gazeta.ru/tech/2018/01/03/11551418/no_net_neutrality.shtml.
20 Sergey Vorniches, ‘Всё, что нужно знать о сетевом нейтралитете,’ Apparat.cc, February 27, 2015, 
https://apparat.cc/world/about-net-neutrality/.
21 ‘Доступ к 122 сайтам Рунета сделают бесплатным,’ Известия, February 24, 2015, https://iz.ru/
news/583390.
22 ‘Russian Police Have Blocked 1,200 Websites Since 2014,’ The Moscow Times, January 12, 2017, https://
themoscowtimes.com/news/1200-russian-websites-blocked-since-2014-56794.
23 Anastasia Golitsyna, ‘Для интернет-компаний придумали наказание—замедлять доступ к их сайтам,’ 
Ведомости, March 13, 2017, https://www.vedomosti.ru/technology/articles/2017/03/13/680827-zamedlit-
skorost-dostupa.
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adopted in 2014, came into force. Compliance with this localisation requirement by 
Twitter24 and Snapchat25 has been claimed by the Russian communications regulator 
Roskomnadzor but denied by the companies themselves, while Facebook is not yet 
compliant and consequently is regularly threatened with a nationwide ban.26 According 
to a November 2017 survey, Google, Apple, Alibaba, Viber, Gett, Uber and Microsoft 
all rent Russian data centre space for the purpose of compliance.27
All of these measures are in accordance with a predominant view among Russian 
government agencies, especially those concerned with national security, that the 
Internet presents more of a threat than an opportunity. In April 2014, President 
Vladimir Putin remarked that the Internet ‘came about as a special project of the CIA’ 
and implied that it continued to be a tool of the US government, and consequently 
dangerous for Russia.28 In contrast with Western assumptions, Russian information 
security preoccupations focus on the role not only of hostile code such as cyber 
attacks, but also hostile content such as opinions or information which are detrimental 
to the Russian state.29 President Putin has personally praised Chinese-style censorship 
and defended it against criticism from digital rights advocates.30 
But Russia’s plans to protect itself from the Internet go even further, and extend to 
consideration of operating without access to global Internet services at all.31 This 
scenario is variously presented by Russian government officials as either a voluntary 
withdrawal by Russia – ‘pulling the plug’ – or being disconnected by the hostile West, 
which according to one persistent Russian view, controls the Internet.32 President 
Putin’s adviser on Internet affairs, German Klimenko, is a particular advocate of 
Chinese-style Internet restrictions and preparing for possible total net withdrawal.33 
24 Alec Luhn, ‘Moscow Says Twitter Ready to Store Data of Users on Russian Servers Despite Concerns 
Over Surveillance,’ The Telegraph, November 8, 2017, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/11/08/
moscow-says-twitter-ready-store-data-users-russian-servers-despite/.
25 Marina Galperina, ‘Oops, Snapchat Accidentally Ended Up on a Russian Government Snitch Registry,’ 
Gizmodo, August 10, 2017, https://gizmodo.com/oops-snapchat-accidentally-ended-up-on-a-russian-
gover-1797721574.
26 ‘Роскомнадзор пригрозил Facebook блокировкой,’ РБК, September 26, 2017, https://www.rbc.ru/
own_business/26/09/2017/59ca1e899a7947351acdf385.
27 Galina Boyarkova, ‘Все терабайты в гости к нам,’ Фонтанка, November 12, 2017, https://www.
fontanka.ru/2017/11/10/144/.
28 ‘Путин заявил, что интернет - это проект ЦРУ,’ BBC Russian Service, April 24, 2014, http://www.bbc.
com/russian/rolling_news/2014/04/140424_rn_putin_csi_Internet.
29 This contrast is examined in detail in Keir Giles, ‘Russia’s Public Stance on Cyberspace Issues’, in C. 
Czosseck, R. Ottis, K. Ziolkowski (Eds.), 2012 4th International Conference on Cyber Conflict.
30 ‘Не стоит критиковать китайский вариант ограничений в Интернете – Путин,’ Звезда, April 3, 2017, 
https://tvzvezda.ru/news/vstrane_i_mire/content/201704031346-9yin.htm.
31 Grigory Naberezhnov and Darya Luganskaya, ‘Кремль прокомментировал сообщения об отключении 
России от интернета,’ РБК, September 19, 2014, https://www.rbc.ru/politics/19/09/2014/5704225a9a794
760d3d419b6.
32 ‘Клименко: Россия должна быть готова к отключению от мирового интернета,’ ТАСС, December 29, 
2016, http://tass.ru/obschestvo/3914882.
33 ‘Советник президента предложил ограничить интернет в России,’ Дождь, January 26, 2017, https://
tvrain.ru/news/Internet-426274/.
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In March 2018, Klimenko announced that, after lengthy preparations, Russia was now 
technically capable of removing itself from the global Internet.34 
Russia’s security-driven approach to managing the Internet stands in stark contrast 
to the Euro-Atlantic community, and the difference is instructive. We argue in this 
paper that net neutrality as currently understood by the West is a potential handicap 
for ensuring security and responding to cyber warfare actions. In Russia, this 
challenge is well recognised and bound up with the perceived threat of free flow of 
information across national borders, which for the West is an inalienable element of 
how the Internet works. The result is that Russia has circumvented the net neutrality 
challenge by changing the entire basis for Internet access, and making it conditional 
on state interest. Any solution this extreme would be unpalatable and unworkable in 
Western liberal democracies, being incompatible both with principles of freedom of 
expression and with the greater independence of commercial entities including ISPs 
outside Russia. 
3. net neutralIty and cyber warfare
Recent net neutrality discussions have centred on censorship, Internet access and 
traffic limitations. However, these discussions are too narrow and must be expanded 
to more general considerations on data traffic management, which should be perceived 
as a core element in future cyber warfare.
A. Net Neutrality in Attack Vectors
Malicious actors can abuse net neutrality to establish dominance through different 
attack vectors, including DDoS, DrDoS and SYN-flood attacks.
DDoS-attacks use the fact that all incoming traffic is treated equally to create an 
advantage for the attacker. All IT components have a limit to their processing 
capabilities, and when legitimate requests to a component compete on an equal 
basis with a flood of malicious traffic from bots, the component is overloaded and 
becomes unable to reply. While this principle is a standard tactic, there are many 
different ways of carrying out a DDoS-attack. In a distributed reflected DoS-attack 
(DrDoS), the attacker hijacks (spoofs) the IP-address of its target and sends service 
requests to servers (such as the DNS), asking them to reply to the spoofed IP. What 
follows is a DDoS-attack with no attribution being possible and, depending on the 
servers involved, that is impossible to block without self-inflicted damage. One of 
the largest DDoS-attacks recorded to date was observed during March 2018 against 
Github, causing a record-breaking data transfer rate of 1.35 Terabits per second using 
34 ‘Советник Путина: Россия готова к отключению от мирового интернета’, RFE/RL, March 5, 2018, 
https://www.svoboda.org/a/29079358.html.
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a modified DrDoS.35 In this scenario the attacker also relies on the fact that the target 
will treat all data packets equally, even when not useful, not requested or identified as 
potentially harmful.
One of the most basic, yet highly imbalanced methods to attack a network component 
is a SYN flood attack. SYN flood attacks belong to the group of DoS-attacks that 
abuse both the equal treatment of packets at the target’s side and the TCP handshake 
protocol. To establish a TCP connection to the target (server-side) from the attacker 
(client-side), a three-way handshake is initiated. The client sends a SYN-request 
(synchronise) to the server, the server replies with a SYN-ACK (SYN-acknowledge) 
and allocates resources for the awaited TCP connection. Usually, the client replies 
with another ACK, which establishes the TCP connection, however, a malicious client 
can withhold the final ACK. This leads to the server keeping the resources allocated 
blocked until a timeout is reached. Depending on the servers’ configuration, the 
allocated resources may make up a considerable proportion of the resources available 
and the timeout may be excessively long. If this attack is combined with a distributed 
approach, or if many SYN requests are started in parallel, the result is a DoS. 
B. Imbalance of actors
Techniques for malicious actors to circumvent the legitimate control and regulation 
of data are publicly available and used. Legitimate actors, by contrast, cannot demand 
more bandwidth or privileged access from ISPs to create a power balance between 
themselves and sophisticated attackers. In fact, even direct responses to an ongoing 
attack may be problematic as in many cases attribution has to be examined and verified 
by juridical institutions to make any actions against the source legitimate. Legitimate 
actions therefore often focus on re-routing mechanisms or involve large redundancy 
set-ups to cope with outages. However, these fail-safe environments are necessarily 
limited and bound to the number of fall-back components integrated. 
Currently, net neutrality places still further constraints on the technical capabilities 
of legitimate cyber actors. When considered strictly, net neutrality principles prevent 
live monitoring of suspicious traffic and hinder any attempts of attribution through 
the ISP, even though the ISP is often the first to notice unusual cyber activities. Traffic 
blocking is also against net neutrality standards, even if it is obvious to the technical 
expert that the traffic is involved in an ongoing attack. To resolve this issue, ISPs 
have begun to attempt to contact the initiators of such traffic; a tedious, costly and 
potentially fruitless venture.36
35 Lily Hay Newman, ‘Github survived the biggest DDoS attack ever recorded’, Wired Security, March 3, 
2018, https://www.wired.com/story/github-ddos-memcached/, last access: March 16, 2018.
36 Michael Kan, ‘Amid cyberattacks, ISPs try to clean up the Internet’, CSO Online, February 23, 2017, 
https://www.csoonline.com/article/3173274/security/amid-cyberattacks-isps-try-to-clean-up-the-Internet.
html, last access: January 7, 2018.
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Discussing net neutrality in terms of traffic management and control inevitably 
leads to the insight that net neutrality protects both ordinary users and actors with 
hostile intent. While the rights and protection of innocent users should not be reduced 
unnecessarily, methods should be developed to empower legitimate over malicious 
actors.
C. Cyber Actions
The effects net neutrality has on cyber warfare scenarios can be divided into three 
distinct categories, based on the type of cyber action: cyber defence, proactive cyber 
defence and offensive cyber operations.
While cyber defence generally describes actions taken in the aftermath of cyber 
attacks and passive methods to deter or prevent the attack, proactive cyber defence 
allows an active response during and, to a degree, prior to cyber attacks taking place. 
Offensive cyber operations may range from aggressive, conflict-initiating operations, 
to supportive actions among allies during defensive cyber scenarios, but are generally 
directed against the attacker or its associated components.
Long-term defensive measures include log analysis, system hardening, redesigning 
of networks, training of personnel and developing incident response strategies. 
Immediate defensive techniques are especially those that are used to prevent further 
damage and neutralise the ongoing attack by measures taken at the victim’s end 
only. Typical examples are the shutdown of servers, network components or infected 
devices and the blocking of traffic and services associated with the attack. These 
methods generally do not conflict with net neutrality principles if coordinated through 
legitimate law enforcement units or if immediate action is needed to prevent further 
damage to the ISP. However, immediate action through cyber units or proactive 
approaches through ISPs to prevent damage in foreign networks are currently limited.
One possible resolution of this conflict of interest would be that legitimate actors 
should be limited to defensive techniques to minimise contravention of net neutrality 
principles. However, purely defensive techniques are often of limited utility if the 
attacker’s motivation is to cause the unavailability of services or devices. This is 
commonly seen in the various forms of denial-of-service attacks (DDoS). Furthermore, 
defensive strategies may also be considered too insecure if more sophisticated attacks 
are expected that may remain unnoticed for longer periods of time. These types of 
attacks are typically associated with espionage or information warfare, and it is these 
cyber activities in particular that are protected by current net neutrality standards. 
Although ISPs may be able to deduce that traffic is suspicious based on heuristics (i.e. 
without violating net neutrality), net neutrality would prevent further investigation 
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and action against the initiator unless authorised by law enforcement and judicial 
authorities. 
Proactive cyber defence allows defensive methods to be combined with more 
aggressive monitoring and filtering rules. The line between defence and proactive 
defence is often blurred and depends on the specific technologies used. Firewall rules 
may be proactive and not compatible with net neutrality standards and DPI, which 
allows analysis on the content of the data packet passing and is often used to enforce 
Internet censorship. DPI is not compatible with net neutrality principles when applied 
to certain packets only.
Offensive cyber actions may vary greatly depending on the assets and technologies 
used. Any type of offensive strategy that aims at limiting, blocking, monitoring or 
manipulating specific traffic has to be considered as violating net neutrality principles. 
Whether legitimation can be given and under which circumstances has to be considered 
by the judiciary. It appears questionable whether it can be demanded of ISPs that they 
participate in military or governmental operations violating agreed telecommunication 
standards, such as net neutrality. But if they do not, this would imply a need for 
legitimate cyber actors to reroute traffic to their own network components to bypass 
ISPs in the context of offensive cyber activities to avoid limitations introduced by 
those ISPs during the operation. 
If applied strictly to all traffic, demanding and enforcing the equal treatment of all data 
packets would prohibit the use of several cyber defence techniques. Those considered 
proactive would be particularly affected, since they rely on traffic being monitored 
based on origin, destination or content. If carried out by ISPs, these measures are 
not in line with net neutrality principles. Offensive cyber actions too may need the 
permission or active involvement of ISPs, which raises questions of legitimacy, 
particularly if this includes violations of agreed telecommunication standards.
D. Cyber Power
Actors in cyberspace are represented by their data and traffic. Controlling either data 
or traffic corresponds to controlling the actor. Limiting the capabilities of legitimate 
actors to legally interfere with malicious traffic is a digital form of unilateral 
disarmament, and as a consequence has the capability to destabilise cyber sovereignty.
As described above, net neutrality places limits on the whole range of legitimate 
actions in cyberspace, reducing both offensive and preventive measures. However, 
these limitations again only apply to actors bound by restrictions, while illegitimate 
actors can choose to circumvent or disregard them. The limitation of preventive 
measures plays a major role not only in constraining defence against future attacks, 
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but also in helping attackers conceal their activities and avoid prosecution. This is 
because net neutrality prevents ISPs from collecting only selected data from the traffic 
they forward. Paradoxically, this has often been a contributory factor to the adoption 
of general telecommunications data retention (e.g. in Germany). The irony is that 
from the point of view of net neutrality, if you collect data on everybody this is legal 
and acceptable, but only collecting data on traffic that appears suspicious is not. 
Overall, strict application of net neutrality principles contributes to an unbalanced 
cyberspace. Legitimate actors are being deprived of rights granted in non-digital 
circumstances, while the community is unable technically to enforce net neutrality on 
the attackers’ side as well. This gives rise to a substantial mismatch in the distribution 
of cyber power among actors.
4. oPPortunItIes and challenges
If net neutrality principles are weakened, ISPs will need to reserve bandwidth and 
develop reliable methods to identify privileged customers and services without 
introducing additional physical media in order to guarantee high transmission rates 
for these customers and services; the mere throttling of ‘unprivileged traffic’ is 
insufficient. It is likely that both channelling and protocol developments will take 
place. Additional hardening of access to these channels may help to ensure that only 
legitimate users have access to the channel. Creating privileged channels contributes 
to restoring a balance between legitimate cyber actors and attackers in cyberspace. 
Currently, attackers have the ability to simply allocate bandwidth and to technically 
enforce prioritised processing, while the options of legitimate actors are severely 
limited.
Cyber defence support among allies could be affected positively by weakening net 
neutrality principles and installing prioritised channels. Establishing privileged high-
speed connections may prove valuable in scenarios where remote access to networks 
under attack is needed. This occurs when network administration personnel are 
faced with sophisticated cyber attacks for which they are insufficiently prepared. In 
such cases, remote access could be established, even in scenarios including a denial 
of service, by technically enforcing processing of data received by the prioritised 
channels through networking rules and interrupt handling strategies. Such methods 
could be implemented easily in Software Defined Networks (SDNs), however, 
standards should be defined that ensure these measures conform to our democratic 
norms. This would in turn not only allow remote support during cyber incidents but 
facilitate forensic activities during and after the attack. 
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37 Candid Wueest, ‘Threats to virtual environments’, Symantec Security Response, August 12, 2014; 
European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA), Security aspects of 
virtualization, February 2017, ISBN 978-92-9204-211-0.
Prioritised channels could also be used to uphold a minimal service availability if, 
for example, critical infrastructure is being targeted. The use of prioritised channels 
allows the separation of critical traffic from common or public traffic. While a smaller 
number of sophisticated attacks should be expected to target the prioritised channels, 
the larger portion of less sophisticated and limited attacks will target the public traffic 
channels, which in turn may be processed on less prioritised components with limited 
device access. Although this may appear unfair at first, current security standards 
attempt to enforce precisely this by network virtualisation and service encapsulation. 
However, due to their high abstraction layer, several vulnerabilities arise within 
solutions based on virtualisation and the attack surface is even enlarged.37 These 
vulnerabilities are not to be expected on lower abstraction layers, which is why we 
would envision low layer solutions.
Although several benefits could be expected from weakening net neutrality principles 
and establishing prioritised traffic through ISPs, new attack vectors must also be 
expected. As bandwidth and transmission rates are high-value assets in cyberspace, 
attackers are likely to work on ways to obtain access to prioritised traffic. Therefore, 
the development of such technologies and the definition of adequate standards should 
not be left to the free market only. It must also be guaranteed that democratic values 
and standards are not being undermined. However, this is an obligation of Western 
democracies that should not only apply for legitimate actors, but must also be enforced 
for malicious actors threatening the cyber domain.
5. outlooK
This article has explored net neutrality and networking principles from both strategic 
and technical views. The handling of net neutrality and traffic equality within the EU, 
UK and Russia were compared and discussed. Particular attention was given to the 
influence the different approaches have in the uprising congested and contested cyber 
domains as expected in cyber warfare scenarios.
Russia’s distinct approach to net neutrality and network regulations in general 
was explored, highlighting the measurements taken and scheduled to prevent the 
destabilising effect net neutrality has on cyber power and sovereignty. While several 
of the technologies and regulations established within Russia are not acceptable by 
Western standards due to their limitation of individual rights, the deployed methods 
show Russia’s sensibility to the arising threats and an awareness of the cyber power 
imbalance.
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The EU is currently struggling with enforcement of the approved Regulation on 
the telecommunications single market. The Regulation allows national judicial 
interpretation which leads to different implementations of net neutrality within the 
EU. This condition is unsatisfactory as it creates an imbalance between EU members 
both in terms of market regulations and cyber power. This limits joint cyber operations, 
as cyberspace is not limited by national borders, but data traffic is treated according 
to national jurisdiction, possibly hindering prosecution depending on the national 
networking regulations. 
The UK has made a step forward in terms of providing broadband access to all 
consumers, however, it has also been considered as one of the ‘enemies of the Internet’ 
by the RSF since 2014. The UK is known for its surveillance capabilities, which can 
also be applied through local ISPs. It is noteworthy that the UK plays a major role 
in building the transatlantic backbone of the Internet, especially between the United 
States and EU. Severe limitations of net neutrality must be expected to follow the 
withdrawal of the UK from the EU unless regulatory and technical enforcement are 
developed.
Discussions on net neutrality are discussions on traffic management. There is a 
requirement to define standards and policies that regulate when and how legitimate 
actors may demand assistance by ISPs to either prioritise their own traffic or limit 
the traffic of potentially malicious actors. As blocking or reducing malicious traffic 
may result in unjust penalisation of unaware end-users, this paper advocates the 
prioritisation of governmental (or governmentally legitimated) cyber actors. The 
aim of any legitimate action in cyberspace must be to protect civilian users while 
defending networks and services and to establish cyber sovereignty and power.
While there are good reasons to weaken net neutrality principles, this should be done 
in a controlled manner and monitored by independent authorities. As demonstrated in 
the case of the United States both before and immediately following the 2017 easing 
of net neutrality constraints, uncontrolled outsourcing to private companies bears the 
risk of abusive methods that not only influence the end users of telecommunication 
services but may also limit free market growth and lead to monopolies.
Net neutrality regulations should consider the protection of individual rights and 
equality among civilian end-users but must also ensure stability in cyberspace and 
equality among actors. This is of particular importance in cyber war scenarios where 
some states are less constrained in their legitimate cyber activities than others. There 
are two possible choices: either to technically enforce net neutrality (which has 
already been proven impractical in the face of botnets or distributed cyber attacks as 
the attribution of cyber actions remains an unsolved task) or to define regulations that 
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allow legitimate actors to rebalance cyber power and regain control over congested 
networks during cyber incidents to uphold sovereignty in cyberspace.
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security significantly, this may change with upcoming new concepts and systems, like 
decentralized ledger technologies (Blockchains) or quantum-secured communication.
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1. IntroductIon
As a consequence of the cyber attacks on Estonia in 2007, both the consideration 
and use of cyberspace by the military has fundamentally changed and will continue 
to do so. Over the years, such attacks have effectively demonstrated how significant 
impacts can be wrought by supposedly trivial and low-key means. On the other 
hand, military forces also depend strongly on the rapid exchange of information for 
their decision-making process so their forces can gain battlefield superiority, which 
enforces the need for network-enabled capabilities (NEC) [1] to realize network-
centric warfare (NCW) [2]. This creates a challenging and complex system of 
interdependencies, opening a broad spectrum of possible attack vectors. Therefore, 
operations in cyberspace can be used to generate effects not only in cyberspace itself, 
but also in the physical environment, which is an attractive new capability for military 
commanders. Indeed, armed forces worldwide now highly value the new role of cyber, 
and are building cyber commands and establishing new operational capabilities, 
and the asymmetric nature of cyber warfare can give the advantage to armed forces 
otherwise in possession of comparatively smaller weaponry. However, the complexity 
of sophisticated cyber attacks like Stuxnet can also imply the opposite. Thus, cyber 
defence is also of enormous importance. And while numerous technologies proposed 
over recent years have not improved cyber security significantly, this may change with 
upcoming new concepts and systems. Blockchains, quantum-secured communication, 
mathematically verified software microkernels, and trusted hardware platforms are 
likely to be key elements for new, more secure systems. Along with the armaments 
industry itself developing a better understanding of cyber threats, this should lead to 
better and more resilient weapon systems.
In light of these thoughts, the paper analyses the development of both cyber threats 
and defence capabilities over the past 10 years from 2007 to 2017, evaluates the 
current situation and gives recommendations for further development. The paper 
is structured as follows: first, general conditions for military forces with respect to 
“cyber” are described and dependencies and requirements are highlighted. Second, 
a brief overview of the development of cyber threats and defence capabilities during 
the past ten years is given, including a discussion of the usefulness of the measures. 
Upcoming technologies which are important for cyber security are briefly discussed 
to analyse opportunities for more secure systems. Finally, the conclusions of the paper 




For all the millennia of warfare that have passed, the tools and tactics of how armies 
fight have evolved as military technologies have evolved [2]. However, recent years 
have seen fundamental changes come to affect the very character of war [2]. Military 
forces worldwide are increasingly capitalizing on the advances and advantages of 
information technology to facilitate radical changes in the way they structure and 
deliver offensive and defensive capabilities [1]. The US Navy was among the first to 
investigate how to use Information and Communication Technology (ICT) to increase 
the efficiency and efficacy of their forces on the 21st Century battlefield [3], the main 
consequence being the increased integration of individual, hitherto autonomously 
acting systems, thus a fundamental shift from what is called platform-centric warfare 
to network-centric warfare (NCW). NCW harnesses network technology to facilitate 
radical improvements in the shared awareness of disposition and intent, together with 
a capability for rapid reconfiguration, and synchronization of operations [1] and thus 
improves both the efficiency and effectiveness of military operations [4].
As such, NCW creates superiority in war by harvesting information from a network 
of reconnaissance systems and enabling its analysis and use by command and control 
centres, as well as use in weapons systems. Hence military superiority across the 
entire range of military operations, i.e. full spectrum dominance, is achieved. The 
vision for NCW is to provide seamless access to timely information at every echelon 
in the military hierarchy and enable all elements to share information within a single, 
coherent, complete, and dynamically accurate picture of the battlefield. It is intended 
that NCW will produce an improved understanding both of the intent of higher 
command and of the operational situation at all levels of command, with every element 
better able to tap into the collective knowledge and reduce the “fog and friction” 
[4] of war, and enable the optimal use of resources. Although the transformation 
towards NCW is not finalized completely, even not by the United States [1, 4], NCW 
is anticipated to be one of the greatest revolutions in military operations in the past 
200 years (see Figure 1).
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FIGURE 1. NCW ROUTE MAP [5, 6]
However, within such an integrated system lies a greater vulnerability: attacking 
the weakest link could compromise the entire system and lead to catastrophic 
consequences, in the worst case rendering an entire military force incapable of action.
A. On Multinational Coalitions
In addition to the increased use of information technology, the aspect of cooperative, 
multinational participation in conflicts is of great importance. Military operations 
today are almost always multilateral in complexion. With regard to NATO, since 1990, 
there has been a significant increase in the number of military operations requiring 
NATO member states to contribute forces to some multinational coalition or alliance 
[7]. Moreover, the range of mission types has broadened to include peacekeeping, 
peace support, and humanitarian operations [7]. Corresponding challenges with 
such a force are, for example, what the agreed operational concepts are, different 
intelligence requirements and structures, the diverse capabilities and qualities of the 
various formations as well as command, control, communication, and intelligence 
(C4I)/cyber interfaces that have to be developed and integrated [8, 7].
Increased defence cooperation, such as “Smart Defence” (NATO), “Pooling & 
Sharing” (European Union), or the “Framework Nations Concept”, in theory increases 
sustainability and helps to preserve key military capabilities [9]. Smaller armies can 
plug their remaining capabilities into an organizational backbone provided by a larger, 
“framework” nation [9]. In practice, however, this theory has yet to fully prove itself, 
and the extent to which those well-understood obstacles to defence cooperation can 
be overcome remains to be seen [9, 10]. Deeper cooperation also calls for reliability 
among the different partners [9]. In terms of ICT, cyber is always a potential risk. 
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Therefore, it can be said that despite the undisputed advantages of multi-national 
coalitions, a military force made up of numerous divergent parts can see the overall 
system’s cyber defences be compromised, which can easily play into the hands of the 
attacker and hamper one’s own defence.
B. On Russia – Analysis of Russia’s Course of Action
Western countries follow the assumption that economically prosperous democracies 
are less likely to wage war against each other. Therefore, the EU operates a 
“Europeanization policy” aimed at democratization and economic liberalization, 
particularly in its eastern domain [11]. This basic principle of foreign policy, however, 
is by no means a priori transferable to all states. In light of Russia’s annexation of 
the Crimea in Ukraine and the war in the Donbas, unresolved territorial conflicts on 
the eastern borders of the EU have gained international attention and concern. From 
Russia’s perspective, the West’s approach is flawed on several fronts. In context, 
shortly after World War Two, the Kremlin sought to protect the USSR by establishing 
a cordon sanitaire between itself and its major nemeses, the Western powers [13], 
with the occupation and coercive support of eastern European states under the Warsaw 
Pact. Although this buffer zone disintegrated over 1989-1991, as did the USSR itself, 
with the Kremlin believing its borderlands could slip under the aegis and control of 
the West, Moscow created the concept of “Frozen Conflicts” to weaken, divide, and 
ultimately prevent these countries (Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine, for example) 
from drifting far from their eastern orbit of Russia [13]. Russia did so through the 
manipulation of nationalist impulses among border populations [13], encouraging 
minorities to think of themselves as distinct from the majority population [13]. 
Unwilling to risk more than limited open military intervention, the Russians enhanced 
hybrid warfare (which has its origins in 1938), using the presence of its peacekeepers 
and its diplomatic powers to keep these conflicts in a “no war, no peace” situation (i.e., 
Frozen Conflicts) that perpetuates a Russian role in its borderlands [13].
As much as Russia profits more from enabling if not inciting temporary and regionally-
limited “skirmishes” to justify its own intervention, it is important to prevent the 
West from being drawn into these conflicts. Hence the importance of the concept of 
“Escalation Dominance” within every domain, including cyber, which imparts the 
ability to create a credible deterrence to outside forces involving themselves. Like any 
offensive or defensive capability, this will only work as a deterrent if the host nation 
shows it has the appropriate means, and the will to use them. As a conclusion, it can 
be stated that Russia – unlike the West – benefits more from regionally limited Frozen 
Conflicts and, for reasons of Escalation Dominance, also in terms of cyber, might 
feel the need to demonstrate Cyber Dominance to hamper other nations engaged or 
seeking to engage in those conflicts. Correspondingly, this increases the likelihood of 
cyber attacks.
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3. a decade of cyber threats and defence
Making hard decisions in the area of cyber security requires a comprehensive 
understanding of cyber security threats and developments. What follows then is an 
analysis of the last 10 years in the evolution of cyber threats and defence from 2007 
to 2017, the starting point being the Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks on 
Estonia, which marked a step-change in the onset of cyber warfare. 
A. Development of Security Incidents
CyCon X signifies 10 years of conferences dealing with legal, strategic, conceptual, 
and technical challenges of cyber conflict. Motivated by the consequences of the 
DDoS attacks on Estonia [14], which affected broad parts of everyday life in a 
country that had already highly digitized systems of infrastructure and governance, 
the conferences sought to explore and discuss numerous aspects of cyber security. 
2007-2009: The DDoS attacks on Estonia were not the only remarkable event in 2007. 
DDoS attacks are themselves a relatively simple method of attack, where vast amounts 
of data requests are directed towards a target with the aim of exhausting the target’s 
means of providing data, and legitimate traffic is blocked out in a simple but effective 
method. But this is just one case and while any number of digital assaults may be 
ostensibly quite primitive in format, it is the failure to anticipate them that enables 
their effectiveness, and significant, material impacts can be delivered. For example, 
the US Department of Energy ran the so-called Aurora experiment in their Idaho Labs 
in 2007 [15], showing how an attack on a power generator’s control system could led 
to the generator’s destruction. These incidences, both actual and theoretical, brought 
the issue of vulnerabilities in modern critical infrastructures into the public domain 
for the first time.
Meanwhile, a remarkable military operation was undertaken by the Israeli Air Force 
(IAF). During Operation Orchard, the IAF executed a pre-emptive strike against 
Syria’s plutonium-powered nuclear reactor Al Kibar shortly before it became active 
[16]. Highly successful, no plane was lost, with not a single Syrian missile fired. Some 
reports said this was because Syria’s air-defence systems were blinded by standard 
electronic scrambling tools [16], but some analyses highlighted the use of either 
special software or a backdoor in the adversary’s systems as more likely explanations 
for their failure to fire [17].
The notorious worm Downadup (also known as Conficker) appeared in October 2008. 
While worm attacks had already been declining for some years, Downadup manifest 
itself as one of the most widespread threats seen in some time [18]. It combined 
several techniques to spread itself and hide within systems, and defend itself against 
165
attacks. Even by 2014, over a million machines were still infected, highlighting the 
difficulties of removing this malware [19]. The ability to observe the defenders and 
adapt the code underlined the sophistication of the hackers [20]. While attribution 
of the precise origins of the attack is still not clear, with the creators of Downadup 
remaining unknown, sources were traced to Ukraine and China. Only the last version 
of the worm carried a malicious payload and it was a version that deleted itself after 
a month. This may indicate that Downadup was more of a test run by a still unknown 
source rather than a directed attack by cyber criminals.
Also in 2008, manipulated credit-card readers were found in UK supermarkets. The 
devices were fitted with wireless equipment and could transmit stolen data once a day 
or go dormant to avoid detection [21]. This was a remarkable attack on the country’s 
retail supply chain and its customers.
The rising threat towards critical infrastructures was seen when the US Federal 
Aviation Administration’s computer systems were hacked in 2009 [22], endangering 
not only commercial air traffic but military operations as well. In February, the (in-)
famous Downadup malware together with poor cyber hygiene grounded French naval 
aircraft [23], and in December, the US military realized that Iraqi insurgents had used 
the $26 software “SkyGrabber” to capture video feeds from US drones that had been 
transmitted via satellite links [24]. Despite what newspapers reported at the time, 
there was no “hacking” involved, only installing the software, aligning the antenna, 
and starting the record: the transmissions themselves were unencrypted.
2010: Some serious incidents affected the Internet in early 2010. Apparently, a 
configuration error made the I-root instance of the Domain Name System (DNS) root 
servers visible outside of China. I-root does not give correct address resolutions for all 
queries because of online censorship in China. Suddenly it was being used by computers 
outside of China, which unintentionally fell into this censorship [25]. Only two weeks 
later, a small Chinese ISP called IDC China Telecommunications Corporation, that 
had normally sourced about 40 prefixes, announced nearly 37,000 unique prefixes 
for about 15 minutes. Because of that, approximately 10 per cent of Internet traffic 
was rerouted through China, including traffic from providers like Deutsche Telekom 
and AT&T [26]. The incident highlighted how a good understanding of structures and 
protocols can be used to generate simple and effective attacks.
An important incident was discovered in October 2010 by the Belarusian company 
VirusBlokAda: Stuxnet. While the complexity of the malware sample challenged the 
security companies (resulting in some incorrect analysis), eventually it was determined 
that the malware attacked the Iranian enrichment facility in Natanz, interfering with 
the enrichment process and finally destroying centrifuges [27]. While it was not, as 
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reported at the time, the first cyber attack to result in physical damage, it definitely 
was a game changer, clearly demonstrating the new opportunities thrown up by a 
globalized, interconnected world. Even more, it marked the start of a new area of 
cyber ambitions from numerous countries around the world.
2011-2012: A sophisticated spear-phishing attack in 2011 obtained data used to 
compromise network security company RSA’s SecureID technology, which was then 
used to attack Lockheed Martin [28].
In 2012, the media reported on Chinese hackers stealing classified information about 
Lockheed Martin’s F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), as revealed by documents obtained 
by the NSA whistle-blower Edward Snowden (whose own story is a testament to 
how vast, top-security IT systems can be compromised by one person with a USB-
stick, see below) [29]. Comparing Lockheed Martin’s JSF and China’s Shenyang J-31 
fighter, David Majumdar has said: “On the surface, the J-31 looks very much like a 
twin-engine F-35 clone – and there are plenty of reasons to believe that the Chinese 
jet was based on stolen JSF technology – and could eventually be more or less a match 
for the American jet” [30].
Another controversial discussion was about a hardware backdoor in the Microsemi 
ProASIC3 processor – a chip used in numerous high performance aircraft, ranging 
from USAF fighters to the Boeing 777 Dreamliner, as well as military applications 
like encryption devices. While the researchers found some processor commands on-
board the chip which could be used as a backdoor [31], industry argued that these 
functions were only undocumented debugging functionality to be used by the chip 
developers for testing purposes. On the one hand this may be true, especially as 
modern processors contain thousands of undocumented commands and features 
[32], but on the other hand, for a sensitive or classified military application, it was a 
dangerous attack vector.
2013-2014: The power of relatively simple hacks when executed by an agent with a 
strong understanding of a system and its dependencies was once again demonstrated 
in April 2013, when a fake Tweet sent by the Syrian Electronic Army via the Associate 
Press’s Twitter feed caused a temporary crash of the New York Stock Exchange, 
costing US $136 billion. The content of the tweet said “Breaking: Two Explosions in 
the White House and Barack Obama is injured” [33]. Of course, it was quickly realized 
that there had not been an attack and the index recovered quickly; nevertheless, 
knowing (or executing) such a ploy can result in a lot of money being lost, or at least, 
changing hands when otherwise it might not.
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Another major event that should profoundly change the importance with which cyber 
security is viewed was the Snowden Leaks. The whistle-blower Edward Snowden 
worked as a system administrator for the NSA until May 2013. He passed on top 
secret, classified information about surveillance projects to the world’s press. The 
range of the revelations was vast, from the eavesdropping of Internet links, the 
introduction of hardware as well as algorithmic backdoors, to techniques for bridging 
the air-gap [34].
The Snowden Leaks came as part of a growing tide of stories about incidents of high 
level breaches of data and hacking. Even so, another breach in 2014 is of particular 
note, with the US Office of Personnel Management (OPM) targeted [35]. The severity 
of the breach stemmed from the business engaged in by the companies concerned, 
namely KeyPoint Government Solutions, the contractor for OPM, doing security 
clearance background investigations. Thus, the nature of the data was highly critical, 
not only because of personally identifiable information like Social Security numbers 
and addresses, but because of the risk of interference with and blackmailing potential 
of actual employees, with information heisted from such background checks.
In October 2012, NATO identified a comprehensive espionage campaign [36] that 
was attributed to Russia, and was found to have been going for five years already, 
additionally targeting institutions of the EU and the Ukrainian government. As is often 
the case, it was very difficult to give a close estimate as to quantity of data stolen. For 
example, logging data is often available only for short periods of time and is limited 
by legal regulations, which confounds the chances of getting a complete picture of 
what has happened. Hence, identifying the extent of the damage, and by that the scale 
and detail of potential hazards thereafter faced, is highly challenging. 
There were also breaches identified and intensified in the energy sectors in the United 
States and across Europe. Hackers from the “Dragonfly” group, also known as 
“Energetic Bear”, and traced to Eastern Europe, successfully hacked IT systems run 
by energy grid providers, electricity generation firms, petroleum pipeline operators, 
and industrial equipment providers in the US, Spain, France, Italy, Germany, Turkey, 
and Poland [37]. While the primary objectives were espionage and persistent access, 
there also remained the capability to carry out acts of sabotage [37].
2015: A highly “visible” attack occurred in April 2015, when 12 channels of the 
broadcasting station TV5 Monde went off air. While a defacement displayed IS 
propaganda online, an investigation identified the Russian hacker group APT28 as the 
source of the attack. It was a well-prepared assault and possibly sought to destroy the 
television station, but greater damage was prevented by the serendipitous presence 
on site of many more technicians than usual due to a new channel going on air the 
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same day of the attack [38]. Another attack resulting in actual physical consequences 
was demonstrated in western Ukraine in December. A long-prepared cyber attack 
on multiple electricity distribution stations caused power outages that affected 
approximately 225,000 customers. In parallel, phone DoS attacks were carried out on 
call centres to prevent customers from contacting the power company under assault 
[39].
2016: Early 2016 saw the beginning of the end for old-school methods of bank 
robbing, i.e. masked men with guns telling everyone to get on the floor, as new high-
tech methods introduced themselves to the world stage [40]. An attacker group named 
“Lazarus”, traced to North Korea, stole a total of over US $100 million, mainly from 
the Bangladesh Bank, among others, by penetrating the Alliance Access software 
used by the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) 
networks, which carries worldwide financial transactions in a (up to that point) secure 
and standardized way. In the same year, North Korean hackers also looted 235 GB 
of sensitive documents from South Korea’s defence data centre, including blueprints 
for a joint-US plans for war on the peninsula and scenarios for removing the North 
Korean leader, Kim Jong-un [41].
During the breach of the Philippines Commission on Elections, personal information 
from all of the country’s 55 million registered voters, including fingerprint data, 
passport numbers, and expiry dates, was exposed online and fully searchable [42], 
while the designs of India’s Scorpion submarines was leaked from the French 
shipbuilder DCNS [43]. Other data breaches that came to the public’s attention 
involved the casual dating website AdultFriendFinder, with the details of 412 million 
users exposed to the world [44], and even the NSA’s own hacking tools were stolen 
by the hacker group “The Shadow Brokers” [45].
But while such incidents have grown in number and severity, the methods deployed 
in the attacks techniques are still often quite simple, with DDoS attacks achieving 
disruption of services ranging from Amazon and Netflix to the PlayStation Network – 
nearly one decade after the attacks on Estonia.
2017: Numerous cyber security incidents were seen in 2017. In May, the WannaCry 
ransomware campaign hit enterprises and institutions all over the world [47], with 
impacts including the taking offline of 61 National Health Service hospitals in the 
UK and leading to production at numerous Renault factories in France stopping. By 
using the ETERNALBLUE vulnerability stolen from the NSA in 2016 and published 
by the Shadow Brokers in April 2017, the malware was very virulent. While patches 
had been made available by Microsoft for supported systems in March 2017, the run 
affected especially older Windows XP/8/Server 2003 systems for which no patch 
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had been published. In light of the outbreak, Microsoft took the “extraordinary” and 
“unusual” step of providing an emergency update for the aforementioned systems 
[48]. While the attacks elicited little by way of ransom, the financial impact can be 
enormous. An attack by the NotPetya ransomware later in 2017 on Maersk cost the 
Danish shipping giant up to US $300 million [49].
Some details about stolen data from the NSA were also published. A contractor for 
the organization had without authorization copied data and stored it on his computer 
at home. Russian hackers then compromised that computer and raided the files. 
According to The Wall Street Journal, the files had been identified by the Russian 
attackers through the contractor’s use of a popular antivirus software made by the 
Russia-based company Kaspersky Lab [50]. In addition that year, a new series of 
classified documents was leaked, this time from the CIA [51]. The material called 
Vault 7 and 8 showed the activities of the CIA in detail, including compromising cars, 
Smart TVs, and smartphones, and the CIA’s capability to conduct cyber warfare [52].
Already by this selection of cyber security incidents of the past 10 years, it seems that 
the situation has not been improving. To better understand the underlying problems, 
as well as new opportunities for cyber defence, a quick look at security-related 
developments during the decade in question follows.
Technological Development
Looking back to 2007, the Canadian company D-Wave Systems, Inc. presented their 
first commercial 16-qubit quantum annealing processor. Annealing is not universal 
quantum computing (the most powerful form of quantum computing), and is really 
only able to solve optimization problems. But D-Wave was the first company using 
quantum effects for building new kinds of processors. A publication in 2015 [53] led 
to heated debates over the statement that a calculation by an annealing-based system 
was carried out “100 million times faster than [that of a] PC”, but the comparison 
was not fair; the problem was greatly optimized for that demonstration and only 
slightly reflected real-world problems. Moreover, it was easy solvable by certain 
cluster-detecting algorithms, which were not used for comparison in the paper [54]. 
Anyway, while no application has been found yet where quantum annealing notably 
outperforms classical simulation approaches, the benefits of quantum annealing are 
becoming better understood and speed advantages have been demonstrated [55]. 
Further steps towards a universal quantum computer have been made, e.g., IBM 
presented a 50-qubit quantum processor in late 2017 [56]. While quantum key 
distribution (QKD) enables mathematically provable secure connections, and for 
which commercial systems have been offered since 2003, there have also been attacks 
on these systems that target weaknesses in their implementation. For example, Liu 
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and Sauge demonstrated a hack of QKD back in 2009, while the following year Xu et 
al. demonstrated the “phase remapping” attack.
In 2008, a paper by an author who called himself Satoshi Nakamoto was published, 
describing a peer-to-peer electronic cash system [57]. While the elements of the 
concept, cryptographic signatures, Merkle Chains, and P2P-networks, had already 
been known, the author was able to solve the double-spending problem by combining 
them within a distributed, trustless consensus system. The further success of Bitcoin 
is well-known, but the underlying concept of Blockchains is much more powerful, as 
it is able to guarantee the integrity of arbitrary data and enable different applications 
in the area of cyber security [58].
In 2009, a search engine well-known among security researchers was founded: 
Shodan [59]. Unlike previous systems, Shodan scans the Internet for connected 
devices, looking at services and collecting all provided information [60]. Different 
techniques for handling data evolved, especially in the area of big data and cognitive 
systems. For example, IBM celebrated a great success for cognitive systems in 2011, 
when IBM’s Watson computer won the Jeopardy! challenge [61]. Since then, Watson 
has been deployed in more and more areas, e.g., cancer treatment, financial planning, 
or advanced cyber threats and defence.
Much progress has also been observed in the area of Artificial Intelligence (AI). 
Going beyond the search in problem spaces or behaviour-based approaches, AI is 
opening up more and more fields, in creativity and even in consciousness [62]. For 
example, AI is already able to paint new art based on original drawings [63], or 
compose new music [64]. Of course, there have also been hurdles. Microsoft’s Twitter 
chatbot “Tay” had to be shut down in 2016 after less than 24 hours because it began 
using racist language [65], while a team from MIT’s Computer Science and Artificial 
Intelligence Laboratory tricked Google’s AI into misidentifying pictures of turtles 
as weapons [66]. Nevertheless, the well-disposed AI program Sophia was granted 
citizenship in Saudi Arabia in 2017. Now, Sophia is calling for women’s rights [67]. 
Also, Google’s already well-known AlphaGo AI system was enhanced even further 
in a very interesting and powerful away, being no longer constrained by the limits of 
human knowledge, but learning tabula rasa from itself and outperforming all previous 
systems [68].
From a military perspective, in 2013 the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian 
Federation Armed Forces, General Valery Gerasimov, published an article highlighting 
the asymmetrical possibilities offered by cyberspace and the necessity of perfecting 
activities in this information space [69]. In summary, the approach is guerrilla, and 
waged on all fronts with a range of actors and tools – for example, hackers, media, 
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businessmen, leaks and, yes, fake news, as well as conventional and asymmetric 
military means. Chaos is the strategy the Kremlin pursues, Gerasimov specifies that 
the objective is to achieve an environment of permanent unrest and conflict within 
an enemy state [70]. In November 2014, the US Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel 
announced the “Defense Innovation Initiative” [71], with the aim being to “pursue 
innovative ways to sustain and advance our military superiority for the 21st Century” 
[71]. To stop the erosion of American dominance in key domains in waging war, it 
is necessary, he argued, to find “new and creative ways to sustain and in some areas 
expand our advantages even as we deal with more limited resources” [71]. While 
this sounds quite challenging, it is historically motivated: “The US changed the 
security landscape in the 1970s and 1980s with networked precision strike, stealth, 
and surveillance for conventional forces. We will identify a third offset strategy that 
puts the competitive advantage firmly in the hands of American power projection over 
the coming decades” [71].
As new and challenging technologies are emerging with increasing pace, many of 
which are part and parcel of cyber security, a closer look at the root causes of the 
incidents between 2007-2017 incidents is necessary.
B. Attacker vs. Defender
Today, hundreds of cyber security systems are available on the market. Already back 
in 2004, the market research company International Data Corporation (IDC) coined 
the term “Unified Threat Management” (UTM). Basically, UTM is the evolution 
of firewall techniques into a comprehensive security solution, containing areas like 
control usage and policy enforcement, and therefore, combining techniques like 
content filtering, intrusion detection, and prevention, DDoS mitigation and antivirus 
applications. However, in spite of so broad and extensive an approach to cyber 
security, cyber security incidents are on the rise in number and gravity. Indeed, as with 
antivirus software being the conduit for hackers being able to expose data on a NSA 
contractor’s laptop, we are repeatedly seeing how products intended to protect the 
system have become the gateway for attackers (e.g., see [72]). It is not unsurprising 
then that in 2015 Netflix chose to discard its antivirus systems [73].
As a definition of an “incident” we should exclude any “ping” or an attempted 
connection from an unknown machine, as they generate huge numbers, but for the 
most part are of no greater significance. An attempt was made but failed. Far better 
then to concentrate on events where huge amounts of personal data or confidential 
files or even money have been stolen, or where physical damage has been wrought. 
The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has recorded incidents [74], 
with Figure 2 charting occurrence since 2007.
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FIGURE 2. NUMBER OF SIGNIFICANT CYBER INCIDENTS SINCE 2007 AS RECORDED BY CSIS [74]
It is particularly noticeable how the number of significant cyber security incidents has 
risen since 2015. However, a major variable is the efficacy of protective measures, 
which can be affected by numerous factors, including falling investment in cyber 
security. Hence figures for investment in cyber security are included in Figure 3, 
which shows investment in cyber security has consistently risen [75–77], even in the 
years of global economic crises when overall GDP has contracted [78].
 
FIGURE 3. EVOLUTION OF THE GLOBAL GDP, THE CYBER SECURITY MARKET REVENUE AND 
THE AVERAGE COST OF A CYBER INCIDENT BASED ON [75-78]
Estimating the net loss generated by cybercrime is a challenging task. Official numbers 
published by government or non-governmental bodies are a weak indicator, as only 
those cases filed with them are included. Additional data can be harvested from 
companies engaging in surveys on the matter, but this may still only be scratching 
the surface. Various public and private sources produce reports on a regular basis, but 
even when comparing the same periods under review, there is no consistent picture 
regarding cyber-attack statistics. For example, IDG’s summary of PwC’s Global State 
of Information Security Survey 2018 [79], published on October 18th, 2017, states 
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that “The number of security incidents detected continues to drop, along with the 
average financial loss due to cyber security attacks. However, the financial loss per 
incident continues to climb” [80]. In contrast, the 2017 Cost of Cyber Crime Study 
published by Accenture on September 26th, 2017, highlights a 27.4% increase in the 
average annual number of security breaches [81]. This underlines how the presented 
numbers cannot be generalized and how difficult it is to estimate the total damage, 
with the lack of reliable data being a core issue [82]. Recent studies by McAfee and 
CSIS throw some light on the subject by estimating the economic impact [83] and the 
global cost of cybercrime [84]. The most recent report suggests that the global cost 
of cybercrime is now US $600 billion, which includes gains to criminals and costs to 
companies for recovery and defence [84]. Within the studies, McAfee highlights the 
importance to include certain additional indirect costs, such as reputational damage, 
and this is also emphasized by Anderson et al. [85].
Thus, the global damage has increased sharply since the calculations for the period 
2013-2014 where the estimation was US $400 billion [86]. The data is on a par 
with calculations from the British insurance company Lloyd’s. Anderson ultimately 
concluded, “that we should perhaps spend less in anticipation of computer crime (on 
antivirus, firewalls etc.) but we should certainly spend an awful lot more on catching 
and punishing the perpetrators” [85].
While there are only a few studies dealing with net losses, a large number of cyber 
security reports are released. For example, Verizon’s Data Breach Investigations 
Report (DBIR) 2017 indicates that 75% of data breaches are perpetrated by outsiders 
and 25% involved internal actors [87]. For the tactics used, Verizon surmised that 
62% of breaches featured hacking, 51% included malware, and 43% had been social 
engineering attacks [87]. Still, such numbers are too abstract to identify underlying 
problems. For example, Figure 4 shows the evolution of known vulnerabilities, as seen 
by Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) [88], Open Sourced Vulnerability 
Database OSVDB [89], and Vulnerability Database VulnDB respectively [90] 
(OSVDB was discontinued in 2012, the same year VulnDB started). The range of 
very different identified vulnerabilities per year is striking. This may be due to some 
databases also including additional, non-publicly available information in their 
statistics. As vulnerabilities are the gateway for attackers, one would assume that 
an evaluation of this data brings light into the cyber security darkness. However, an 
in-depth analysis by Rory McCune showed that the technical evaluations of various 
reports are “built on faulty data at best” [91, 92]. As the used data is heavily biased, 
evaluations are not representative of real-world challenges and by that, are not the 




FIGURE 4. DEVELOPMENT OF IDENTIFIED VULNERABILITIES AS SEEN BY CVE AND OSVDB/
VULNDB [88-90]
The publicly known vulnerabilities may also be biased [93]: publications strongly 
depend on the interest and knowledge of some researchers, e.g., the pattern of “local 
privilege escalation”, where vulnerability numbers followed an expected pattern 
based on the knowledge of researchers and their activities [94]. Therefore, analysing 
the vulnerability databases is not enough to obtain a comprehensive and accurate 
picture of the scale of hazards and events encountered.
Overall, then, one can see that neither the array of figures and cases of cyber security 
breaching incidents, nor the evaluation of vulnerabilities or malign programs, can 
suffice to comprehensively address all the challenges posed by cyber security issues. 
Even as investment in cyber security constantly rises, so too are overall net losses 
growing, and strongly so. An analysis of the root causes is challenging, due to the 
inherent limits of available data, how it is collated, how incidents are defined, and other 
flaws and biases innate to any study. All these factors complicate the question then of 
what is to be done, what kind of effective measures can be deployed in defence. For all 
of that, efforts need to be made to construct a macro-level investigation of the global 
situation involving all actors and agents, to best identify the scale of the problems and 
what can be done about them.
C. Conclusions from 10 Years of Cyber (In)security
Looking back at 10 years of cyber security incidents and technical circumstances and 
development, a number of trends can be identified:
Trivial vs. Sophisticated Attacks: Although the techniques of attackers are becoming 
more advanced, it is often the more relatively trivial attacks that the media hypes 
up. As highlighted, the “hacking” of military drones in Iraq was nothing more than 
recording and displaying what was arguably accessible information. Still, it is the 
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technically simple assaults that can generate the most extensive effects, as seen by the 
DDoS attacks on Dyn. Despite infecting more than 300,000 systems in 150 countries 
and having dramatic consequences, WannaCry was also, at a technical level, rather 
rudimentary, in that it only exploited already known vulnerabilities.
On the other hand, it can be seen how there is a growing number of ever more 
sophisticated attacks. Stuxnet marked the beginning of a new class of cyber attacks, 
in that a cyber weapon was deployed that led to significant material damage. The 
same can be seen in the attacks on the power grid in Ukraine, which were long in 
preparation and affected various kinds of software and systems, including the 
manipulation of firmware of Industrial Control Systems (ICS). Also, our partial 
knowledge of the surveillance structures and tools of the NSA and CIA shows they 
are highly sophisticated, as revealed by the respective leaks.
The trend towards more sophisticated attacks and their development on the timeline 
leads to the next findings:
Preparation of the Battlefield: A variety of actions in recent years reveals how ever 
more comprehensively engagement on the cyber battlefield is being prepared. The 
number as well as the quality of attacks on critical infrastructures is rising, as are 
infiltration campaigns aimed at installing backdoor access. The preparation of access 
opportunities also can be seen by different attacks on the supply chain, introducing 
malevolent hardware that can manipulate whatever software is installed upon it. At 
the same time, comprehensive cyber espionage activities can be identified, focusing 
on military systems and developments, as well as blueprints for the development and 
testing of new cyber weapons being used in the field, e.g., like in the cases of TV5 
Monde or the Ukrainian power grid.
Glassy Humanity: The amount and quality of breached data reaches a level that can 
severely affect many areas of life, but especially people in security-critical tasks and 
functions. The OPM breaches presented a very severe incident, including data relating 
to personnel security background checks, while the breaches of the casual dating 
platforms Ashley Madison and AdultFriendFinder contained very detailed, personal 
data. Also, medical and personal devices and trackers are collecting more and more 
data and are often poorly secured, putting them well within the range of hostile online 
forces.
Further, newly available services like satellite surveillance offered by the company 
Planet Labs Inc. [95] will make surveillance capabilities previously reserved for the 
military and states available for almost everybody.
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Theoretical vs. Practical Security: Another aspect already visible in the real world and 
growing in importance is the tension between theoretical and practical security. While 
having new systems based on mathematically provable security systems like QKD, 
complex technical implementations open up almost inestimable possibilities for side 
channel attacks. Being a very powerful and evolving instrument, AI can support 
cyber security, but at the same time such systems may also produce unpredictable and 
unwanted results, based on their complexity and “black box” character.
Demonstration of Cyber Power: Finally, some cases of the demonstration of cyber 
power can already be identified. Eventually, Stuxnet turned out in the demonstration 
of cyber power, based on the change of the code and attacker behaviour, as well as the 
too intense public discussions and statements. In part the attack on TV5 Monde and 
the activities of The Shadow Brokers can be seen as demonstrations of cyber power.
Figure 5 highlights the coherences between cyber security incidents and the derived 
characteristics.
D. The next 10 Years: A look into the Crystal Ball
Technological evolution is exponential, and IT improvements grow at an even super-
exponential rate over long time spans [96]. This is something hard to cope with for 
human beings in daily life, and often decisions are taken based on a “linear feeling”. 
Having a look at current research programs and activities coupled with various 
developments and announcements over the last few years provides glimpse of a 
picture of what we may expect.
The “Defense Innovation Initiative” already mentioned earlier is a good starting point 
to figure out how tomorrows technical world may look like. By having a look at related 




FIGURE 5. COHERENCES OF IMPORTANT CYBER SECURITY INCIDENTS FROM 2007 TO 2017
First, the wide use of practically unlimited storage like 5d Glass discs and DNA 
storage [97] will challenge encryption security systems. Being able to store everything 
until one can decrypt it requires stronger encryption methods, and renders traditional 
concepts of proposed key lengths for certain periods of time as insufficient.
Second, Quantum supremacy will be achieved. While applications like QKD are 
already available, new techniques for secure communications will become ready 
for use. More so, universal quantum computers will open new opportunities for 
simulation, prediction, and security of systems, in the process supplanting and 
surpassing traditional security concepts. Recent research published by the University 
of Cambridge [98], IBM, and Intel shows tremendous progress in this area.
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Robots and the “Soldier 4.0” concept (technical and bio enhancements to soldiers) 
will be much more powerful, but to the same degree, much more dependent on IT – 
ranging from the use of exoskeletons [99] to smart bandages for the faster healing of 
wounds or selectively erasing memories of trauma from the brain [100]. Of course, 
technology in \itself is morally inert – there is as much scope for misuse and abuse as 
there is for beneficent impacts benefiting all mankind. 
Self-X technologies will find their way into products used in the real-world. While 
DARPA’s Cyber Grand Challenge in 2016 demonstrated the potential for self-
defending systems to analyse attacks and patch themselves up, the setup was based on 
tiny, very limited operating systems. Anyway, it shows the future of cyber security, and 
related programs like “System Security Integrated Through Hardware and Firmware” 
(SSITH) [101] will raise the bar for attackers.
Finally, AI will only increase in power and come to pervade all areas of life, with 
algorithms achieving ever more superior performance with no human input. 
Together with more and more powerful and specialized hardware, e.g., self-learning 
neuromorphic chips that mimic brain functions [102], this will enable completely 
autonomous systems to operate independently in hostile environments, and much 
faster than any system reliant on human input in their loop.
Summing up these aspects highlights key elements of tomorrow’s forces: autonomous 
and collectively mission-executing systems that are produced cheaply and mobile via 
3D-printing, that can self-destruct or dissolve in air so the technology will not fall into 
the hands of the adversary. While this can enable future supremacy on the battlefield 
even in denied environments (A2AD), the core requirement remains the same – strong 
cyber security, not only to protect the systems of tomorrow, but also to protect the 
research, design, and production that led to them.
4. conclusIon
Looking back on 10 years of cyber security, the situation seems to be becoming more 
and more challenging. Cyber is a popular tool for numerous reasons and many players. 
Upcoming technologies enforce hard and timely decisions, but the opportunities exist 
for a sustained improvement in cyber security. Figure 6 summarizes the paper and 
thus visually establishes a relationship between the Sections 2 and 3.
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FIGURE 6. MAPPING OF THE IDENTIFIED COHERENCES AND DEDUCTIONS IN CYBERSPACE TO A 
RISK ASSESSMENT
Basically, risk can be seen as a mathematical product of the factors “probability of 
occurrence” and “impact of the damage”. With respect to cyber, this equation is often 
extended to a three-factor equation:
Cyber Risk = Cyber Offense x Cyber Defence x Cyber Dependence
Section 2 has outlined how Russia’s political will to use cyber weapons has increased. 
On that point, we have used examples of (i) economic subversion, and (ii) use of cyber 
attacks in Ukraine and Georgia. Technical developments are manifold and can be 
subdivided into the categories outlined. As per the actual realization of political will 
and technical capabilities in conducting cyber warfare, we have seen only the tip of 
the iceberg and, in the future, we will see cyber powers demonstrated far more often. 
Many of the attacks thus far could be ascribed to the notion of the “Preparation of 
the Battlefield”. To be able to survive in a cyber war tomorrow, you have to do your 
homework today, and thus “prepare your opponent”. It has to be assumed that countries 
such as Russia or China have quite different weapons at their disposal. Anyone 
who believes that these nations find cyber vulnerabilities “by accident” is wrong. 
Systematic preparation means deliberately finding and exploiting vulnerabilities on 
your opponent’s side, if not indeed actively installing them in the soft- or hardware 
they may have sourced from you, and not waiting for “luck” to lean in your favour.
For the West, this means we have to think about cyber security more holistically and 
system-wide, especially in our military forces, and we need more innovative concepts 
with shorter procurement cycles. The topic of whether or not Western nations need a 
“critical security industry” is also an issue that needs to be discussed.
For the military, the power of future assertiveness means using NCW and autonomous 
systems. Fast decision-making requires information superiority and that in turn requires 
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ICT. Nonetheless, parallel to networking, greater autonomy and decentralization must 
be given greater consideration. To realize this complex task, sometimes less is more: 
in order not to end up in the “complexity trap”, we should rather stick to the keep-it-
simple approach, instead of looking for a vast, single, super solution. This means, in 
particular, the use of cost-effective systems, which are built to be mission-specific and 
on time using additive production methods and which are able to fulfil their missions 
on the basis of AI and swarm behaviour, even under A2AD conditions. Multi-billion 
dollar, high-value systems intended for use over decades, are only needed to a small 
extent as part of an overall strategy.
Furthermore, critical systems like weapon or crypto systems need verifiably secure 
designs. Trusted hardware for selected and highly-critical components as well as 
verified microkernels like seL4 are ways to realize this.
It is important to realize that the preparation of tomorrow’s battlefield is happening 
now, resulting in backdoors in today’s design and production. Therefore, better 
security along the supply line is required quickly and can be pushed by, for example, 
the use of Blockchain technologies.
Finally, disruptive technologies can have a huge impact on cyber security. For example, 
quantum computers will have a huge and immediate impact on cyber security when 
they are finally realized and deployed on a wholesale, real-world scale. Therefore, 
preparation is essential, even in the unlikely case that quantum computing does not 
get beyond the experimental lab stage. Thus, systems must be highly adaptive; for 
example, algorithms must be exchangeable quickly and comprehensively, but also 
structures and organizations must be flexible, being able to control and implement the 
required administrative processes.
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Aladdin’s Lamp: The Theft 
and Re-weaponization of 
Malicious Code
Abstract: Global superpowers do not have a monopoly on cyber warfare. Software 
thieves can steal malware written by more advanced coders and hackers, modify it, 
and reuse it for their own purposes. Smaller nations and even non-state actors can 
bypass the most technically challenging aspects of a computer network operation – 
vulnerability discovery and exploit development – to quickly acquire world-class 
cyber weapons. This paper is in two parts. First, it describes the technical aspects of 
malware re-weaponization, specifically the replacement of an existing payload and/or 
command-and-control (C2) architecture. Second, it explores the implications of this 
phenomenon and its ramifications for a range of strategic concerns including weapons 
proliferation, attack attribution, the fog of war, false flag operations, international 
diplomacy, and strategic miscalculation. And as with Aladdin’s magic lamp, many 
malware thieves discover that obtaining a powerful new weapon carries with it risks 
as well as rewards.
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1. IntroductIon: stealIng cyber weaPons
In Arabian Nights, a poor but clever Aladdin finds a magic lamp offering power, 
wealth, and love. However, the acquisition of these benefits also carried a burden 
of risk and responsibility. This parable offers lessons for aspiring cyber armies. The 
theft of advanced malware facilitates a similar shortcut to increased power on digital 
national security terrain. Computer code written by the Great Powers, including the 
United States, Russia, China, and Israel, can be acquired, reverse-engineered, and re-
weaponized by small nations and even non-state actors.
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Malware is a weapon unlike old-fashioned tanks and planes, and it is not necessary to 
break into a top-secret malware vault to steal it. Rather, compiled and fully-functioning 
cyber weapons can be found every day, by a careful observer, within network traffic 
and even on most email servers. And just as with Aladdin’s magic lamp, these tools 
can be quickly repurposed for new operations, entirely distinct from what the malware 
was originally intended to do. Such malware theft can save thousands of hours of time 
and effort.
When Sir Isaac Newton said, “if I have seen further, it is by standing on ye shoulders 
of giants,” [1] he was also presaging this phenomenon. Indeed, not just malware but 
all of today’s software benefits from the millions of coders and hackers who came 
before. Precious little code today is written entirely from scratch. Instead, existing 
code is customized and/or has new features added to it. And this is only one example 
of the way in which IT has changed both the nature of power and the way in which 
power is transferred between people, organizations, and nations. This is true not 
only for source code, but also in the case of malware samples, where only access to 
executable code is available.
We know for a fact that malware re-weaponization is possible because we often see it 
within academic research1 [2] [3] and in capture-the-flag (CTF) hacker competitions 
[4]. However, we have also seen reflections of it in real-world computer network 
operations by nation-states [5] [6]. Cyber actors and campaigns with names like 
DarkHotel, Lazarus, and TigerMilk have been seen throughout Asia, reusing attack 
code such as NetTraveler and Decafett in ways that also appear to incorporate false 
flags intended to cast blame on others during cyber operations [7]. 
One of the most prominent recent cases of malware source code theft involved the 
U.S. National Security Agency (NSA), from which code was allegedly stolen and 
released by the “Shadow Brokers” via the website Wikileaks in 2016. Reportedly, 
an NSA exploit named EternalBlue was leveraged in May 2017 to facilitate the 
WannaCry ransomware attack that targeted Windows computers and demanded 
Bitcoin payments. A month later, EternalBlue was used again to propagate the Petya 
ransomware, primarily against Ukraine. In March 2017, the Shadow Brokers also 
released malware allegedly developed by the CIA, again via Wikileaks [8].
What is a “cyber weapon”? To be sure, this term has been abused and exaggerated 
by analysts, journalists, and politicians, even when describing some well-known case 
studies [9]. And strangely, in some long-standing international conflicts, there seem 
to have been no known examples of cyber-attacks at all [10]. Part of the challenge 
in defining cyber-attacks and “cyber war” is the novelty of this new conflict domain. 
1 The Bao paper cited here discusses an “automatic system” for identifying and replacing outer shellcode. 
Our discussion in this paper goes deeper and examines the escalation of privilege exploits, as well as a C2 
replacement technique that appears perfect for false flag attacks.
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On March 23, 2018, noted security researcher “The Grugq” explored this question 
in depth during a Black Hat conference keynote entitled, “A Short Course in Cyber 
Warfare.” The Grugq referred to “Cyber” as the “5th Domain” of warfare, which is 
“literally a new dimension” and “much more complicated than anything we know.” 
He explained that cyber-attacks comprise “Active,” “Passive,” “Physical,” and 
“Cognitive” elements that can be employed in unique ways every time, making the 
next cyber-attack painfully hard to predict – and sometimes even to understand.2
For the purposes of this paper, the authors consider that a cyber-attack can be any 
information-based or kinetic operation designed to compromise the confidentiality, 
integrity, or availability of an IT system. In a national security context, such an 
operation must cause sufficient harm that it rises to the attention of national decision 
makers. It is this latter criterion that contributes to the definition controversy, as a 
final determination is subjective and open to political or business opportunism; 
however, this is a problem that certainly predates the Internet. Finally, the authors 
share the opinion that the malware sample analysed in this paper more than meets 
the requirement for a cyber weapon, as it contains two rare “zero-day” exploits and is 
specifically designed to give an attacker full remote-access to a target computer.
Here is what current U.S. policy states about “computer network operations”: 
“Cyberspace is the most affordable domain through which to attack the United States. 
Viruses, malicious code, and training are readily available over the Internet at no cost. 
Adversaries can develop, edit, and reuse current tools for network attacks.” [11].
The concept of malware theft via executable code manipulation (i.e. no access to 
source code) has also been addressed directly. In an August 2017 speech to a U.S. 
Department of Defense Intelligence Information Systems (DoDIIS) conference, 
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Director Lt Gen Vincent Stewart said, “Once 
we’ve isolated malware, I want to reengineer it and prep to use it against the same 
adversary who sought to use it against us.” [12].
Within the context of NATO, there is ample evidence that computer network operations 
have already risen to the highest level of importance. In 2016, NATO promised to 
defend allied cyberspace as it has land, sea, and air since the end of World War II. 
Further, it is now officially integrating cyber operations into its military plans [13] 
with the explicit goal of trying to deter cyber-attacks like those that have occurred in 
Estonia, Georgia, Ukraine, and the United States [14] [15].
The theft and re-weaponization of malware samples, in which hackers steal each 
other’s executable code, swap existing payloads for custom munitions, and/or 
2 As an example of an “Active” cyber-attack, The Grugq cited Israel’s manipulation of the Palestine 
Liberation Organization’s online financial resources; for “Passive” he cited China’s “Operation Aurora” 
vs. Google in 2009; for “Physical” he cited Stuxnet; and “Cognitive” includes the doxing of the U.S. 
Democratic National Committee in 2016.
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3 The authors do not go into sufficient detail to allow the reader to create a live weapon. Specific technical 
details such as exact byte offsets are omitted.
4 “Zero-day” exploits target computer vulnerabilities that are yet unknown to software makers and security 
researchers; an exploit ceases to be a zero-day once specific patches are available.
replace its command-and-control (C2) functionality, will increase the number of 
actors, attacks, and complexities on the cyber battlefield, and will negatively impact 
deterrence, diplomacy, and arms control in cyberspace.
This paper is divided into two primary sections: 1) a description of the technical aspects 
of malware re-weaponization, and 2) an exploration of its strategic implications.
2. malware re-weaPonIZatIon: 
technIcal asPects
In this section, the authors will examine the first part of their argument: that malware 
analysis is not “rocket science” and that executable code of any type can be captured, 
reverse-engineered, and repurposed with relative speed and ease. We will look at a 
genuine malware sample that was detected on a live network in 2017.3 We believe that 
this malicious program was used by a nation-state with the specific intent of breaching 
a well-defended computer network. By any measure, it is advanced code, in part due 
to the fact that the program leverages no fewer than two “zero-day” exploits.4
The key takeaway from this short analysis is that the most technically challenging part 
of a cyber-attack’s lifecycle – its vulnerability discovery and exploit development – 
can simply be stolen from another cyber actor. A malware thief (or cyber army) can 
then reconfigure and repurpose the code, adding unique functionality and/or control 
data, and then launch a high-grade cyber weapon in any direction they choose.
FIGURE 1. RUSSIAN DOLL [16]
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A. Malware and its Russian doll design
Computer programs, including malware, are characterized by a layered structure that 
can be compared to a Russian matryoshka doll. With malware, most of the layers form 
a benign skeletal structure, while others (some of which can be hidden or encrypted) 
are designed to subvert computer security, hijack communications, or steal data.
1. Human layer
• The outermost layer is that which humans see and understand, such as a 
Microsoft (MS) Office document. Our sample was an MS Word file sent via 
email. For an infection to begin, the email recipient simply had to open the 
attached file which had been expertly crafted by a phishing specialist.
2. Image file
• Once opened, the MS file loaded an Encapsulated PostScript (EPS) image 
file that contained hidden, encrypted computer instructions in hexadecimal 
format5 [17].
3. Shellcode
• The decrypted code exploited a vulnerability in the Office EPS engine CVE-
2017-0261 and executed shellcode that was embedded within the EPS file 
in order to open a command window through which an attacker could try to 
access the target computer.
4. Dropper
• The shellcode was obfuscated (packed) and contained a Portable Executable 
(PE) file to be launched on the victim’s computer. The executable file 
performed privilege escalation (CVE-2017-0263, individual exploits for 32- 
or 64-bit OS) and wrote a payload executable to disk.6
5. Payload
• Once sufficient privileges were gained on the target computer, a “payload” 
was run, which was a fully-fledged remote administration tool that could 
perform a range of malicious actions such as stealing, blocking, and/
or manipulating data. In our sample, the payload had been encrypted and 
compressed as an additional way to delay and complicate malware analysis.
6. Command-and-Control (C2)
• After successful installation, the malware tried to “phone home” to a 
malicious C2 domain somewhere on the Internet in an attempt to report for 
duty, seek updates, and await further instructions. These communications 
were encrypted to help protect them from the prying eyes of network 
defenders.
This level of malware analysis is not difficult and is available to any nation. Powerful 
tools such as code disassemblers and debuggers can perform decryption, de-
5 Researchers recently reported that multiple online threat actors, including Russian cyber espionage groups, 
have been leveraging EPS files and zero-days against European diplomatic and military entities.
6 These exploits took advantage of Common Vulnerability and Exposure (CVE) 2017-0263.
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obfuscation, and unpacking of malware samples. In our case study, we employed 
numerous techniques. Some aspects of the design, such as the “.zip” algorithm and the 
“XOR cipher”, are well-known to most malware researchers. Others, such as a string 
obfuscation algorithm for the C2, were custom-made by the malware’s author, and 
required in-depth reverse-engineering.7
FIGURE 2. MALWARE SAMPLE ARCHITECTURE
B. Re-weaponization
Malware dissection at this level of detail already yields sufficient understanding 
for redesign and re-weaponization purposes. This section describes two ways to re-
weaponize malware: 1) C2 replacement, and 2) payload replacement. Once either 
modification is performed, the malware thief simply reverses the steps taken in 
the malware’s analysis, layer-by-layer, for the entire software package – just like a 
Russian doll.
The authors successfully tested both C2 replacement and payload replacement on this 
sample. They also wrote user-friendly command-line-interface scripts whereby even 
non-technical personnel, without any reverse-engineering knowledge, could perform 
the entire process.
1) Command and Control (C2) replacement
The quickest way to re-weaponize a malware sample is simply to replace its C2 
components, such as by giving it a new domain that is under the malware thief’s 
control. In fact, malware authors often reuse C2 architectures over time, even for 
7 This effort required knowledge of the C programming language, as well as some luck. For example, one 
algorithm was symmetric, i.e. encrypt = decrypt. Asymmetric encryption could be defeated as well, but we 
would need to use a new encryption key and therefore the re-weaponized sample would be different from 
the original.
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different exploits and malware campaigns. This typically serves to simplify ongoing 
operations which can grow in complexity over time. However, this characteristic also 
helps cyber defenders and malware thieves to analyse and reverse engineer how an 
attacker’s C2 architecture works, both tactically and strategically.
Replacing the C2 requires an intermediate level of technical expertise in software 
coding, reverse engineering, and network communications. But with the aid of 
disassembler software, this task can be accomplished relatively quickly, even by a 
small team or a lone expert. There can be technical limitations, such as with the length 
of the domain name. However, in practice, such limitations are easily overcome with 
some level of flexibility and creativity on the part of the malware thief.8
Finally, C2 replacement offers malware thieves an additional, tantalizing opportunity: 
the possibility of running easy false-flag operations. First, a re-weaponized malware 
sample is virtually indistinguishable from the original. Second, the malware thief can 
use the same service providers (including certificate issuers, hosters, DNS registrars, 
etc.) to make a new operation simply blend in with the campaign that the original 
attacker was already running, providing instant anonymity, or at least plausible 
deniability.
In Figure 3, below, the authors have written a small (120 lines of code) script to 
demonstrate the simplicity of C2 replacement. Here, there is just one command line 
parameter: the new C2 domain (cycon.org). All the necessary steps to replace the 
C2 domain in the malicious EPS file have been automated in an easy-to-use script. 
Running “python changeCnC.py cycon\.org [epsOutputFile” produces a malicious 
EPS file that can be included in a Word document. Once the malicious Word document 
is opened, malware infects the computer and connects to the modified C2 domain 
(cycon.org, as seen in the example screenshot). The primary challenge regarding C2 
replacement is that one needs to reverse-engineer the C2 communication protocol and 
write server-side software to support this protocol.
8 For example, there are many ways to generate a short domain name, and to verify that it works, before an 
attack is launched.
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FIGURE 3. C2 REPLACEMENT TO CYCON.ORG
2) Payload replacement
A second option for a would-be malware thief is to replace the payload with a tailored 
munition of their choice. For many scenarios, this is in fact the preferred option for a 
malware thief, such as:
1. when the thief already possesses custom agent and server software; 
2. time constraints do not allow for C2 reverse-engineering; or 
3. a proposed operation has easily achievable objectives such as wiping all data 
on the victim’s machines.
Payload replacement is more invasive than C2 replacement and requires more 
malware expertise. As with C2 replacement, there can be some technical limitations, 
such as payload size. However, these can also be overcome with some flexibility and 




In the previous section, the authors established that, even with limited time and 
expertise, a malware thief can reverse-engineer advanced malware, replace its C2 
architecture, or replace its payload with a tailored munition, and launch an entirely 
new attack. In this section, we will explore the ramifications of this phenomenon for 
cyber defenders and for national security decision-makers9 [18]. We will cover six 
strategic consequences in order from the logically most urgent and compelling to 
address to the least:
1. Proliferation
2. Attribution





The first and most obvious challenge posed by malware re-weaponization is 
proliferation. Arms control, as a discipline, seeks to reduce the size of military arsenals 
that are capable of inflicting harm on humanity. But recycling malware means that 
the same vulnerabilities and exploits can be used by Country A against Country B, 
Country C against Country D, Country E against Country F, and so on. Furthermore, 
smaller nations and even non-state actors will sometimes be able to employ truly 
world-class digital weapons that would have been almost impossible for them to 
develop on their own.
So far, the cyber battlefield has seemingly been dominated by the Great Powers, such 
as the United States, Russia, and China, as well as regional powers with ongoing 
conflicts like Israel, Iran, and North Korea. Further, one experienced national security 
and cyber security specialist, James Lewis, recently argued that non-state actors are 
simply incapable of launching “massive and damaging” cyber-attacks [19]. But we 
suspect that most governments are, at the very least, leveraging computer network 
operations for cyber espionage in support of their core national security interests. We 
contend that malware theft and re-weaponization will only make this more common.
9 The Leitzel paper cited here, “Cyber Ricochet: Risk Management and Cyberspace Operations,” uses 
the phrase “cyber ricochet” to denote denial-of-service attacks where the attacker does not directly 
communicate with the target but instead sends packets to intermediate nodes with spoofed source/
destination addresses. The authors of this paper feel that the term “cyber ricochet”, along with the label 
“reflection attack” which is used to describe a common hacker technique, imply that the malware thief 
is not directly controlling the operation and that an attack with unexpected consequences could result. 
However, when the payload or C2 infrastructure is wholly replaced, as we describe here, the attacker is in 
full control.
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Above all, re-weaponization can save an aspiring cyber power significant time and 
money. IT and hacker talent are expensive. A credible cyber-attack program requires 
software developers, vulnerability analysts, exploit developers, malware testers, bot 
herders, and much more. In 2010, noted hacker and former NSA employee Charlie 
Miller told a CyCon audience that an effective cyber army would cost about $45 
million per year with almost one-quarter of that sum spent on vulnerability analysts 
and exploit developers [20]. Thus, malware reuse offers a substantial reduction in cost 
for the most technically challenging parts of any operation: vulnerability discovery 
and exploit development.
B. Attribution
Increased cyber weapons proliferation means that there will be more armies on the 
cyber battlefield which in turn will increase the challenge of attribution. The digital 
battlefield has always been difficult for humans to see, understand, and contextualize. 
And three of the primary goals of a cyber-attacker are stealth, anonymity, or plausible 
deniability. Most cyber-attacks are closer to a covert operation than a traditional 
military operation. The laws of war state that soldiers should wear national uniforms 
with proper insignia, in part to bolster accountability for actions taken. However, 
hackers take advantage of the labyrinthine architecture of the Internet to obscure their 
true location.
The question of finding who is sitting at a remote keyboard is therefore fundamental 
to enhancing not only cyber security but also national security including deterrence, 
diplomacy, arms control, prosecution, and/or retaliation.10 For computer network 
operations, this has been true since at least the mid-1980s.11 Following the Cold War, and 
especially after the terrorist attacks of 9/11, law enforcement and counterintelligence 
agencies have invested considerable resources in cyber-attack attribution, but the 
size of the Internet and the dynamic nature of cyberspace have ensured that this will 
remain a vexing challenge for the foreseeable future.12  Attribution is an art as well as 
a science, and a cyber-attack must usually cross a high threshold in terms of damages 
before sufficient resources will be allocated to its success [21].
Today, cyber defense is a professional discipline, and attribution is typically based on 
a wide range of observable tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP).13 However, in 
many cyber-attack investigations, there has been a singular, most valuable attribution 
10 For example, in the 1990s, there were numerous cases in which the U.S. Government believed that a 
cyber-attack had been launched by a nation-state only to discover that it was a teenage student.
11 In the 1980s, Cliff Stoll, a system administrator at the University of California, Berkeley, spent a year 
tracking likely Russia-backed hackers who were targeting U.S. national laboratories, a tale recounted in 
The Cuckoo’s Egg.
12 More recently, commercial firms have gotten into the attribution game. However, without the benefit of 
other sources of intelligence available to nation-states, such as human (HUMINT) and signals intelligence 
(SIGINT), they remain at higher risk of making mistakes in attribution.
13 Robust attribution relies on many pieces of evidence, including MD5 hashes, “diff” results, payloads, IP 
addresses, C2 infrastructure, domain names, digital certificates, network searches, exfiltrated data, source 
code, time zones, algorithms, encryption, current events, and more.
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indicator: the malware “signature”. Cyber actors have traditionally been associated 
with particular “families” of malware. Malware theft and re-weaponization therefore 
threatens to wreak havoc on the attribution process as we know it if an increasing 
number of players are simply using the same hacker tools that tend to be tightly 
controlled by their creator, and only accessible to others by malware reuse.
C. Fog of War
If already-challenging attribution becomes harder, national security decision-making 
will suffer from a thicker “fog of war”. Sun Tzu famously wrote that “all warfare is 
based on deception” [22], but in the age of cyberwar, this dictum has never been more 
true. The problem is exacerbated by the fact that so many cyber-attacks take place 
during peacetime, either as cyber espionage or preparation of the battlespace for some 
future war that may never take place. Thus, in many ways, what we call “cyberwar” 
has no beginning – and no end.
The risks that cyber-attacks pose to our national critical infrastructures is high. 
Their integrity rests on the proper functioning of IT. This is true for everything from 
electricity to elections. Examples abound: in 2007, Syrian air defense personnel were 
apparently blinded by a cyber-attack that preceded an assault by Israeli warplanes; in 
2015, foreign hackers are believed to have turned out the lights in Western Ukraine; 
and in 2016, Russian hackers were blamed for interfering in the U.S. Presidential 
election.
Malware theft and re-weaponization will increase the fog of war precisely because 
it increases weapons proliferation and hinders attack attribution. If all nations have 
access to roughly the same arsenal of vulnerabilities and exploits, who is to say 
that a third party is not playing agent provocateur in an ongoing conflict between 
two other nations? And how does any nation know when its cybersecurity has been 
compromised to the point that a traditional military invasion – or a coup d’état – is 
imminent? The chances for misunderstanding and miscalculation in cyberspace loom 
large indeed, especially in a conflict domain where time is of the essence.14
D. False Flags
Potential cyber-attackers know that the fog of war is thicker than ever. This fact will 
tempt many of them to engage in “false flag” operations that involve an effort to pin 
the blame on a third party. Such tactics long preceded the Internet, as pirate ships used 
to hoist false flags in an effort to prevent their targets from readying their defenses or 
evading the threat [23]. Modern spies also carry counterfeit passports, wear disguises, 
and lie about their true intentions.
14 Especially considering that the latest craze in both cyber-attack and defense is artificial intelligence (AI).
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Malware theft and re-weaponization will tempt national-level decision-makers to 
engage in this type of behavior across the open Internet. False flag operations can be 
tricky to run as there are so many details to get right and so many ways that an operation 
can go wrong. But in cyberspace, the chances of success are higher, and the penalty 
for getting caught less severe than for a traditional military or intelligence operation. 
For most cyber operations, anonymity is not required, as plausible deniability will 
suffice.
Cyberspace is vast, and growing more crowded by the day, with students, soldiers, 
spies, and statesmen all living and working in the same space. There are 193 sovereign 
member states of the U.N., but there are 255 Internet country code top-level domains 
(ccTLD)15. This gives cyber-attackers the chance to be whomever they want, and 
suggests that malware reuse will increase the number of false flag political and 
military operations we see.
E. Diplomacy
If malware reuse is so helpful from an attacker’s perspective, those who would seek 
to counter these advantages – law enforcement, counterintelligence, and diplomats 
– will have a more arduous road before them. Within the realm of international 
relations, the management of negotiations, treaties, and tension fall under the rubric 
of diplomacy. However, the rise of the Internet and cyberspace has complicated our 
understanding of both national security and diplomacy. There is only one Internet, and 
one cyberspace, and all nations are struggling to retain their traditional concepts of 
national sovereignty and law enforcement jurisdiction within it.
In 2018, diplomatic tensions over information security could hardly be higher. In 
cyber espionage, there are continuing reverberations over the Snowden revelations.16 
In propaganda, Russian interference in the U.S. electoral process has led to efforts 
throughout Europe to protect social media from information operations emanating 
from Moscow. And in nuclear diplomacy, cyber-attacks have been used by both sides 
on the Korean peninsula to improve their odds of victory in a real war.
Cyberwar is of special significance to diplomats for four reasons. First, cyber-attacks 
typically fall below the threshold of the use of force, so will be publicly addressed by 
diplomats more often than by soldiers. Second, most cyberwar occurs in peacetime 
when diplomacy takes priority over military operations. Third, diplomats are prime 
targets of an adversary’s cyber espionage and influence operations. Fourth, alliance 
members risk getting dragged into a cyber conflict which they did not approve or even 
know about.
15 Internet country code top-level domains (ccTLD) encompass not only countries but also dependent 
territories.
16 For example, governments in Europe and South America have discussed building a new undersea cable in 
the Atlantic Ocean that could avoid direct digital contact with the United States.
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Success or failure in diplomacy can have life-or-death consequences. Malware 
theft and re-weaponization will complicate cyber-related diplomacy, because of the 
expected rise in the number of actors, frequency of attacks, and the level of complexity 
of many cyber operations.
F. Miscalculation
History is littered with national security-related mistakes, from invading Russia to 
bombing Pearl Harbor, made by those who trusted in hope. It is human nature to be 
overly optimistic. And the theft of world-class malware is no different, carrying as it 
does risks for any malware thief. Attribution is difficult, but ultimately not impossible. 
It is easy to imagine that smaller nations, without sufficient political and military 
strength, will use such a weapon rashly and prematurely, and suffer disproportionate 
retaliation, in what could be a miscalculation of strategic proportions.
The fact that computer network operations are often time-sensitive only adds to this 
risk. When an attacker is able to pair an exploit (even a zero-day) with a discovered 
vulnerability, it is understood that the window of opportunity will not be open forever. 
A system administrator or software company can update, patch, or harden the target 
network, operating system, or application at any time. Malware signatures are 
constantly updated. And a malware thief has the added pressure of knowing that at 
least one other party knows about the exploit and vulnerability.
Even the possession of powerful malware does not mean that an attacker can 
properly execute all facets of a complex computer network operation. Part of it they 
may get right and others wrong. Hackers are routinely caught during any phase of a 
cyber-attack, from reconnaissance, to lateral movement on a network, during data 
exfiltration, and so on – sometimes even long after an attack is over. Incident response 
is always improving, and if done correctly, it will incorporate traditional intelligence 
analysis sources and methods as part of its attribution determination.
A final consideration involves stolen malware that has been backdoored, trojaned, or 
watermarked (potentially with malware theft in mind). Unless a hacker has written a 
computer program from scratch, it is hard to know whether it contains undiscovered, 
hidden functionality. For example, in 2013, the Syrian government allegedly targeted 
non-governmental organizations in Syria by encouraging them via social media 
to download Freegate, a common Virtual Private Network (VPN) client used to 
circumvent censorship. The Syrian government had reportedly trojaned this version 
of Freegate, precisely to target domestic opposition [24]. Thus, the desire for a quick, 
cheap cyber-attack can lead a malware thief into a trap.
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4. conclusIons
For Aladdin, the acquisition of a magic lamp brought both benefits and risks. The theft 
and re-weaponization of malware is no different. Smaller nations, and even non-state 
actors, can obtain powerful digital weapons almost for free. As a result, there will be 
more armies on the cyber battlefield, more cyber-attacks, and a higher overall level of 
complexity for cyber defense. This phenomenon will have ramifications for weapons 
proliferation, attack attribution, the fog of war, false flag operations, international 
diplomacy, and strategic miscalculation.
If a malware thief asks too much of the magic lamp, however, there may be serious 
repercussions and unintended consequences. All cyber thieves must ask themselves 
whether they have the traditional political and military might to absorb a potential 
response. In this light, reliable attribution might still tend toward traditionally strong 
military powers – states that in any case may be less concerned with unforeseen 
consequences.
In terms of mitigating the potential impact of malware theft and re-weaponization, 
governments are likely to consider a wide range of options, including enhanced 
vulnerability disclosure,17  watermarking digital weapons to keep closer track of them, 
the use of blockchain to enhance attribution, and even the signing of non-aggression 
pacts for cyberspace.18 More research is needed on mitigation strategies.
In the longer term, it is possible that an increased awareness of this phenomenon 
will slow down the current pace of cyber operations worldwide, so that nations can 
better safeguard their code and operations. Potentially, this will serve to decelerate 
the prevailing level of conflict and instability in cyberspace, since every nation is 
now home to an abundance of cyber vulnerabilities. Advanced cyber powers might be 
wise to consider more carefully the potential fallout from approving reckless digital 
operations so that they do not lose control of the magic lamp.
5.  references
[1]  I. Newton, “Letter from Sir Isaac Newton to Robert Hooke (1675),” Historical Society of Pennsylvania, 
2017. Available: https://discover.hsp.org/Record/dc-9792/Details [Accessed March 28, 2018].
[2] R. W. Y. S. D. B. T Bao, “Your Exploit is Mine: Automatic Shellcode Transplant for Remote Exploits,” 
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, San Jose, 2017. Available: https://www.ieee-security.org/TC/
SP2017/papers/579.pdf [Accessed March 28, 2018].
[3] Y. S. R. W. C. K. G. V. D. B. Tiffany Bao, “How Shall We Play a Game? A Game-theoretical Model for 
Cyber-warfare Games,” Carnegie Mellon University, p. 1. Available: https://users.ece.cmu.edu/~youzhib/
paper/bao2017csf.pdf [Accessed March 28, 2018].
17 Cyber commands already weigh the operational value of vulnerabilities and exploits against their national 
exposure to them.
18 There might be voluntary limits on cyber espionage, which is understood to be a natural precursor to 
cyber-attack.
201
[4] W. K. J. Yam, “Strategies used in capture-the-flag events contributing to team performance,” 
Naval Postgraduate School, March 2016, pp. 2-3. Available: https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/
handle/10945/48498/16Mar_Yam_Jerel.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y [Accessed March 28, 2018].
[5] J. Cox, “The CIA Allegedly ‘Borrows’ Code From Public Malware Samples,” Motherboard, March 7, 
2017. Available: https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/3dyd53/the-cia-allegedly-borrows-code-from-
public-malware-samples [Accessed March 28, 2018].
[6] G.-S. C. R. Juan Andrés, “Walking in Your Enemy’s Shadow: When Fourth Party Collection Becomes 
Attribution Hell,” in Virus Bulletin, Madrid, 2017. Available: https://cdn.securelist.com/files/2017/10/
Guerrero-Saade-Raiu-VB2017.pdf [Accessed March 28, 2018].
[7] K. Zetter, “Masquerading Hackers are Forcing a Rethink of How Attacks are Traced,” The Intercept, 
October 4, 2017. Available: https://theintercept.com/2017/10/04/masquerading-hackers-are-forcing-a-
rethink-of-how-attacks-are-traced/ [Accessed March 28, 2018].
[8] M. R. A. W. L. Scott Shane, “WikiLeaks Releases Trove of Alleged C.I.A. Hacking Documents,” New 
York Times, March 7, 2017. Available: https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/07/world/europe/wikileaks-cia-
hacking.html [Accessed March 28, 2018].
[9] M. D. Cavelty, “The Militarisation of Cyberspace: Why Less May Be Better,” in 4th International 
Conference on Cyber Conflict, NATO CCD COE, Tallinn, 2012. Available: https://ccdcoe.org/publications/
2012proceedings/2_6_Dunn%20Cavelty_TheMilitarisationOfCyberspace.pdf [Accessed March 28, 2018].
[10] R. C. M. Brandon Valeriano, Cyber War Versus Cyber Realities: Cyber Conflict in the International 
System, New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2015, p. 2. Available: http://www.brandonvaleriano.com/
uploads/8/1/7/3/81735138/cyber_war_versus_book_review_itp.pdf [Accessed March 28, 2018].
[11] “Strategic Cyberspace Operations Guide,” United States Army War College, June 1, 2016, p. 7. Available: 
https://info.publicintelligence.net/USArmy-StrategicCO.pdf [Accessed March 28, 2018].
[12] I. Thomson, “US Military Spies: We’ll Capture Enemy Malware, Tweak it, Lob it Right Back at Our 
Adversaries,” The Register, 15 Aug 2017. Available: https://www.theregister.co.uk/2017/08/15/us_
government_wants_to_reverseengineer_malware_to_fight_back/ [Accessed March 28, 2018].
[13] NATO, “NATO Defence Ministers Agree to Adapt Command Structure, Boost Afghanistan Troop Levels,” 
November 9, 2017. [Online]. Available: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_148722.htm. [Accessed 
December 2017].
[14] T. E. Ricks, “NATO’s Little Noticed but Important New Aggressive Stance on Cyber Weapons,” Foreign 
Policy, December 7, 2017. Available: http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/12/07/natos-little-noticed-but-
important-new-aggressive-stance-on-cyber-weapons/ [Accessed March 28, 2018].
[15] C. Bing, “Russia-linked Hackers Impersonate NATO in Attempt to Hack Romanian Government,” 
Cyberscoop, May 11, 2017. Available: https://www.cyberscoop.com/dnc-hackers-impersonated-nato-
attempt-hack-romanian-government/ [Accessed March 28, 2018].
[16] W. Commons, “Floral matryoshka set 2 smallest doll nested,” [Online]. Available: https://commons.
wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Floral_matryoshka_set_2_smallest_doll_nested.JPG. [Accessed December 2017].
[17] A. L. A. B. B. R. D. K. G. M. Genwei Jiang, “EPS Processing Zero-Days Exploited by Multiple Threat 
Actors,” FireEye, May 9, 2017. Available: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/eps-
processing-zero-days.html [Accessed March 28, 2018].
[18] B. Leitzel, “Cyber Ricochet: Risk Management and Cyberspace Operations,” Center for Strategic 
Leadership, U.S. Army War College, 2012. Available: http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a568619.pdf 
[Accessed March 28, 2018].
[19] J. Lewis, “Fighting the Wrong Enemy, aka the Stalemate in Cybersecurity,” The Cipher Brief, November 
26, 2017. [Online]. Available: https://www.thecipherbrief.com/column_article/fighting-the-wrong-enemy-
aka-the-stalemate-in-cybersecurity. [Accessed March 9, 2018].
[20] C. Miller, “Kim Jong-Il and Me: How to Build a Cyber Army to Defeat the U.S.,” oral presentation at 
CyCon and DEF CON 18, Tallinn and Las Vegas, 2010. 
[21] B. B. Thomas Rid, “Attributing Cyber Attacks,” The Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 38, no. 1–2, p. 4–37, 
2015. 
[22] S. Tzu, “Wikiquote,” Creative Commons, [Online]. Available: https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Sun_Tzu 
[Accessed March 28, 2018].
[23] L. deHaven-Smith, Conspiracy Theory in America, University of Texas Press, Austin, 2013, p. 225.
[24] M. M.-B. John Scott-Railton, “A Call to Harm: New Malware Attacks Target the Syrian Opposition,” The 




Cyber Law and 
Espionage Law as 
Communicating 
Vessels
Abstract: Existing legal literature would have us assume that espionage operations 
and “below-the-threshold” cyber operations are doctrinally distinct. Whereas one is 
subject to the scant, amorphous, and under-developed legal framework of espionage 
law, the other is subject to an emerging, ever-evolving body of legal rules, known 
cumulatively as cyber law. This dichotomy, however, is erroneous and misleading. 
In practice, espionage and cyber law function as communicating vessels, and so are 
better conceived as two elements of a complex system, Information Warfare (IW). 
This paper therefore first draws attention to the similarities between the practices – the 
fact that the actors, technologies, and targets are interchangeable, as are the knee-jerk 
legal reactions of the international community. In light of the convergence between 
peacetime Low-Intensity Cyber Operations (LICOs) and peacetime Espionage 
Operations (EOs) the two should be subjected to a single regulatory framework, one 
which recognizes the role intelligence plays in our public world order and which 
adopts a contextual and consequential method of inquiry. The paper proceeds in 
the following order: Part 2 provides a descriptive account of the unique symbiotic 
relationship between espionage and cyber law, and further explains the reasons for this 
dynamic. Part 3 places the discussion surrounding this relationship within the broader 
discourse on IW, making the claim that the convergence between EOs and LICOs, as 
described in Part 2, could further be explained by an even larger convergence across 
all the various elements of the informational environment. Parts 2 and 3 then serve 
as the backdrop for Part 4, which details the attempt of the drafters of the Tallinn 
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1. IntroductIon
Here is a story in two parts. In Part I, the Defense Minister for the Republic of 
Scamdinavia is honey-trapped by an attractive showgirl. During the course of their 
secret affair, the showgirl introduces the Minister to a senior naval attaché from the 
Embassy of Cyberia. The Minister, who quickly befriends the attaché, invites the 
latter to visit his home. Upon arrival, the attaché creates a diversion and seizes the 
opportunity to enter the Minister’s private office, placing a pen-shaped recording 
device on his desk and photographing top-secret documents pertaining to the 
Department’s security contracts and research spending. As a result, a number of top-
secret Department of Defense projects are jeopardized, and the Minister is forced to 
resign.1
The second part begins with a series of phishing emails, sent to a number of major 
corporations across Scamdinavia, by a private hacking group with support and 
direction from Cyberia’s central intelligence agency. The emails contain a trojan 
downloader. Within an eight-month period, roughly 50,000 computers are infected 
by the malicious code. Exploiting zero-day vulnerabilities in Microsoft XML Core 
Services, the malware begins modifying Windows registries, poisoning local DNS 
caches, disabling antivirus programs, and sequencing certain information harvesting 
and hard disk wiping processes. As a result of the attack, a number of financial 
institutions in Scamdinavia are unable to provide services and take weeks to fully 
restore functionality, causing significant economic losses. To make matters worse, the 
1 This hypothetical is loosely based on one of the biggest spy scandals and political controversies of the 
Cold War era, the 1961 Profumo Affair. At the centre of the public blunder stood John Profumo, then 
Secretary of State for War, who was discovered to have had a sexual affair with model and showgirl 
Christine Keeler. Keeler was also romantically involved with Evgenii Ivanov, a senior naval attaché at 
the Soviet Embassy and an officer of the Soviets’ Main Intelligence Directorate. At Keeler’s invitation, 
Profumo and Ivanov met and soon became friends. Relying on his intimate access to Profumo’s home and 
office, Ivanov was able to photograph highly classified documents pertaining to allied contingency plans 
for the Cold War defense of Berlin, as well top-secret specifications of US spy planes and nuclear weapons. 
Secretary Profumo initially denied the allegations of impropriety raised against him, but he eventually was 
forced to resign from his post, a fact that played a role in hastening the end of Harold Macmillan’s term as 
Prime Minister. For further reading see JONATHAN HASLAM, NEAR AND DISTANT NEIGHBORS: A 
NEW HISTORY OF SOVIET INTELLIGENCE, 207-209 (2015); Leon Watson, I Did Betray My Country: 
Fifty Years After Profumo’s Resignation, Christine Keeler Confesses She Passed Secrets to Russians, 
DAILY MAIL (9 June 2013), available at http://goo.gl/kPyXQT.
Manual 2.0 to compartmentalize espionage law and cyber law, and the deficits of their 
approach. The paper concludes by proposing an alternative holistic understanding 
of espionage law, grounded in general principles of law, which is more practically 
transferable to the cyber realm.
Keywords: international law, information warfare, espionage, cyber law, Tallinn 
Manual 2.0, sovereignty, diplomatic law, consular law, general principles of law
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secret data of major government contractors is breached, and a number of top-secret 
Department of Defense projects are jeopardized.2
Existing legal literature would have us assume that these two hypothetical scenarios 
are doctrinally distinct. The first scenario is a textbook example of interstate spying, 
and insofar as it is regulated at all, it is only subject to the scant, amorphous, and under-
developed legal framework of espionage law.3 The second scenario, on the other hand, 
involves an example of what is colloquially termed a “cyber attack”, which is subject 
to an emerging, ever-evolving body of legal rules, known cumulatively as cyber law.4 
This dichotomy, however, is erroneous and misleading. In practice, espionage and 
cyber law function as communicating vessels, and so are better conceived as two 
elements of a complex system, Information Warfare (IW). The paper draws attention 
to the similarities between the practices – the fact that the actors, technologies, and 
targets are interchangeable, as are the knee-jerk legal reactions of the international 
community. In light of the convergence between peacetime low-intensity cyber 
operations and peacetime espionage operations, the two should be subjected to a 
2 This hypothetical is inspired by the events that transpired in South Korea on 20 March 2013 and are 
commonly known as the “Dark Seoul” incident. The attack, which occurred at approximately 2:15pm, 
hit television broadcasters YNT and MBC, as well as banks KBS, Shinhan, Nonghyup, and Jetu. South 
Korea’s communicating regulator, Park Jae-Moon, released a statement suggesting that: “unidentified 
hackers used Chinese IP addresses to contact servers of the six affected organizations and plant malware 
which attacked their computers.” Based on previous practice of North Korea to spoof Chinese IP address, a 
number of high-ranking officials from South Korea pointed their finger to Pyongyang. For further reading 
see Jonathan A.P. Marpaung & HoonJae Lee, Dark Seoul Cyber Attack: Could it Be Worse, 6th Conference 
of Indonesian Students Association in Korea (7 July 2013), available at http://goo.gl/MgCI9u; China 
IP Address link to South Korea Cyber-Attack, BBC News (21 March 2013), available at http://goo.gl/
wm43kQ.
3 As Prof. Chesterman has argued, intelligence exists “in a legal penumbra, lying at the margins of diverse 
legal regimes and at the edge of international legitimacy.” Elsewhere he noted that: “despite its relative 
importance in the conduct of international affairs, there are few treaties that deal with it directly. Academic 
literature typically omits the subject entirely or includes a paragraph or two defining espionage and 
describing the unhappy fate of captured spies. For the most part, only special regimes such as the laws 
of war address intelligence explicitly. Beyond this, it looms large but almost silently in the legal regimes 
dealing with diplomatic protection and arms control.” See Simon Chesterman, The Spy Who Came In From 
the Cold War: Intelligence and International Law, 27 MICH. J. INT’L. L. 1071, at 1072, 1130 (2006); 
Richard Falk, foreword, in ESSAYS ON ESPIONAGE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW v, v (Roland J. 
Stranger ed., 1962) (“traditional international law is remarkably oblivious to the peacetime practice of 
espionage. Leading treatises overlook espionage altogether or contain a perfunctory paragraph that defines 
a spy and describes his hapless fate upon capture”); Christopher D. Baker, Tolerance of International 
Espionage: A Functional Approach, 19 AM. U. INT’L. L. REV.1091, 1091 (2004) (“Espionage is 
curiously ill-defined under international law, even though all developed nations, as well as many lesser-
developed ones, conduct spying and eavesdropping operations against their neighbors”); Gary D. Brown 
& Andrew O. Metcalf, Easier Said Than Done: Legal Reviews of Cyber Weapons, 7 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & 
POL’Y 115, 116 (2014) (“there is a long-standing (and cynically named) ‘gentleman’s agreement’ between 
nations to ignore espionage in international law”). 
4 See e.g., MICHAEL N. SCHMITT (ED.), TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
APPLICABLE TO CYBER OPERATIONS (2nd ed., 2017); UN General Assembly Resolution on an 
International Code of Conduct for Information Security, UN Doc. A/66/359 (14 September 2011); Elaine 
Korzak, UN GGE on Cybersecurity: The End of an Era?, THE DIPLOMAT (31 July 2017), available at 
http://goo.gl/BSWfnm; Louise Arimatsu, A Treaty for Governing Cyber-Weapons: Potential Benefits and 
Practical Limitations, in 4TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON CYBER CONFLICT (Czosseck 
& Ziolkowski eds., 2012); Joseph S. Nye Jr., The World Needs New Norms on Cyberwarfare, THE 
WASHINGTON POST (1 October 2015), available at http://goo.gl/NuC4z7; Brad Smith, The Need for 
a Digital Geneva Convention, MICROSOFT ON THE ISSUES (14 February 2017), available at goo.
gl/4xPN7F.
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5 2 JOHN T. MORSE, LIFE AND LETTERS OF OLIVER WENDELL HOMES 40 (1896). The statement 
was made by Holmes in response to an article in The Nation which harshly criticized his philosophy. 
6 ANDRÉ BRETON, COMMUNICATING VESSELS (Translated by Mary Ann Caws & Geoffrey Harris, 
1990).
7 STEVEN DEWULF, THE SIGNATURE OF EVIL: (RE)DEFINING TORTURE IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 535-551 (2011). 
single regulatory framework, one which recognizes the role that intelligence plays in 
our public world order and which adopts a contextual and consequential method of 
inquiry. 
Part 2 of this paper provides a descriptive account of the unique symbiotic relationship 
between espionage and cyber law. It further explains the reasons for this dynamic and 
applies its findings to the two hypothetical scenarios introduced above. Part 3 then 
situates the discussion surrounding this relationship within the broader discourse on IW, 
making the claim that the convergence identified in Part 2 could further be explained 
by an even larger convergence across all the various elements of the informational 
environment. Parts 2 and 3 serve as the backdrop for Part 4, which details the attempt 
of the drafters of Tallinn Manual 2.0 to compartmentalize espionage law and cyber 
law, and the deficits of their approach. The paper concludes by proposing in Part 5 an 
alternative holistic understanding of espionage law, grounded in general principles of 
law, which is more practically transferable to the cyber realm. 
2. law of communIcatIng Vessels
“If you had a bent tube, one arm of which was the size of a pipe-
stem and the other big enough to hold the ocean, water would stand 
at the same height in one as in the other. Thus discussion equalizes 
fools and wise men in the same way, and the fools know it.” 
     -Oliver Wendell Holmes5
The experiment described in the quote, what Justice Holmes called the “hydrostatic 
paradox of controversy”, is merely the Justice’s cynical take on a classic principle 
of fluid mechanics, according to which the levels of homogenous liquid in a system 
of connected containers will always aspire to be equal, since the pressures on 
those levels are equal. Thus, if additional liquid is added to one vessel, the liquid 
will immediately find a new equal level in all connected vessels. This image of the 
“communicating vessels” experiment carries with it a powerful metaphor, which 
has been used across the humanities and social sciences, from construing surrealist 
thought,6 to characterizing international policies on torture.7 In this paper, I argue 
that the trite principle could also be helpful in describing the dialectical relationship 
between espionage law and cyber law.
What do I mean by “espionage” and “cyber”? It is worth recalling that: “no 
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internationally recognized and workable definition of ‘intelligence collection’ 
exists.”8 Similarly “there are no common definitions for Cyber terms – they are 
understood to mean different things by different nations/organizations”.9 Given these 
innate ambiguities, it is important that I provide working definitions for both terms 
at the outset of this paper. To begin with, I am only interested in those cyber and 
espionage operations that occur in peacetime, given that wartime spying and cyber 
warfare are more constrained by the rules of international humanitarian law, and in 
any event occur at a far lesser rate than their peacetime equivalents. Limiting myself 
to peacetime cyber operations further narrows the scope of cyber activities to be 
examined, as it excludes from review those operations that by their scale and effect 
are likely to trigger an international armed conflict or to provoke responses in self-
defense. Our attention thus automatically shifts to Low-Intensity Cyber Operations 
(LICOs). These are “below-the-threshold” operations which have not only proven 
to be significantly costly in recent years, but are in fact commonplace, as Michael 
Schmitt notes: “Few, if any, cyber operations have [ever] crossed the armed attack 
threshold”.10
With Espionage Operations (EOs), I tend to cast the net quite wide, using the 
terms “espionage”, “intelligence collection”, “surveillance”, and “reconnaissance” 
interchangeably, thus rejecting method-based definitional distinctions. Instead, I 
use the term EOs to mean a peacetime operation which encompasses the following 
four elements: (1) the operation involves the gathering, analysis, verification, and 
dissemination of information of relevance to the decision-making process of a State 
or States or otherwise serves some State interests; (2) the operation is launched by 
agents of a State or States, or those with a sufficient nexus to the State or States in 
question; (3) the operation targets a foreign State or States, their subjects, associations, 
corporations, or agents, without the knowledge or consent of that State or those States; 
and (4) the operation involves some degree of secrecy and confidentiality, as to the 
needs behind the operation and/or the methods of collection and analysis employed, 
8 Sulmasy and Yoo, Counterintuitive: Intelligence Operations and International Law, 28 MICH. J. INT’L. 
L. 625, 637 (2007). 
9 Cyber Definitions, NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, available at http://goo.gl/
wtAkWP.
10 Michael N. Schmitt, “Below the Threshold” Cyber Operations: The Countermeasures Response Option 
and International Law, 54 VA. J. INT’L L. 697, 698 (2014). For further reading on the nature of LICOs 
see: Beatrice Waldon, Note, Duties Owed: Low-Intensity Cyber Attacks and Liability for Transboundary 
Torts in International Law, 126(5) YALE L. J. 1242 (2017). See also James R. Clapper, Statement of the 
Record, US Cybersecurity and Policy, Senate Armed Services Committee (29 September 2015), available 
at goo.gl/aWSgKH (where Clapper makes an alarming prediction: “we foresee an ongoing series of low-
to-moderate level cyber-attacks from a variety of sources over time, which will impose cumulative costs on 
US economic competitiveness and national security”).
208
so to ensure its effectiveness.11 Notice that I exclude from review various forms 
of unconcealed open-source intelligence gathering, such as reading a newspaper, 
visiting a social media website, or gathering information in the course of routine 
diplomatic relations (element 4). I further exclude from my analysis domestic forms 
of surveillance focusing solely on interstate activities, launched by one State and its 
proxies (element 2) against another State and its proxies (element 3).
Already visible is the close proximity in nature between EOs and LICOs, for our 
definition of LICOs could also be limited only to interstate interactions (especially if 
we are to distinguish between LICOs and more local forms of domestic cyber crime). 
The only difference, therefore, between EOs and LICOs rests on the first element. 
Unlike EOs, LICOs can only be employed against electronic information (as opposed 
to non-electronic physical properties, e.g. a passport kept in a dresser or printed 
bank records stored in a cabinet). Moreover, LICOs are different as they may extend 
beyond the mere passive copying and storing of data to other more aggressive and 
coercive forms of electronic intrusion (e.g. altering, removing, disrupting, degrading, 
or destroying certain information, programs, systems, or networks).12
 
Therefore, if we put EOs and LICOs in a Venn diagram (see below in Figure 1), 
not only will the circle-circle overlap be significant (encompassing different types 
of cyber espionage and electronic surveillance operations), but the remaining sets 
will share profound similarities. I provide below a list of hypothetical examples of 
operations which are either exclusively EOs, exclusively LICOs, or in between, to 
exemplify those similarities. 
It is this affinity between EOs and LICOs that creates the “communicating vessels” 
phenomenon. Any attempt to modify or extend existing bodies of international law 
to better regulate LICOs will inevitably result in tidal waves that will engulf EOs. 
11 This definition mirrors in some respects, and departs from in others, the definition put forward by 
Dermarest: “espionage can be defined as the consciously deceitful collection of information, ordered by 
a government or organization hostile to or suspicious of those the information concerns, accomplished by 
humans unauthorized by the target to do the collecting” (Geoffrey Dermarest, Espionage in International 
Law, 24 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 321, 326). Note that as highlighted in Dermarest’s definition, and 
as a general rule, intelligence operations involve some degree of secrecy and confidentiality to ensure their 
effectiveness (operations de cape et d’épée, coupled with some degree of deceitful intent). That said such 
is not always mandated (e.g. open source intelligence collection). 
12 Note that my definition of EOs excludes “covert action” operations. These types of activities have a 
different primary purpose than the acquisition of intelligence. They seek the “purposive attenuation 
of the options of the target”, influencing economic, ideological, political, diplomatic, and military 
conditions abroad. See W. MICHAEL REISMAN AND JAMES E. BAKER, REGULATING COVERT 
ACTION: PRACTICES, CONTEXTS, AND POLICIES OF COVERT COERCION ABROAD IN 
INTERNATIONAL AND AMERICAN LAW 10-12 (1992) (Reisman and Baker provide a useful list 
of examples of covert activities ranging from psychological operations and disinformation to political 
assassinations). If I were to include covert action into the definition of EOs, additional similarities between 
EOs and LICOs will surface (consider, for example, Russian interferences in elections as reflecting both 
covert action and a “below the threshold” cyber intrusion). In other words, expanding the definition of 
EOs to include covert action will entail extending its purpose beyond “mere passive copying and storing 
of information to other more aggressive types” of intrusions (namely the disruptive, degrading, and 
destructive kind).
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Conversely, any attempt at normative compartmentalization or regulatory insulation 
could be equated to challenging a law of physics and would not pass the smile test. 
FIGURE 1: VENN DIAGRAM OF EOS AND LICOS INTERSECTION
Exclusively EOs:
• Launching a spy satellite into space to engage in geo-spatial monitoring of a 
rogue country.
• Placing human agents in a major oil company, gathering information about 
its strategic plans.
• Gathering information about a government ministry relying on diplomatic 
engagements and open source materials.
• Placing cameras and microphones in the apartment of cyber criminals and 
monitoring their business dealings.
• Entering a training camp for a terrorist organization and seizing certain 
documents relating to an impending attack. 
Exclusively LICOs:
• Jamming the communications links of a commercial satellite and sending it 
false GPS coordinates.
• Launching a ransomware attack against a major oil company, shutting down 
its operations for a short period.
• Launching a DDoS operation against a non-essential government service 
website.
• Hacking the devices of cyber criminals and blocking their access to a certain 
cryptocurrency.
• Installing malware on laptop computers at a terrorist training camp, 
circumventing a terrorist plot by altering certain data stored therein. 
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EOs-LICOs Overlap:
• Hacking a spy satellite for the purpose of gathering information about its 
technical specifications.
• Installing malware on the tablet of an oil company’s CEO to gather 
information about the company’s strategic plans.
• Hacking the DNS server of a government ministry and monitoring the 
internet activities of the ministry’s staff.
• Hacking the devices of cyber-criminals and monitoring their business 
dealings by remotely activating certain sensors.
• Installing spyware on laptop computers at a terrorist training camp, and 
seizing certain documents relating to an impending attack.
To further my point, let us examine some areas of convergence between peacetime 
EOs and LICOs. First, both passive intelligence collection and mildly more aggressive 
cyber intrusions are launched by the same primary actors – State intelligence and 
security agencies and/or their proxies – and using the same advanced technological 
tools. Unit 8200 of Israel provides one good example,13 and APT33 with its ties 
to Iran’s Cyber Army offers another.14 This reality is owed in part to the fact that 
traditional EOs now rely heavily on cyber techniques to increase their likelihood of 
success and broaden their scope of impact. For 16th century Sir Francis Walsingham, 
the father of modern intelligence agencies, “a global mass surveillance program 
involved paying off travellers in the ports of Lyon and merchant adventurers in the 
bazars of Hamburg”.15 Today, we cannot imagine an intelligence agency that would be 
satisfied with such low-tech techniques. SIGINT-based tools, such as the hacking of 
connected devices and the interception of electronic communications (either targeted 
or in bulk) have now significantly overshadowed the old historical techniques. The 
rise to predominance of Cyber-HUMINT, as its own distinct discipline, proves that 
even the most traditional of spying methodologies is not immune from this wave of 
digitalization.16 Once an agency controls a band of cyberspies, calibrating between 
passive collection and moderately more offensive intrusions is left to its discretion 
and capacity limitations. So it is not surprising that the NSA is hoarding zero-day 
13 John Reed, Unit 8200: Israel’s Cyber Spy Agency, FINANCIAL TIMES (10 July 2015), available at goo.
gl/951paE.
14 Eric Auchard, Once ‘Kittens’ in cyber spy world, Iran gains prowess: security experts, REUTERS (20 
September 2017), available at https://goo.gl/DCmDkf; Jaqueline O’Leary et al., Insight into Iranian Cyber 
Espionage, FIREEYE (20 September 2017), available at https://goo.gl/vcS6Wc.
15 Asaf Lubin, A Principled Defence of the International Human Right to Privacy: A Response to Frédéric 
Sourgens, 42(2) YALE J. INT’L. L. 1, 2 (2017).
16 Andy Greenberg, Cyberespionage is a Top Priority for CIA’s New Directorate, WIRED (9 March 2015), 
available at goo.gl/YWp5Zx (discussing the CIA’s “digital overhaul” and quoting Jim Lewis from the 
Center for Strategic and International Studies, who notes: “Those ‘humint’ operations, as the intelligence 
community calls them, typically involve real spies on the ground, unlike the NSA’s remote cyber espionage 
or the cyberwarfare activities of the Pentagon’s Cyber Command. ‘This kind of cyber activity has become 
increasingly important to them’ … That combination of humint and digital operations could mean a spy 
infiltrating an organization to plant spyware by hand, for instance, or a digital investigation to check the 
bona fides of a source or agent. ‘If you think of NSA operations as a vacuum cleaner and Cyber Command 
as a hammer, this is a little more precise, and it’s about supporting human operations’”).
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vulnerabilities,17 that the CIA controls a whole vault of cyber tools,18 or that the FBI 
hacks thousands of foreign computers in the dark web with a trove of malware.19
Second, both EOs and LICOs thrive on “plausible deniability” and demand increased 
levels of deception and secrecy, intrinsically resisting mechanisms of accountability. 
Think of an undercover agent who is masquerading one day as a 30-year-old Danish 
female protester at a reproductive rights rally and the next day as a 55-year-old 
German wheelchair-bound male social worker. Now think of the Chinese hacker who 
is spoofing his way through the Tor network, one day hijacking the computer of a real 
Danish protester and the next adopting the online identity of an actual German social 
worker. Both operations, due to their unique nature, create similar and significant 
evidentiary hurdles for assigning individual and State responsibility under traditional 
international legal frameworks.20
Finally, both EOs and LICOs target information in ways that are non-kinetic and 
below-the-threshold, triggering the same knee-jerk international legal reactions. The 
victims of spying and cyber operations have a limited basket of potential claims that 
they might raise for a violation of international law, namely: violations of sovereignty, 
territorial integrity, the principle of non-intervention, the prohibition on extraterritorial 
enforcement, certain human rights abuses (such as the rights to privacy and freedom 
of expression), certain property rights abuses (including IP rights), and other potential 
State and individual immunities and privileges, depending on the subject matter of 
the operation.21 What is more, common to both EOs and LICOs is the fact that the 
international norms enumerated in the above list are sufficiently under-defined to 
leave ambiguity as to whether an actual violation of a primary rule of international 
law had occurred. The Tallinn Manual 2.0 was in this regard an attempt to clarify 
(if not codify) the “key aspects of the public international law governing ‘cyber 
operations’ during peacetime”.22 Put differently, the experts in Tallinn 2.0 sought to 
elucidate the law of LICOs in isolation from the law on EOs. As I will show later, 
this unfortunate compartmentalized approach adopted by the Manual’s authors 
proves counterproductive at offering effective regulation. For now, let me conclude 
this section by showing in Table 1 how the two hypotheticals that opened this paper 
exemplify the convergence between EOs and LICOs. 
17 See e.g., Andy Greenberg, The Shadow Brokers Mess is What Happens when the NSA Hoards Zero-Days, 
WIRED (17 August 2016), available at goo.gl/zUdceh.
18 See e.g., Lorenzo Franceschi-Bicchierai, The secret-spilling organization launches a new series where it 
will release the source code of alleged CIA tools from the Vault 7 series, MOTHERBOARD (9 November 
2017), available at goo.gl/5C8eyN.
19 See e.g., Joseph Cox, The FBI Hacked over 8,000 Computers in 120 Countries Based on One Warrant, 
MOTHERBOARD (22 November 2016), available at goo.gl/wWRtm2.
20 See e.g. John S. Davis et al., Stateless Attribution: International Accountability in Cyberspace, RAND 
CORPORATION (2017), available at https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2081.html; Dieter 
Fleck, Individual and State Responsibility for Intelligence Gathering, 28 MICH. J. INT’L. L. 687 (2007).
21 For potential violations from EOs, see generally Chesterman, n. 3. For potential violations from LICOs see 
Waldon, n. 10, at 1469-1477.
22 MICHAEL N. SCHMITT (ED.), TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
APPLICABLE TO CYBER OPERATIONS (2nd ed., 2017) 3.
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TABLE 1: AREAS OF CONVERGENCE BETWEEN EOS AND 
LICOS AS REFLECTED IN THE HYPOTHETICALS
3. InformatIon warfare: communIcatIng
Vessels wIthIn a unIfIed system
Dr Martin Libicki of the RAND Corporation gave one of the keynote addresses in 
the 8th International Conference on Cyber Conflict. In his remarks, he made the 
claim that the old 1990s DoD catch-phrase “Information Warfare” (IW) was making 
a comeback.23 IW as a unified theory suggests that “competition over information 
would be the high ground of warfare,”24 and that such competitions would involve 
“the protection, manipulation, degradation and denial of information”.25 It employs 
the following litmus test: “If information is used to perpetrate an act that was done 
to influence another to take or not take actions beneficial to the attacker then it can 
be considered IW”.26 Due to this broad test, different scholars at different times have 
introduced different elements that form part of IW. Libicki, for example, in his 1995 
short monograph What Is Information Warfare, introduced it as a heptagon of methods 
of varying maturity, encompassing: 
23 Martin C. Libicki, The Convergence of Information Warfare, STRATEGIC STUD. Q. 49, 50 (2017) 
(“given today’s circumstances, in contrast to those that existed when information warfare was first mooted, 
the various elements of IW should now increasingly be considered elements of a larger whole rather than 
separate specialties that individually support kinetic military operations”).
24 Id., at 49.
25 MARTIN C. LIBICKI, WHAT IS INFORMATION WARFARE? X (1995).
26 A. JONES AND G. KOVACICH, GLOBAL INFORMATION WARFARE: THE NEW DIGITAL 








Private Hackers with Support 
from Cyberia’s Intelligence
Malware Capable of Both 
Copying Data and More 
Disruptive Functions
Untraceable Phishing Emails 
and Hard-To-Detect Trojan 
Downloader
Information on DOD R&D 
Projects, Economic Disruption 
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Sovereignty, Non-Intervention, 
Privileges and Immunities, 
Property Rights, Privacy Rights
Part I: Classic EO Part II: Classic LICO
213
“(i) command-and-control warfare (which strikes against the 
enemy’s head and neck); (ii) intelligence based warfare (which 
consists of design, protection, and denial of systems that seek 
sufficient knowledge to dominate the battle space); (iii) electronic 
warfare (radio-electronic or cryptographic techniques); (iv) 
psychological warfare (in which information is used to change 
the minds of friends, neutrals, and foes); (v) ‘hacker’ warfare (in 
which computer systems are attacked); (vi) economic information 
warfare (blocking information or channelling it to pursue economic 
dominance); and (vii) cyberwarfare (a grab bag of futuristic 
scenarios)”.27
Jones and Kovacich go even further, arguing that IW covers a whole spectrum of 
elements including, inter alia: lawfare, business continuity, knowledge management, 
information security, computer network exploitation, and intelligence.28
27 Libicki, n. 25, at X. Note that today Libicki seems to take a far more condensed approach to the elements 
encompassing IW, suggesting it covers ISR operations (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance), 
electronic warfare (EW0, psychological operations (PSYOP), and Cyber Operations. See Libicki, n. 23, 
at 49. Directive 3600.1 of the US DoD similarly adopted this multi-dimensional approach in defining 
IW’s core and supporting capabilities. The original directive was adopted in 1996 but has since been 
amended twice in 2006 and 2013. In its latest iteration it defines “Information Operations” as “the 
integrated employment, during military operations, of information-related capabilities (IRC) in concert 
with other lines of operations to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision making of adversaries 
and potential adversaries while protecting our own” (DODD O-3600.01, Information Operations (IO) 12 
(2 May 2013), available at goo.gl/wJJX6T). The directive proceeds to note that IRCs constitute “tools, 
techniques, or activities” employed within a dimension of the information environment. These can include, 
but are not limited to, “a variety of technical and non-technical activities that intersect the traditional areas 
of electronic warfare, cyberspace operations, military information support operations (MISO), military 
deception (MILDEC), influence activities, operations security (OPSEC), and intelligence.” Id., at 1.
28 See Jones and Kovacich, n. 26, at 6.
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FIGURE 2: JONES AND KOVACICH’S ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION WARFARE
Regardless of which model of IW you adopt, all seem to include both certain EOs and 
LICOs as components of the broader theater of informational conflict. Libicki argues 
that the recent convergence of the IW’s various elements, and the theory’s broader 
resurgence as a unified doctrine, can be explained by three emerging circumstances:
“First, the various elements can use many of the same techniques, 
starting with the subversion of computers, systems, and 
networks, to allow them to work. Second, as a partial result of 
the first circumstance, the strategic aspects of these elements are 
converging. This makes it more likely that in circumstances where 
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one element of IW can be used, other elements can also be used. 
Hence, they can be used together. Third, as a partial result of the 
second circumstance, countries – notably Russia, but, to a lesser 
extent, North Korea, Iran and China – are starting to combine IW 
elements, with each element used as part of a broader whole.”29
I highlight the discourse on IW because I feel it is important that we place the unique 
dialectical relationship between EOs and LICOs within a broader informational 
enviornment. These are two communicating vessels which form part of an even 
larger machine and the operating logic of that machine, as laid down in the above 
quote by Libicki, helps further explain the special relationship of EOs and LICOs. 
Assistant Secretary of Defense Eric Rosenbach once referred to cyber operations 
as filling the gap between diplomacy and economic sanctions on the one hand, and 
military action on the other. He called this gap, “the space between” and claimed that 
cyber operations within this space assist policy-makers in achieving their national 
interest.30 The imagery of the space between is useful, but unlike Rosenbach’s 
depiction, it encompasses much more than just cyber operations. A far larger spectrum 
of informational action, both cyber and non-cyber, occupies this “space between”, 
with intelligence gathering and covert action constituting a significant and historical 
component. Any attempt at regulating some aspects of this space, in isolation from 
others, would be ill-fated. 
4. the comPartmentalIZatIon aPProach 
and the tallInn manual 2.0
Against this backdrop, I want to begin portraying what was attempted in the Tallinn 
Manual 2.0. Rule 32 on “peacetime cyber espionage” is located in Section 5 of 
the Manual, which covers those cyber operations that the Group of Experts (GoE) 
deemed to be “not per se regulated by international law”. According to the GoE, 
customary international law “does not prohibit espionage per se”,31 and therefore 
29 See Libicki, n. 23, at 50.
30 For further reading see Thomas E. Ricks, The Future of War: Cyber is Expanding the Clausewitzian 
Spectrum of Conflict, FOREIGN POLICY (13 November 2014), available at goo.gl/1Nrsmi.
31 Note that the Experts rely on a single source to make this claim, basing themselves on the Office of 
General Counsel, Department of Defense Law of War Manual. However, paragraph 16.3.2, to which they 
cite, makes no reference to a lack of customary regulation of espionage under international law, quite 
the opposite is speaks clearly of “long-standing and well-established considerations” and “long-standing 
international norms” which govern this practice. See DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, LAW OF WAR 
MANUAL 990 (2016) (“international law and long-standing international norms are applicable to State 
behavior in cyberspace, and the question of the legality of peacetime intelligence and counterintelligence 
activities must be considered on a case-by-case basis. Generally, to the extent that cyber operations 
resemble traditional intelligence and counter-intelligence activities, such as unauthorized intrusions into 
computer networks solely to acquire information, then such cyber operations would likely be treated 
similarly under international law. The United States conducts such activities via cyberspace, and such 
operations are governed by long-standing and well-established considerations, including the possibility 
that those operations could be interpreted as a hostile act.”)
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determinations of lawfulness should be made on a case-by-case basis taking into 
account the particular methods employed in the conduct of the specific EO.32 This 
allowed the GoE to avoid the need to address the hot potato of comprehensively 
explaining the law and practice of government espionage. What is more, it furthered 
the GoE’s desire to compartmentalize spying, in its traditional sense, from the more 
specific cyber espionage and LICOs which regulation the Manual sought to elucidate. 
But as Chesterman has taught us, claiming that espionage is not per se regulated under 
international law is nothing more than a straw man: “Intelligence is less a lacuna in 
the legal order than it is the elephant in the room”.33 Well, the elephant was alive and 
well during the Tallinn Manual plenary sessions. It swayed its trunk and stomped its 
feet; but was nonetheless ignored. 
Tossing to the side the question of the lawfulness of peacetime intelligence gathering, 
the GoE dodged the need to speak in higher granularity as to the conduct of interstate 
spying. Instead, the way was paved for the experts to engage in more general and 
casuistic reasoning. Throughout their commentary, the experts extract and extend 
legal rules from a series of tailored hypothetical scenarios, of their own design, which 
they then analyse in isolation from one another and in accordance with predominantly 
treaty norms. This “divide-and-conquer” approach is far from harmonious and results 
in a series of fragmented statements made throughout the Manual, each with varying 
degrees of consensus behind it. Every one of these statements can be compared to 
liquid being added to one of the vessels. Due to the communicative nature of cyber 
law and espionage law, as discussed above, any regulation of cyber espionage put 
forward by the experts – that is to say any regulation of the EOs-LICOs overlap area 
in our original Venn diagram – automatically sends equilibrium-adjusting tidal waves 
across the entire system. The experts did not acknowledge these tidal waves, nor did 
they address the impractical legal realities that they would inevitably create. Let us 
take up only two examples within the limits of this paper.
The GoE took a territorially protectionist approach to sovereignty violations. 
According to them:
“[I]n the cyber context [...] it is a violation of territorial sovereignty 
for an organ of a State, or others whose conduct may be attributed 
to the State, to conduct cyber operations while physically present 
on another State’s territory against that State or entities or persons 
located there.”34
32 Tallinn Manual 2.0, n. 22, at 169-170 (“while the International Group of Experts agreed that there is 
no prohibition of espionage per se, they likewise concurred that cyber espionage may be conducted in 
a manner that violates international law due to the fact that certain methods employed to conduct cyber 
espionage are unlawful”).
33 Chesterman, n. 3, at 1072.
34 Tallinn Manual 2.0, n. 22, at 19. This rule is then extended to the territorial sea (Rule 48) and the 
territorial airspace (Rule 55). The GoE is most explicit in the context of the physical tapping of submarine 
communication cables for the purpose of collecting data. The GoE agreed that “doing so in the territorial 
or archipelagic waters of another State constitutes a violation of that State’s sovereignty”. Id., at 257.
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The GoE provide the example of an agent of one State who uses a USB flash drive 
to introduce malware into cyber infrastructures in another State and claim that 
this would result in a sovereignty violation.35 The caveats provided (“in the cyber 
context”, “cyber operations”, etc.) are an attempt at compartmentalization, and have 
little meaning. If spies cannot clandestinely use a USB flash drive in the territory of 
a foreign country without it resulting in a sovereignty violation, it follows that they 
cannot also take photographs, handle HUMINT sources, or steal physical documents 
in that territory. Especially not in an age where all of these activities de facto require 
some form of cyber enabling. Going down this rabbit-hole, under basic rules of 
syllogistic logic, if every act of territorial spying results in a sovereignty violation, 
and every sovereignty violation is a violation of international law,36 then territorial 
spying violates international law. Lo and behold, the same experts that concluded that 
espionage was not “prohibited per se”, have just per se prohibited espionage in its 
most elementary form.37 Their approach would seem to suggest that the only lawful 
way to conduct espionage in the 21st century is either by remote means,38 or with 
consent (from the targeted State) or authorization (from the UN Security Council). 
A second example comes in the form of the applicability of diplomatic and consular 
law to cyber espionage. The GoE argues that if a sending State launches spyware from 
within its diplomatic mission against the cyber infrastructures of another State that 
would constitute “an abuse of the diplomatic function and therefore an internationally 
wrongful act.”39 Similarly, if the receiving State or third States intercepted the 
electronic communications of diplomatic missions and consular posts, they would 
be violating “the confidentiality of diplomatic and consular communications”, 
35 Ibid. Note that the GoE later backtrack this definitive statement, arguing that they could not agree “on 
the lawfulness of close access cyber espionage operations, such as the insertion of USB flash drive into a 
computer located on one State’s territory by an individual acting under the direction or control of another 
State”. Id., at 171.
36 AJIL Unbound has recently held an online symposium titled “sovereignty, cyberspace, and Tallinn Manual 
2.0” which focused on whether sovereignty constitutes a stand-alone binding international legal norm that 
may be violated. In this debate, I second the view put forward by Phil Spector that there is ample evidence 
to assert that sovereignty is in fact a binding rule. See Phil Spector, In Defense of Sovereignty, In The Wake 
of Tallinn 2.0, 111 AJIL UNBOUND 219 (2017).
37 Not only that, but the experts also claim that certain LICOs employed to enable spying operations, e.g. 
using cyber intrusions to ‘herd’ the target’s communications to a platform more susceptible to surveillance, 
might itself trigger separate grounds for sovereignty violations. Tallinn Manual 2.0, n. 22, at 172.
38 Id., at 19 (“the mere interception of wireless signals from outside the target state’s territory does not 
constitute a violation of that State’s sovereignty”). Though even on the point of remote surveillance, 
there was those experts who argued that a severity test should be employed and that if the consequences 
suffered from the remote surveillance were so severe, they might too result in a sovereignty violation (Id., 
at 171). Put differently, for certain members of the GoE even spying from outer space, the high seas, or 
international airspace, might violate sovereignty if they reach a certain degree of severity. This echoes 
to me the Soviet concept of “danger theory” pushed, and rejected, in the 1960s following the U2 Spy 
Plane incident. The crux of the Soviet position was that sovereignty might be violated without incursions 
into national territory, so long as certain national rights were endangered due to a particular surveillance 
practice. For further reading see Joseph R. Soraghan, Reconnaissance Satellites: Legal Characterization 
and Possible Utilization for Peacekeeping, 13(3) McGill L. J. 458, 471-472 (1967) (quoting the work of 
Ronald Christensen, he notes that Soviet Russia regarded “her sovereignty rights as going beyond her 
territorial borders, ceasing, it seems, not even at the borders of another state, and, perhaps pervading the 
entire universe. No one anywhere, she says, has the right to endanger the Soviet Union”).
39 Id., at 211-212, 229.
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which is central to their function, and therefore will also result in an internationally 
wrongful act.40 Once again, note that the repeated references to cyber technologies 
are inconsequential. The GoE, in essence, is banning espionage from within or 
against diplomatic missions, regardless of the method employed. If you cannot do 
it with a malware, there is nothing to justify doing it with your bare hands. The fact 
that “diplomacy and intelligence gathering have always gone hand in hand,”41 and 
that the practice of spying from and on diplomatic missions is as historical as it is 
commonplace,42 was not even mentioned in Tallinn Manual 2.0, let alone addressed 
or resolved. Consider the following three reported allegations from the past two 
decades: (1) In the lead-up to the UN Security Council vote authorizing the use of 
force against Iraq in 2003, the US and the UK spied on every single delegation to the 
Security Council;43 (2) During the G20 talks in Toronto in 2010, the US and Canada 
spied on large numbers of heads of states and other diplomats in attendance;44 (3) 
Between 2012-2017 Chinese agencies used backdoors into computer networks at the 
African Union Headquarters (networks which they had paid for and installed as a gift) 
in order to spy on the various delegations.45 If one wanted to apply Tallinn Manual 2.0 
rules to these three operations, one would have to conclude that all of them violated 
international law. The same experts who sought to isolate intelligence gathering – to 
not per se address its lawfulness – ended up banning some of the most basic methods 
through which it is acquired and thereby the practice as a whole. Attempting to only 
regulate LICOs resulted in tidal waves that inadequately constrained EOs. 
In attempting to cage the espionage elephant (by limiting their analysis to specific and 
self-selected cases of cyber espionage), the GoE found themselves engaging in textual 
treaty derivation which regurgitated the myth system while ignoring the operational 
code.46 The experts did not appreciate fully what CIA analyst James Jesus Angleton 
40 Id., at 221.
41 Chesterman, n. 3, at 1072.
42 Craig Forcese, Spies Without Borders: International Law and Intelligence Collection, 5 J. NAT’L SEC’Y 
L. & POL’Y 179, 197 (2011); Ashley Deeks, An International Legal Framework for Surveillance, 55(2) 
VIRG. J. INT’L L. 291, 313 (2015) (citing Antonin Scalia who at the time of working for the DOJ 
OLC drafted a memorandum which concluded that “the practice of spying on foreign missions was so 
widespread that the “inviolability” provision of the VCDR should not be read to prohibit such activities).
43 See e.g. Martin Bright and Peter Beaumont, Britain spied on UN allies over war vote, THE GUARDIAN 
(7 February 2004), available at http://goo.gl/fXhd8U.
44 See e.g. Paul Owen, Canada ‘allowed NSA to spy on G8 and G20 summits’, THE GUARDIAN (28 
November 2013), available at http://goo.gl/HJB6mD.
45 See e.g. Reuters, China rejects claim it bugged headquarters it built for African Union, THE GUARDIAN 
(29 January 2018), available at http://goo.gl/i5yt2g.
46 As Professor W. Michael Reisman noted “in law things are not always what they seem,” and one needs 
to be particularly mindful of the existence of “two ‘relevant’ normative systems: one which is supposed 
to apply and which continues to enjoy lip service among elites and one which is actually applied”. 
Reisman describes the tension between the myth and the code as a “dynamic process” and a “symbiotic 
relationship”. Acknowledging that the international law governing EOs and LICOs does not exist solely in 
the myth or solely in the code, but rather in the space between the two, would have benefited the quality 
of Tallinn Manual 2.0’s overall analysis. For further reading see W. Michael Reisman, On the Causes of 
Uncertainty and Volatility in International Law, in THE SHIFTING ALLOCATION OF AUTHORITY 
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: CONSIDERING SOVEREIGNTY, SUPREMACY AND SUBSIDIARITY 
44-45 (Tomer Broude & Yuval Shany eds., 2008).
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described as the “wilderness of mirrors” that is part and parcel of spycraft. Explaining 
the legal intricacies of espionage requires one to embrace the notion that all law 
inevitably involves certain forms of lex simulata and lex imperfecta. Merely citing the 
law-in-the-books, while avoiding the-law-in-action, pays a disservice to the experts’ 
overall courageous goal of legal elucidation and codification. The Tallinn Manual 
2.0 could have (and should have) engaged in a far more deliberate, nuanced, and 
comprehensive investigation into the international law of intelligence, which would 
have inspired the development of more harmonious and sensible cyber norms with 
practicability for both scholars and practitioners. 
5. ProPosIng an alternatIVe 
harmonIous account
The Tallinn Manual 2.0 could have started by acknowledging that customary 
international law recognizes a sovereign nation’s right to spy – because it does. Our 
international legal order, and within it more specifically our “contemporary global 
security system”, is dependent upon a “reliable and unremitting flow of intelligence to 
the pinnacle elites”.47 A plethora of legal sources, enshrined in both treaty and custom, 
effectively recognize the existence of a derivative liberty right of States to peacetime 
intelligence gathering. These sources include: 
1. The right of States to survival, recognized by the ICJ in the Nuclear Weapons 
advisory opinion48 (and the related collective right of self-determination of 
peoples);
2. The laws on the use of force (and their recognition of both a customary and 
a Charter-based right for individual and collective self-defense);
3. Collective monitoring obligations under UN and Treaty Law (as encompassed 
for example in the fields of disarmament and counter-proliferation law, 
counter-terrorism law, sanctions regimes, environmental law, disaster relief, 
and the fight against illicit trafficking);
4. International human rights law (and the obligation of States to respect and 
ensure the right to life, liberty, and security of all persons subject to their 
jurisdiction, as well as the discretion of States to derogate from certain rights 
in times of emergency as well as balance them off in the name of protecting 
national security interests);
47 Myres S. McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell & W. Michael Reisman, The Intelligence Function and World 
Public Order, 46 TEMP. L.Q. 365, 434 (1973).
48 Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996, 226, 263 (8 July 1996) (“The Court 
cannot lose sight of the fundamental right of every State to survival and thus its right to resort to self-
defense in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter, when its survival is at stake”). 
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5. International humanitarian law (and the obligation of States to develop 
“effective intelligence gathering systems”, already in peacetime and 
in preparation for armed conflict, so to be able “to collect and evaluate 
information concerning potential targets” during the war);49 and
6. International Accountability Regimes (certain obligations and requirements 
derived from both international criminal law and the frameworks governing 
State responsibility for internationally wrongful acts). 
Within the scope of this paper, I cannot delve into a comprehensive analysis of each of 
these sources. Instead, let me focus on the right of self-defense, as a single example. 
Dating back to the Caroline incident of 1837, the right of a State to engage in pre-
emptive self-defense in order to avert an attack that is “instant, overwhelming, leaving 
no choice of means, and moment of deliberation”50 has been extensively analysed.51 
Even those who still maintain, based on the wording of UN Charter Article 51, that a 
right of self-defense applies only “if an armed attack occurs,” cannot ignore diverse 
and robust subsequent practice by States.52 The 2004 High-level Panel on Threats, 
Challenges, and Change established by the UN Secretary-General thus recognized 
that “a threatened State, according to long established international law, can take 
military action as long as the threatened attack is imminent, no other means would 
deflect it, and the action is proportionate.”53 Regardless of what interpretation of 
“imminence” one adopts, from a classically restrictive “Pearl Harbor”-type position 
to a highly permissive “Bush doctrine”-type position,54 both ends of the spectrum, and 
everything in between, will embrace a State’s derivative right to engage in peacetime 
intelligence gathering. For how else will a State know when a threat reaches whatever 
level of imminence is deemed sufficient to justify military action? If a State is entitled 
to retaliate against imminent threats to its survival, by definition it must be allowed to 
engage in peacetime espionage to gather the information necessary to reach that very 
conclusion. 
Even were we to adopt the formalistic and anachronistic approach that only Article 
51 holds (and therefore that a State may only react to an imminent threat by seeking 
49 Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign 
Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, ICTY, ¶29 (June 2, 2000), available at http://goo.gl/btGZ6y.
50 See generally, R.Y. Jennings, The Caroline and McLeod Cases, 32 AM. J. INT’L L. 82 (1938).
51 For a summary of the literature, see Christopher Greenwood, Self-Defence, MAX PLANCK 
ENCYCLOPEDIA PUB. INT’L. L. (Apr. 2011), available at http://goo.gl/zwaErV. For a more recent 
review of the literature, see Monica Hakimi, North Korea and the Law on Anticipatory Self-Defense, EJIL: 
TALK! (Mar. 28, 2017), available at http://goo.gl/4XPZeb.
52 W. Michael Reisman & Andrea Armstrong, The Past and Future of the Claim of Preemptive Self-Defense, 
100 AM. J. INT’L. L. 525, 526 (2006) (noting that anticipatory self-defense was not, in their view, “in 
the contemplation of drafters of the Charter, though claimed by many to have been grafted thereon by 
subsequent practice,” followed by a showing of such practice through case studies).
53 Secretary General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, A More Secure World: Our 
Shared Responsibility, UNITED NATIONS 63 (2004), available at http://goo.gl/JxTQKb.
54 For more moderate interpretations, see Daniel Bethlehem, Principles Relevant to the Scope of a State’s 
Right of Self-Defense Against an Imminent or Actual Armed Attack by Nonstate Actors, 106 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 769 (2012); Jeremy Wright, The Modern Law of Self-Defense, EJIL: TALK! (Jan. 11, 2017), available 
at http://goo.gl/1QCaHH.
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Security Council authorization) there would still be a derivative right for States to 
engage in peacetime intelligence gathering. For how else will a delegation be able to 
prove to the Security Council that a threat is mounting, so to convince its members 
to vote in favour of an authorization of the use of force? To the extent that the United 
Nations does not have its own intelligence capacities, the Security Council must rely 
on Member States in order to fulfil its mandate of maintaining peace and security. Note 
in this regard that the UN Security Council has in fact acknowledged the function that 
Member States’ intelligence plays in its ability to exercise this mandate. Most recently 
it adopted this view in Resolution 2396, concerning threats to international peace 
and security caused by terrorist acts. Acting under Chapter VII the Council not only 
called on Member States to “intensify and accelerate” their peacetime intelligence 
collection efforts, it went on to suggest exactly what measures they should employ. 
The Council decided that Member States “shall develop and implement systems 
to collect biometric data, which could include fingerprints, photographs, facial 
recognition, and other relevant identifying biometric data”. Other measures ordered 
by the Council were certain capabilities for the collection, processing, and analysis 
of passenger name record (PNR) and advance passenger information (API) data, the 
development and implementation of watch lists and databases on suspected terrorists, 
and increased cooperation with information communication technology companies 
in gathering a myriad of digital records and their later sharing through bilateral and 
multilateral arrangements.55
By recognizing that a right to spy exists as a matter of customary international 
law, the international community inexplicitly created a caveat to the myth system 
enshrined, inter alia, in Articles 2(1), 2(4), and 2(7) of the UN Charter, as well as 
in certain international legal regimes (such as the ones governing diplomatic and 
consular relations). Countries are willing to accept as tolerable certain assaults on 
their territorial sovereignty, political independence, their jurisdiction to determine 
their domestic affairs, and immunities and privileges, in the name of maintaining the 
important functions that intelligence plays in our public world order.56 So long as 
the surveillance serves the raison d’être of our international system, the fundamental 
goals of all law – “the minimization of violence, the maintenance of minimum order, 
and as approximate an achievement of the politics of human dignity as each situation 
allows”57 – the practice will be stomached even by those who have been discontentedly 
55 UN Security Council Resolution 2396 concerning Threats to International Peace and Security Caused by 
Terrorist Acts, UN Doc. S/RES/2396 (21 December 2017).
56 For more on this function see Myres S. McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell & W. Michael Reisman, The 
Intelligence Function and World Public Order, 46 TEMP. L.Q. 365 (1973).
57 W. Michael Reisman, Editorial Comment: Assessing Claims to Revise the Laws of War, 97 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 82, 83 (2003).
222
subjected to it.58 Note that this position was suggested, though ultimately not adopted, 
by a minority of the experts in Tallinn Manual 2.0:
“A few of the experts were of the view that the extensive State 
practice of conducting espionage on the target State’s territory has 
created an exception to the generally accepted premise that non-
consensual activities attributable to a State while physically present 
on another’s territory violate sovereignty. They emphasized, 
however, that this exception is narrow and limited solely to acts 
of espionage”59
Of course, acknowledging the right to spy would only be the first step in articulating 
the broader law on espionage. A fundamental source of international law mostly 
ignored by the GoE is that of general principles of law, which stand on the same 
footing as treaties and custom.60 One of the typical uses of general principles is as 
“standard clarifiers”, serving the purpose of defining “the depth and contours of broad 
or amorphous legal provisions” where international conventions and customs offer 
little organizational help.61 One such general principle is the principle of “Abuse of 
Rights”. Sir Hersch Lauterpacht recognized that “there is no legal right, however 
well established, which could not, in some circumstances, be refused recognition on 
the ground that it has been abused”.62 Applying the Abuse of Rights doctrine to our 
newly articulated Right to Spy creates the basis for the Jus Ad Explorationem (the law 
governing the launching of EOs). When spying is launched to achieve goals other than 
the ones for which it was originally intended, the particular operation will no longer 
be tolerable. Spying may only serve the national security interests of a State or the 
58 Note that stomaching it from an international law point of view is different from domestically prohibiting 
spying and working extensively to prevent it. This is the essence of the “liberty right” to spy, as a weaker 
right, that does not create an obligation on third parties to condone or facilitate it. This GoE acknowledged 
the practice of State domestic criminalization of espionage, see Tallinn Manual 2.0, n. 22, at 174 (“States 
are entitled to, and have, enacted domestic legislation that criminalises cyber espionage carried out against 
them”).
59 Id., at 19. See also at 171 (“A few of the experts took the view that [territorial cyber espionage] would not 
be unlawful, suggesting that acts of espionage represent an exception to the prohibitions of violations of 
sovereignty and intervention”). 
60 In the Introduction to Tallinn Manual 2.0, Professor Schmitt addresses which “rules and commentary” 
guided the GoE. It is quite visible from his description that the experts were solely interested in articulating 
treaty and customary international rules. The third source of international law, that of general principles, is 
not once mentioned by the project director in that section and is rarely brought up as such throughout the 
Manual. Id., at 3-5.
61 Alain Pellet, Article 38, in THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: 
A COMMENTARY 731, 850 (Andreas Zimmermann et al. eds., 2nd ed., 2012) (noting that the ICJ 
“will usually only resort to [General Principles of Law] in order to fill a gap in the treaty or customary 
rules available to settle a particular dispute”); CHARLES T. KOTUBY JR. AND LUKE A. SOBOTA, 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AND INTERNATIONAL DUE PROCESS: PRINCIPLES AND 
NORMS APPLICABLE IN TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTES 31-32 (2017) ()the authors cite the example 
of the ICSID tribunal using general principles to determine the precise content of the “fair and equitable 
treatment” standard, taking this interpretive approach due to the fact that “treaties and international 
conventions. … are not of great help to this end”).
62 SIR HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE 
INTERNATIONAL COURT 164 (1958).
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broader interests of maintaining peace and security for the international community 
in general.63 Thus, for example, if spying is done for the purpose of advancing the 
personal economic interests of a particular leader or those of specific corporations 
or industries,64 or if it is conducted to facilitate a dictatorship or to commission an 
internationally wrongful act,65 such spying operations are used “for an end which is 
different from which the right has been created”,66 and would therefore constitute an 
abuse of that very right. 
Moreover, even in cases where the operation does serve a lawful purpose, but in its 
choice of means or targets (the Jus In Exploratione) the State adopts certain measures 
which are either customarily prohibited (e.g. torture and other cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment; or arbitrary interference with the customary human rights to 
privacy or freedom of expression), or which go beyond “unexpressed but generally 
accepted norms and expectations”,67 the operation might nonetheless be deemed 
unlawful. Again, general principles of law such as good faith, proportionality, rule 
of law, effectiveness, fairness, and comity,68 might serve as useful tools in both 
interpreting existing treaty and customary norms (e.g. determining what constitutes as 
torture, or other cruel inhuman or degrading treatment; determining what violates the 
international human rights to privacy and freedom of expression) and clarify standards 
where the law has not yet caught up with the development of new surveillance and 
63 See Asaf Lubin, The Dragon-Kings Restraint: Proposing a Compromise for the EEZ Surveillance 
Conundrum, 57 WASHBURN L. J. 1, 56 (2018).
64 Note that this idea was entertained to some degree by certain members of the GoE. See Tallinn Manual 
2.0, n. 22, at 169, fn 386 (citing the 2015 US-Chinese commitment not to support cyber-enabled theft 
of intellectual property, and to a similar commitment taken by the G20 leaders that same year, the 
GoE cautioned that States may have committed themselves inter se to certain restrictions on industrial 
espionage. Nonetheless the GoE stopped short of determining that such practice was unlawful).
65 This resembles the position of the GoE that cyber espionage operations may be unlawful if they “constitute 
an integral and indispensable component of an operation that violates international law.” See Id., at 171-
172.
66 Alexandre Kiss, Abuse of Rights, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, para. 
5 (2006).
67 Roger D. Scott, Territorially Intrusive Intelligence Collection and International Law, 46 A.F. L. Rev. 
217, 226 (1999) (“as long as unexpressed but generally accepted norms and expectations associated with 
espionage are observed, international law tolerates the collection of intelligence”).
68 None of these general principles were sufficiently addressed in Tallinn Manual 2.0. Quite the opposite, 
the GoE even challenged the customary nature of proportionality as a binding legal requirement (Tallinn 
Manual 2.0, n. 22, at 204-205). For an analysis of proportionality as a general principle of international 
law see Kotuby and Sobota, n. 61, at 114-119. Similarly, an array of human rights standards, common to 
surveillance jurisprudence, and their applicability to both LICOs and EOs were hardly addressed by the 
authors. These include inter alia the principles of legality, necessity, proportionality, ex ante authorization, 
minimization procedures and safeguards from abuse, ex post review, independent oversight, non-
discrimination, notification requirements, and access to remedy and justice.
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cyber technologies.69 Of course, making these determinations requires the use of 
contextual and consequential methods of inquiry.70
Determining the lawfulness of a particular LICO, including specifically cyber espionage 
operations, is not for the fainthearted. One should be willing to engage the Jus Ad 
Explorationem and the Jus In Exploratione, in light of the function that intelligence 
plays in our public world order, and in view of a contextual- and consequential-based 
analysis. It is therefore the reality that in some instances foreign agents introducing 
USB flash drives filled with spyware into national cyber infrastructures might indeed 
violate the international law of espionage, whereas in other instances they might 
not. We consider the intrusion on sovereignty or on diplomatic immunities only as 
factors in a far more layered legal analysis. This type of nuanced application will 
be relevant to all of the other hypotheticals introduced in the Manual: from certain 
cyber intrusions that ‘herd’ a target’s communications to a platform more susceptible 
to surveillance, through tapping underwater submarine cables in the territorial 
sea, to spying on diplomats at the United Nations. Some of these might meet the 
above standards and criteria and would therefore be tolerated and stomached by 
the international community; others might not and would therefore be condemned, 
potentially even triggering State obligations for reparation. Far from rushing to 
provide rigid rules, Tallinn Manual 2.0 should have recognized the symbiosis that 
exists across the informational domain, as manifested in the communicative nature 
of cyber and espionage law and should have thus been more modest in its approach. 
Instead of a rulebook, the GoE should have provided government lawyers with a map 
and a compass.
6. conclusIon
Dr Seuss taught us that “sometimes the questions are complicated and the answers 
are simple”. In the area of cyber and espionage law, however, both the questions and 
the answers are complicated. This places a burden of humility on rule prescribers 
and rule appliers. In this paper, I have tried to highlight how, in our liberal rush to 
demonstrably regulate the cyber domain, a pursuit that we undertake for all the right 
reasons and with all the right intentions, we might end up leaving scorched earth. 
69 M. Cherif Bassiouni, A Functional Approach to “General Principles of International Law”, 11 MICH. J. 
INT’L. L. 768, 777 (1989-1990) (where he suggested that general principles prevent “the static application 
of anarchic norms and procedures to what is admittedly an evolving legal process designed to frame 
or regulate the dynamic exigencies and needs of a community of nations with changing interests and 
mutable goals and objectives. To state that international law has faced and is likely to face increasing new 
challenges, if for no other reason than to meet the fast-growing and changing technological advances, is 
a truism. Thus the demands on international law must be accommodated through an expanded usage of 
‘General Principles’”).
70 Reisman and Baker take this analysis a step further by applying a similar methodology (though at a higher 
level of abstraction) to the regulation of covert action. See W. MICHAEL REISMAN AND JANES E. 
BAKER, REGULATING COVERT ACTION: PRACTICES, CONTEXTS AND POLICIES OF COVERT 
COERCION ABROAD IN INTERNATIONAL AND AMERICAN LAW (1992).
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When policy-makers are provided with sufficiently accurate information as to the 
levels and types of threats posed by their adversaries, their intentions, and capabilities, 
they are more likely to calibrate their responses properly, and are less likely to rely 
on force as a means for guarding against startling attacks or strategic surprises. 
Intelligence gathering, in this context, serves a stability-enhancing function in public 
world order, by increasing the potential for pacific settlement of disputes and reducing 
the chances for violence. As George Washington said: “To be prepared for war is one 
of the most effectual means of preserving peace”.71 The communicative nature of 
cyber law and espionage law entails that we need to take a degree of caution so that we 
do not regulate the former to a point where we can no longer benefit from the positive 
functions served by the latter.
A legal regime that tries to address LICOs without being mindful and cognizant of the 
tidal waves that such regulations will inevitably create for EOs is one that is doomed 
to be rejected by States. Far more troubling, however, is the fact that such a legal 
regime will not even serve our initial goals of enhancing the rule of law, stability, and 
the peaceful resolution of conflicts. The former President of the Republic of Estonia, 
Toomas Hendrik Ilves, opens Tallinn Manual 2.0 by criticizing those who rely on 
realpolitik to dismiss international law as mere “window-dressing”.72 I share his 
criticism, but to adopt a set of rules that only echo the myth system while ignoring the 
operational code will only give fuel to those who scoff at the power of international 
law to effectively shape and bound government actions and expectations. 
71 President George Washington, First Message to Congress on the State of the Union (Jan. 8, 1790).





Between Self-Regulation and 
Outsourcing Law Enforcement1
Abstract: Recent years have seen increasing pressure on Internet intermediaries that 
provide a platform for and curate third-party content to monitor and police, on behalf of 
the State, online content generated or disseminated by users. This trend is prominently 
motivated by the use of ICTs by terrorist groups as a tool for recruitment, financing, 
and planning operations. States and international organizations have long called for 
enhanced cooperation between the public and private sectors to aid efforts to counter 
terrorism and violent extremism. However, as the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of 
Expression noted in his latest report to the Human Rights Council, ‘the intersection 
of State behaviour and corporate roles in the digital age remains somewhat new for 
many States’.
Detailed information on the means and modalities of content control exercised by 
online platforms is scarce. Terms of service and community standards are commonly 
drafted in terms that do not provide sufficiently clear guidance on the circumstances 
under which content may be blocked, removed or restricted, or access to a service may 
be restricted or terminated. Users have limited possibilities to challenge decisions to 
restrict material or access to a service. Moreover, as private bodies, such platforms 
are generally subject to limited democratic or independent oversight. At the same 
time, having private actors such as social media companies increasingly undertake 
traditionally public interest tasks in the context of Internet governance is likely 
unavoidable, as public authorities frequently lack the human or technical resources to 
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1. IntroductIon: onlIne Platforms
as gateKeePers of thIrd-Party content
It is difficult to overstate the role of the Internet intermediaries that provide a platform 
for and curate online content in facilitating the public’s access to seek, receive, and 
impart information, including discourse on issues of public interest. Individuals’ 
exercise of free speech is increasingly channelled through online platforms, which also 
enable governments to communicate with their constituencies and similarly facilitate 
the dissemination of messages by other actors. Many major online platforms (social 
media portals and search engines being prime examples) function on the basis of 
business models centred around hosting third-party content. The companies running 
these platforms regularly claim that the platforms function as mere distribution 
channels that exercise no or limited editorial intervention over the content published. 
Some of these sites have extremely high levels of user activity and interactivity,2 
allowing them to reach broad and diverse audiences in a manner that was not feasible 
before.3 This, at the same time, makes meaningful real-time monitoring challenging 
or even impossible and editorial intervention time- and resource-intensive.
Online platforms regulate their use through terms of service and community standards. 
The private regulatory mechanisms used by these platforms generally represent an 
efficient alternative to public regulation in the online space. The terms and standards 
are pre-established and unilaterally imposed on all users who want access to the 
services offered, providing the platform with quasi-normative power when it comes 
to user behaviour. This power extends not only to the substantive aspects of use, such 
2 It has been reported that every 60 seconds 510,000 comments are posted on Facebook, 293,000 statuses 
are updated, and 136,000 photos are uploaded. See Zephoria Digital Marketing, ‘The Top 20 Valuable 
Facebook Statistics – Updated January 2018’, 8 May 2017, https://zephoria.com/top-15-valuable-
facebook-statistics/, accessed 15 January 2018. The daily video content watched on YouTube has reached 
1billion hours this year. See YouTube Official Blog, ‘You know what’s cool? A billion hours’ (27 February 
2017) https://youtube.googleblog.com/2017/02/you-know-whats-cool-billion-hours.html, accessed 15 
January 2018.
3 See Dave Chaffey, ‘Global social media research summary 2017’ (Smart Insights, 27 April 2017) http://
www.smartinsights.com/social-media-marketing/social-media-strategy/new-global-social-media-research/, 
accessed 15 January 2018. 
Against this background, this paper aims to examine ways to define the contours of 
the division of responsibilities in countering terrorism and violent extremism between 
the public and private spheres. It addresses ways to ensure that Internet intermediaries 
carry out quasi-enforcement and quasi-adjudicative tasks in a manner compliant with 
international human rights norms and standards.
Keywords: terrorism, violent extremism, human rights, Internet intermediaries, 
freedom of expression
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as the content that users are authorized to share or access, but also to enforcement-
related ones, such as the criteria for decision-making and the technical tools used 
for the implementation of such decisions. In addition to these quasi-normative and 
quasi-executive functions, platforms frequently enjoy quasi-adjudicative power by 
requiring that disputes with users are settled via internal or other alternative dispute 
resolution or remedy mechanisms.
Such private ‘sovereignty’ should nonetheless be subject to public scrutiny to avoid 
arbitrary or abusive use of power. This is particularly important in light of some 
platforms undertaking functions traditionally catered for by the State. The argument 
that online platforms have become the digital age equivalent of public squares has been 
gaining traction in recent years.4 Due to their reach, use, and level of interactivity, some 
of these platforms arguably play a public interest role. Studies show that people have 
increasingly been getting their news from social media.5 Social media platforms have 
further been instrumental in disseminating information about political developments 
at home and abroad, humanitarian crises, and allegations of violations and abuses 
committed by States and Non-State actors.6 In some countries or provinces, certain 
social media platforms are so dominant that to many inhabitants they represent the 
Internet itself.7 As such, the information these inhabitants have access to online is 
restricted to whatever is available on these platforms. As offline information flows 
in these contexts are frequently restricted, social media platforms may constitute the 
main source of information, including of public interest information.
4 See Alissa Starzak, ‘When the Internet (officially) became the public square’ (Cloudfare, 21 June 2017) 
https://blog.cloudflare.com/internet-became-public-square/, accessed 15 January 2018; Ephrat Livni, 
‘The US Supreme Court just ruled that using social media is a constitutional right’ (Quartz, 19 June 2017)  
https://qz.com/1009546/the-us-supreme-court-just-decided-access-to-facebook-twitter-or-snapchat-is-
fundamental-to-free-speech/, accessed 15 January 2018.
5 See Jordan Crook, ‘62% of U.S. adults get their news from social media, says report’ (TechCrunch, 26 
May 2016) https://techcrunch.com/2016/05/26/most-people-get-their-news-from-social-media-says-
report/, accessed 15 January 2018; Jane Wakefield, ‘Social media “outstrips TV” as news source for young 
people’, (BBC News, 15 June 2016) http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-36528256, accessed 15 January 2018.
6 Christoph Koettl, ‘Twitter to the rescue? How social media is transforming human rights monitoring’, 
(Amnesty International USA, 20 February 2013) http://blog.amnestyusa.org/middle-east/twitter-to-the-
rescue-how-social-media-is-transforming-human-rights-monitoring/, accessed 15 January 2018; Juliette 
Garside, ‘Rioters’ use of social media throws telecoms firms into spotlight’ (The Guardian, 21 August 
2011) https://www.theguardian.com/business/2011/aug/21/riots-throw-telecoms-firms-social-media-
controls-into-spotlight, accessed 15 January 2018; Clay Shirky, ‘The Political Power of Social Media: 
Technology, the public sphere and political change’ Foreign Affairs (January/ February 2011) Vol. 90, 
No.1, 28-41.
7 See Megan Specia and Paul Mozur, ‘A war of words puts Facebook at the center of Myanmar’s Rohingya 
crisis’ (The New York Times, 27 October 2017) https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/27/world/asia/
myanmar-government-facebook-rohingya.html?mtrref=www.google.com, accessed 12 March 2018; Casey 
Hynes, ‘Internet use is on the rise in Myanmar, but better options are needed’ (Forbes, 22 September 
2017) https://www.forbes.com/sites/chynes/2017/09/22/Internet-use-is-on-the-rise-in-myanmar-but-better-
options-are-needed/#1ef96e44448e, accessed 12 March 2018; Corynne McSherry, Jeremy Malcolm, Kit 
Walsh, ‘Zero Rating: What it is and why you should care’ (Electronic Frontier Foundation, 18 February 
2016) https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/02/zero-rating-what-it-is-why-you-should-care, accessed 12 
March 2018.   
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8 Bruce Schneier, Data and Goliath (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2015), 114-116. 
9 See, for example, Ryan Goodman and Justin Hendrix, ‚Facebook users have the right to know how they 
were exposed to Russian Propaganda’ (Just Security, 23 October 2017) https://www.justsecurity.org/46171/
facebook-users-right-to-know-exposed-russian-propaganda/, accessed 12 March 2018; Hannes Grassegger 
and Mikael Krogerus, ‘The data that turned the world upside down’ (Motherboard VICE, 27 January 2017) 
https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/mg9vvn/how-our-likes-helped-trump-win, accessed 12 March 
2018. 
10 Gesetz zur Verbesserung der Rechtsdurchsetzung in sozialen Netzwerken [Netzwerksdurchsetzungsgesetz 
- NetzDG] (2017). 
11 The reasons for choosing to demonstrate related issues by reference to the EU framework are the more 
detailed nature of EU regulation and its interpretation and also numerous current developments at the EU 
and Member State level. Many of the concerns raised are, however, valid beyond the EU. 
The full picture needs to be considered in light of technological developments that have 
provided new means and modalities for controlling the content available online. Online 
platforms and those who provide and facilitate access to them have considerable power 
in shaping the information that gets disseminated; that is, they have de facto authority 
when it comes to regulating online content. As offline news consumption continues to 
decrease, particularly with younger demographics, these actors can exert significant 
influence over individuals’ access to information, freedom of opinion, expression, and 
association, and over interlinked political and public interest processes.8 The issue has 
figured prominently in recent discussions centring around the role of social media in 
influencing democratic, including electoral, processes.9
In addition to these regulatory functions, platforms have increasingly been undertaking 
policing and law enforcement functions traditionally considered to be State tasks. At 
times, such roles are delegated through law, as is the case of the German Network 
Enforcement Act.10 However, platforms increasingly undertake such functions 
without their being formally delegated by state authorities, in an attempt to avoid 
liability or pre-empt State regulation.
This paper aims to examine the division of responsibilities between the public and 
private sphere in countering terrorism and violent extremism in a context where the 
‘playground’ is privately owned and operated infrastructure, with uneven levels of State 
regulation. It addresses means and modalities to ensure that Internet intermediaries, 
with particular focus on social media platforms, carry out quasi-enforcement and 
quasi-adjudicative tasks in a manner compliant with international human rights norms 
and standards. The analysis will pay particular attention to relevant developments in 
European Union (EU) laws and policies and Member State practices.11
2. state trends to outsource onlIne
(content) PolIcIng
Recent years have seen increasing pressure on Internet intermediaries that provide a 
platform for and curate third-party content to monitor and police, on behalf of the State, 
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online content that is generated or disseminated by users. This trend is prominently 
motivated by the use of ICTs and social media, in particular, by terrorist groups as 
a tool for recruitment, propaganda outreach, fundraising, and planning operations.12 
Discussions on the role and responsibilities of relevant online platforms in preventing 
and countering terrorism and violent extremism have intensified in the wake of recent 
attacks perpetrated by individuals linked to or inspired by ISIL.13 Some policy-makers 
have expressed dissatisfaction with the efficiency of monitoring terrorist and violent 
extremist content and have warned platforms about the need to ‘do more’ if they want 
to avoid State intervention through binding regulation and sanctions.14
For its part, the tech industry has attempted to tackle the problems posed by terrorist 
or extremist third-party content through coordinated initiatives aimed at bolstering the 
efficiency of individually taken measures. Coordinated initiatives include the Global 
Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism,15 the EU Internet Forum, bringing together 
EU entities, governments and technology companies,16 the Code of Conduct on 
Countering Illegal Hate Speech Online,17 and the Shared Industry Hash Database,18 
to name a few. Individually, companies have pledged to take further action to counter 
the use of their platforms for terrorist and other unlawful purposes by employing 
12 See Brendan I. Koerner, ‘Why ISIS is winning the social media war’ (Wired, April 2016) https://www.
wired.com/2016/03/isis-winning-social-media-war-heres-beat/, accessed 15 January 2018; David P. Fidler, 
‘Countering Islamic State exploitation of the Internet’ (Council on Foreign Relations, 18 June 2015) 
https://www.cfr.org/report/countering-islamic-state-exploitation-internet, accessed 15 January 2018. 
13 Andrew Sparrow, Alex Hern, ‘Internet firms must do more to tackle online extremism, says No 10’ (The 
Guardian, 24 March 2017) http://www.theguardian.com/media/2017/mar/24/internet-firms-must-do-more-
to-tackle-online-extremism-no-10, accessed 15 January 2018; Jessica Elgot, ‘May and Macron plan joint 
crackdown on online terror’ (The Guardian, 12 June 2017) https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/
jun/12/may-macron-online-terror-radicalisation, accessed 15 January 2018.
14 Amar Toor, ‘France and the UK consider fining social media companies over terrorist content’ (The Verge, 
13 June 2017) https://www.theverge.com/2017/6/13/15790034/france-uk-social-media-fine-terrorism-
may-macron, accessed 15 January 2018; Samuel Gibbs, ‘Facebook and YouTube face tough new laws on 
extremist and explicit video’ (The Guardian, 24 May 2017)
 https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/may/24/facebook-youtube-tough-new-laws-extremist-
explicit-video-europe, accessed 15 January 2018; Kate McCann, ‘Facebook “must pay to police internet” 
or face fines: UK Parliament’ (The Canberra Times, 30 April 2017)
 http://www.canberratimes.com.au/technology/technology-news/facebook-must-pay-to-police-internet-
20170430-gvvz2e.html, accessed 15 January 2018.
15 Microsoft Corporate Blogs, ‘Facebook, Microsoft, Twitter and YouTube announce formation of the 
Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism’ (26 June 2017) https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-
issues/2017/06/26/facebook-microsoft-twitter-youtube-announce-formation-global-internet-forum-counter-
terrorism/, accessed 15 January 2018.
16 European Commission, ‘EU Internet Forum: a major step forward in curbing terrorist content on the 
internet. Press release’ (Brussels, 8 December 2016) http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-4328_
en.htm, accessed 15 January 2018.
17 The initiative is from the European Commission, together with Facebook, Microsoft, Twitter and YouTube. 
The Code of Conduct is available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/fundamental-rights/files/hate_speech_code_
of_conduct_en.pdf, accessed 15 January 2018.
18 Google, ‘Partnering to help curb the spread of terrorist content online’ (5 December 2016) https://www.
blog.google/topics/google-europe/partnering-help-curb-spread-terrorist-content-online/, accessed 15 
January 2018.
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artificial intelligence and ‘human expertise’ to identify ‘extremist and terrorism-
related’ content.19
3. onlIne Platforms and counter-terrorIsm
Relevant corporate obligations are included in a variety of laws adopted at the national 
level, among others those tackling hate speech, cybercrime, counter-terrorism, violent 
extremism, and intermediary liability. Many jurisdictions also encourage self- and 
co-regulation.
A. Terrorism and Violent Extremism: Dilemmas of Definition
Despite a plethora of multilateral treaties, Security Council resolutions, and other 
international and regional instruments addressing terrorism-related issues,20 an 
internationally agreed definition of terrorism or an agreed list of terrorism-related 
offences is lacking. As a result, relevant definitions are to be found in laws and policies 
adopted at the level of States, causing considerable discrepancies between different 
domestic frameworks.
Particularly pertinent to our context are preparatory and ancillary offences and, newly, 
offences criminalizing the advocacy of terrorism, including ‘glorification’, ‘apology’, 
‘praise’ or ‘justification’ of terrorism.21 United Nations human rights mechanisms 
and other stakeholders have raised concerns over some definitions lacking precision, 
stressing the potential negative human rights implications of definitions of terrorism 
19 See, for example, Google, ‘Four steps we’re taking today to fight terrorism online’ 18 June (2017) https://
www.blog.google/topics/google-europe/four-steps-were-taking-today-fight-online-terror/, accessed 15 
January 2018; Monika Bickert, Brian Fishman, ‘Hard Questions: How We Counter Terrorism’, (15 June 
2017) https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2017/06/how-we-counter-terrorism/, accessed 15 January 2018; 
Twitter Inc. ‘An update on our efforts to combat violent extremism’ (18 August 2016) https://blog.twitter.
com/official/en_us/a/2016/an-update-on-our-efforts-to-combat-violent-extremism.html, accessed 15 
January 2018. 
20 See United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, International Legal Instruments, 
https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/ctitf/en/international-legal-instruments, accessed 15 January 2018.
21 The UN Human Rights Committee has stressed that offences such as ‘praising’, ‘glorifying’, or ‘justifying’ 
terrorism must be clearly defined to ensure that they do not lead to unnecessary or disproportionate 
interference with freedom of expression. See United Nations Human Rights Committee, General Comment 
34. Article 19: Freedoms of opinion and expression (CCPR/C/GC/34), para. 46. Similarly, the Secretary-
General and the UN Special Rapporteur on Counter-Terrorism have expressed concerns about the 
‘troubling trend’ of criminalizing the glorification of terrorism, stating that this amounts to an inappropriate 
restriction on expression. See Protecting Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering 
Terrorism. Report of the Secretary-General (A/63/337) and United Report of the Special Rapporteur on the 
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism (A/
HRC/31/65).
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and related offences that are overly-broad22 or attach criminal sanctions to conduct 
that falls short of incitement to terrorism or advocacy of national, racial or religious 
hatred constituting incitement to violence.23
Laws and policies addressing violent extremism similarly raise definitional concerns. 
While the term ‘violent extremism’ and related notions such as ‘extremism’ 
and ‘radicalization’ are prominently present in current political discourse at the 
international, regional, and national levels, none of these terms have internationally 
agreed definitions.24 Many of the relevant definitions found in domestic laws 
and policies have been criticized for being vague and at times encompassing 
manifestations that are lawful under international human rights law.25 In some 
jurisdictions, these concepts have become dissociated from violence,26 thereby raising 
the potential for abusive implementation, as such definitions risk selectively blurring 
the distinction between belief and violent conduct. Such approaches, especially when 
not accompanied by robust safeguards, risk leading to the suppression of views that 
deviate from the social norms accepted by the majority, under the guise of preventing 
extremism; and measures may target thought, belief, and opinion, rather than actual 
conduct.
22 See, for example, Protecting Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism. 
Report of the Secretary-General, (A/68/298); Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism (A/
HRC/28/28); International Commission of Jurists, Report of the Eminent Jurists Panel on Terrorism, 
Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights (2009). See also, Cathal Sheerin, ‘The threat of ‘glorifying 
terrorism’ laws’ (IFEX, 2 February 2017) https://www.ifex.org/europe_central_asia/2017/02/02/glorifying_
terrorism_charges/, accessed 12 March 2018; EDRi, ‘European Union Directive on counter-terrorism 
is seriously flawed’ (30 November 2016) https://edri.org/european-union-directive-counterterrorism-
seriously-flawed/, accessed 12 March 2018; Amnesty International, ‘EU: Orwellian counter-terrorism 
laws stripping rights under guise of defending them’ (17 January 2017) https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/
news/2017/01/eu-orwellian-counter-terrorism-laws-stripping-rights-under-guise-of-defending-them/, 
accessed 12 March 2018; Amar Toor, ‘France extends draconian anti-terrorism laws’ (The Verge, 17 
February 2016) https://www.theverge.com/2016/2/17/11031006/france-extends-state-of-emergency-paris-
attacks , accessed 12 March 2018; Amnesty International, ‘Tweet… if you dare. How counter-terrorism 
laws restrict freedom of expression in Spain’ (March 2018), Index no. EUR 41/7924/2018. 
23 See Article 20, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. See also, Amnesty International, 
‘Tweet… if you dare. How counter-terrorism laws restrict freedom of expression in Spain’. In France, 
the Constitutional Court has recently struck down an amendment to the Penal Code criminalizing 
‘regular consultation’ of content deemed to be inciting or glorifying terrorism. See Nadim Houry, ‘French 
legislators rebuked for seeking to criminalize online browsing’ (Human Rights Watch, 15 December 2017) 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/12/15/french-legislators-rebuked-seeking-criminalize-online-browsing, 
accessed 12 March 2018; Conseil constitutionnel, Décision n° 2017-682 QPC du 15 décembre 2017. 
24 Acknowledging this shortcoming, the Secretary-General in his Plan of Action to Prevent Violent 
Extremism stated that violent extremism is to be defined at the national level, while emphasizing that such 
definitions must be consistent with obligations under international human rights law. 
25 See Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms While Countering Terrorism (A/HRC/31/65) and Report on Best Practices and Lessons Learned 
on How Protecting and Promoting Human Rights Contribute to Preventing and Countering Violent 
Extremism. Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (A/HRC/33/29).
26 A number of countries also target ‘extremism’ that is non-violent. For example, extremism is defined in 
the United Kingdom as ‘vocal or active opposition to fundamental values, including democracy, the rule 
of law, individual liberty and the mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs’. See HM 
Government, Prevent Strategy (2011), Annex A; HM Government, Counter-Extremism Strategy (2015, 
October), para. 1. 
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The potential and actual uses of the counter-terrorism and preventing violent extremism 
framework to stifle dissent, to persecute human rights defenders, journalists, and the 
political opposition, and to criminalize the work of humanitarian organizations has 
been addressed at length elsewhere.27 Online platforms having to operationalize such 
laws and policies may find themselves contributing to the negative human rights 
impact of these frameworks. Even in cases where related domestic legal and policy 
frameworks do not present these shortcomings, the discrepancies between different 
domestic frameworks inevitably raise difficulties for online platforms, in particular 
those that operate worldwide (or at least in numerous jurisdictions), making it difficult 
to comply with all relevant domestic laws.
B. Online Platforms as De Facto Content Regulators
1) Means and Modalities of Content Review
Many platforms rely on a combination of artificial intelligence (AI) and human 
expertise to review and moderate content. The use of AI to spot terrorist or violent 
extremist content is a relatively new development,28 and platforms such as Facebook 
acknowledge that it is a tool that must be complemented by human review.29 Using 
algorithms to assess compliance with the law and terms of service or community 
standards provides for a time-efficient way for dealing with large volumes of 
material. It is one advocated by bodies such as the European Commission, which 
encourages online platforms to ‘step up investment in, and use of, automatic detection 
technologies’.30
Algorithms, however, are not fool-proof, as they are not necessarily well-equipped to 
understand context, different forms of humour and satire,31 and may not pick up on 
certain subtleties.32 For example, hash-matching or even fingerprinting algorithms are 
not capable of analysing meaning or context, such as whether certain content contains 
27 See Interagency Standing Committee, Sanctions Assessment Handbook: Assessing the Humanitarian 
Implications of Sanctions (United Nations, 2004); Kate Mackintosh and Patrick Duplat, ‘Study of the 
Impact of Donor Counter-Terrorism Measures on Principled Humanitarian Action’ (United Nations Office 
for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and the Norwegian Refugee Council, July 2013).
28 See Monika Bickert and Brian Fishman, note 19. 
29 Monika Bickert and Brian Fishman, ‘Hard Questions: Are We Winning the War on Terrorism Online?’ 
(Facebook, 28 November 2017)
 https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2017/11/hard-questions-are-we-winning-the-war-on-terrorism-online/, 
accessed 15 January 2018; Lynsey Barber, ‘Facebook’s now using artificial intelligence to remove terror 
content’ (CityA.M., 29 November 2017) http://www.cityam.com/276626/facebooks-now-using-artificial-
intelligence-remove-terror, accessed 15 January 2018.
30 European Commission, ‘Communication on tackling illegal content online, towards enhanced 
responsibility of online platforms’ (28 September 2017) https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/
news/communication-tackling-illegal-content-online-towards-enhanced-responsibility-online-platforms, 
accessed 15 January 2018.
31 Julia Krüger, ‘Kommentar: Das Recht auf den Tweet’ (Netzpolitik.org, 6 January 2018) https://netzpolitik.
org/2018/kommentar-das-recht-auf-den-tweet/, accessed 15 January 2018. 
32 See, for example Julia Reda, ‘When filters fail: These cases show we can’t trust algorithms to clean up the 
Internet’ (28 September 2017) https://juliareda.eu/2017/09/when-filters-fail/, accessed 15 January 2018.
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terrorist propaganda or hate speech, or reveals criminal intent.33 As a result, they 
may end up removing not only videos produced by terrorist groups for recruitment 
purposes, but also media analysis of these videos, or even footage uploaded by human 
rights groups reporting on abuses.34 Some machine-learning algorithms, such as 
natural language processing tools, are better suited for the kind of analysis required 
in this context. However, even their use comes with limitations. Experts argue that 
these tools cannot be applied with the same reliability across different contexts, as 
language use differs across different cultural, demographic, and linguistic groups.35 
An algorithm trained to parse out anti-Muslim hate speech may achieve lower levels 
of accuracy when attempting to identify anti-Semitic hate speech, for example. 
As with any machine learning algorithm, these tools can also amplify existing 
biases (including social and other bias existing in a language). This may result in 
algorithms over-censoring groups that are already marginalized.36 Dialects that are 
underrepresented in mainstream text are also more likely to be misinterpreted, leading 
to algorithms performing less accurately,37 and many of the existing natural language 
processing tools only work for English or other high-resource languages.38
These limitations suggest that unchecked use of algorithms for content management 
may lead to screening that is over- or under-inclusive. The margin of error would 
prove particularly problematic in the case of large online platforms. For example, 
Facebook has at some point reported that it receives one million user violation reports 
a day.39 If all these reports were processed through AI tools, it would mean hundreds 
of thousands of mistaken decisions per day.40 For meaningful oversight of decisions 
made by AI tools, integrating the human-in-the-loop principle needs to be ensured. 
Unfortunately, most social media platforms do not provide meaningful information 
33 Ibid. See also Evan Engstrom and Nick Feamster, ‘The limits of filtering: A look at the functionality & 
shortcomings of content detection tools’ (Engine, March 2017) 13-15 and 17-21.
34 See, for example, Daphne Keller, ‘Problems with filters in the European Commission’s platforms proposal’ 
(Stanford Center for Internet and Society, 5 October 2017) http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2017/10/
problems-filters-european-commissions-platforms-proposal, accessed 12 March 2018. 
35 See Bermingham et al., ‘Combining Social Network Analysis and Sentiment Analysis to Explore the 
Potential for Online Radicalisation’, Proceedings of the International Conference on Advances in Social 
Network Analysis and Mining (2009), 3; Su Lin Blodgett and Brendan O’Connor, ‘Racial Disparity in 
Natural Language Processing: A Case Study of Social Media African-American English’, Proceedings of 
the Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency in Machine Learning Conference (2017) 1-2, https://arxiv.
org/pdf/1707.00061.pdf, accessed 15 January 2018.
36 Jieyo Zhao et al., ‘Men Also Like Shopping: Reducing Gender Bias Amplification using Corpus-Level 
Constraints’, Proceedings of the Conference on Empirical Methods in Natural Language Processing  
(2017), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1707.09457, accessed 15 January 2018.
37 Su Lin Blodgett and Brendan O’Connor, note 35, 1-2; Rachael Tatman, ‘Gender and Dialect Bias in 
YouTube’s Automatic Captions’, Proceedings of the First Association for Computational Linguistics 
Workshop on Ethics in Natural Language Processing, 53–59 (2017), http://rachaeltatman.com/sites/default/
files/papers/EthNLP06.pdf, accessed 15 January 2018. See also Natasha Duarte, Emma Llanso, Anna 
Loup, ‘Mixed Messages? The Limits of Automated Social Media Content Analysis’ (Centre for Democracy 
and Technology, November 2017) 15.
38 Id., 14.
39 Sara Ashley O’Brien, ‘Facebook gets 1 million user violation reports a day’ (CNN Tech, 12 March 
2016) http://money.cnn.com/2016/03/12/technology/sxsw-2016-facebook-online-harassment/index.html, 
accessed 15 January 2018. 
40 Natural language processing tools reportedly do not possess an accuracy rate higher than 80%. See Natasha 
Duarte, note 37, 5.
236
on content review procedures and the criteria that determine whether certain content 
will be reviewed by AI, human moderators, or both.41
Having content reviewed by human moderators does not necessarily assuage all 
concerns. Assessing what may amount to hate speech, incitement to terrorism, 
‘glorification’ of terrorism or violent extremist content frequently requires a rather 
complex analysis to be conducted by a highly trained, specialized, and adequately 
resourced workforce. The reality, however, does not seem to fit this picture. Reports 
indicate that low-paid and insufficiently trained moderators frequently end up being 
the de facto gatekeepers of freedom of expression online.42 Moreover, bearing in 
mind the overwhelming pace at which content is posted, relying primarily on human 
monitoring, particularly in near real-time, would be next to impossible.
Many large social media platforms operate worldwide, or at least in numerous 
jurisdictions. This makes it difficult or even impossible to produce a universally 
suitable set of rules for their algorithms and moderators. As described above, such 
rules need to take into account the differences between domestic legal systems and the 
scope of prohibited content in different jurisdictions and linguistic, cultural, social, 
and other contexts.
2) Safeguards, Transparency, and Accountability
Detailed information on the means and modalities of content control exercised by 
online platforms is scarce. Terms of service and community standards are commonly 
drafted in vague terms and do not provide sufficiently clear guidance on the 
circumstances under which content may be blocked, removed or restricted, or access 
to a service restricted or terminated, including the criteria used for such assessments. 
Facebook’s Director of Global Policy Management, Monika Bickert, explained that 
the company does not share details of its policies to avoid encouraging people ‘to find 
workarounds’.43 This also means reduced transparency, including when it comes to 
the internal consistency of the application of these policies, and may as a result lead 
to reduced accountability.
41 See Monika Bickert, note 19. While the so-called ‘Facebook files’ provide some insight into the 
moderation process, many questions remain. Moreover, moderation policies of other major social network 
platforms remain obscure.
42 See Olivia Solon, ‘Counter-terrorism was never meant to be Silicon Valley’s job. Is that why it’s 
failing?’ (The Guardian, 29 June 2017) https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/jun/29/silicon-
valley-counter-terrorism-facebook-twitter-youtube-google; accessed 15 January 2018; Olivia Solon, 
‘Underpaid and overburdened: The life of a Facebook moderator’ (The Guardian, 25 May 2017) https://
www.theguardian.com/news/2017/may/25/facebook-moderator-underpaid-overburdened-extreme-
content, accessed 15 January 2018; Till Krause and Hannes Grassegger, ‘Inside Facebook’ (Süddeutsche 
Zeitung, 15 December 2016) http://www.sueddeutsche.de/digital/exklusive-sz-magazin-recherche-inside-
facebook-1.3297138, accessed 15 January 2018; Nick Hopkins, ‘Facebook struggles with ‘mission 
impossible’ to stop online extremism’ (The Guardian, 24 May 2017) https://www.theguardian.com/
news/2017/may/24/facebook-struggles-with-mission-impossible-to-stop-online-extremism, accessed 15 
January 2018. 
43 Monika Bickert, ‘At Facebook we get things wrong – but we take our safety role seriously’ (The Guardian, 
22 May 2017) https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/may/22/facebook-get-things-wrong-but-
safety-role-seriously, accessed 15 January 2018.
237
Information provided ex post facto is similarly lacking. Users are frequently not 
informed of the origin of removal requests, the procedure that led to removal or 
rejection of removal and the criteria used.44 They also have limited possibilities 
to challenge decisions to restrict content or access to a service. To tackle this 
shortcoming, the recently adopted German Network Enforcement Act requires 
companies to report on a biannual basis describing their means and modalities for 
handling complaints and disclosing the criteria for removing or blocking content. It 
similarly calls on companies to inform both the complainant and the users affected by 
particular measures, including the reasoning for the decision. The law, however, does 
not explicitly require companies to provide users with the option to challenge these 
decisions.
As relevant measures by private companies are generally taken in enforcement of 
terms of service and not on the basis of specific legislation, it is frequently not possible 
to challenge them in court. Platforms may also impose internal or other alternative 
dispute resolution mechanisms, should disputes arise. Moreover, as private bodies, 
such platforms are generally not subject to democratic or independent oversight in 
the way that public authorities are, despite their effectively carrying out regulatory, 
executive, and adjudicative functions.45 Removing the possibility of independent, 
including judicial, review of measures that interfere with human rights is problematic 
in general and particularly so having in mind recent legal and policy developments. 
Businesses are potentially facing fines and sanctions imposed by States if they do not 
restrict unlawful content.46 On the other hand, should they remove lawful content in 
the process, affected individuals have limited avenues of redress. In case of doubt, 
businesses will more likely err on the side of over-censoring. 
C. The Scope of Responsibility of Online Intermediaries
Online platforms that host or store user-generated content and enable access 
to and retrieval of this content by the author and other users47 qualify as Internet 
intermediaries. Such intermediaries, as opposed to authors and publishers of content, 
are generally protected against liability for third-party content, with certain caveats. 
The scope of this exemption differs depending on jurisdiction.48 For example, under 
the EU e-Commerce Directive, hosting intermediaries do not incur liability as long 
44 See Annemarie Bridy and Daphne Keller, ‘U.S. Copyright Office Section 512 Study: Comments in 
Response to Notice of Inquiry’ (31 March 2016) 29.
45 ‘Zachary Loeb – Who moderates the moderators? The Facebook files’ (Boundary 2, 7 June 2017) http://
www.boundary2.org/2017/06/zachary-loeb-who-moderates-the-moderators-on-the-facebook-files/, 
accessed 15 January 2018.
46 See Section C infra : The Scope of Responsibility of Online Intermediaries. 
47 Monica Horten, ‘Content ‘responsibility’: The looming cloud of uncertainty for Internet intermediaries’ 
Center for Democracy and Technology (September 2016) 5. See also Jaani Riordan, The Liability of 
Internet Intermediaries (Oxford University Press, 2016) Chapter 2. 
48 See Article 19, ‘Internet Intermediaries: Dilemma of Liability’ (2013); Eric Goldman, ‘Facebook isn’t 
liable for fake user account containing non-consensual pornography’ (Forbes, 8 March 2016) https://www.
forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/2016/03/08/facebook-isnt-liable-for-fake-user-account-containing-non-
consensual-pornography/#40ba670379b2, accessed 15 January 2018.
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as they ‘expeditiously’ remove or disable access to illegal content once they have 
‘actual knowledge’ of its existence.49 Under EU law, it is not permitted to impose 
a general obligation to monitor content or to ‘actively seek facts or circumstances 
indicating illegal activity’.50 Similarly, so-called ‘notice and stay-down’ injunctions, 
involving an obligation to ensure that content, once removed, will not reappear on the 
platform, are also problematic to the extent that their implementation requires general 
monitoring.
The idea of introducing such a burden on intermediaries has emerged in current 
debates, with policy-makers calling for stricter regulation of the liability of Internet 
intermediaries when it comes to countering terrorism, violent extremism, and hate 
speech. Proposals include imposing fines and other sanctions on social media 
platforms ‘that fail to take action against terrorist propaganda and violent content’,51 
and even having social media companies bear the costs of authorities policing content 
online.52 The introduction of criminal liability for platforms was discussed and 
ultimately rejected by the European Parliament in the context of the Directive on 
Combating Terrorism. However, the European Commission, in its Communication on 
Tackling Illegal Content Online: Towards enhanced responsibility of online platforms, 
recommended that tech companies proactively look to identify illegal content on 
their platforms with the help of artificial intelligence, stressing that ‘online platforms 
should also be able to take swift decisions […] without being required to do so on the 
basis of a court order or administrative decision’.53 The Commission considers that 
online platforms can take the recommended proactive measures without fear of losing 
their liability exemption under the e-Commerce Directive.54
Other developments similarly come close to recommending or requiring proactive 
monitoring by intermediaries, potentially also affecting the internal consistency of 
the EU legal framework. Article 28a of the review proposal to the Audio-Visual 
Media Services (AVMS) Directive55 provides that video-sharing platforms56 must 
49 Article 14, Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain 
legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market 
(e-Commerce Directive).
50 Article 15, e-Commerce Directive. See also Belgische Vereniging van Auteurs, Componisten en Uitgevers 
CVBA (SABAM) v. Netlog NV. Case C-360/10 (2012) (European Court of Justice). 
51 Toor, note 14; Gibbs, note 14. 
52 See House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, ‘Hate crime: abuse, hate and extremism online’ (25 
April 2017); McCann, note 14.
53 European Commission, note 30.
54 While the Communication addresses the compatibility of such proactive measures with Article 14 of the 
e-Commerce Directive, it does not pay similar attention to Article 15. 
55 European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council Amending 
Directive 2010/13/EU: On the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or 
administrative action in Member States concerning the provision of audio-visual media services in view of 
changing market realities. 
56 It must be noted that some civil society organizations and some Member States caution against the 
inclusion of video-sharing platforms, in particular social media ones, within the scope of the Directive. 
See EDRi, ‘EDRi Position on AVMSD Trilogue Negotiations’ (14 September 2017) https://edri.org/files/
AVMSD/edriposition_trilogues_20170914.pdf, accessed 15 January 2018.
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take measures to ‘protect all citizens’ from content containing incitement to violence, 
discrimination or hate.57 In addition to providing for a rather vague definition of 
such content,58 the proposed provision may be interpreted as requiring proactive 
monitoring.59
As a result of such developments, the EU will have to assess the compatibility of 
the e-Commerce Directive with other instruments addressing the role of Internet 
intermediaries in combating hate speech and other illegal content, especially in light 
of the decision not to reopen the e-Commerce Directive. It is in this vein that the 
European Commission has adopted the above-mentioned Communication on Tackling 
Illegal Content Online60 and is developing measures that set common requirements 
across the Union for companies when it comes to removing illegal content, as a means 
to avoid ‘overzealous rules that differ between EU countries’.61
What seems to be missing is the human rights-based analysis of such new obligations. 
This shortcoming comes even though human rights concerns posed by far-reaching 
intermediary liability and, in particular, its negative impact on freedom of speech 
and interlinked rights, have repeatedly been flagged by international human rights 
mechanisms62 and civil society actors.63 It is questionable whether the course of 
action proposed in the Commission’s Communication can be construed in line with 
human rights standards,64 including as spelled out in the EU Council’s Human Rights 
57 See EDRi, ‘EDRi’s analysis on the CULT compromise on Article 28a of the draft Audiovisual Media 
Services Directive (AVMSD) proposal’ (13 April 2017) https://edri.org/files/AVMSD/compromise_
article28a_analysis_20170413.pdf, accessed 15 January 2018. 
58 For example, a compromise amendment under discussion provides for the following: ‘protect all citizens 
from content containing incitement undermining human dignity, incitement to terrorism or content 
containing incitement to violence or hatred directed against a person or a group of persons defined by 
reference to nationality, sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or 
belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age, 
gender, gender expression, gender identity, sexual orientation, residence status or health.’ (emphasis added) 
See European Parliament. Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs. (2016) Amendments 
47-171. (2016/0151(COD)). 
59 While the draft explicitly mentions that it is without prejudice to articles 14 and 15 of the e-Commerce 
Directive, the intended scope of the duty of care is still unclear. See also Horten, note 47, 14.
60 European Commission, ‘Liability of online intermediaries’, (15 June 2017) https://ec.europa.eu/digital-
single-market/en/liability-online-intermediaries, accessed 15 January 2018. 
61 Catherine Stupp, ‘Gabriel to start EU expert group on fake news’ (Euractiv, 30 August 2017) https://www.
euractiv.com/section/digital/news/gabriel-to-start-eu-expert-group-on-fake-news/, accessed 15 January 
2018. 
62 See Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion 
and Expression (A/HRC/35/22), para. 49. See also, Joint Declaration by the United Nations Special 
Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe (OSCE) Representative on Freedom of the Media, the Organization of American States (OAS) 
Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(ACHPR) Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information, presented at the 
UNESCO World Press Freedom Day event (3 May 2016).
63 See note 48. 
64 For criticism of the Communication, see for example Daphne Keller, note 34; Graham Smith, ‘Towards a 
filtered internet: the European Commission’s automated prior restraint machine’ (Cyberleagle, 25 October 
2017) http://www.cyberleagle.com/2017/10/towards-filtered-internet-european.html, accessed 12 March 
2018.
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Guidelines on Freedom of Expression Online and Offline,65 bearing in mind its 
emphasis on protecting intermediaries from an obligation of blocking Internet content 
‘without prior due process’. Indeed, the Communication seems to stress ex post facto 
modalities of redress at the expense of ‘prior due process’. In this respect, it states that 
platforms should be able to take ‘swift decisions’ to take action with respect to illegal 
content ‘without being required to do so on the basis of a court order or administrative 
decision’. This is the case in particular when such content has been flagged by a 
law enforcement authority. Law enforcement authorities may be so-called ‘trusted 
flaggers’, together with other ‘specialized entities with specific expertise in identifying 
illegal content’. In some cases, platforms ‘may remove content upon notification from 
the trusted flagger without further verifying the legality of the content themselves’.
One entity identified as a trusted flagger in the context of assessing terrorist and 
violent extremist content is the Internet Referral Unit (IRU) of Europol. The IRU 
flags content that contravenes the EU legal framework related to terrorism and also 
content that goes against the terms of service set by platforms.66 However, terms of 
service instituted by platforms commonly impose restrictions that go beyond what 
could lawfully be imposed in compliance with freedom of expression standards.67 
This approach creates the risk that content will be blocked, filtered or removed beyond 
what would be permissible under international human rights law. It may also result in 
undermining regular safeguards that protect against excessive interference, including 
the right to an effective remedy, as the end decision is ultimately delegated to private 
entities.68
Relevant developments have to be noted at Member State level as well. Germany has 
recently adopted the controversial69 Network Enforcement Act,70 imposing onerous 
obligations on social media platforms with more than two million registered users. 
Platforms falling within the ambit of the law face fines of up to €50 million if they 
65 Council of the European Union, EU Human Rights Guidelines on Freedom of Expression Online and 
Offline (Foreign Affairs Council meeting, Brussels, 12 May 2014) http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/
cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/142549.pdf, accessed 12 March 2018. 
66 See European Parliament, ‘Question for written answer to the Commission’ (16 March 2017) http://www.
europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=WQ&reference=E-2017-001772&language=FR, accessed 12 
March 2018; Answer given by Mr Avramopoulos on behalf of the Commission (12 June 2017) http://www.
europarl.europa.eu/sides/getAllAnswers.do?reference=E-2017-001772&language=EN, accessed 12 March 
2018. See also, Graham Smith, note 64.
67 See e.g. Elizabeth Nolan Brown, ‘YouTube says no to sexual humor, profanity, partial nudity, political 
conflict, and “sensitive subjects” in partner content’ (Reason, 1 September 2016) http://reason.com/
blog/2016/09/01/youtube-bans-sex-drugs-and-politics , accessed 12 March 2018. As privately-run outlets, 
social media platforms can of course decide to shape the content hosted by them in order to facilitate the 
creation of a space that fits their business model, by enabling a more family-friendly or minor-friendly 
environment, for example.
68 See European Digital Rights (EDRi). (2011, January). The Slide from ‘Self-Regulation’ to ‘Corporate 
Censorship’. Retrieved from https://edri.org/files/EDRI_selfreg_final_20110124.pdf. 
69 ‘Wirtschaft und Aktivisten verbünden sich gegen Maas-Gesetz’ (Der Spiegel, 11 April 2017) http://
www.spiegel.de/netzwelt/netzpolitik/heiko-maas-wirtschaft-und-netzszene-protestieren-gegen-hassrede-
gesetz-a-1142861.html, accessed 15 January 2018. 
70 Gesetz zur Verbesserung der Rechtsdurchsetzung in sozialen Netzwerken.
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fail to remove or block access to ‘clearly illegal’ content within 24 hours71 and other 
illegal content within 7 days72 after having been put on notice through a complaint. 
The law includes no guidance on how to distinguish ‘clearly illegal’ entries from 
merely ‘illegal’ ones. Such lack of clear guidance, when paired with a threat of hefty 
fines, becomes a definite incentive to over-censor in case of doubt.
Implementation of the Act started on the 1st of January 2018 and related incidents 
have already drawn attention to the limits of algorithmic moderation73 as well as the 
discrepancies in the approach to moderating content demonstrated by different social 
media platforms.74 In addition to cases of lawful content being removed by overeager 
platforms, some argue that it also results in obstructing prosecution of related crimes, 
as deletion of online content frequently results in deletion or improper retention of 
evidence needed to plead the case in court.75 The Act will inevitably influence how 
major social media sites approach users’ freedom of expression, with its impact in 
all probability extending beyond Germany’s borders due to the cross-border nature 
of information flows and also the likelihood of it influencing similar legal and policy 
initiatives in other jurisdictions.
Changes in laws and policies aimed at more effectively tackling terrorist and extremist 
content and hate speech have also been contemplated in other jurisdictions. In this 
respect, the UK House of Commons Home Affairs Committee has recommended 
that Internet intermediaries proactively identify illegal content and expressed 
dissatisfaction with such platforms for only reviewing content after it has been 
flagged by users or other stakeholders and for not ensuring that blocked and removed 
content does not resurface.76 Similarly, the French-British Action Plan on the Use 
of the Internet for Terrorism Purposes77 (also known as the Macron-May Plan) calls 
on platforms to proactively identify terrorist content and prevent it from being made 
available by automating the detection and suspension or removal of content, based 
on both the posting person or entity and the actual content of the post. This measure 
71 Unless the social media network agrees a different timeline with the competent law enforcement authority. 
Netzwerksdurchsetzungsgesetz, Article 1 §3 (2) No. 2.
72 Unless the unlawful character of the content in question depends on factual circumstances to be determined 
or unless the social media network transmits the case to an authorized self-regulatory mechanism 
(Einrichtung der regulierten Selbstregulierung). Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz, Article 1 §3 (2) No. 3.
73 See note 31. 
74 Ibid.
75 Bernhard Rohleder, ‘Germany set out to delete hate speech online. Instead, it made things worse.’ (The 
Washington Post, 20 February 2018) https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theworldpost/wp/2018/02/20/
netzdg/?utm_term=.331d14c7fb0a, accessed 12 March 2018. 
76 House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, note 52. See also, Elliot Harmin, ‘“Notice-and-stay-down” 
is really “filter-everything”’ (Electronic Frontier Foundation, 21 January 2016) https://www.eff.org/
deeplinks/2016/01/notice-and-stay-down-really-filter-everything, accessed 15 January 2018. 
77 French-British Action Plan on the Use of the Internet for Terrorism Purposes (Paris, 13 June 2017) https://
www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/619333/french_british_action_
plan_paris_13_june_2017.pdf, accessed 15 January 2018. 
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drew criticism for advocating both far-reaching monitoring and prior restraint.78 
The Plan also recommends measures that go beyond the existing ‘notice and take-
down’ process, which has also been reinforced through the establishment of Europol’s 
Internet Referral Unit and the UK’s own domestic referral unit, raising the possibility 
of a ‘notice and stay-down’ obligation.
4. conclusIon
The Internet has frequently been described as a neutral tool that can be instrumentalised 
in various ways.79 It is fundamental in facilitating the public’s ability to seek, receive, 
and impart information and may provide a platform for persons and groups that are 
less included in debates of public interest, such as women and individuals belonging 
to minority groups, but it also enables terrorist groups and other criminal actors to 
convey their messages and use it as a recruitment and operational planning tool.
As online content continues to be generated at a staggering rate, attempts to control its 
flow encounter significant challenges and, due to the particularities of the digital space, 
tech companies running these online platforms are better positioned to regulate their 
functioning, while State powers in this respect may be more limited. There are clear 
expectations on the part of States that online platforms take more responsibility when 
it comes to illegal third-party content. Many governments view the use of automated 
decision-making tools as an essential component of handling content. The choice is 
understandable, having in mind the volume of the material that is being produced, the 
pace of such production and the need to take swift action. However, the limitations of 
existing technology are significant. If algorithms are used for regulating content, they 
become the rule, the rule-maker in the case of machine learning algorithms, and the 
tool for enforcement. The rules behind the algorithms become the de facto standards 
for the platform and beyond.
The duty of States to protect the human rights of those within their jurisdiction, 
including from undue interference by third parties such as businesses, is well-
established. Outsourcing such tasks – whether formally or informally, through 
actively encouraging corporate governance or through omission or acquiescence – 
without establishing adequate safeguards and oversight systems, fails to comply with 
that duty.80 The rise of automated processes without a corresponding strengthening 
of users’ rights is likely to lead to undermined protection, and while ensuring ex post 
78 See, for example, Monica Horten, ‘Macron-May Internet deal: Necessary measures or prior restraint?’ 
(Iptegrity.com, 28 July 2017) http://www.iptegrity.com/index.php/internet-freedoms/1068-macron-may-
internet-deal-necessary-measures-or-prior-restraint, accessed 15 January 2018.
79 Anja Mihr, Cyber Justice: Human Rights and Good Governance for the Internet (Springer, 2017), 47.
80 See, for example, Emily B. Laidlaw, Regulating Speech in Cyberspace (Cambridge University Press, 
2015) Chapter 6.
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facto safeguards and modalities for redress is important, it is not sufficient, particularly 
as existing studies indicate that these tools go underused.81
There are, of course, legitimate and practical justifications for stressing the role and 
responsibility of social media companies in the context of countering terrorism and 
violent extremism. Due to the control and influence they exercise over content on their 
platforms, meaningful action could not be taken without their cooperation. Having 
private actors such as social media companies increasingly undertake traditionally 
public tasks in the context of Internet governance is probably unavoidable, especially 
as public authorities (including the judiciary) in most States do not have the human or 
technical resources to satisfactorily perform these tasks.
While it is inevitable for relevant private actors to play an increasingly significant 
role, including the taking up of quasi-executive and quasi-adjudicative tasks, this 
should not be done without proper guidance and safeguards. At this point, however, 
the outsourcing results in lowering or removing existing human rights safeguards and 
protections. Social media companies are stuck with tasks that they are not particularly 
well-equipped to carry out. For example, it is questionable whether private actors are 
well-placed to assess whether a particular measure is necessary and proportionate in 
the interest of national security or public order.
Social media platforms should be given clear and detailed instructions and guidance 
if they are to carry out such assessments. If control over elements of the right to 
freedom of expression are outsourced to these outlets, independent oversight of their 
conduct in this respect needs to be ensured, to guarantee transparency, accountability 
and respect for the right to remedy of individuals whose rights are unjustly interfered 
with in the process. The necessity for safeguards is not simply due to intermediaries 
lacking the relevant legal expertise, but a basic matter of legal principle requiring that 
measures impacting human rights be subjected to independent oversight by public, 
preferably judicial, authorities rather than left up to private bodies.
The challenges that arise in this domain call for ways to bridge public and private 
dimensions involved in promoting and protecting human rights. This in turn 
would require ensuring complementarity and synergy between various systems of 
regulation.82
81 See note 44, Appendix B. 
82 See note 80, 233-234.
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From Grey Zone to 
Customary International 
Law: How Adopting the 
Precautionary Principle 
May Help Crystallize the 
Due Diligence Principle in 
Cyberspace
Abstract: The international principle of “due diligence” is well recognized under 
international law, and is an outgrowth of the general obligation of States to “do no 
harm”. The due diligence principle imposes an obligation on States to take affirmative 
action to ensure their territory or objects over which they maintain sovereign control 
are not used for internationally wrongful purposes. The due diligence principle has 
been recognized by international scholars and jurists since the early 20th century, and 
has been adopted as a principle of customary international law in the international 
environmental law context by States and courts, including the International Court 
of Justice. The International Court of Justice has specifically endorsed a procedural 
aspect of due diligence – that States must conduct environmental impact assessments, 
where appropriate, as a precautionary measure to ensure their territory is not used for 
internationally wrongful purposes. In 2013 and 2017, the Tallinn Manual and Tallinn 
Manual 2.0 confirmed the due diligence principle applies in cyberspace. However, 
in both manuals, the experts could not agree on the scope of its application. And, in 
2017, the Tallinn Manual 2.0 experts agreed that the due diligence obligation does not 
include a preventive feature, as is reflected in international environmental law. This 
paper examines this grey area of international law, and whether and to what extent the 
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1. IntroductIon
The principle of State sovereignty is considered “the most fundamental” principle 
of all international law,1 and has been defined as the “supreme authority of every 
[S]tate within its territory”2 to exert “independence” over the “functions of a State” 
to the “exclusion of any other State”.3 This principle, however, is not without limit. 
A number of “principles and rules of conventional and customary international law 
derive from the general principle of sovereignty”,4 including the “corollary”5 principle 
of non-intervention, which is codified at Article 2 of the United Nations (UN) Charter 
and restricts States from unlawfully interfering against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of another State.6 The principle of non-intervention therefore 
restricts States in their exercise of sovereignty from using their territory or objects 
over which they maintain sovereign control for purposes “detrimental to the rights of 
other States.”7 This specific obligation is often referred to as the duty to not commit 
transboundary harm,8 and is well reflected in the writings of Oppenheim as early as 
1912,9 the 1928 Island of Palmas award,10 and in the International Court of Justice’s 
(ICJ or Court) 1949 Corfu Channel judgment.11 
1 Michael Schmitt, Grey Zones in the International Law of Cyberspace, 42 Yale J. of Int’l L. Online 1, 4 
(2017).
2 Lassa Oppenheim, Oppenheim’s International Law, at 564 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th edn, 
1992).
3 Island of Palmas (Neth. v. U.S.), 2 RIAA 829, 838 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928) (hereinafter, “Island of Palmas”).
4 Int’l Group of Experts, Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations 11 
(Rule 1) (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2017) (hereinafter, “Tallinn Manual 2.0”). 
5 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. V. U.S.), 198 I.C.J. 14, 106 (June 27) 
(hereinafter, “Nicaragua”).
6 Ibid.; U.N. Charter Art. 2(4).
7 Schmitt, note 1, at 11. 
8 Stephen Fietta et al., The South China Sea Award: A Milestone for International Environmental Law, The 
Duty of Due Diligence and The Litigation of Maritime Environmental Disputes? 29 Geo. Envtl. L. Rev. 
711, 723 (2017).
9 Lassa Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise, 243-44 (2nd edn, 1912). 
10 Island of Palmas, note 3, at 829-90.
11 Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 22 (Apr. 9) (hereinafter, “Corfu Channel”).
precautionary principle, as adopted in the international environmental law context, 
could be applied in cyberspace. After an examination of the precautionary principle as 
applied, this paper argues its application in cyberspace would help crystallize the due 
diligence principle from a grey zone in international law into customary international 
law of cyberspace by introducing a procedural due diligence requirement for States to 
conduct a cyber impact assessment where appropriate.
Keywords: due diligence, cyber due diligence
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To carry out this prohibition against transboundary harm, and by extension the 
principle of non-intervention, States have agreed to carry out their activities with 
“due diligence.” The due diligence obligation imposes an independent duty on States 
to take affirmative action to stop or prevent their territory, or the items or persons 
within their jurisdictional control, from knowingly being used to cause internationally 
wrongful acts.12 This principle is well established “in the rules, and interpretation 
thereof, of numerous specialised regimes of international law[,]”13  most notably 
in international environmental law. In 2010, the ICJ affirmed the principle of due 
diligence as reflective of customary international law in its Case Concerning Pulp 
Mills on the River Uruguay between Argentina and Uruguay (Pulp Mills) judgment14 
wherein the Court endorsed a preventive interpretation of the principle as “a customary 
rule”15 and made clear that a State is “obliged to use all the means at its disposal in 
order to avoid activities which take place in its territory, or in any area under its 
jurisdiction, causing significant damage to the environment of another State”.16 
The ICJ specifically recognized States have a procedural due diligence obligation 
to conduct an environmental impact assessment (EIA) “before embarking on an 
activity having the potential adversely to affect the environment of another State[.]”17 
This principle, generally known as the precautionary principle in international 
environmental law, requires States to take preventive measures even in the absence of 
scientific certainty. The principle was further endorsed by the ICJ in its 2015 judgment 
in the case concerning the Construction of a Road in Costa Rica Along the San Juan 
River between Nicaragua and Costa Rica (Costa Rica).18  
Whether and to what extent the due diligence principle, and the precautionary principle, 
apply in cyberspace has been the subject of extensive debate over the past five years.19 
In 2009, the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (NATO CCD 
COE) commissioned an independent group of experts (IGE) to examine whether and 
to what extent general principles of international law apply in cyberspace.20 The IGE 
produced two manuals in response - the 2013 Tallinn Manual on the International Law 
Applicable to Cyber Warfare (“Tallinn Manual 1.0”) and the 2017 Tallinn Manual 
2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations (“Tallinn Manual 
2.0”).21 In both, the IGE endorsed the application of the due diligence principle in 
12 Ibid. 
13 Tallinn Manual 2.0, note 1, at 30, Rule 6, ¶1.
14 Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), 2010 I.C.J. 14, 55-56 (Apr. 20, 2010) 
(hereinafter, “Pulp Mills”); Corfu Channel, note 11, at 22.
15 Pulp Mills, note 14, at 55.
16 Id. at 55-56.
17 Id. at 83.
18 Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua) and 
Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River (Nicaragua v. Costa Rica), 2015 I.C.J. 
665, 706-707 (Dec. 16, 2015) .
19 Schmitt, note 1, at 11; Tallinn Manual 2.0, note 4, at 30 (Rule 6).
20 Tallinn Manual 2.0, note 4, at 1.
21 Int’l Group of Experts, Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare (Michael N. 
Schmitt ed., 2013) (hereinafter, “Tallinn Manual 1.0”); Tallinn Manual 2.0, note 4.
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22 Tallinn Manual 1.0, note 22, at 26.
23 Id. at 28.
24 Schmitt, note 1, at 11; Tallinn Manual 2.0, note 4, at 30 (Rule 6).
25 Schmitt, note 1, at 11.
26 Ibid.
27 Id. at 13; Tallinn Manual 2.0, note 4, at 41-42 (Rule 6) cmt. 42; id. at 44-45 (Rule 7) cmts. 7-10.
28 Schmitt, note 1, at 11; Tallinn Manual 2.0, note 4, at 31 (Rule 6) cmt. 3.
29 Schmitt, note 1, at 11.
30 Rep. of the Grp. of Governmental Experts on Devs. In the Field of Info. & Telecomm. In the Context of 
Int’l Sec., U.N. Doc. A/68/98, ¶ 23 (June 24, 2013) (hereinafter, “2013 GGE Report”); Rep. of the Grp. of 
Governmental Experts on Devs. In the Field of Info. & Telecomm. In the Context of Int’l Sec., U.N. Doc. 
A/70/174, ¶¶ 13(c), 28(e) (July 22, 2015) (hereinafter, “2015 GGE Report”).
cyberspace,22 but could not agree on its scope.23 In the 2017 Tallinn Manual 2.0, for 
example, the IGE agreed the due diligence principle applies in cyberspace,24 but was 
“divided as to the interpretation of the due diligence obligation”.25 Specifically, the 
IGE agreed the principle generally applies when cyber operations “having serious 
adverse consequences vis-à-vis a legal right of a State are mounted from another State’s 
territory”,26 but could not agree that there was a preventive or precautionary element 
tied to this obligation.27 The IGE also noted that because “not every State involved 
in pre-publication consultations readily accepted the application of due diligence to 
cyberspace as a matter of customary law”, there was a view, not shared by the IGE, 
“by which the premise of applicability is lex ferenda (what the law should be), rather 
than lex lata (current law)”.28 This view, according to the IGE, appears to be based 
in part on the 2013 and 2015 reports of the United Nations Groups of Governmental 
Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the 
Context of Informational Security (GGE),29 which only agreed that  States “should,” 
rather than must, take actions necessary to put an end to cyber operations emanating 
from their territory which are harmful to other States.30
This paper examines this grey area of international law, and whether a preventive or 
precautionary principle should, as the lex ferenda, apply in cyberspace. This paper 
specifically explores whether applying a procedural due diligence requirement in 
cyberspace, similar to the procedural due diligence obligation in environmental law, 
would help crystallize the due diligence obligation in cyberspace and close the gap 
recognized by the Tallinn Manual 2.0. In so doing, this paper argues that States should 
agree to conduct a cyber impact assessment as a procedural due diligence requirement 
that each would undertake before embarking on an activity having the potential 
adversely to affect the cyber infrastructure or interests of another State. This principle, 
of course, is not the lex lata. States have not agreed to this approach in cyberspace. 
But because there are analogies to be drawn between significant and irreparable 
environmental harm and the harm that a serious and adverse cyber operation could 
impose on States, this paper argues the lex ferenda should properly consider the 
application of a precautionary approach in cyberspace to further ensure States have 
clear rules concerning due diligence in their cyber operations vis-à-vis one another. 
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This paper is divided into four parts. Part I examines the history of the due diligence 
principle as it has developed under international law. Part II examines the development 
of the precautionary approach in international environmental law. Part III examines 
the application of the due diligence principle in cyberspace, as reflected in the Tallinn 
Manual 1.0, Tallinn Manual 2.0, and the 2013 and 2015 GGE Reports. And Part IV 
explores how, if adopted, a precautionary approach may help further crystallize due 
diligence in cyberspace by imposing a procedural due diligence obligation on States. 
2. Part I - deVeloPment of due dIlIgence 
under InternatIonal law
The obligation of “due diligence” is well recognized in international law, and dates 
back to the writings of Grotius and Vattel.31 The principle has been applied in various 
specialized regimes of international law, including international human rights, 
humanitarian, trade, and environmental law.32 The ICJ expressly endorsed the due 
diligence principle in its 1949 Corfu Channel judgment, stating there are “certain 
general and well-recognized principles” of international law, including “every State’s 
obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights 
of other States”.33 The ICJ further endorsed the principle in the case concerning the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. 
In addition to these general developments, the principle of due diligence has received 
considerable attention in the international environmental context. It was first endorsed 
in the 1938 Trail Smelter Arbitral Award, which determined that Canada was required 
to take protective measures to reduce the air pollution in the Columbia River Valley 
caused by sulphur dioxide emitted by zinc and lead smelter plants in Canada, only 
seven miles from the Canadian-US border:34 
Under the principles of international law, no State has the right to 
use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to cause 
injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or the properties or 
persons therein, when the case is of serious consequence and the 
injury is established by clear and convincing evidence.35
The ICJ further endorsed this principle in 2010 and 2015, and introduced the 
preventive principle within the due diligence obligation in the Pulp Mills and Costa 
31 Stephen Fietta, et al., The South China sea Award: A Milestone for International Environmental Law, The 
Duty of Due Diligence and The Litigation of Maritime Environmental Disputes? 29 Geo. Envtl. L. Rev. 
711, 723 (2017).
32 Fietta, note 32, at 723 (citing Friendly Relations Declaration, multiple Security Council resolutions, the 
four Geneva Conventions of 1949, and multiple arbitral decisions).
33 Corfu Channel, note 11, at 22.
34 Trail Smelter (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905, 1965 (1938).
35 Ibid.
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Rica judgments. In its 2010 Pulp Mills judgment, the ICJ affirmed the principle of due 
diligence as reflective of customary international law, and relied on its articulation 
of the principle in its 1949 Corfu Channel judgment.36 From this general principle, 
the ICJ additionally recognized that within the due diligence principle there exists 
a principle of prevention which is also “a customary rule”,37 and obliges States to 
“use all the means at [their] disposal in order to avoid activities which take place 
in its territory, or in any area under its jurisdiction, causing significant damage to 
the environment of another State”.38 The ICJ made clear in its judgment that it may 
now be considered a requirement under general international law to undertake an 
environmental impact assessment where there is a risk that the proposed industrial 
activity may have a significant adverse impact in a transboundary context, in particular, 
on a shared resource.39
Although the Court’s judgment in Pulp Mills referred only to industrial activities, the 
Court further expanded on the principle in its 2015 Costa Rica judgment and affirmed 
the principle of due diligence and that the requirement of an EIA “applies generally to 
proposed activities which may have a significant adverse impact in a transboundary 
context”.40 The Court stated that in order to “exercise due diligence in preventing 
significant transboundary environmental harm, a State must, before embarking on 
an activity having the potential adversely to affect the environment of another State, 
ascertain if there is a risk of significant transboundary harm, which would trigger the 
requirement to carry out an environmental impact assessment.41 This principle, the 
preventive principle, is also known as the precautionary principle.  
3. Part II - deVeloPment 
of PrecautIonary PrIncIPle
A. 1971 - 1991
Most commentators agree that the “precautionary” principle traces back to 1971 and 
the concept of Vorsorgeprinzip (foresight) under German environmental law.42 This 
principle was asserted by Germany ten years later during international conferences 
held to discuss the protection of the North Sea,43 and was adopted in 1987 as part 
of the Ministerial Declaration Calling for Reduction of Pollution, which stated in 
relevant part: 
36 Pulp Mills, note 14, at 55-56; Corfu Channel, note 11, at 22.
37 Pulp Mills, note 14, at 55.
38 Id. at 55-56.
39 Id. at 83.
40 Costa Rica, note 18, at 706. 
41 Id. at 706-707.
42 Ling Chen, Realizing the Precautionary Principle in Due Diligence, 25 Dal. J. Leg. Stud. 1, 4 (2016); Mary 
Stevens, The Precautionary Principle in the International Arena, 2 Sus. Dev. Law & Pol. 13, 13 (2002).
43 Stevens, note 42, at 13.
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[in] order to protect the North Sea from possibly damaging effects 
of the most dangerous substances, a precautionary approach 
is necessary which may require action to control inputs of such 
substances even before a causal link has been established by 
absolute clear scientific evidence.44 
The principle was also referenced in the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that 
Deplete the Ozone Layer, which provides that States must “protect the ozone layer by 
taking precautionary measures to control equitably total global emissions that deplete 
it”.45 
By 1990, the principle had received widespread adherence. It was applied at the 
third conference on the protection of the North Sea46 and was also included in Great 
Britain’s 1990 White Paper on Britain’s Environmental strategy, which provided:
We must analyze the possible benefits and costs both of action 
and of inaction. Where there are significant risks of damage to the 
environment, the Government will be prepared to take precautionary 
action to limit the use of potentially dangerous pollutants, even 
where scientific knowledge is not conclusive, if the balance of the 
likely costs and benefits justifies it. This precautionary principle 
applies particularly where there are good grounds for judging 
either that action taken promptly at comparatively low cost may 
avoid more costly damage later, or that irreversible effects may 
follow if action is delayed.47
Europe further endorsed the principle in 1991 in a meeting between parties to the 
1927 London Dumping Convention,48 and in the Bamako Convention of 1991 which 
requires States party to prevent the “release into the environment of substances which 
may cause harm to humans or the environment without waiting for scientific proof 
regarding such harm”.49
B. 1992 To The Present
The precautionary principle gained momentum in 1992, and was endorsed in 
multiple international instruments, including Article 2 of the 1992 Convention for the 
44 Chen, note 42, at 5.
45 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 16 September 1987, 1522 UNTS 3 
(entered into force 1 January 1989).
46 Final Declaration of the Third International Conference on Protection of the North Sea, Mar. 7-8, 1990. 1 
YB Int’l Envtl Law 658, 662-73 (1990). 
47 This Common Inheritance: Britain’s Environmental Strategy, Sept. 1990 at § 1.18.
48 London Dumping Convention Amendments (1991).
49 Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import into Africa and the Control of Transboundary Movement and 
the Management of Hazardous Wastes Within Africa, Jan. 30, 1992, OAU/CONF/COOR/ENV/MIN/AFRI/
CONV.1(1) Rev. 1, reprinted in 30 L.L.M. 773.
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Protection of the Marine Environment of the Northeast Atlantic and Article 15 of the 
landmark Rio Declaration, which was signed at the UN Conference on Environment 
and Development and provides that: 
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach 
shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities. 
Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of 
full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing 
cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.50
The 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change also endorsed the 
precautionary principle:
The parties should take precautionary measures to anticipate, 
prevent, or minimize the causes of climate change and mitigate its 
adverse effects. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible 
damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a 
reason for postponing such measure, taking into account that 
policies and measure to deal with climate change should be cost-
effective so as to ensure global benefits at the lowest possible 
cost.51
Article 6 of the 1995 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of 
the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea relating to the Conservation and 
Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks further 
endorsed the application of the precautionary approach,52 and provided that States 
party are required to use the precautionary approach to conserve, manage, and exploit 
the stocks of straddling fish and highly migratory fish and “shall be more cautious 
when information is uncertain, unreliable or inadequate”.53 Under this principle, 
States cannot delay or refuse to take conservation and management measures because 
of inadequate scientific information.54 States are also required to implement the 
precautionary principle when developing scientific information and technology to 
mitigate uncertainties relating to the size of fish stocks, and collect data to assess the 
impact of certain fishing activities.55
50 Rio Declaration at art. 15.
51 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, art. 3, para. 3, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.151/26.
52 UNGA, Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, 6th Sess, Agreement 
for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 
December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly 
Migratory Fish Stocks, UN Doc A/CONF.164/37, September 1995.
53 Id. at Art. 6.1, 6.2.
54 Ibid.
55 Id. at art. 6.3.
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The 2000 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity 
also applies the precautionary principle to the control of transboundary movements 
of genetically modified organisms,56 wherein the principle is reflected in paragraph 
4 of its preamble57 and Articles 1, 10(6) and 11(8).58 Articles 10(6) and 11(8), both 
of which track precautionary language, include language such as “lack of scientific 
certainty”, “insufficient relevant scientific information and knowledge”, and the 
minimization of “potential adverse effects”.59
As noted above, the ICJ embraced the precautionary principle in the 2010 Pulp Mills 
judgment, and made clear that the due diligence principle carries with it a procedural 
element – the undertaking of an EIA in appropriate circumstances to determine if 
there is a risk of significant transboundary harm, which would trigger the requirement 
to carry out an environmental impact assessment.60 The Court further articulated that 
the content of the EIA is to be made in “light of the specific circumstances of each 
case”:61
it is for each State to determine in its domestic legislation or in 
the authorization process for the project, the specific content of 
the environmental impact assessment required in each case, having 
regard to the nature and magnitude of the proposed development 
and its likely adverse impact on the environment as well as to the 
need to exercise due diligence in conducting such an assessment.62
The Court further elaborated on this procedural due diligence obligation in the Costa 
Rica judgment, noting that if the:
environmental impact assessment confirms that there is a risk of 
significant transboundary harm, the State planning to undertake 
the activity is required, in conformity with its due diligence 
obligation, to notify and consult in good faith with the potentially 
affected State, where that is necessary to determine the appropriate 
measures to prevent or mitigate that risk.63
56 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, 29 January 2000, 2226 UNTS 
208 (entered into force 11 September 2003).
57 Id. at preamble, para. 4.
58 Id. at arts 1, 10(6), 11(8).
59 Id. at art 10(6), 11(8).
60 Costa Rica, note 18, at 706-07.
61 Id. at 707.
62 Pulp Mills, note 11, at 83.
63 Costa Rica, note 18, at 707.
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4. Part III - due dIlIgence In cybersPace
Whether and how the principle of due diligence and its precautionary approach apply 
in cyberspace has been examined closely by scholars and jurists over the past five 
years. Although there are myriad opinions on the application of due diligence in 
cyberspace, this paper focuses solely on those opinions set out in the Tallinn Manual 
1.0, Tallinn Manual 2.0, and the 2013 and 2015 GGE Reports. 
A. Tallinn Manual 1.0
The Tallinn Manual 1.0 endorses the principle of due diligence in cyberspace by 
reaffirming the principle that a State may not “allow knowingly its territory to be 
used for acts contrary to the rights of other States”.64 The IGE concluded that States, 
in their cyber operations, are to “take appropriate steps to protect those rights”.65 
The scope of that obligation, however, was the subject of extensive debate and 
disagreement. Indeed, due diligence was only dealt with in a single rule accompanied 
by a brief commentary. And the IGE could not achieve consensus on the parameters of 
the obligation. The IGE noted that the implementation of the due diligence principle 
in cyberspace is complicated by the nature of harmful cyber acts, “especially time and 
space compression, and their often-unprecedented character.”66
The IGE therefore adopted a knowledge standard when applying the due diligence 
principle in cyberspace, noting that the principle of due diligence applies only if the 
territorial State has “actual knowledge” of the cyber operation and/or the threat in 
question.67 The IGE could not “achieve consensus” as to whether the principle of due 
diligence applies if “the respective State has only constructive (‘should have known’) 
knowledge”.68 In other words, the IGE agreed it was:
unclear whether a State violates [the principle of due diligence] if it 
fails to use due care in policing cyber activities on its territory and 
is therefore unaware of the acts in question. Even if constructive 
knowledge suffices, the threshold of due care is uncertain in 
the cyber context because of such factors as the difficulty of 
attribution, the challenges of correlating separate sets of events as 
part of a coordinated and distributed attack on one or more targets, 
and the ease with which deception can be mounted through cyber 
infrastructure.69 
64 Tallinn Manual 1.0, note 22, at 26.
65 Ibid.
66 Id. at 27.




The IGE also could not agree on whether a State must take preventive measures to 
ensure the cyber hygiene of the infrastructure on its territory or whether “States should 
be required to monitor for malicious activity that might be directed at other States”.70 
B. Tallinn Manual 2.0
The Tallinn Manual 2.0 further confirmed that the due diligence principle applies to 
cyber operations originating from a State’s territory,71 making clear that the principle 
of due diligence was reflected in international law and applied in cyberspace as the lex 
lata.72 Notwithstanding, the IGE rejected the notion that due diligence in cyberspace 
involves an “obligation of prevention”, stating that the group of experts was in 
agreement that the “due diligence principle does not encompass an obligation to take 
material preventive steps to ensure that the State’s territory is not used in violation [of 
the law]”.73 In reaching this decision, the IGE stated it “carefully considered whether 
the due diligence principle imposes a requirement to take preventive measures, 
such as hardening one’s cyber infrastructure, to reduce general, as distinct from 
particularised, risks of future cyber operations falling within the purview of the [due 
diligence principle].74 
Ultimately, the IGE “rejected the premise of a requirement to take purely preventive 
measures of a general nature”75 based on the difficulty in mounting comprehensive 
and effective defences against all possible cyber threats.76 Such a requirement, 
according to the IGE, would “impose an undue burden on States, one for which there 
is no current basis in either the extant law or current State practice.”77 The IGE further 
noted that “States have not indicated that they believe such a legal obligation exists 
with respect to cyber operations, either by taking preventive measures on this basis or 
by condemning the failure of other States to adopt such measures”.78
The IGE also noted that because knowledge is a requirement under the principle of 
due diligence, it would be “contradictory to expand” the principle of due diligence 
to “hypothetical future cyber operations”79 because a State cannot know of a “cyber 
operation that has yet to be decided upon by the actor”.80 Thus, having rejected the 
duty of prevention, the IGE concurred that a State is “not required to monitor cyber 
activities on its territory”.81
70 Michael N. Schmitt, In Defense of Due Diligence in Cyberspace, The Yale Law Journal Forum at 71 (June 
22, 2015).
71 Tallinn Manual 2.0, note 4, at 30 (Rule 6).
72 Id. at 31 (Rule 6). The IGE also acknowledge a view, which no member held, that the due diligence 
principle is not reflective of custom based on the non-mandatory language found in the 2013 and 2015 
GGE Reports.
73 Id. at 32 (Rule 7).
74 Id. at 44.
75 Ibid. 
76 Id. at 45.
77 Ibid.
78 Ibid.




The IGE, did, however, acknowledge the precautionary approach in international 
law. It “acknowledged the contrary view, which none of them held, that the due 
diligence obligation extends to situations in which the relevant harmful acts are 
merely possible”.82 “By it, States must take reasonable measures to prevent them 
from emanating from their territory.”83 The IGE notes that this view is based on the 
existence of an obligation to “take preventive measures in the context of transboundary 
environmental harm”.84 According to this position, a “State must take feasible 
preventive measures that are proportionate to the risk of potential harm. They have 
to take account of technological and scientific developments, as well as the unique 
circumstances of each case”.85
The IGE rejected this principle, practically, because “if such an approach were to be 
adopted, it would be unclear when the obligation would be breached”:
One possibility is that a breach takes place when a target State 
is placed at the risk of harm by virtue of the territorial State not 
having taken appropriate measures to prevent harmful cyber 
operations being mounted from or through its territory. Another 
is that although the due diligence principle requires States to take 
appropriate preventive measures, they cannot be held responsible 
for having failed to do so unless and until the target State actually 
suffers the requisite harm.86
The IGE concluded that the “precise threshold of harm at which the due diligence 
principle applies is unsettled in international law”.87 
C. The 2013 and 2015 GGE Reports
In 2013, the UN GGE issued a report on the application of “norms derived from 
existing international law relevant to State behavior in cyberspace”.88 Concerning the 
due diligence principle, the GGE concluded that States must “meet their international 
obligations regarding internationally wrongful acts attributable to them”, and “should 
seek to ensure that their territories are not used by non-State actors for unlawful use” 
of their cyber infrastructure.89 In 2015, the GGE reaffirmed this principle, and stated 
that “States should not knowingly allow their territory to be used for internationally 
wrongful acts” using their cyber infrastructure.90 The use of the word “should” instead 
of “shall” or “must” has raised questions as to whether States truly understand that 
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid.
84 Id. at 45-46.
85 Id. at 46.
86 Ibid. 
87 Tallinn Manual 2.0, note 4, at 36.
88 2013 GGE Report, note 31, at 2.
89 Id. at 8, ¶23.
90 2015 GGE Report, note 31, at 8, ¶13(c)
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the due diligence principle is reflective of customary international law. “[As] due 
diligence is purportedly a primary rule of international law, a State’s violation of 
which constitutes an internationally wrongful act, such hesitancy to accord the rule 
lex lata status produces a grey zone of international law.”91 
5. adoPtIng the PrecautIonary 
aPProach In cyber
Whether the due diligence obligation reflects the lex lata in cyberspace is not the 
focus of this paper. This paper instead questions the 2017 Tallinn Manual 2.0 IGE’s 
conclusion that a preventive feature of due diligence cannot apply in cyberspace. 
The 2017 IGE rejected the application of the precautionary approach in cyberspace 
because States cannot harden their cyber defenses against all possible cyber threats.92 
The IGE also rejected its application because knowledge is a requirement to trigger 
the due diligence principle, and it would be “contradictory to expand” the principle of 
due diligence to “hypothetical future cyber operations” because a State cannot know 
of a “cyber operation that has yet to be decided upon by the actor”.93  
These are legitimate concerns. However, they would be mitigated if States adopted a 
procedural due diligence obligation, similar to the standard articulated by the ICJ in 
the 2010 Pulp Mills and 2015 Costa Rica judgments. In particular, a procedural due 
diligence approach in cyberspace would not require States to harden their systems 
against any possible cyber threat. Nor would it require States to guard against any 
“hypothetical future cyber operations”. Instead, as the Court stated in Pulp Mills and 
Costa Rica, States would have a procedural due diligence obligation that would be 
triggered once the State embarks on any activity “having the potential adversely to 
affect the [rights and interests] of another State” to “ascertain if there is a risk of 
significant transboundary harm”.94 Specifically, in such circumstances, States would 
be required to conduct an “impact assessment” to determine if the State’s actions in 
cyberspace would have the potential to adversely affect the rights and interests of 
another State. 
This “impact assessment” could come in a variety of forms and would be circumscribed 
in “light of the specific circumstances of each case”.95 For example, as the Court noted 
in Pulp Mills, it would be for “each State to determine in its domestic legislation” the 
specific content of the impact assessment required in each case, having regard to “the 
nature and magnitude” of the proposed activity and its likely adverse impact on the 
91 Schmitt, note 1, at 11.
92 Id. at 45.
93 Ibid.
94 Costa Rica, note 18, at 706-07.
95 Id. at 707.
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rights and interests of other States, “as well as to the need to exercise due diligence 
in conducting such an assessment”.96 Further, as the Court stated in Costa Rica, if the 
impact assessment “confirms that there is a risk of significant transboundary harm, 
the State planning to undertake the activity is required, in conformity with its due 
diligence obligation, to notify and consult in good faith with the potentially affected 
State, where that is necessary to determine the appropriate measures to prevent or 
mitigate that risk”.97
Adopting the preventive / precautionary approach in cyberspace would therefore 
introduce a procedural due diligence obligation on States, and would impose two 
distinct obligations on States. First, if the State plans to engage in activity having 
the potential adversely to affect the rights and interests of another State, the State 
would undertake a cyber impact assessment to ascertain if there is a risk of significant 
transboundary harm resultant from that action. Second, if the impact assessment 
confirms there is a risk of significant transboundary harm, the State planning to 
undertake the activity is required, in conformity with its due diligence obligation, 
to notify and consult in good faith with the potentially affected State, where that is 
necessary to determine the appropriate measures to prevent or mitigate that risk.
Adopting this obligation is not impossible for States, as many already implement the 
due diligence principle in many of their cyber strategies and domestic plans. In its 2011 
International Strategy for Cyberspace, for example, the United States stated that “States 
should recognize and act on their responsibility to protect information infrastructures 
and secure national systems from damage or misuse”.98 Germany likewise adopted 
a due diligence approach in many of its national programs and strategies.99 Similar 
jurisdictions have due diligence principles built into their programmes, including new 
data protection regulations in the European Union. 
Adopting a procedural due diligence approach in cyberspace would also be consistent 
with international law. States are already bound to conduct their international relations 
with other States in “good faith,”100 which has been defined as a sustained upkeep of 
negotiations over a period appropriate to the circumstances and with an awareness of 
the interests of the other party.101 States could apply this principle when determining 
whether to enter into negotiations with other States regarding the results of their impact 
96 Pulp Mills, note 11, at 83.
97 Costa Rica, note 18, at 707.
98 International Strategy for Cyberspace: Prosperity, Security, and Openness in a Networked World, White 
House 10 (2011).
99 Annegret Bendiek, Due Diligence in Cyberspace: Guidelines for International and European Cyber Policy 
and Cybersecurity Policy, SWP Research Paper at 22 (2016).
100 Rogoff, The Obligation to Negotiate in International Law: Rules and Realities, 16 Mich, J. Int’l L. 141, 
153 (1994).
101 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
(Georgia v. Russian Federation), 2011 I.C.J. 157 (2011); Arbitration between Kuwait and the American 
Independent Oil Co., (AMINOIL) 21 ILM 1982, 1014; Lac Lanoux Arbitration (France v. Spain) (1957) 24 
I. L. R. 101, 23 November 16, 1957. 
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assessment, and whether certain systems should be hardened, or further information 
should be exchanged.
Adopting a procedural due diligence approach in cyberspace would also address the 
underlying concern addressed in international environmental law – the prevention 
of significant and non-reversible transboundary harm. Over the past ten years alone, 
from the 2007 attack in Estonia to the 2016 attack in the United States, the scope and 
impact of detrimental cyber operations has been manifest. The precautionary principle 
would require an impact assessment be conducted, even if technical certainty is not 
conclusive to prevent transboundary harm. In this context, applying the precautionary 
approach in cyberspace would not, as the IGE supposes in the Tallinn Manual 2.0, 
place an unreasonable burden on States, because the obligation would not require the 
State to harden systems per se but only to conduct a procedural review to determine 
if there is a threat of significant harm to another State. Thus, under the formulation set 
out by the ICJ in the Pulp Mills and Costa Rica cases, the precautionary approach in 
cyberspace could blend procedural and substantive elements. 
From a substantive perspective, it could be agreed between States that, as a general 
rule, States must take steps to mitigate any potential transboundary harm resultant 
from potential cyber operations using that territorial State’s cyber infrastructure, even 
if there is no conclusive evidence of attribution, technical identification, or operational 
certainty. To effectuate this substantive obligation, as in the environmental context, a 
procedural obligation would be required by States that would place a lesser burden 
on them. This requirement would not, as the 2017 IGE suggests, require a State to 
anticipate every hypothetical attack. It would instead allow the territorial State to 
understand the current state of its national cyber infrastructure, to measure that against 
known threats within and outside its jurisdiction, and to make a determination as to 
whether it should consult with other States based on a threat analysis commensurate 
with the experience and resources of the territorial State. As the ICJ noted in 
Costa Rica, the scope and substance of such an assessment would be subject to the 
circumstances of each State.
Of course, there are certain guideposts that could be established by treaty that would 
outline the scope of any such impact assessment. States could agree, for example, 
that when triggered a general framework for review should be used similar to that 
provided in the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s (NIST) Framework 
for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity.102 This uses a common language 
to address and manage cybersecurity risk for private business, focusing on a risk 
management framework. Many private-sector entities understand that the standard for 
private sector “due diligence” is compliance with the NIST Framework103 and several 
102 National Institute of Standards and Technology, Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure 
Cybersecurity (2014) (hereinafter, “NIST Framework”).
103 Why the NIST Cybersecurity Framework Isn’t Really Voluntary, Info. Sec. Blog (Feb. 25, 2014), http://
www.pivotpointsecurity.com/risky-business/nist-cybersecurity-framework.
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States are engaged in NIST collaborations, including the United Kingdom, Japan, 
Korea, Estonia, Israel, and Germany.104 In any event, this paper does not endorse any 
particular method of impact assessment, only that once triggered, States should agree 
that conducting an impact assessment is a procedural due diligence requirement.
By segregating procedural and substantive due process, the concern raised by the 
IGE in Tallinn Manual 2.0 that the due diligence principle is difficult to effectuate 
in cyber space because of the “difficulty of mounting comprehensive and effective 
defences against all possible cyber threats”105 would be mitigated. States would 
not have to mount comprehensive and effective defenses against all possible cyber 
threats. Territorial States would instead only need to conduct a procedural due 
diligence impact assessment, if triggered. In Pulp Mills, the ICJ noted that the scope 
and substance of EIAs would be dependent on the specific “nature and magnitude 
of the proposed development and its likely adverse impact on the environment”.106 
Likewise in cyber, the scope and nature of an impact assessment would be dependent 
on the nature and magnitude of the particular cyber infrastructure in question. For 
example, an impact assessment conducted by the United States or China would be 
significantly more complex than that conducted of lesser cyber capable States. The 
standards could be flexible. But the underlying principle should be clear.
By adopting the precautionary approach, as reflected in the ICJ’s jurisprudence, States 
would have a clear obligation that would help better crystallize the substantive due 
diligence obligation that has evaded State interest to date.   
6. conclusIon
The IGE recognized in the Tallinn Manual 2.0 that “in light of the nature of cyber 
activities, preventive measures are arguably prudent”.107 Applying the precautionary 
approach to the due diligence principle in cyberspace would help to crystallize the 
principle of due diligence, and encourage increased adherence, by implementing a 
prudent and understandable procedural obligation. The precautionary principle in 
cyberspace is, of course, not reflective of customary international law. This paper 
argues that instead the approach is the lex ferenda, or where the law should go. The 
benefits of the precautionary approach, especially delineating between procedural 
and substantive due diligence, would have clear benefits in cyberspace by providing 
more clear guideposts for States on what is required when carrying out due diligence. 
By requiring States to undergo critical assessments of their cyber infrastructure to 
104 See Brian Fung, A Court Just Made It Easier for the Government to Sue Companies for Getting Hacked, 
Wash. Post (Aug. 24, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2015/08/24/a-court-
just-made-it-easier-for-the-government-to-sue-companies-for-getting-hacked/?wpmm=1&wpisrc=nl_
headlines.
105 Tallinn Manual 2.0 at p. 45, Rule 6, ¶ 8.
106 Pulp Mills, note 11, at ¶205.
107 Tallinn Manual 2.0, note 4, at 46 (Rule 7).
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determine potential vulnerabilities, the precautionary approach would create a 
baseline obligation for States that could help to crystallize the due diligence principle 
in cyberspace, and help move this grey zone of international law to a principle of 
customary international law.  
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Pressing Pause: A New 
Approach for International 
Cybersecurity Norm 
Development
Abstract: Over the last few years, the international community has devoted much 
attention to the topic of “international cyber norms”. However, there appears to be 
a fundamental tension between these norm-development efforts and their real-world 
application as effective tools to reduce cyber risk and deter or prevent malicious 
state and non-state actors. Furthermore, in the current geopolitical climate, a broad 
agreement on global cyber norms seems improbable, as suggested by the lack of 
consensus in the course of the UN GGE 2017 process. 
In the meantime, government officials tasked with developing and deploying 
cybersecurity policy and law face day-to-day challenges and are operating on a 
different track. Questions continuously arise with respect to the role of the state in 
formulating cybersecurity standards, information sharing, active defense and privacy 
protection. These questions are dealt with mostly in the “civilian” cybersecurity 
sphere and are occurring largely under the radar of the global “international cyber 
norms” community.
Against this backdrop, the paper suggests a shift in the approach to cyber norms. 
Its central thesis is that, at this juncture, rather than attempting to create a set of 
pre-defined aspirational norms aimed at achieving global stability, the international 
community should pay greater attention to discussions that are already occurring 
between cybersecurity regulators/authorities and should proactively support such 
discussions. Incremental and “bottom-up” processes, covering technical, policy and 
legal challenges at the domestic level, create fertile grounds for discussions that 
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1. IntroductIon
The subject of “cyber norms” has been discussed at length in recent years, especially 
following the report on the subject issued in 2015 by a United Nations Governmental 
Group of Experts (GGE), regarding the use of information and communications 
technologies (ICT) by states.2 Building upon the 2013 GGE Report,3 the 2015 GGE 
Report acknowledged the application of basic concepts of international law, such as 
self-defense and state responsibility for internationally wrongful acts, to the cyber 
domain. It also recommended a series of “voluntary, non-binding norms” applicable 
in peacetime, which according to the Report were intended to reflect the international 
community’s expectations as to “responsible behavior by states” in order to “increase 
stability and security in the global ICT environment.”4 The suggested norms covered 
a range of topics, from information sharing between states, to providing assistance to 
other states in dealing with cyber incidents, to protection of critical infrastructure.5 
The report was considered a significant development because representatives of 20 
countries holding widely divergent views had produced a consensus text on certain 
topics that had previously been considered highly contentious. Another GGE was 
convened in 2016, with a mandate to expand on the 2015 GGE Report.6 However, 
amid reports of profound rifts among the participating countries,7 this GGE ended its 
work in 2017 without a consensus text being issued. Despite this setback, the subject 
2 Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and 
Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, UN Doc. A/70/174 (22 July 2015) (“2015 
GGE Report”).
3 Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and 
Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, UN Doc. A/68/98 (24 June 2013).
4 2015 GGE Report, para. 9 and 10.
5 Id., par. (c), (f) and (h).
6 UNGA Resolution A/RES/70/237 (23 December 2015). 
7 Michele Markoff, US Expert to the GGE, Explanation of Position at the Conclusion of the 2016-
2017 UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Developments in the Field of Information and 
Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, June 23, 2017, <https://usun.state.gov/
remarks/7880>. See also  Arun M. Sukumar, Lawfare Blog, Tuesday, July 4, 2017 <https://lawfareblog.
com/un-gge-failed-international-law-cyberspace-doomed-well>.
can be scaled up. This civilian, bottom-up approach is admittedly more mundane 
than the “aspirational cyber norms” track. Both tracks can and should continue to 
coexist in parallel, though the “civilian” track is more likely to result in a common 
taxonomy, legal/policy interoperability or common understandings that states can 
readily endorse, all of which could potentially ultimately lead to norms that enhance 
cybersecurity more pragmatically.
Keywords: cyber norms, international law, cybersecurity law
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of “cyber norms” continues to draw attention, with some arguing that states should 
expand this exercise.8 
The working assumption in this discussion, it seems, is that norms are inherently a good 
thing: broadly defined as “shared expectations about appropriate (or inappropriate) 
behavior within a given community”,9 they can lay down the “rules of the road” 
between states, and thus contribute to international stability.10 This has generated a 
wide range of proposals and ideas in an effort to identify the “right” forum in which 
a discussion can be held11 or the “right” norm that states can settle on,12 and to devise 
ways in which to implement the 2015 GGE norms.13 
To be sure, the general notion that norms might eventually play a positive role in 
stabilizing cyberspace remains relevant, and the work of the GGE processes has 
arguably advanced the global conversation.14 However, these approaches have not 
yielded concrete results beyond the 2015 GGE Report. Finnemore and Hollis refer to 
“fatigue” from the multiplicity of projects in this field.15
Against this backdrop, this paper argues that a moderate shift in approach is called 
for, beginning with a reassessment of current norm-development efforts and their 
underlying premises. The first part presents a critique of cyber norms and the global 
community’s expectations of them. It argues that given the present political context 
and divergences between the main players, the focus on “global stability” – arguably, 
the underlying theme of the 2015 GGE Report – is, at this point in time, overly 
ambitious, and that norm-development efforts should be untethered from this goal. 
The second part proposes to shift the emphasis, from “global stability” to domestic 
cybersecurity. Its central thesis is that, rather than the current top-down approach that 
8 See for example Kubo Mačák. (2017). From Cyber Norms to Cyber Rules: Re-engaging States as Law-
makers. Leiden Journal of International Law, 30(4), 877-899. doi:10.1017/S0922156517000358. 
9 This paper adopts on the definition used by Duncan B. Hollis in his article, “China and the US Strategic 
Construction of Cybernorms: The Process Is the Product”. Hoover Institute, Aegis Paper Series No. 1704, 
July 6, 2017, <https://www.hoover.org/research/china-and-us-strategic-construction-cybernorms-process-
product>, at p. 1. 
10 See for example UK National Cyber Security Strategy 2016-2021, para.6.3.3; Australia Cyber Security 
Strategy, p. 42, which emphasize this point.
11 See James A. Lewis, “Revitalizing Progress in International Negotiations on Cyber Security”, in Centre 
for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), Getting beyond Norms: New Approaches to International 
Cyber Security Challenges, edited by Fen Osler Hampsen and Michael Sulmeyer, Sept. 5, 2017, pp. 13-18; 
Joseph S. Nye Jr., “Normative Constraints on Cyber Weapons”, in Getting Beyond Norms, ibid., pp. 19-22.
12 For example, Tim Maurer, Ariel (Eli) Levite, George Perkovich, “Toward a Global Norm Against 
Manipulating the Integrity of Financial Data”, White Paper, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
March 27, 2017.
13 E.g. East-West Institute, “Promoting International Cyber Norms:  A New Advocacy Forum”, Dec. 2015; 
ICT4Peace open consultations on the United Nations Cybersecurity Norms Proposals, <https://ict4peace.
org/call-for-global-open-consultations-on-the-united-nations-cybersecurity-norms-proposal/> (accessed on 
March 11, 2018); Mariarosaria Taddeo, “Deterrence by Norms to Stop Interstate Cyber Attacks”, Minds & 
Machines (2017) 27:387–392, 390.
14 Eneken Tikk and Mika Kerttunen, “The Alleged Demise of the UN GGE: An Autopsy and Eulogy”, Cyber 
Policy Institute, 2017.
15 Martha Finnemore and Duncan B. Hollis, Constructing Norms for Global, Cybersecurity, 110 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 425, 469 (2016).
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16 Finnemore & Hollis, n. 15, p. 470.
17 GGE Report 2015, para. 10.
has characterized norm-development efforts to date, the cybersecurity community 
would be better served by focusing more on bottom-up processes emanating from 
cybersecurity policies as they are developed and deployed domestically. It contains 
a non-exhaustive overview of topics and issues that pose concrete challenges in this 
sphere. It argues that, while some of these topics are already the subject of bilateral and 
multilateral conversations to a certain extent, they could benefit from more expanded 
regional and multilateral conversations. A broad roadmap for taking the discussion 
forward is then submitted. 
Most critically, the approach suggested herein is not focused on a specific set of norms 
around which to center a global process, but on issues-based discussions between 
government officials tasked with developing and implementing cybersecurity 
policy and law at the domestic level. There is no predictable outcome for such an 
exercise – it may or may not produce guidelines, common understandings or norms, 
and the outcomes might be global or between like-minded countries only. Neither 
does this approach negate the importance of maintaining existing multilateral cyber 
norm diplomatic efforts. However, the paper argues that, short of achieving “global 
stability”, as current norms processes set out to do, such a bottom-up, needs-driven 
approach can help enhance cybersecurity for the parties involved in a concrete way. 
2. a crItIQue of cyber norms
A. Advantage of Cyber Norms
Cyber norms have undeniable political and policy advantages for states. As defined 
in the 2015 GGE Report, norms differ from international law rules in that they are 
not binding on states. As such, they provide a certain flexibility, allowing states to 
coalesce around a particular principle or value without compromising their official 
legal positions. In the case of the 2015 GGE, this may have enabled the United 
States, the United Kingdom, Germany, China and Russia – countries with profoundly 
different approaches to the application of international law to cyberspace and what 
“information security” means – to agree on a set of broad principles.16 
Another argument in favor of cyber norms, for states, is signaling or deterrence. By 
expressing support for or adherence to a certain norm, states are putatively indicating 
to each other that they would treat the violation of such a norm as non-trivial. The 2015 
GGE Report makes this goal explicit: “norms reflect the international community’s 
expectations, set standards for responsible State behaviour, and allow the international 
community to assess the activities and intentions of States”.17 Cyber norms can 
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indicate red lines, providing states with a justification to respond, for example through 
diplomacy or trade sanctions, when the line is crossed.18 
The process by which norms are developed can also be seen a positive element. The 
very fact that governments are speaking with one another, voicing their disagreements 
and attempting to hash out a consensus, allows the discussion to move forward. The 
process provides an outlet for states that hold opposing positions to interact with each 
other and seek common ground. Even if the process does not necessarily generate 
concrete results, it does foster dialogue between countries, which ultimately is a 
stepping stone towards global stability. To paraphrase Finnemore and Hollis, the 
process is the product.19
These arguments are valid and sound. However, they should be weighed against the 
challenges, disadvantages and costs of current cyber norm development efforts.
B. Critical Perspective on Current Cyber Norm Development Efforts
1) Political Challenges
The question of how to achieve global stability in the use of ICTs is an intrinsically 
political one. The lack of consensus at the 2017 GGE regarding the applicability of 
international law to the use of ICTs, including specifically the availability of self-
defense - despite statements to that effect in previous GGE reports20 – underscores 
the ideological and political gaps that remain between the positions of the US and 
European states on the one hand, and Russia and China on the other.21 These gaps 
have been further highlighted in recent months, as China and Russia have each 
enacted laws tightening controls on Internet access.22 In parallel, Russia has been 
actively promoting a new “cybercrime” treaty23 which adopts an approach to ICTs 
that is fundamentally different from that found in the Council of Europe’s Cybercrime 
Convention.24 It is unlikely that these gaps will be resolved in the short term via 
another iteration of the GGE process or some variant thereof.
18 See for example EU Draft Council Conclusions on a Framework for a Joint EU Diplomatic Response to 
Malicious Cyber Activities (“Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox”), June 7, 2017.
19 Finnemore and Hollis, n. 15, p. 453.
20 2015 GGE Report, par. 28(d) and (e); Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments 
in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, UN Doc. 
A/68/98, 24 June 2013), para. 19.
21 United Nations, General Assembly, Letter dated 9 January 2015 from the Permanent Representatives of 
China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to the United Nations 
addressed to the Secretary-General, A/69/723 (13 January 2015). 
22 Samm Sacks, “China’s Cybersecurity Law Takes Effect: What to Expect”, Lawfare Blog, June 1, 2017, 
<https://www.lawfareblog.com/chinas-cybersecurity-law-takes-effect-what-expect>; Janet Burns, “Russian 
Laws Will Ban VPNs And Force Chat Users To Register, Giving Censors An Edge”, Forbes, July 30.2017, 
<https://www.forbes.com/sites/janetwburns/2017/07/30/new-russian-laws-ban-vpns-and-force-chat-users-
to-register-giving-censors-an-edge/#637dd7d02d7e>.
23 David Ignatius, “Russia is pushing to control cyberspace. We should all be worried”, Washington Post, 
Oct. 24, 2017 <https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/russia-is-pushing-to-control-
cyberspace-we-should-all-be-worried/2017/10/24/7014bcc6-b8f1-11e7-be94-fabb0f1e9ffb_story.
html?utm_term=.30f8621ccc5c>.
24 Council of Europe, Convention on Cybercrime, ETS 185 (2001).
268
Furthermore, one cannot dissociate the cyber norms debate from the broader 
geopolitics at play. For example, the United States’ qualification of the Sony attacks 
and of Russia’s alleged interference in the 2017 US elections was couched in terms 
of core principles and values such as free speech and civil liberties.25 US interests in 
those cases extended beyond questions of how ICTs are used, and touched on broader 
questions of interference in another state’s internal affairs. Similarly, in a briefing 
regarding the United States’ attribution of WannaCry to North Korea, Tom Bossert, 
then-current Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, 
made a connection between North Korea’s behavior in its use of the ransomware 
and its nuclear missile program.26 The difficult topics that successive GGEs wrestled 
with cannot be analyzed solely from a perspective of information and communication 
technologies – they are intrinsically tied to a complex web of national interests and 
alliances, national and international security, international trade and diplomacy. 
Finally, the norms discussion is occurring against the backdrop of a broader 
debate on the future of Internet governance. As is often recalled, the International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU) has been an unfortunate battleground for this 
debate, and it remains so to date.27 The question of whether the Internet can or 
should be “regulated” in any way at the ITU – a dicey question in itself – has become 
intertwined with questions of sovereignty “over” the Internet,28 further complicating 
the norms debate.
There are good arguments to be made that, notwithstanding the above, agreement 
on core “global stability” issues is desirable and could conceivably be achieved. 
Some of the proposals advanced recently include protecting the integrity of financial 
data,29 dealing with “states’ responsibility arising from the actions of their citizens,” a 
commitment to ensure that actions in cyberspace do not contravene their international 
commitments, treatment of election processes as protected infrastructure and norms 
for cybercrime.30 While it may be possible to achieve a consensus around these types 
of issues in the medium or long term, the doubts raised in this paper relate to whether 
25 White House Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by the Press Secretary on the Executive Order 
Entitled “Imposing Additional Sanctions with Respect to North Korea”, January 2, 2015, <https://
obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/02/statement-press-secretary-executive-order-
entitled-imposing-additional-s>; White House Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by the President on 
Actions in Response to Russian Malicious Cyber Activity and Harassment, December 29, 2016 <https://
obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/12/29/statement-president-actions-response-russian-
malicious-cyber-activity>.
26 White House Press Briefing transcript, Dec. 19, 2017 <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/
press-briefing-on-the-attribution-of-the-wannacry-malware-attack-to-north-korea-121917/>.
27 Samantha Dickinson, “How ‘Cyber’ Sidelined ‘Development’ at the ITU’s World Telecommunication 
Development Conference”, CFR Blog, Nov. 17, 2017 <https://www.cfr.org/blog/new-cyber-brief-
countering-russian-information-operations-age-social-media>.
28 Paul Rosenzweig, “The Continuing Struggle for Control of Cyberspace--and the Deterioration of Western 
Influence”, Lawfare, Jan. 13, 2014 <https://www.lawfareblog.com/continuing-struggle-control-cyberspace-
and-deterioration-western-influence>.
29 Maurer, Levite, and Perkovich, n. 12.
30 Getting beyond Norms, n. 9, pp. 16 and 21.
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such agreements could emerge as a result of a self-styled norms process, and whether 
this approach is appropriate for the near future.31
2) Practical Limitations
Several factors limit the practical utility of norms. For one, the purported effect of 
a particular cyber norm cannot be gaged with certainty, since cyber operations are 
not usually made public. Second, since the GGE norms of 2015 and subsequent 
reiterations of those norms by the G7 in 2016 and 2017,32 the world has seen several 
cyber incidents attributed to nation-states. Public testimony given by the US Director 
of National Intelligence to a Senate committee in May 2017 attests to the magnitude 
of cyber threats by states.33 Indeed, major incidents at least partially attributed to 
states, like WannaCry, NotPetya, the DNC hack, and election hacks in France,34 
occurred after the adoption of the 2015 GGE norms. Of course, since this list only 
represents attacks that have been reported, definitive conclusions cannot be drawn 
from these and similar data. And certainly, the occurrence of these incidents should 
not be attributed to a “failure” of the norms process. What is evident, however, is that 
these kinds of incidents illustrate the challenge of applying broad aspirational cyber 
norms to actual scenarios.   
States are also developing their doctrines and strategies at their own cautious pace, 
based on actual operational needs and existing legal frameworks. The merits of 
making their conclusions more transparent can be debated, but the national defense 
and security community is currently on a somewhat slower and more prudent track 
than the one reflected in current efforts to promote cyber norms.35 To the extent that 
a given norm might impact national defense/security interests, the more conservative 
approach of governmental departments and agencies entrusted with these interests 
must be acknowledged.
The broader issue here is not whether a particular cyber norm is in fact being 
implemented. It is that declaring the existence of a norm at a UN forum or similar 
forum does not guarantee its effectiveness. Norms may provide guidance and declare 
red lines, but when a country’s core interests are at stake, norms arguably play a lesser 
role. As Tikk and Kerttunen noted,
31 White House, Fact Sheet: President Xi Jinping’s State Visit to the United States, 25 September 
2015,<obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/25/fact-sheet-president-xi-jinpings-state-
visit-united-states>.  
32 G7 Principles on Actions in Cyber, May 27, 2016, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000160279.pdf>; G7 
Declaration on Responsible States Behavior on Cyberspace Lucca, 11 April, 2017, available at <www.
mofa.go.jp/files/000246367.pdf>.
33 Daniel R. Coats, Director of National Intelligence, Statement for the Record, “Worldwide Threat 
Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community,” Senate Armed Services Committee, 23 May 2017.
34 See full list at CSIS website, <https://www.csis.org/programs/cybersecurity-and-warfare/technology-
policy-program/other-projects-cybersecurity>.
35 Max Smeets, “Europe Slowly Starts to Talk Openly About Offensive Cyber Operations”, CFR Blog, Nov. 
6, 2017 <https://www.cfr.org/blog/europe-slowly-starts-talk-openly-about-offensive-cyber-operations>; 
Robert Hackett, “Gasp! China admits to having cyber warriors”, Forbes, Mar.26, 2015 <http://fortune.
com/2015/03/26/china-admits-cyber-warriors/>.
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“[given] the premature understanding what cyber security is about 
and how it can or may affect international peace and security, it is 
hard to see how the necessary level of peer pressure can manifest 
between 193 actors with (justifiably) sovereign interests and 
authority.”36
One notable case study in the norm-development process is the norm prohibiting cyber 
industrial theft, which was excluded from the 2015 GGE Report. It was embodied in 
a bilateral commitment between China and the United States in 2015,37 after which 
it was replicated in other international texts.38 There have been conflicting reports as 
to the extent to which China has actually adhered to that commitment.39 If reports 
of a partial reduction in cyber industrial theft are accurate, they reinforce the point 
made above, that at present bilateral commitments based on reciprocal interests are 
more likely to be effective than multilateral ones. The replication of this particular 
norm, specifically in bilateral commitments between China and other countries, 
also suggests that it emerged from a concrete need of states to address a specific 
concern (theft of intellectual property by companies), as opposed to a broad attempt to 
promote international stability. Other bilateral agreements based on a pragmatic need 
to resolve specific issues might also work in similar fashion.40 
3) Taxonomy and the Ambiguous Value of Constructive Ambiguity
Joseph Nye has shown that the international cyber domain is a “regime complex”, 
composed of a multiplicity of sub-regimes (incident response, law enforcement, 
international standards, international law, etc.), each with its own set of frameworks 
and actors.41 The discussion on cyber norms can be confusing because different states 
frame the issue differently. Among Western states, cybersecurity, cybercrime, and the 
applicability of the laws of armed conflict to the cyber domain are distinct (though 
related) concepts, each governed by its own legal or political regime. By contrast, the 
concept of “information security” as understood by Russia and China is significantly 
different.42
36 Tikk and Kerttunen, n. 12, p. 26.
37 White House, Fact Sheet: President Xi Jinping’s State Visit to the United States, 25 September 
2015,<obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/25/fact-sheet-president-xi-jinpings-state-
visit-united-states>.  
38 G7 Declaration on Responsible States Behavior on Cyberspace Lucca, n.32 para.12.; G20 Leaders 
Communiqué, Antalya Summit, 15-16 November 2015, para. 26 <https://www.g20.org/profiles/g20/
modules/custom/g20_beverly/img/timeline/Turquia/2015-g20-final-declaration-eng.pdf>; Reuters, 
“China, Canada vow not to conduct cyber attacks on private sector”, June 26, 2017, <https://www.reuters.
com/article/us-canada-china-cyber/china-canada-vow-not-to-conduct-cyber-attacks-on-private-sector-
idUSKBN19H06A>.
39 Andy Greenberg, “China Tests the Limits of its Us Hacking Truce”, in Washington Post, Oct. 31, 2017, 
<https://www.wired.com/story/china-tests-limits-of-us-hacking-truce/>; David Sanger, “Chinese Curb 
Cyberattacks on U.S. Interests, Report Finds”, New York Times, June 20, 2016, <https://www.nytimes.
com/2016/06/21/us/politics/china-us-cyber-spying.html>. 
40 See, for example, Jack Goldsmith, “Contrarian Thoughts on Russia and the Presidential Election”, Lawfare 
Blog, Jan. 10, 2017, <https://www.lawfareblog.com/contrarian-thoughts-russia-and-presidential-election>.
41 Nye, Joseph S. 2014. The Regime Complex for Managing Global, Cyber Activities. Global Commission 
on Internet Governance, Paper Series, 1.
42 UNGA, n. 21.
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The 2015 GGE Report attempted to bridge this divergence of views through vaguely-
drafted norms. For example, the 2015 Report includes a norm against attacking a 
country’s “critical infrastructure” contrary to international law but provides no 
workable definitions or guidelines.43 This is also the case with the norms regarding 
“due diligence”, supply chain oversight and reporting of vulnerabilities.44 One 
may argue that this type of constructive ambiguity is helpful in that it conveys an 
intelligible concept that states are free to define going forward.45 One may also point 
to the current norm-development forums as positive efforts to infuse content to these 
norms. These arguments are certainly persuasive. However, the fundamental difficulty 
with this type of top-down push for achieving consensus is that it places the carriage 
before the horse: it glosses over the constructs around which the norms are built, 
declares a particular norm into existence, and only then seeks a way to operationalize 
it. This approach is not conducive to widespread implementation by states. 
Indeed, events are unfolding at a rapid pace, challenging a short or mid-term conception 
of what a “stable ICT environment” might look like. The domestic policy landscape 
is continuously evolving: for example, it has recently been reported that Germany is 
actively exploring the possibility of enacting legal authority for state “hackbacks”,46 
while China has adopted a sweeping cybersecurity law.47 Moreover, the use of cyber 
tools by diverse actors – state, non-state, hacktivist groups and individuals – continues 
to rise, presenting new practical and legal challenges to states.48 In short, it is difficult 
to deal with long-term stability through cyber norms, when the short and medium-
term reality are filled with moving targets. 
In summary, it is not argued that there is no room for a discussion on cyber norms 
involving core “global stability” issues. However, there is another, potentially more 
fertile ground for discourse in the field of domestic, “civilian” cybersecurity (defined 
below). Given the above factors, a more promising approach to cyber norms would be 
to promote and expand existing discussions in the domestic civilian sphere and allow 
norms within that sphere to emerge and evolve in a more organic fashion. The next 
part proposes a multi-stage analysis for how such a process might take place.
43 2015 GGE Report, para.13(f).
44 Ibid., para. 13(b), (h), (i), (j).
45 See discussion on “incompletely theorized” norms in Finnemore & Hollis, n. 15, p. 21.
46 Andrea Shalal, “German spy agencies want right to destroy stolen data and ‘hack back’ ”, Reuters, Oct.5 
2017, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-cyber/german-spy-agencies-want-right-to-destroy-
stolen-data-and-hack-back-idUSKBN1CA1IN>.
47 Sachs, n. 22.
48 Paul Rosenzweig, “The Reality of Cyber Conflict: Warfare in the Modern Age”, Heritage Foundation, 
2017,  <http://index.heritage.org/military/2017/essays/reality-cyber-conflict/>.
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3. reframIng the global dIscussIon on cyber 
norms: a PossIble Path forward
The stated purpose of the cyber norms in the 2015 GGE Report was to “help to prevent 
conflict in the ICT environment and contribute to its peaceful use.” Those objectives 
were ambitious, to say the least, and the current state of play suggests that the goal of 
global stability may be too much to pin on cyber norms. 
Rather than attempting to tackle large, controversial issues that are fraught with 
political baggage, it may be more useful to enhance and broaden existing discussions 
around more mundane – yet no less important – issues of cybersecurity policy and 
regulation in the domestic, civilian sphere. Put otherwise, rather than asking “which 
cyber norms can enhance global stability in the cyber domain?”, it is worth asking 
“what issues do cybersecurity officials have in the domestic arena, that could benefit 
from a broader conversation with their counterparts around the world?” As one 
commentator noted:
“Given these near-dead ends, real issues might best be taken up 
bilaterally or multilaterally between countries and entities that have 
mutually agreed priorities and issues. Given political sensitivities, 
technical-level cooperation – be it between computer emergency 
response teams, law enforcement entities or judicial authorities – is 
likely more efficient than politicized formats.”49
This admittedly unassuming starting point will not in and of itself produce world 
peace. However, if cybersecurity professionals engage in greater discussions of the 
type described below, this could help the international community or coalitions of like-
minded countries to achieve a few discrete objectives in the field of domestic policy 
and law. This might contribute to greater security in the cyber domain, which could in 
turn enhance global stability over time. The approach proposed below is not intended 
to replace or subsume current large-scale “global stability” norm development efforts. 
Rather, it is a parallel track, which at this juncture should be afforded greater attention. 
A. Framing the Discussion: Cybersecurity in the Civilian Sphere
Since the 1980s and 1990s, the body of policies and laws for protecting critical networks 
has matured into a full-fledged discipline. States are beginning to develop and update 
comprehensive cybersecurity strategies,50 and are being increasingly active in the 
legislative sphere, as exemplified by the US Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act 
of 2015 and the EU NIS Directive. Furthermore, cybersecurity has percolated into the 
49 Eneken Tikk, “Norms à la Carte”, in Getting Beyond Norms, n. 9, p. 25.
50 See n. 10. 
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spectrum of regulatory issues, with regulators in the financial sector,51 energy,52 and 
transportation,53 for example, developing sector-specific cybersecurity policies and 
rules. In the private sector as well, insurance companies, accounting firms, law firms 
and consulting firms have begun offering services in cybersecurity to their clients.54 
For the most part, the topics covered by these areas do not involve complex questions 
of international law or international relations. They are mainly focused on building 
up robustness (sharing information about threat indicators, regulatory incentives 
for the private sector to improve defense, cyber awareness campaigns, supply chain 
oversight, etc.), and resilience (breach incident notification requirements, intervention 
of the national CERT, etc.), at the domestic level.55 By way of illustration, on the 
domestic “civilian” end are topics such as how to protect personally identifiable 
information as part of an organization’s information sharing with the government, 
application of the NIST framework to private entities, regulation of cybersecurity 
professionals, breach incident disclosure requirements in consumer protection law 
and securities law, cybersecurity regulation on the cloud, active defense in the private 
sector, and labeling requirements for software. The processes for policy development 
in these areas are usually unclassified and involve open consultations with the private 
sector. Similarly, these measures operate mainly in the civilian sphere, and they aim 
to promote domestic cybersecurity in the narrow sense of the term – reducing the risk 
of cyber incidents and the damages caused when such incidents occur. 
At the other end of the spectrum are measures regarding the interface with the 
attacker or associated actors in the international sphere, for example deterrence tools, 
permitted actions above or below the “use of force” threshold under Article 2(4) of 
the UN Charter, the proposed norm about refraining from manipulating financial data, 
and broad questions of sovereignty and jurisdiction. Such topics are inherently more 
51 Financial Services Board, Stocktake of Publicly Released Cybersecurity Regulations, Guidance and 
Supervisory Practices, Oct. 13, 2017, <http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/P131017-2.pdf>,  Tom 
Gilheany, “The State of Cybersecurity Laws in the Financial Services Industry”, in Talking Tech With 
Cisco Blog, May 18, 2017 <https://learningnetwork.cisco.com/blogs/talking-tech-with-cisco/2017/05/18/
the-state-of-cybersecurity-laws-in-the-financial-services-industry>.
52 Energy Expert Cyber Security Platform, “Cyber Security in the Energy Sector Recommendations for the 
European Commission on a European Strategic Framework and Potential Future - Legislative Acts for 
the Energy Sector”, February 2017, available at <https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/news/new-report-cyber-
security-energy-sector-published>.
53 For example: UK Government, Department of Transport, “Principles of cyber security for connected 
and automated vehicles”, Aug. 6, 2017 <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/principles-of-
cyber-security-for-connected-and-automated-vehicles/the-key-principles-of-vehicle-cyber-security-for-
connected-and-automated-vehicles>.
54 OECD (2017), Enhancing the Role of Insurance in Cyber Risk Management, OECD Publishing, Paris. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264282148-en; Lexis Nexis Business of Law Blog, “Beautiful Minds: 41 
Legal Industry Predictions for 2016”, Dec.16, 2015 <http://businessoflawblog.com/2015/12/legal-industry-
predictions-2016/>.
55 Regarding the distinction between “robustness” and “resilience”, see Matania, E. & Yoffe, L. & 
Mashkautsan, M. “A Three-Layer Framework for a Comprehensive National Cyber-security Strategy.” 
Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, vol. 17 no. 3, 2016, pp. 77-84. Project MUSE, doi:10.1353/
gia.2016.0038. 
274
sensitive, approaching the core of a country’s national security interests and raising 
complex international relations and international law questions.
This distinction between “domestic civilian” and “international” realms does not 
profess to create entrenched categories of cybersecurity policy and law, nor to suggest 
that any particular area in the cybersecurity discussion belongs exclusively to either 
realm. It merely highlights that certain areas of policy and law will tend to be easier 
for states to discuss in an open and transparent manner than others. 
It should be stressed that the proposal to focus on the domestic civilian sphere is not 
meant to exclude the evolution of other norms in the field of defense and security, 
such as how to apply the law of state responsibility to attacks attributable to non-
state actors, what “sovereignty” means,56 and what “responsible state behavior” could 
look like in practice. Processes in both these areas can coexist and complement one 
another. The thrust of the argument here is that the domestic civilian cybersecurity 
sphere should garner more attention from the international community than it has to 
date, and may reveal itself to be a promising path forward. 
B. Bottom-up Process Led by Domestic Cybersecurity Professionals
Having broadly defined the types of issues that could be discussed, it is equally 
important to describe the contours of possible discussions around these issues. 
Civilian cybersecurity discussions are driven by those government officials tasked 
with creating and deploying domestic policy and law. This includes officials involved 
with cyber education and awareness, defense of critical and non-critical infrastructure 
networks, handling of cyber events in real time within a CERT, policy development, 
engagement with the private sector, regulation and oversight.
Through this dialogue, cybersecurity professionals with diverse backgrounds develop 
a common language, share issues and questions of concern, learn from best practices, 
and achieve informal capacity building. The dialogue is technical, legal or policy-
oriented or multidisciplinary. This is fundamentally a bottom-up process, which draws 
from the experience and expertise of cybersecurity professionals. 
To be sure, there are already formal and informal discussions under way between 
different actors around these topics (within FIRST, the network of CERTs including 
national CERTs, as well as between sector-specific industry regulators). Our 
suggestion here is to expand upon, and refocus the international community’s efforts 
around, these types of discussions. 
56 Gary Corn, Tallinn Manual 2.0, Advancing the Conversation, Just Security (Feb. 15, 2017) <https://www.
justsecurity.org/37812/tallinn-manual-2-0-advancing-conversation/>.
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The process suggested above can be distinguished from the OSCE’s confidence-
building measures of 2013 and 2016.57 Finnemore and Hollis have shown how, among 
other factors, the choice of a particular type of forum to promote a particular norm 
can be just as important as the content of the norm.58 For example, when a proposed 
norm is developed within an existing organization (in this case, the OSCE), this has an 
impact on the way the norm is understood and its reach to a particular target audience. 
The OSCE’s confidence-building measures were developed primarily in a top-down 
fashion, mostly through diplomatic action, and thus far, it does not appear that they 
have been “adopted” by the national CERT community. By contrast, a bottom-up 
process focused on “civilian cybersecurity” on the topic of confidence building, 
would likely result in a more technical set of standards based on the perceived needs 
of national CERT officials, which could then percolate upwards with the assistance of 
cyber diplomats. 
The COE Cybercrime Convention can be taken as illustrative of the ways in which 
top-down and bottom-up efforts can converge. On the one hand, the Convention 
constitutes a relatively successful exercise in international law development in a 
different though related field. Adopted in 2001, it has been ratified by 56 countries 
and remains the benchmark text in the field of cybercrime. Thus, one might view 
the Convention as an example of the success of the “top-down” approach. At the 
same time, the Convention is an example of how the law developed bottom-up from 
a concrete specific need, namely, law enforcement cooperation to deal with cross-
border cybercrime. The conference of state parties of the Convention constitutes a 
useful forum which is currently tackling several important issues, such as access to 
data on the cloud, and is attended by a mix of diplomats and practitioners.  
An additional clarification is in order. The suggested focus on “domestic cybersecurity” 
should not be seen as a negating the need for discussions on “global stability”. 
Similarly, diplomatic efforts should not compete with, or come at the expense of, 
bottom-up civilian-based technical efforts, or vice versa. On the contrary, these two 
processes can and should complement each other. However, the point made here is 
that up until now, bottom-up processes have been largely ignored in the cyber norms 
discussion.59 A few concrete examples of how such processes can be amplified and 
harnessed will be suggested below.
57 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Decision No. 1106: Initial Set of OSCE 
Confidence-Building Measures to Reduce the Risks of Conflict Stemming from the Use of Information 
and Communication Technologies, PC.DEC/1106,  OSCE  Permanent Council, 975th Plenary Meeting, 
3 December 2013), <http://www.osce.org/pc/109168?download=true>; Decision No. 1202: OSCE 
Confidence-Building Measures To Reduce the Risks of Conflict Stemming from the Use of Information 
and Communication Technologies, PC.DEC/1202, OSCE Permanent Council, 1092nd Plenary Meeting, 10 
March 2016, <https://www.osce.org/pc/227281?download=true>.
58 Finnemore and Hollis, n. 15, p. 468.
59 A notable exception is the “CERT diplomacy” initiative raised at the 2017 Internet Governance Forum, 
which is addressed below.
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C. Potential Areas of Discussion
As noted previously, there is no definitive list of cybersecurity topics that can neatly 
fit into a “civilian” category. Similarly, not every issue is necessarily conducive to 
broad multilateral discussions. Still, there are areas where common ground, or at least 
shared understandings, are more realistic. We provide below a few examples of such 
areas.
1) The Role of the State
The hybrid private-public nature of Internet infrastructure, coupled with the 
pervasiveness of connected devices, presents new challenges for domestic 
cybersecurity regulators. One of these is identifying the instances in which a national 
cybersecurity agency can and should intervene in the market in order to prescribe 
minimum standards. The need for government cybersecurity officials to manage risk, 
prioritize and classify types of organizations and networks, balance between rules-
based and principles-based regulation making and optimize the use of deterrents and 
incentives, while maintaining the core authority to intervene when national security or 
public order or safety are at stake, requires difficult choices, constant engagement with 
the private sector, and an adaptive modus operandi. While domestic cybersecurity 
agencies might be developing this approach on their own, there could be much benefit 
to an expanded discussion on regulatory choices, pitfalls and best practices. The NIST 
Framework,60 the OECD Recommendations on Digital Risk Management61 and the 
OECD workshop on protecting critical infrastructure62 provide useful starting points 
for such discussions.
2) Information Sharing Between the Public and Private Sectors
An underlying issue of concern for cybersecurity regulators is how to generate trust 
between the public and private sectors within a particular jurisdiction.63 Relevant 
questions to be asked include: are current domestic policies and practices in this field 
optimal? Do they lead to actionable results? How can data collection practices be 
streamlined? Can and should a common information sharing standard be adopted? 
What type of approach vis-à-vis the private sector is desirable? In what cases are 
incentives more appropriate? How can individuals’ personal information be protected 
in the course of information sharing? An expanded dialogue on how to improve 
60 NIST, “Cybersecurity Framework,” <www.nist.gov/cyberframework>.
61 OECD (2015), Digital Security Risk Management for Economic and Social Prosperity: OECD 
Recommendation and Companion Document, OECD Publishing, Paris. DOI: http://dx.doi.
org/10.1787/9789264245471-en.
62 See workshop website at <http://www.oecd.org/going-digital/digital-security-in-critical-infrastructure/>, 
accessed on March 11, 2013.
63 See, for example, the discussions held at the 2017 Internet Governance Forum regarding this topic: 
International cooperation between CERTS: technical diplomacy for cybersecurity (https://igf2017.sched.
com/event/CTrn/international-cooperation-between-certs-technical-diplomacy-for-cybersecurity-ws38?if
rame=no&w=100%&sidebar=yes&bg=no>); Cybersecurity 2.0 - Leveraging the Multistakeholder Model 




information sharing between the private and public sectors could lead to real solutions 
to such dilemmas. 
3) Active Defense in the Private Sector
For the purposes of this paper, we define “active defense” as actions and measures 
taken to:
“detect, analyse, identify and mitigate threats to and from 
communications systems and networks in real-time, combined 
with the capability and resources to take proactive or offensive 
action against threats and threat entities including action in those 
entities’ home networks”.64
The issue has been analyzed at length, leading to growing calls for a more sophisticated 
discussion on active defense in the private sector.65 Possible policy discussions to be 
held include whether some of the risks attendant to active defense could be mitigated 
by adding elements of ex ante and ex post government oversight and entrusting the 
task to reputable cybersecurity companies under an accreditation system. Another 
policy issue is whether the perceived need to allow active defense could be diminished 
if “internet infrastructure” entities such as ISPs were better incentivized to take a more 
active role in detecting and mitigating attacks transiting through their networks. 
4) Cybersecurity on the Cloud
The UN Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) has begun grappling 
with the contractual aspects of cloud services in the private sector,66 and this topic 
seems ripe for further study from a cybersecurity perspective, particularly with respect 
to government procurement of cloud services from third party vendors.67  
64 Robert Dewar, “The ‘Triptych of Cyber Security’: A Classification of Active Cyber Defence” (6th Annual 
Conference on Cyber Conflict, 2014), NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, https://
ccdcoe.org/cycon/2014/proceedings/d1r1s9_dewar.pdf.
65 Joe Uchill, “New bill would allow hacking victims to ‘hack back’ ”, The Hill, Oct.13, 2017 <http://
thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/355305-hack-back-bill-hits-house>. See also Paul Rosensweig, Steven 
P. Bucci and David Inserra, “Next Steps for U.S. Cybersecurity in the Trump Administration: Active 
Cyber Defense”, Heritage Foundation Backgrounder 3188, May 5, 2017 <www.heritage.org/sites/default/
files/2017-05/BG3188.pdf >.
66 UNCITRAL Working Group IV on e-commerce.
67 American Technology Council, “Report to the President on Federal It Modernization”, Dec. 13, 2017  
<https://itmodernization.cio.gov/>UK Government Digital Service, “Government Cloud First Policy”, Feb. 
3, 2017 <https://www.gov.uk/guidance/government-cloud-first-policy>.
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Other relevant topics include:
• cyber insurance (whether and how the market should be regulated, guidance 
on how to quantify cybersecurity risks);
• cybersecurity for the Internet of Things;68
• labeling and rating of software;69 
• developing a common ontology and technical standards for cybersecurity.70
At the same time, it should be borne in mind that not all civilian efforts are worth 
pursuing at a global scale.71 The challenge is to identify topics that could both benefit 
from and lend themselves to an international conversation.  
D. The Formats of Potential Discussions
The format of an international discussion about a particular area can be as important 
as the topic itself, as it sets the stage for the types of discussions that are held and the 
expectations of participants.72 Accordingly, we offer the following basic principles 
regarding the format for potential discussions around topics such as the ones discussed 
above. 
1. A non-prescriptive process is more likely to enable participants to engage 
in an exploratory dialogue in which they consider a range of options. A 
discussion on norms should be allowed to emerge naturally as a result of the 
discussions, rather than established as a goal from the outset.
2. As mentioned earlier, the agenda should be set by cybersecurity officials 
involved with policy development and deployment. They are arguably best 
placed to define and discuss the challenges they face on a day-to-day basis. 
3. The level of engagement (multilateral, regional or like-minded) plays an 
important role in expectations and outcomes. To state the obvious, the more 
global the forum, the more challenging it is to achieve consensus.  
4. One cannot ignore the place of bilateralism. Several countries have opened 
lines of dialogue and entered into bilateral agreements and memorandums 
of understanding in the field of cybersecurity73 and this trend will likely 
68 Laura DeNardis & Mark Raymond, “The Internet of Things as a Global Policy Frontier”, UC Davis Law 
Review, Issue 51:2 (December 2017), 475.
69 E.g. DHS designation of Kaspersky products as presenting security risks - DHS Statement on the Issuance 
of Binding Operational Directive 17-01, Sept. 13, 2017 <https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/09/13/dhs-
statement-issuance-binding-operational-directive-17-01>; see also Cyber Independent Testing Lab, 
founded by Sara and Peter Zatko (a.k.a Mudge).
70 Claire Vishik, Mihoko Matsubara, Audrey Plonk, “Key Concepts in Cyber Security: Towards a Common 
Policy and Technology Context for Cyber Security Norms”, in International Cyber Norms Legal, Policy & 
Industry Perspectives, Anna-Maria Osula and Henry Rõigas (Eds.), NATO CCD COE Publications, Tallinn 
2016.
71 Columbia School of International Public Affairs New York Cyber Task Force, “Building a Defensible 
Cyberspace”, Sept. 2017, <https://sipa.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/3668_SIPA%20Defensible%20
Cyberspace-WEB.PDF>, p. 14.
72 Finnemore and Hollis, n. 15, p. 468.
73 See, for example, Mapping of India’s Cyber Security-Related Bilateral Agreements, <https://cis-india.org/
internet-governance/blog/india-cyber-security-bilateral-agreements-map-dec-2016> (accessed on March 
11, 2018), Australia Cyber Security Strategy, n. 10, p. 43.
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continue in the near future. While the resulting texts may be phrased in 
broad language that encourages general cooperation rather than requiring 
compliance with concrete obligations, they create the framework for 
engagement between states within which future cybersecurity discussions 
can be held. 
5. The creation of yet another global forum dealing with cybersecurity should 
be avoided. The focus should not be on adding to the high-level discussions 
that already exist, but on expanding the bottom-up, professional discussions 
that are currently under-exploited. 
One practical way forward was recently explored at the Internet Governance Forum 
of 2017 in Geneva. There, national and private CERTs were identified as technical and 
largely apolitical actors at the frontline of incident response. These attributes position 
CERTs advantageously, as potentially significant actors on the global sphere. To tap 
into this potential, governments could further empower CERTs to engage with one 
another, broaden the scope of their discussions and cooperation, and take the lead in 
“cyber diplomatic efforts”.74 That being said, any expanded role for CERTs should be 
carefully crafted to avoid unduly politicizing their activities and tainting their technical 
mission. Another interesting outcome of the 2017 IGF was the proposal, in one of 
the panels, to leverage the multi-stakeholder model to enhance cybersecurity policy 
development and deployment.75 While this panel was primarily focused on domestic 
cybersecurity, examples were given of how bottom-up domestic policy development 
processes can have international ripple effects. The NIST Framework was frequently 
cited as a useful standard for countries and entities outside the United States.
Another example could be to expand the work of technical, policy and legal working 
groups in bodies such as UNCITRAL and the OECD. These bodies enjoy broad 
membership with established structures and work methods, and their work is typically 
produced by subject-matter experts. As noted above, they have each undertaken work 
that touches on cybersecurity issues in the past, and they could be tasked with more 
such issues going forward. This requires a “bottom-up” push from cybersecurity 
officials to suggest clear mandates for working groups within these organizations, 
followed by a “top-down” push from capitals to promote these mandates when the 
relevant organization decides on its future work program.
Finally, a more adventurous endeavor could consist of creating one or more ad hoc 
topical and specialized forums, not necessarily tied to existing organizations. For 
example, one might imagine a forum similar to the Financial Action Task Force 
74 A transcript of the session can be accessed at: <https://www.intgovforum.org/multilingual/content/igf-
2017-day-3-room-xi-ws38-international-cooperation-between-certs-ws38-technical-diplomacy>. See 
summary here: <https://www.intgovforum.org/multilingual/index.php?q=filedepot_download/5902/858>. 
75 A transcript of the session can be accessed at <https://www.intgovforum.org/multilingual/content/igf-2017-
day-3-room-ix-of70-cybersecurity-20-leveraging-the-multistakeholder-model-to>. See summary here: 
<https://www.intgovforum.org/multilingual/index.php?q=filedepot_download/5921/1042>.
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(FATF), which could work on developing global cybersecurity standards in specific 
areas (information sharing, professional qualifications, etc.). The FATF is a product 
of high-level ministerial cooperation and it has been highly influential in setting 
standards to combat money-laundering and the financing of terrorism. Arguably, 
a similar model could be adopted by cybersecurity agencies wishing to promote 
concrete steps towards enhancing global cybersecurity through domestic measures.
It goes without saying that the diplomatic community has a role to play in each of 
the examples provided above. Diplomatic efforts are needed to initiate, support and 
sustain the contacts between technical and policy professionals between different 
states, especially if some of the states will not be “like-minded”. Such efforts will 
also be needed to lend visibility to the discussions taking place, so as to increase their 
reach and effectiveness. 
4. conclusIon
The analysis above conveys a few recurring themes. The first is a shift in expectations: 
while acknowledging that some discussion of cyber norms might contribute to global 
stability, it would be unrealistic to expect that such stability can be achieved by 
declaring the existence of a norm or by attempting to operationalize a particular norm. 
The second theme is the need for a bottom-up approach, driven by actual needs of, 
and challenges faced by, government cybersecurity organizations. The third and most 
fundamental theme is the shift in emphasis, from the current discussions focused on 
global “stability”, towards the more mundane goal of domestic cybersecurity. 
In their comprehensive paper on cyber norms, Tikk and Kertunen have stated: 
“[...] cyber incident and risk assessments indicate more than 
state-on-state hostilities. Data breaches, website defacements, 
increasing cybercrime and botnet topologies, more than they speak 
of the potential of cyber warfare, testify of a cyber crisis surface 
where the risk of unwanted or unforeseen developments cannot 
be effectively prevented due to the still low awareness or obvious 
capacity gaps. Therefore, the GGE has, without necessarily 
meaning to, developed at least two separate agendas of international 
cybersecurity: one that can be understood and explained by way 
of traditional geopolitics and where the likelihood of conflict or 
no conflict does not depend significantly on ICT as such. Absent 
ICTs, the relationships between the US, China, Russia, Iran and 
North Korea remain largely the same. What geopolitics cannot 
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exhaustively explain, is the surface of potential cyber crisis that has 
emerged by way of extensive adoption of ICTs across the world, 
without due acknowledgment of the accompanying risks and 
ways of their mitigation. Jumping on the international information 
highway has been too fast, too soon, for countries that are not able 
to run sustainable information systems and services: States that 
have to run on Windows XP, cannot be helped by any of the UN 
GGE recommendations.”76 
In very broad terms, the two agendas described above summarize the distinction 
made in this paper between “global stability”, which current cyber norm efforts 
have been promoting, and domestic cybersecurity, which deserves greater attention 
from the international community. The effect of the suggested bottom-up, domestic 
cybersecurity approach is a series of open-ended processes, the milestones of 
which will likely be more incremental. Its successes will hopefully be enduring and 
substantive, though they will not grab national headlines. Under this approach, the role 
of civil society is crucial. Think-tanks, multinational corporations and academics can 
generate valuable ideas outside conventional thinking, conduct large-scale empirical 
research and provide a diversity of perspectives that can all feed in to these bottom-
up processes. Diplomacy, too, plays a critical role in taking the domestic civilian 
cybersecurity discussion to the global arena. The challenge for the multi-stakeholder 
cybersecurity community, then, is to reassess current cyber norm development efforts, 
adjust expectations, refocus and leap forward with a new sense of purpose.
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and Cohesive Cybersecurity 
Legal Principles
Abstract: Legal discussions about combatting global cyber threats often focus 
on international cybercrime arrangements or the application of the law of war to 
cyberspace. While these discussions are vital, policy-makers and scholars have not 
devoted adequate attention to creating a global legal framework to bolster the defenses 
of public and private infrastructure. Due to the interconnected nature of cyberspace 
and the cross-border impacts of attacks, inadequate security in one country could 
harm another.
To build cyber strategies that rely in part on defense and deterrence by denial, 
governments should also focus both on the security of their systems and those of 
the private sector. Industry has been the target of some of the most destructive 
cyberattacks worldwide. Guiding international principles for a cyber security legal 
framework would help nations to build effective laws that reduce the likelihood of 
successful attacks, and increase resilience after attacks occur. Moreover, international 
collaboration on cybersecurity laws provides multinational companies with a more 
coherent legal framework. A patchwork of hundreds of different international security 
requirements is not only burdensome for companies, but it increases the potential for 
vulnerabilities, particularly if the company operates in countries with less stringent 
cybersecurity requirements.  
This paper sets out the need for nations to discuss common legal principles for 
promoting and regulating cybersecurity, similar to the privacy principles articulated 
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1. IntroductIon
Over the past decade, there has been great progress on international cooperation to 
combat cybercrime and build on norms to deter and deny states that leverage the 
asymmetric nature of cyber operations. All of these discussions are vital and must 
continue on the international stage. However, international legal discussions also must 
address cybersecurity law.  
At the outset, this Paper defines “cybersecurity law,” as the term is often used 
interchangeably to describe regulation of the private sector’s computer systems and 
networks, federal programs that assist the private sector, cybercrime statutes and the 
legal norms of cyberwar. For the purposes of this paper, I broadly define cybersecurity 
law as domestic laws that seek to promote the confidentiality, integrity and availability 
of public and private computer systems, networks and information.2 This expansive 
definition applies equally to governmental regulations and public-private partnerships 
and to incentives that have the ultimate goal of improving cybersecurity.
Improving the cybersecurity of public and private systems has two primary national 
security benefits. First, hardened defenses help to reduce or eliminate harm caused 
by an aggressor. Second, cybersecurity is an important part of a framework to deter 
attacks, provided that the aggressor is aware of the strong defenses. While deterrence 
by punishment is an important component of a cyber strategy, so too is deterrence 
by denial. Cyber deterrence requires nations to ensure that their laws provide 
adequate assistance and incentives for cybersecurity of both government and private 
infrastructure. Too often, the security of the private sector is missing from the greater 
discussion of national cybersecurity.3 Governments worldwide have recognized the 
2 See Jeff Kosseff, Defining Cybersecurity Law, 103 IOWA L. REV. 985 (2018). 
3 See Kristen E. Eichensehr, Public-Private Cybersecurity, 95 TEX. L. REV. 467, 536 (2017) (“As the 
operation of government-like power becomes more diffuse and more complicated, the actions of private 
sector actors can implicate the public law values that traditionally apply to governmental actions, and 
governmental actions may come into increasing tension with public law values.”).   
in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s Fair Information 
Practices in 1980. As a starting point for discussion, this paper suggests four goals 
of common international principles for cybersecurity law: (1) modernization 
of cybersecurity laws; (2) uniformity of legal requirements; (3) coordination of 
cooperative incentives and coercive regulations; and (4) supply chain security. 
Although cybersecurity laws will always vary, international coordination could 
improve their efficacy by providing some degree of consistency. A dialogue also could 
help policy-makers learn from other nations’ cybersecurity successes and failures.
Keywords: cybersecurity; cooperation; principles; cybercrime; data security
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need for private companies to protect their data and cyber infrastructure. The private 
sector controls vast amounts of infrastructure that are vulnerable to cyberattacks, 
making the private sector’s cybersecurity important not only to nations’ economies, 
but also to their national security.4 
The interconnected nature of cyber threats – in which an attack in one country could 
cause harmful spill-over effects in another country – provides policy-makers with a 
compelling reason to improve cybersecurity laws globally. To do so, nations should 
collaborate and articulate core principles for cybersecurity, just as the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) did for privacy law nearly four 
decades ago when it developed its Fair Information Practices. 
This paper then draws on examples of successful cybersecurity laws and partnerships 
worldwide to outline some goals of a global cybersecurity legal framework:
• Modernization of cybersecurity laws to address current threats;
• Uniformity of legal and regulatory requirements;
• Coordination of cooperative cybersecurity programs and regulatory 
obligations; and
• Supply chain security. 
Cybersecurity often involves an alignment of public-sector and private-sector interests. 
Accordingly, cybersecurity law should move from the outdated, purely punitive 
model of privacy law to a collaborative and cooperative framework. I refer to this 
model as “collaborative cybersecurity law,” a mixture of incentives, public-private 
partnerships, and tailored regulations that is designed to improve cybersecurity as a 
whole.
For this paper, collaborative cybersecurity law has two equally important applications. 
First, the public and private sectors should collaborate to determine the most 
effective legal frameworks to build defenses and resilience. Second, governments 
should collaborate at the local, state/province, and national levels to ensure that their 
requirements and incentives are aligned to the common goal of protecting global 
cyber infrastructure. Cyberspace does not have clearly defined geographic or public/
private boundaries. Nor should the defense of cyberspace.
I do not suggest the creation of a single set of cybersecurity laws to apply across 
all nations; such a task would be a fool’s errand, as countries have a wide range of 
tort, constitutional, and administrative laws that would prevent a single law across all 
jurisdictions. Jurisdictions such as the United States tend to favor cybersecurity laws 
4 See Roger Hurwitz, The Play of States: Norms and Security in Cyberspace, 36 AMERICAN FOREIGN 
POLICY INTERESTS 322 (2014) (“Our discussion suggests that efforts to establish a state-led 
comprehensive regime for cyberspace will not succeed, notwithstanding the illusion that it could provide a 
more stable order and block fragmentation of the Internet.”). 
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5 See Elisa Bertino & Nayeem Islam, Botnets and Internet of Things Security, 50:2 COMPUTER 76-79 
(Feb. 2017). 
6 See Bernard Marr, Botnets: The Dangerous Side Effects of The Internet of Things, FORBES (Mar. 7, 
2017). 
7 Lorenzo Franceschi-Bicchierai, Blame the Internet of Things for Destroying the Internet Today, 
MOTHERBOARD (Oct. 21, 2016). 
that promote free expression over other interests, while jurisdictions such as those in 
Europe tend to favor privacy protection. Rather than attempt a uniform set of laws, 
countries should develop a set of shared core cybersecurity values to apply as they 
develop laws to address cybersecurity threats via laws, regulations, and government 
programs. 
In short, this paper argues that nations must broaden their conception of the international 
cybersecurity dialogue. While the ongoing discussions regarding cyberwarfare norms 
are essential, it is only one piece of the much larger solution to improving the security 
of cyberspace. Nations must also develop a cohesive strategy to secure both public 
and private cyber information and infrastructure through regulations and incentives. 
2. the global ImPact of InadeQuate 
cybersecurIty
Cyber threats are not always confined to geographic borders. Many of the most damaging 
and persistent cyberattacks have targeted systems and data in multiple countries. The 
attacks target not only military systems or civilian government computers, but often 
also home systems that are operated by the private sector. With the private sector 
controlling critical infrastructure such as logistics, telecommunications, and financial 
systems globally, the cybersecurity of both the public and private sector is crucial to 
adequate defense. 
The pervasive global nature of cyber threats can be seen in botnets, which use infected 
computers to amass power to launch devastating attacks. As botnets infect more 
computers, they cause more damage, such as forcing websites offline and interrupting 
critical services.5 The Internet of Things era has exponentially increased the number 
of devices connected to the Internet. Botnets have commandeered these devices, in 
part due to the inadequate security measures on many IoT devices.6 
For instance, in October 2016, the Mirai botnet, consisting of hundreds of thousands 
of infected devices, knocked some of the most popular websites in the world offline 
by targeting Dyn, a domain name system management service.7
Botnets demonstrate the international impact of inadequate cybersecurity. Consider, 
for example, a webcam that is manufactured in Germany with inadequate password 
protections. If a consumer in the United States uses that webcam, it could be used in a 
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botnet that shuts down a website in New Zealand. New Zealand alone cannot address 
the botnet problem by regulating the security of Internet of Things devices.  
Likewise, the WannaCry ransomworm demonstrates the interconnected nature of 
cyber threats. WannaCry was initially found on European businesses’ computers on the 
early morning of May 12, 2017. The files on infected computers were encrypted, and 
the computer operators received a demand for bitcoin in exchange for the encryption 
key, though paying the ransom did not always guarantee decryption of the files. The 
ransomworm rapidly spread. In all, WannaCry infected more than 200,000 computers 
around the world.8
WannaCry was so malicious and pervasive because it spread using EternalBlue, 
an exploit that allows malware to spread in Windows operating systems. Hackers 
allegedly stole EternalBlue from the U.S. National Security Agency.9 The U.S. and 
UK authorities have attributed WannaCry to North Korea.10
According to the European Union Agency for Network and Information Security, 
once a computer was infected with WannaCry, it would scan public Internet Protocol 
addresses for other external networks to infect.11 Rather than merely spreading across 
a company’s internal network, WannaCry used its infected computers to find and 
target other vulnerable networks.12
WannaCry and Mirai demonstrate the globally interconnected nature of harms 
associated with cyberattacks. The attacks demonstrate that an attack that initially 
focuses on one geographic region can have immediate and damaging spill-over 
effects into other countries. Therefore, it is in a nation’s interests to secure not only 
the computers within its geographic boundaries, but the systems and networks across 
the globe. 
3. the need for legal PrIncIPles to ImProVe 
global cybersecurIty
Enhanced cybersecurity of a nation’s infrastructure plays two critical roles in cyber 
strategy. First, it reduces or eliminates the risk of harm from an attempted attack by 
bolstering defenses. Second, the known existence of the attack may deter the attacks 
from ever occurring. 
8 Sam Jones, Timeline: How the WannaCry Cyber Attack Spread, FINANCIAL TIMES (May 14, 2017). 
9 Ibid.
10 David E. Sanger, U.S. Accuses North Korea of Mounting WannaCry Cyberattack, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 18, 
2017). 
11 European Union Agency for Network and Information Security, WannaCry Ransomware Outburst (May 
15, 2017); Adam McNeil, How Did the WannaCry Ransomware Spread? MALWAREBYTES (May 19, 
2017).
12 See Abishek Singh, WannaCry Ransomware Analysis: Lateral Movement Propagation, ACALVIO (May 
16, 2017).
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Deterrence strategy has two components: deterrence by punishment and deterrence 
by denial.13 Deterrence by denial consists of strategies that both resist attacks and 
help recovery from attacks once they have occurred (known as “resilience.”).14 For 
effective cyber deterrence by denial, the private sector must both secure its own 
system and networks and develop secure products throughout the supply chain. As 
Dorothy Denning summarized in 2016:
Cybersecurity aids deterrence primarily through the principle 
of denial. It stops attacks before they can achieve their goals. 
This includes beefing up login security, encrypting data and 
communications, fighting viruses and other malware, and keeping 
software updated to patch weaknesses when they’re found.
But even more important is developing products that have few if 
any security vulnerabilities when they are shipped and installed. 
The Mirai botnet, capable of generating massive data floods that 
overload internet servers, takes over devices that have gaping 
security holes, including default passwords hardcoded into 
firmware that users can’t change. While some companies such 
as Microsoft invest heavily in product security, others, including 
many Internet-of-Things vendors, do not.15
Nations can promote such cybersecurity measures by enacting effective regulations 
and creating public-private partnerships. Defending against attacks helps to mitigate 
the overall harm.16 However, a single nation’s laws are likely to be insufficient to 
adequately shore up its cybersecurity. The cyber vulnerabilities in Country A may 
lead to negative consequences in Country B, and Country B has limited ability, acting 
alone, to impose consequences for inadequate cybersecurity in Country A. That is 
where an international dialogue on cybersecurity is vital. 
Even to the extent that some cyberattacks are strictly local, an international dialogue 
about cybersecurity laws can allow nations to share lessons about their experiences 
with government programs, regulations, and laws. Unlike other areas of law that have 
centuries of empirical evidence to support or reject their adoption, cybersecurity law 
needs to address the rapidly evolving threat landscape. If, for instance, requiring a 
particular safeguard is effective, nations could share these experiences in determining 
best practices. 
13 See A. Wess Mitchell, The Case for Deterrence by Denial, THE AMERICAN INTEREST (Aug. 12, 2015). 
14 See Annegret Bendiek and Tobias Metzger, Deterrence Theory in the Cyber Century, in LECTURE 
NOTES IN INFORMATICS (LNI), GESELLSCHAFT FÜR INFORMATIK, BONN 2015.
15 Dorothy Denning, Cybersecurity’s Next Phase: Cyber Deterrence, SCI. AMERICAN (Dec. 2016). 
16 See Martin Libicki, Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar 176 (2009).
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In both the areas of cybercriminal law17 and cyberwarfare,18 international experts and 
policy-makers have at least attempted to find areas of broad agreement. However, 
criminal laws and warfare norms and guidelines often address responses to cyberattacks 
(i.e., criminal prosecutions or military action). While these are absolutely vital to a 
comprehensive cybersecurity framework, they are only part of the solution. Laws and 
regulations also should seek to bolster defenses to prevent attacks from succeeding in 
the first place. 
The Council of Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime (the Budapest Convention) 
sets minimum requirements for computer crime statutes in participating nations 
and provides for mutual assistance in investigating and prosecuting cybercrimes. 
This cooperation and harmonization is necessary because of the global nature of 
cybercrimes, and the criminal is often located in a different country from the target.19 
By harmonizing cybercrime laws, the Budapest Convention reduces the likelihood of 
some countries becoming “safe havens” for cybercriminals.20 However, the Budapest 
Convention has been criticized for being unsuccessful and overall not helping to crack 
down on cybercrime.21 It has not been adopted outside of a majority of Council of 
Europe members and the United States. When Russia, North Korea, Iran, China, and 
other non-members often are the sources of cyber-attacks, the Budapest Convention 
provides the target countries with little recourse. Moreover, criminal law alone is not 
always sufficient to prevent attacks in cyberspace due to the challenges of attributing 
attacks with certainty.22 While the Budapest Convention plays an important role in 
harmonizing at least some cybercrime laws in some countries, it is not a panacea.23
In some respects, there are even more benefits to coming to a consensus on international 
cybersecurity law than in criminal law. The Budapest Convention is of limited utility 
because many of the most pernicious attacks are perpetrated from nations that are not 
parties to the Convention; laws that effectively promote the cybersecurity of public 
and private systems and networks, however, provide incremental worldwide benefits, 
even if they have not been adopted by the handful of nations that are the sources of 
the attacks. Consider, for example, a cybersecurity regulatory framework that bolsters 
resistance and reduces the spread of botnets by 75 percent in countries that have 
adopted its safeguards. If half of the nations were to adopt the framework, the overall 
17 ETS 185 – Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, 23.XI.2001.
18 See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER OPERATIONS 
(Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2017) (hereinafter, “Tallinn Manual”). 
19 See, e.g., Jonathan Clough, A World of Difference: The Budapest Convention on Cybercrime and the 
Challenges of Harmonisation, 40 MONASH L.R. 699, 700 (“Although many offences are transnational 
in nature – for instance trafficking in humans, weapons and drugs, money laundering and terrorism 
– cybercrime presents unique challenges due to the inherently transnational nature of the underlying 
technology.”).
20 Id. at 700.
21 See, e.g., Jack Goldsmith, Cybersecurity Treaties, A Skeptical View, in FUTURE CHALLENGES IN 
NATIONAL SECURITY AND LAW (Feb. 2011). 
22 Lily Hay Newman, Hacker Lexicon: What is the Attribution Problem? WIRED (Dec. 24, 2016).
23 See Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo, The Cyber Threat Landscape: Challenges and Future Research 
Directions, COMPUTERS & SECURITY 30:8 (Nov. 2011). 
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strength of a botnet likely would weaken because it would not be as successful in 
propagating. 
Similarly, the growing body of scholarship that applies jus ad bellum and jus in bello 
to cyberwarfare is absolutely essential to our understanding of acceptable responses 
to cyberattacks and it helps to inform deterrence strategies. Understanding the 
application of jus ad bellum to cyberspace is essential in informing a deterrence by 
punishment strategy. The two editions of the Tallinn Manual have provided a forum for 
an International Group of Experts on the law of war to articulate both commonalities 
and differences in views about how their field applies in cyberspace.24 Although 
the Tallinn Manual does not represent the official views of a single organization or 
state,25 it is one of the greatest steps in articulating commonalities and differences in 
international cyber law.26
Likewise, from 2016-17, the United Nations Group of Government Experts attempted 
to reach an agreement on norms of cyber issues such as international humanitarian law 
and the right of self-defense. However, those discussions failed to lead to a consensus, 
as some participants had very different views on the fundamental international 
norms.27 Indeed, such consensus will be difficult or impossible for norms related 
to jus ad bellum and jus in bello. But such issues should not be the only focus of 
international discussions. Global norms for domestic cybersecurity issues could play 
an equally vital role in securing cyberspace. 
The cybersecurity of a nation’s infrastructure may play a significant role in its response 
to a cyberattack, as the success or failure of cyberdefense often determines whether a 
cyber act constitutes an unlawful use of force.28 Consider, for instance, a cyberattack 
by Iran on a portion of the U.S. power grid that is operated by a private company. If 
the utility has installed sufficient safeguards, the attack may be nothing more than a 
nuisance that causes little damage. If, however, the attack succeeds, it could cause 
significant economic loss, and perhaps even personal injury. Those two outcomes 
would warrant very different responses under international warfare norms. Just as 
24 See, e.g., Kristen Eichensehr, Review of The Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber 
Warfare, 108 A. J. INT’L L. 585, 586 (2014) (“While the rules on which the IGE agreed are very useful 
in advancing thought and debate about international law regarding cyberwar, more valuable still are the 
instances in which the Tallinn Manual frankly acknowledges disagreement within the IGE.”). 
25 See TALLINN MANUAL at 2 (“Ultimately, Tallinn Manual 2.0 must be understood only as an expression 
of the two International Groups of Experts as to the state of the law.”).
26 See Gary Korn, Tallinn Manual 2.0, Advancing the Conversation, JUSTSECURITY (Feb. 15, 2017) (“[T]
he advisory nature of Tallinn 2.0 should not detract from its immense value to legal practitioners and 
their clients in both the public and private sector as a quality compendium of the general framework of 
international rules and principles most pertinent to cyber operations.”).
27 See Remarks of Michele G. Markoff, Deputy Coordinator for Cyber Issues, U.S. Department of State (June 
23, 2017) (“It is unfortunate that the reluctance of a few participants to seriously engage on the mandate on 
international legal issues has prevented the Group from reaching consensus on a report that would further 
the goal of common understandings among UN Member States on these important issues.”).
28 See Priyanka R. Dev, ‘Use of Force’ and ‘Armed Attack’ Thresholds in Cyber Conflict: The Looming 
Definitional Gaps and the Growing Need for Formal U.N. Response, 50 TEX. INT’L L. J. 379 (2015). 
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the international legal community has attempted to develop common ground as to the 
application of the law of war to cyber, so too should the community develop principles 
that guide the protection of cyber infrastructure. 
Efforts to develop transnational common ground on cybercrime law and cyberwarfare 
norms will not solve all of the complex international legal problems associated 
with threats, though they are necessary components of the overall approach to 
cybersecurity. Moreover, both efforts provide roadmaps for international dialogues 
about cybersecurity laws that deter by denial. The Budapest Convention and the 
Tallinn Manual demonstrate that it is possible for nations with different values to at 
least agree on some core principles for cyberspace. Both the Budapest Convention’s 
formal attempts at proscribing specific cybercrime laws and the Tallinn Manual’s 
attempts to narrate common, nonbinding interpretations are essential as nations 
confront growing cyber threats.
Although there is not currently a universal set of cybersecurity principles outside of 
the cybercrime and cyberwarfare contexts, an analogue exists in the privacy arena and 
demonstrates the utility of setting forth a core set of shared legal values for technology 
law. In 1980, the OECD, an economic development organization consisting of 35 
nations, published the OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder 
Flows of Personal Data, the centerpiece of which was the OECD Fair Information 
Practices.29
Drawing on robust discussions among participating countries, OECD developed the 
following eight general principles for information privacy: collection limitation; data 
quality; purpose specification; use limitation; security safeguards; openness; individual 
participation; and accountability.30 The Guidelines have been revised only once, in 
2013. Each of the eight principles provides a broad framework under which nations 
could choose how to best regulate privacy. For instance, the collection limitation 
principles state that “[t]here should be limits to the collection of personal data and any 
such data should be obtained by lawful and fair means and, where appropriate, with 
the knowledge or consent of the data subject”.31
Broad principles such as this allow for some standardization across nations; yet they 
also provide countries with the flexibility to adhere to these principles within their 
existing legal systems and policy preferences.32 The OECD Guidelines have helped 
29 See Pam Dixon, A Brief Introduction to Fair Information Practices, World Privacy Forum, available at 
https://www.worldprivacyforum.org/2008/01/report-a-brief-introduction-to-fair-information-practices/.
30 OECD GUIDELINES ON THE PROTECTION OF PRIVACY AND TRANSBORDER FLOWS OF 
PERSONAL DATA.
31 Ibid. 
32 Id. at 48, Original Explanatory Memorandum to the OECD Privacy Guidelines (“On the whole, the 
Guidelines constitute a general framework for concerted actions by Member countries: objectives put 
forward by the Guidelines may be pursued in different ways, depending on the legal instruments and 
strategies preferred by Member countries for their implementation.”). 
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to shape the contours of privacy laws around the world, even beyond the 34 OECD 
member nations.33  
The OECD Guidelines are privacy-focused, though the document’s Security 
Safeguards Principle states that personal data “should be protected by reasonable 
security safeguards against such risks as loss or unauthorized access, destruction, 
use, modification or disclosure of data”. The supplemental memorandum for the 
2013 revisions suggests that these safeguards include data security breach notification 
requirements. Although this principle touches on a cybersecurity issue, it focuses 
on personal information security and does not adequately address the full range of 
cybersecurity threats, as discussed in the next section. Privacy and cybersecurity are 
often lumped into the same category of law and share some common issues, but they 
each present different challenges and should be individually addressed.34 While the 
protection of personal information certainly is part of cybersecurity, other threats, such 
as the theft of trade secrets or attacks on cyber-physical systems, are not adequately 
addressed by privacy law.35 Cybersecurity law should promote not only the privacy 
of personal data, but also the protection of systems and data from attacks that could 
interrupt economies or threaten national security. 
This is not to suggest that the OECD framework has perfectly aligned the privacy 
laws and regulations of all member nations. Far from it. The European Union views 
privacy as a fundamental human right, and therefore its privacy laws, including the 
new General Data Protection Regulation, are often far more stringent than those of 
other jurisdictions. However, the OECD Principles, at the very least, give participating 
nations a basis on which to find some commonalities and a general framework for 
discussing and debating privacy issues. 
4. goals for InternatIonal cybersecurIty 
legal PrIncIPles
Because nations have had few robust and meaningful discussions about how to 
promote and regulate cybersecurity via legal frameworks, it would be impossible to 
propose a comprehensive set of principles to guide governments globally. 
33 See, e.g., Monika Kuschewsky, What Does the Revision of the OECD Privacy Guidelines Mean for 
Businesses, AB EXTRA (Oct. 22, 2013) (“Today, its basic privacy principles are essentially reflected in all 
relevant general data protection frameworks worldwide.”).
34 See, e.g., Bob Siegel, What is the Difference Between Privacy and Security?, CSO (May 26, 2016) (“A 
security program protects all the informational assets that an organization collects and maintains. A privacy 
program focuses on the personal information an organization collects and maintains.”).
35 The OECD in 2002 adopted its Guidelines for the Security of Information Systems and Networks, which 
sets out nine general principles for information security. Although these Guidelines are useful, they do 
not address the problem that this paper seeks to address. The guidelines apply equally to government 
entities, businesses, and individual users, and focus more on ethical information security norms rather 
than guidelines for laws. They do not provide the same level of general principles for laws that OECD’s 
privacy principles do. The guidelines are focused on the security of information, and do not address the 
comprehensive threats to cybersecurity that nations currently face.
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This part sets out the goals of global cybersecurity legal standards and a few areas to 
begin discussions among nations as they determine how best to address cybersecurity 
challenges via laws and regulations. To be clear, I do not suggest that this should serve 
as the list of international cybersecurity principles. Such a framework would require 
significant multilateral discussion and assessments of both the cybersecurity threats 
and the legal capabilities and constraints to address those threats. Rather, these four 
goals are broad topic areas that serve as a starting point for an international discussion 
about common principles. 
A. Modernizing Laws to Address Current Cybersecurity Threats
The laws in many nations do not adequately address some of the newer cybersecurity 
threats, as the laws are outgrowths of pre-Internet legal fields such as privacy torts and 
criminal law. International norms could help guide nations as they adjust their laws to 
the current threat landscape. 
One of the core concepts in the cybersecurity field is the CIA Triad: confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability of data, systems, and networks.36 Confidentiality protects 
information from unauthorized access.37 Integrity ensures that the information is 
accurate and systems function as intended.38 Availability guarantees uninterrupted 
access to information and systems.39 An effective cybersecurity program will advance 
all three goals.
Unfortunately, cybersecurity law is often conflated with data security and privacy laws 
that have been on the books for many years or decades. This results in a focus on the 
confidentiality of personal information, which is the primary security-related concern 
of privacy law. Without a doubt, that is an important concern, but it overlooks the 
confidentiality of other critical but non-personal information, such as corporate trade 
secrets or classified government information. For instance, many jurisdictions require 
companies to notify individuals and regulators about disclosure of certain categories 
of personal information, and data security requirements often apply to particularly 
sensitive types of personal information such as medical records. 
Privacy law cares little about integrity or availability, nor do any data security laws 
that are largely an outgrowth of privacy laws. Data security regulations, for example, 
often address the unauthorized access to or acquisition of data. These laws typically 
do little to address attacks on availability (such as ransomware) or attacks on integrity 
(such as website defacement or modifications to database systems that cause physical 
impacts, such as explosions in gas lines).40
36 See U.S. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, FEDERAL 
INFORMATION PROCESSING STANDARDS PUBLICATION 199.
37 Id. at 2.
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
40 See, e.g., Derek E. Bambauer, Schrodinger’s Cybersecurity, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 791 (2015). 
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Laws should, of course, continue to protect confidentiality. Protecting confidentiality 
and privacy is not mutually exclusive with protecting integrity and availability. 
Indeed, many of the concerns regarding interference in the 2016 American election 
boil down to breaches of confidentiality: the hacks of John Podesta’s email account 
and the Democratic National Committee’s servers. However, confidentiality should 
not be the exclusive focus, particularly in the age of cyber-physical systems and the 
Internet of Things, when everyday devices are increasingly connected to the Internet 
and could be vulnerable to attacks. A modern cybersecurity framework must address 
these threats as well as data breaches.  
In addition to promoting all three prongs of the CIA triad, cybersecurity laws should 
be forward-looking and should minimize harm from future cyberattacks. Ideally, such 
laws would require companies and governments to bolster defenses to a point where 
the attacks do not succeed. However, it is highly unlikely that any legal system would 
entirely prevent all attacks. For that reason, a modern cybersecurity legal framework 
should also strive to improve resilience – the ability of a company or government to 
quickly recover after an attack has occurred.41 
B. Uniformity of Regulations
Regulation of the private sector plays a key role in securing cyber infrastructure. 
Companies that have some of the most critical cyber infrastructure operate in many 
countries. Those companies, therefore, are subject to hundreds of legal regimes at the 
local, state/province, and national levels. To the greatest extent possible, cybersecurity 
regulations should be standardized across governments to improve the ease and 
likelihood of compliance. International norms could help to guide that uniformity.
For instance, companies are subject to dozens of data breach notification laws at the 
state/province and national levels, all varying in terms of the specific requirements 
that they impose as to what types of personal data trigger the notification requirements 
and the forms that the notices must take.42 The breach notice laws apply based on 
the residency of the individuals whose data was breached. Thus, a company that has 
customers throughout the world must comply with all of these requirements in the 
days following a breach. Such compliance can be time-consuming, and can divert 
attention from efforts to remedy the harms caused by the breach and prevent further 
intrusions.43
Policy-makers at the international level could help strive toward such uniformity 
by adopting standards that could be the basis of private sector requirements, and 
jurisdictions should aim for uniformity among the regulations of state, provincial, 
41 See Fredrik Hult & Giri Silvanesan, What Good Cyber Resilience Looks Like, J. OF BUS. CONTINUITY 
& EMERGENCY PLANNING 112 (2013-14). 
42 See World Law Group, GLOBAL GUIDE TO DATA BREACH NOTIFICATIONS (2016). 
43 See Brett V. Newman, Hacking the Current System: Congress’ Attempt to Pass Data Security and Breach 
Notification Legislation, 2015 U. ILL. J.L. TECH & POL’Y 437, 442 (2015).
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and local governments. The European Union’s GDPR, for example, aims to improve 
uniformity among European Union members by imposing a single comprehensive 
set of requirements for privacy and security practices when dealing with European 
residents’ personal information.44
Complete global uniformity of cybersecurity laws is impossible, as countries will 
differ in their legal constraints and values regarding issues such as privacy, expression, 
and security. For instance, in Europe, privacy is a fundamental human right, while 
the United States is more likely to balance privacy with other interests such as 
free expression.45 However, even some movements toward similar cybersecurity 
regulations would be useful in providing companies with more effective pathways to 
comply with the global patchwork of laws. 
C. Coordination of Coercive and Cooperative Laws 
Cybersecurity laws should contain a mixture of punitive regulations and incentives 
to promote private sector security. Regulations will always play an important part 
in bolstering companies’ cybersecurity. However, cybersecurity differs from other 
regulated areas in that the government’s goals are often generally aligned with the 
goals of a company. A rational chief executive does not want their company to 
experience a denial of service attack or data breach, nor does a rational government 
official. 
For that reason, there is great room for collaboration between the public and private 
sectors. Such collaboration should form part of a broader strategy for bolstering the 
cybersecurity of public and private infrastructure.
For instance, governments across the world are increasingly improving and expanding 
their cyber threat information sharing programs, which allow the private and public 
sectors to exchange information and collaborate to reduce the spread and damage 
of cyberattacks. In the European Union, the 2016 NIS Directive requires member 
states to establish Computer Security Incident Response Teams that monitor, share, 
and collect information about cyber threats and “establish cooperation relationships 
with the private sector”.46 Likewise, in late 2015, the U.S. Congress passed the 
Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act, which provides companies with limited legal 
immunity for sharing cyber threat information and defensive measures with other 
companies and the federal government’s threat information sharing program. The 
statute has been called “the first major piece of cybersecurity legislation enacted into 
44 See Terry Greer-King, GDPR is Coming: 5 Things to Be Aware Of, Cisco UK & Ireland Blog (Feb. 23, 
2017) (“[E]ach country currently has their own ways of coming up with legislation to control data rights. 
GDPR is going to drive some uniformity, and make it easier to legislate.”). 
45 See Mark Scott & Natasha Singer, How Europe Protects Your Online Data Differently Than the U.S., N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 31, 2016). 
46 Annex I to Directive (EU) 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 2016 
concerning measures for a high common level of security of network and information systems across the 
Union (“NIS Directive”).
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law that seeks to directly address the relationship between the private and public 
sectors”.47 An international dialogue on such efforts could establish best practice for 
such threat-sharing efforts and might also lead to more effective means of exchanging 
critical threat information internationally. 
Cybersecurity education also requires collaborative efforts from both the public and 
private sectors. It includes general awareness campaigns to reduce the success of 
phishing and other social engineering attacks, as well as more advanced collegiate and 
graduate school training to build a cybersecurity workforce. For instance, the Israeli 
National Cyber Bureau has developed a plan both to build cybersecurity awareness 
among the general public,48 and the EU’s NIS Directive requires each member state to 
adopt a strategy that addresses “education, awareness-raising and training programs 
relating to the national strategy on the security of network and information systems”.49 
Governments could also provide financial incentives, such as tax credits and research 
and development funding, to encourage potential targets to invest large sums of 
money and staffing to bolster their cybersecurity. Because many high-profile targets 
are multi-national corporations, international coordination on incentives such as tax 
credits would be particularly useful in developing a global strategy. 
International norms to improve cybersecurity education are particularly useful with 
a global information technology workforce. Nations could determine any particular 
skill shortages within cybersecurity and align educational programs accordingly. 
Moreover, international principles could help to guide and improve cybersecurity 
awareness campaigns to reduce the likelihood of cybersecurity attacks succeeding 
due to human error. 
D. Secure Throughout the Supply Chain
Just as cybersecurity threats arise due to the global interconnection of networks and 
systems, they also often arise because products and services rely on a number of 
components developed around the world and inadequate security of a component 
can make an entire product or service vulnerable. Countries have individually begun 
addressing the supply chain in a thoughtful manner. For instance, in 2008, the United 
States began its Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative, which recognized 
the need for “partnership with industry to develop and adopt supply chain and risk 
management standards and best practices”.50 However, the Initiative recognized that 
supply chain cybersecurity is not merely a problem that arises from U.S. companies: 
47 Jamil N. Jaffer, Carrots and Sticks in Cyberspace: Addressing Key Issues in the Cybersecurity Information 
Sharing Act of 2015, 67 S.C. L. REV. 585, 586 (2016). 
48 See Daniel Benoliel, Towards a Cybersecurity Policy Model: Israel National Cyber Bureau Case Study, 16 
N.C. J.L. & TECH 435, 446 (2015). 
49 NIS Directive at Art. 7(1)(d). 
50 COMPREHENSIVE NATIONAL CYBERSECURITY INITIATIVE, available at 
 https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/node/233086.
297
“Risks stemming from both the domestic and globalized supply chain must be 
managed in a strategic and comprehensive way over the entire lifecycle of products, 
systems and services.”51
International standards for supply chain cybersecurity would be particularly useful, as 
products may rely on technology that is manufactured in many nations. A substantive 
dialogue between governments and industry could develop best practices for supply 
chain cybersecurity, which could be used as the basis for national or regional 
cybersecurity laws. Such standardization could improve the overall security of 
products and services while increasing the ease of compliance. 
5. conclusIon
This paper argues that nations should broaden their cyber discussion beyond 
cyberwarfare and attempt to improve the patchwork of domestic laws that seek to 
improve the cybersecurity of public and private infrastructure and information. Nations 
cannot address cybersecurity threats merely by developing domestic legal rules that 
fail to account for the laws and programs in other nations. An international framework 
for cybersecurity would help nations to align their regulations and public-private 
partnerships to address threats that often know no borders. Effective cybersecurity 
laws require collaboration between governments worldwide and between the public 
and private sectors. Although nations will continue to carve out their own paths, a 
productive international dialogue would help policy-makers to find some common 
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1. IntroductIon
Nation states and military organizations have a long tradition of intelligence gathering 
for purposes such as national security, counter-terrorism or counter-proliferation. The 
public has often held these intelligence activities in contempt, as the associated data 
collection methods tend to be intrusive to personal privacy. In recent times, however, 
we have witnessed the opposite trend in which people themselves are increasingly 
collecting and analyzing intelligence data concerning state and military activities. 
One of the most prominent examples is the tracking of military and government 
aircraft movements. As active communities surrounding affordable software-defined 
radios have brought previously hard-to-access communications into the reach of low-
skilled observers, effective privacy no longer exists on unencrypted radio channels. 
Many avionics communications use such channels, transmitting messages for private, 
military, and governmental aircraft [1], [2]. Thus far, privacy, whilst used for civil air 
traffic communication, is ensured solely by means of policy. 
This paper studies the implications of new open source aircraft data collection 
initiatives on the privacy of military and government actors. We used publicly 
We use movement data collected from more than 580 identified aircraft used by 
100 different governments and over 6,000 military aircraft to identify operations 
and relationships in the real world. We also provide case studies which show that 
potentially sensitive information appears in these open datasets in the clear from both 
military and government-operated aircraft, despite attempts at encrypting some of this 
information. 
Considering these privacy violations, we establish which countries’ militaries and 
governments take active steps in blocking the movements of their sensitive aircraft 
from online tracking websites. We find that overall more than 80% of all military 
aircraft and 60% of all government aircraft are filtered for reasons of privacy, with 
significant variation between different countries. 
Finally, we study the main mitigation methods available to state aircraft operators and 
find that all currently existing options have significant downsides, which inhibit either 
their usability or their effectiveness.
Keywords: OSINT, wireless security, air traffic communication, sensor networks, 
privacy
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available aircraft metadata in conjunction with unfiltered air traffic communication 
data gathered from the collaborative sensor network, OpenSky [3]. We collected 
and examined messages sent via the ACARS and ADS-B protocols by military and 
government-operated planes over the period of one year. We show that it is possible to 
collect and process large amounts of data in an automated fashion, providing insights 
into potentially sensitive operations conducted by military and government aircraft. 
The novelty of this work is that such analysis is possible using open source data and 
is not restricted to professional intelligence services, but rather can be conducted by 
a wide range of actors.  
In our work, we applied both large dataset analysis and case studies to illustrate the 
potential impact of air traffic data for intelligence purposes in several different areas. 
Our contributions in this paper are:
• We use movement data collected from more than 500 identified aircraft 
used by 100 different governments as well as over 6,000 military aircraft to 
identify operations and relationships in the real world. 
• We provide evidence that potentially sensitive information is communicated 
in the clear by both military and government-operated aircraft using ACARS, 
despite attempts at encrypting some of this information. 
• We establish which countries’ militaries and governments are aware of the 
existence of large commercial air traffic sensor networks and take active 
steps to block the tracking of their sensitive aircraft on these websites. 
• Finally, we examine the technical mitigation options open to state aircraft 
operators. Based on our analysis, we argue that all existing methods have 
severe drawbacks, which either inhibit their usability or their effectiveness.
In the remainder of this work, we first briefly describe the ATC technologies which we 
exploited in Section 2. Section 3 describes the crowdsourced system and the available 
public datasets which were used. Section 4 introduces our threat model, Section 5 
presents the approach and the obtained results, and Section 6 analyzes the potential 
mitigations. Finally, Section 7 discusses the implication of our results and Section 8 
concludes this paper.
2. bacKground
Figure 1 provides an abstract overview and comparison of the wireless communication 




FIGURE 1: REPRESENTATION OF ADS-B, SSR, AND ACARS SYSTEMS.
A. ACARS
The Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting System (ACARS) has been 
in use for over 20 years, providing a digital data link between the ground and the 
air [4]. It serves two main purposes: to administer ATC in order to decongest voice 
frequencies, and to improve efficiency for aircraft operations. As such, it can be used 
for safety critical procedures such as negotiating ATC clearance, as well as operational 
purposes including maintenance reports, engine data and weather information. 
It is served over three bands: High Frequency (HF), Very High Frequency (VHF), 
and Satellite Communications (SATCOM). Most aircraft are equipped for all three, 
but may choose to not use one or more. VHF is further split into Plain Old ACARS 
(POA) and VHF Data Link mode 2 (VDLm2); the former is older and slower than the 
latter, though currently has wider coverage. SATCOM is offered by both Inmarsat and 
Iridium, which offer a range of packages depending on the use. ACARS messages are 
ASCII-based and are handled by a network provider, which maintains the network 
infrastructure and access to it. Two main providers exist – SITA and Rockwell Collins.
B. SSR and ADS-B
Secondary Surveillance Radar (SSR) is a cooperative ATC technology currently 
based on the so-called transponder Modes A, C, and S, which provide digital target 
information unlike traditional analog primary radar (PSR) [5]. Aircraft transponders 
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are interrogated on the 1030 MHz frequency and reply with the desired information on 
the 1090 MHz channel, as shown in Figure 1. With the newer Automatic Dependent 
Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) protocol (see Figure 1), aircraft regularly broadcast 
their own identity, position, velocity, and additional information such as intent, status, 
or emergency codes. These broadcasts do not require interrogation; position and 
velocity are automatically transmitted twice a second [6]. 
C. Relationship to other ATC Technologies
Both ADS-B/SSR and ACARS are digital technologies, which send aircraft 
identification data (either the ICAO address, a registration, or both) with every 
message, enabling surveillance and data collection on a large scale. As security was 
not part of the design of these systems, neither includes any cryptography which could 
provide confidentiality for their users. 
A large part of civil ATC is conducted with analog technologies such as traditional 
voice communication on the VHF band. It should be noted that the features used in 
this work could also be obtained through analyzing such analog communication (e.g., 
using automatic speech recognition [7]). However, focusing on unencrypted digital 
technologies has the key advantage of worldwide scalability, with easy manipulation 
and reliable extraction of relevant information using existing crowdsourced 
infrastructure.
D. Aircraft Identifiers in ATC Communication
A 24-bit address assigned by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) 
to every aircraft is transmitted via both ADS-B/SSR and partly on ACARS (on the 
SATCOM/VDLm2 data links). This identifier is different to an aircraft squawk or 
callsign. Squawks, of which there are only 4096, are allocated locally by ATC and are 
not useful for continuous tracking. The callsign can be set separately through the flight 
deck for every flight, and can include both letters and numbers. Callsigns of private 
aircraft typically consist of the aircraft registration number, commercial airliners use 
the flight number, and military and government operators often use special call signs 
depending on their mission.
In contrast, the ICAO identifier is unique providing address space for 16 million 
assignments, and enables the continuous tracking of the movements of particular 
aircraft; while the transponder can be re-programmed by engineers, the identifier is 
not easily (or legally) changed by the pilot. These characteristics make the ICAO 
identifier ideal for continuous tracking over a prolonged period of time.
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E. Related Work
Open source information has been enjoying increased popularity, including by 
private and public intelligence services, which use it for OSINT purposes [8]. Much 
of the related OSINT literature concentrates on social media and the wider Internet 
as a source for information [9], [10]. To the best of our knowledge, no academic 
work has examined the true effect of wireless ATC communication for this purpose. 
However, the authors in [11] recently analyzed the current state of the transponder 
equipment of a sample of military and state aircraft, which is a pre-requisite for the 
present work. Similarly, several works have examined the state of privacy in aviation 
communication and highlighted the fundamental lack of confidentiality within the 
ADS-B and ACARS protocols [2], [12]–[15].
This is not limited to aviation; ships of various size and purpose use Automatic 
Identification System (AIS) to report their position in a similar way to ADS-B. AIS 
also suffers from basic security problems, much like ADS-B [16]. In recent years, its 
clear-text broadcast nature has been used to track illegal fishing [17] or monitor oil 
movements around the world [18]. 
3. oVerVIew of PublIcly 
aVaIlable aVIatIon data
In this section, we present the data collection process. We first discuss the OpenSky 
Network as a representative example of a global sensor network available to passive 
threat actors. Following this, we analyze the potential sources from which to obtain 
metadata information about the observed aircraft. Finally, we illustrate the dataset that 
we use for our analysis in this paper.
A. The OpenSky Network 
OpenSky is a crowdsourced network which is used as proof-of-concept for our OSINT 
collection. As of January 2018, the OpenSky Network consisted of 590 registered 
and about 450 anonymous sensors streaming data to its servers. Registered sensors 
are those operated by active members of the OpenSky Network community, and the 
operators of anonymous sensors are unknown. The network has currently received 
and stored over 4 trillion ATC messages, adding over 15 billion messages by more 
than 50,000 different aircraft every day.
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FIGURE 2: A MAP OF SENSORS REGISTERED TO THE OPENSKY NETWORK (JANUARY 2018).
B. Public Metadata Sources
Besides the pure movement data, we require metadata about the aircraft to contextualize 
their behavior for OSINT purposes. We discuss the available sources of aircraft and 
airport metadata below. 
1) Aircraft Metadata
Several public data sources exist which provide aircraft meta-information based on 
different identifiers. These identifiers include aircraft registration or the unique 24-bit 
ICAO Mode S transponder address. The data usually includes type and the owner 
or operator, which can then be used for further in-depth analysis and stakeholder 
identification. We used several of these third-party databases in our analysis of aircraft 
metadata: 
• The plane spotting and aviation community actively maintains and shares 
database files with spotted aircraft using the BaseStation format for this [19].
• Junzi Sun maintains a database of aircraft seen on Flightradar24. The version 
used in this work is of 24 months and amounting to 136,637 rows [20].
• Aircraft registered in the US are logged on a daily-updated FAA database 
containing owner records. This is online and available for download, but 
excludes any sensitive owner information. Even so, the data set used for this 
work contained 312,162 records in December 2017 [21].
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Besides these offline databases, which amounted to data of more than 2 million aircraft, 
we used several online sources to identify and verify aircraft as being operated by the 
government and military. These sources include the two major private flight tracking 
websites FlightAware [22] and Flightradar24 [23] and the popular database website 
airframes.org. Further leads and insights on more obscure aircraft identifications can 
also be gained on social media (Twitter, Flickr), a Wikipedia article on the topic [24], 
specialized aviation forums and aircraft photo websites such as JetPhotos [25].
2) Airport Metadata
To relate the actual destinations (countries and cities) of the tracked aircraft, we 
obtained the open airport database from Openflights.org [26]. As of December 2017, 
it contained 12,057 different airports around the globe, including name, ICAO and 
IATA (International Air Transport Association) short codes and precise location. 
C. Overview of the Analyzed Datasets
For our work, we created two ADS-B datasets for further analysis, one for government 
aircraft and one for military aircraft. For government movements, we looked at a 
period of one year from 1 July 2016 to 30 June 2017, while for the significantly larger 
military dataset, we considered the period of one month in April 2017 for a more 
straightforward analysis. Regarding the ACARS data, we were able to obtain separate 
datasets for the three data links spanning 9 months in total, which we combined to 
analyze both government and military aircraft together.
1) Government Aircraft Movements
Using the public data sources described above, we created a list of 590 verified 
government aircraft from 113 different states. Table 1 shows the distributions of these 
aircraft and their operating governments per world region and whether OpenSky has 
tracked their position using ADS-B in the observed time frame of one year.
TABLE 1: OVERVIEW OF KNOWN AND TRACKED GOVERNMENTS IN THE DATASET.
2) Military Aircraft Movements











































public data sources. Air forces typically reserve a block in their country’s ICAO ID 
range for military transponders; for example, identifiers used by the US Air Force 
tend to begin with ‘AE’. Any aircraft with an ICAO ID matching this pattern can 
be identified as being used for military purposes. Exploiting this information, we 
can identify aircraft not in our public metadata sources – including the country and 
operator – though in these instances we lack additional meta information such as 
aircraft type. Overall, this approach resulted in a list of about 520,000 potential 
military aircraft transponder IDs. 
In order to analyze the movements of military aircraft, we combined this list with 
all 1090 MHz downlink transponder transmissions recorded by OpenSky in April 
2017. In this set of about 290 billion transmissions, we detected 6,024 unique military 
aircraft that broadcast unencrypted Mode S or ADS-B messages within range. Figure 
3 shows the distribution of countries these aircraft were registered to.
FIGURE 3: DISTRIBUTION OF MILITARY AIRCRAFT SEEN IN OPENSKY BY ORIGIN COUNTRIES 
(APRIL 2017).
3) ACARS Collection
We further used the data from an ACARS receiver set up for the OpenSky Network in 
Central Europe, which collected 2,760,141 messages from 9,924 different aircraft on 
three data links (SATCOM, POA and VDLm2) over a period of 2 months for SATCOM 
and 7 months for VHF and VDLm2. While this ACARS data is not currently open 
source, there are existing platforms such as AVDelphi [27] which make such ACARS 
data publicly available.
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In this dataset, we received 6,149 ACARS messages sent by 200 unique government 
aircraft and 24,923 messages sent by 438 aircraft operated by the military. The majority 
of messages from these groups were received via SATCOM (60% for the government 
and 97% for the military), indicating a strong preference for this data link.
4. threat model
We consider a purely passive attacker as described in [14]. In our model, these are 
interested observers who exploit the open nature of air traffic communication protocols 
to obtain open source intelligence. This threat actor does not actively interfere with 
any of the observed technologies. Instead, they use public tracking services such as 
FlightRadar24 or ADS-B Exchange [28] in conjunction with public metadata sources 
to gather intelligence about government or military aviation movements. A more 
powerful version of this threat actor uses their own network of cheap SDR receivers 
to gather an unfiltered air traffic picture in real time which can be stored for historic 
analysis. This enables them to listen to a wider range of technologies such as ACARS 
and is within the capabilities of practically any determined attacker today [2].
5. exPloItIng oPen source atc data
for IntellIgence PurPoses
In this section, we provide examples of the type and scope of intelligence that can 
be gleaned from ATC data. We first discuss the government dataset, followed by the 
military dataset and an exemplary case study of a government jet operated by the 
military.
A. Government
We assume that governments are less secretive by nature than the military. At 
least in democratic countries, the electorate should be able to hold the government 
accountable, which requires an element of transparency. Whilst there are instances in 
which government transport might need to be kept private momentarily, most day-to-
day government operations may not be secret in order to provide said accountability. 
However, this is evidently not true for all government missions from all countries. 
Thus, in the following, we analyze the quantitative possibilities a passive observer 
has with regards to the tracking of government aircraft.1 Figure 4 illustrates the 
scope of our observations by showing the number and distributions of non-European 
government aircraft in Europe during the observation period.
1 Analyzing the reasons and motivations for specific relationships and government movements is out of the 
scope of this paper. 
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FIGURE 4: AIRCRAFT USED BY NON-EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS 
VISITING EUROPE DURING JULY 2016 – JUNE 2017.
1) Meetings
During the one-year observation period, we observed 164 meetings of groups of at 
least three aircraft from different governments at the same destination.2 As would be 
expected, the majority of these meet-ups happened at the major European capitals: 
Paris (44 times), Brussels (23), Rome (10), London (9), and Berlin (8). 
The largest meetings with the most participants are naturally large global summits, 
such as the World Economic Forum (21 tracked governments), the Nuclear Security 
Summit (20), or the Munich Security Council (13). While these gatherings are not 
secret, their list of participants is not always published, and if it is, it may not be 
complete. Indeed, we found several government aircraft which landed in the vicinity 
of the World Economic Forum that were absent from the official list of participants 
[29].
While large multinational meetings such as the EU or NATO summits are well known, 
most smaller gatherings of three or four countries are not easily attributable. We 
acknowledge that every such occurrence may be due to simple chance, however, they 
can provide a heuristic starting point for further investigations. 
2) Relationships
While there is a possibility of coincidence for every time that government aircraft 
are in the same location, this becomes much less likely for the consistently high 
2 We define a potential multilateral meeting as three or more aircraft, which have landed within 50 km range 
within the same 48h period and not left again.
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numbers of meetings we have seen over a prolonged time frame for many government 
pairs. Table 2 shows the top relationships between all tracked government aircraft in 
OpenSky’s sensor range. The top three relationships have seen two governments at the 
same airport for 133 times (France/Saudi Arabia), 127 times (France/Morocco), and 
102 times (Dubai/Qatar), respectively. Overall, we detected 7,106 pairwise meetings 
over 994 different relationships with a median of 3 meetings/relationship.
TABLE 2: RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN MOST SEEN GOVERNMENTS BASED ON ADS-B DATA. 
Note: We counted the Emirates of Dubai and Abu Dhabi as separate entities due to their prevalence.
Besides looking at the spatio-temporal correlation of two or more government 
aircraft, we can also investigate the most popular destinations of any single aircraft 
over time to infer public or private relationships of the operator. Table 3 lists the most 
visited destinations by the top eight observed governments. Considering OpenSky’s 
core coverage area in Europe and the US, it is unsurprising that the most observed 
government aircraft are those from European countries and the US. Their preferred 
foreign destinations reflect the close diplomatic ties between these countries, or 
special commitments as in the case of Slovakia’s EU presidency (Jul-Dec 2016), 
which necessitated a large amount of flights to the EU’s headquarters in Brussels. 
TABLE 3: MOST POPULAR NON-DOMESTIC DESTINATION COUNTRIES 
AND AIRPORTS OF THE EIGHT MOST SEEN GOVERNMENTS. 
Note: Numbers in brackets indicate the number of times an aircraft was observed visiting the destination. Note, 





























































































3) ACARS Analysis 
Of the government aircraft considered in this section, 29.9% were observed sending 
ACARS messages. This in turn means that they often leak both their existence (their 
identification) and their intent (where they are going). 
In Table 4 we see the position leakage for government aircraft as a result of using 
ACARS across the different subnetworks. Explicit position is simply a set of 
coordinates, whereas indicated position is when the aircraft is sending messages 
which reveal the area it is in. These could be airport information requests, for example. 
Note that we see at least 20% of government aircraft leak indicated position leakage 
on each link. Some of these aircraft were observed transmitting clear text e-mail 
messages via the ACARS satellite link. The nature of these messages was mainly 
flight status related, but some included names and e-mail addresses of fleet operators 
or government employees. 
TABLE 4: POSITION-RELATED MESSAGES SENT OVER ACARS BY GOVERNMENT AIRCRAFT (AC). 
PERCENTAGES ARE OF ALL GOVERNMENT AIRCRAFT SEEN ON THAT SUB-NETWORK.
B. Military
Compared to the identified government aircraft, military aircraft are much less likely to 
be equipped with ADS-B. Nonetheless, of the 6,024 unique military aircraft observed 
in April 2017, 42.9% were equipped with ADS-B and broadcast their positions at 
least some of the time. This varies greatly between different aircraft categories and 
also between countries as previous research has shown [5], [11]. Compared to the 
government aircraft, clusters of military aircraft on the ground are not as obviously 
insightful to an observer, as most operational missions are normally airborne and do 
not require landing. Yet, visits to foreign countries are interesting nonetheless and can 
support analyzes of military strategy and troop movements. 
To prove that valuable OSINT can be collected on military aircraft, we offer some 
additional approaches: we analyze the ACARS messages sent by these aircraft and 
also look at the prevalence of military UAV movements in the dataset.
1) ACARS Analysis 
Of all military aircraft we investigated, we observed 462 or 7.7% sending ACARS 





































illustrates that satellite communication is by far the most popular data link, making up 
about 98% of all traffic received by aircraft of this category. One might speculate that 
this preference indicates concern about the operational security of the ground-based 
links; however, the difficulty of eavesdropping on SATCOM with software-defined 
radios is broadly similar in practice.
As can be seen, 118 of the observed 462 military aircraft explicitly sent their position 
in the clear using ACARS at least once. Furthermore, 269 aircraft broadcast data that 
would give away their position by, for example, requesting weather reports for their 
destination airport.
TABLE 5: POSITION-RELATED MESSAGES SENT OVER ACARS BY MILITARY AIRCRAFT (AC). 
PERCENTAGES ARE OF ALL MILITARY AIRCRAFT SEEN ON THAT SUB-NETWORK.
2) UAV Detection
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) are fast becoming a major presence in civil airspace, 
and many UAVs are operated by governments or the military. Some of these drones 
carry ADS-B or Mode S transponders to cooperate with ATC and detect and avoid 
other aircraft. Hence, their presence and movements are visible to flight trackers and 
ATC receivers in general. 
Using the metadata described in Section 3, we obtained the identifiers of 74 military-
operated UAVs. We analyzed the complete historical data of OpenSky to find evidence 
of these Mode S and ADS-B-equipped UAVs, which returned sightings for 31 or 
41.9% of the complete set. 
“ADS 95 Ranger Drones” operated by the Swiss Air Force to patrol borders and for 
general surveillance purposes provided the most striking evidence of such UAVs. 
Overall, we encountered messages from 14 of these drones, which use Mode S to 
communicate their identification and altitude. 
Additionally, we received ATC messages from four General Atomics MQ-9 Reaper 
UAV and 10 Northrop Grumman RQ-4 Global Hawks. Some of these sightings 
have also been reported in aviation and military blogs on the Internet, showing that 
gathering OSINT by eavesdropping on air traffic communication is becoming more 






































Figure 5 provides a case study on typical OSINT that can be gleaned from a government 
flight operated by a country’s air force. It illustrates that, even with limited sensor 
coverage, the pieces put together via different technologies can provide a detailed 
picture of the whole flight.
FIGURE 5: A CASE STUDY OF OPEN SOURCE FLIGHT INFORMATION OBTAINABLE ABOUT A 
GOVERNMENT FLIGHT.
At the time of flight in December 2016, the OpenSky Network had comprehensive 
ADS-B and SSR coverage in the area within the dotted red line. A satellite ACARS 
receiver was placed centrally within this area, which was able to pick up the uplink 
part of the satellite communication; i.e., the one sent out by aircraft and addressed to 
the ground network.
Figure 5 shows the complete flight from the departure (D) in Riyadh to the landing (L) 
in Shannon. Around departure, the flight plan was sent out via ACARS by the aircraft 
and picked up by the receiver in Europe, detailing the precise route and waypoints the 
aircraft was planning to take. Several other ACARS messages containing potentially 
sensitive information about load and passengers were also picked up within an hour 
of departure (1). At (2), the aircraft reached the ground sensor coverage of OpenSky, 
which received 18,348 messages, providing the altitude of the aircraft and positional 
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information within the range of the receivers. At (3) it entered the range of the ground 
ACARS receiver, which captured all information provided via this channel only. 
While still at cruising altitude between (4) and (5), the aircraft activated its ADS-B 
transponder, broadcasting its exact position, call sign and velocity. It switched off the 
positional broadcasts again before leaving OpenSky’s SSR range at (6) during the 
approach to Shannon (as verified by the Mode S altitude messages).
This behavior shows that ADS-B can and is turned on and off by military-operated 
aircraft. Turning it on at least sometimes indicates a general willingness to use ADS-B 
and, by doing so, facilitate tracking with civil surveillance technologies. However, 
turning it on only at cruising altitude and turning it off again before descending most 
likely aims at concealing the airport of departure and/or arrival.
6.  exIstIng mItIgatIon oPtIons
There are several potential mitigation options for both government and military aircraft 
to prevent the information leakages discussed in the previous section. Here, we analyze 
the effectiveness of blocking information from web trackers, the use of pseudonyms, 
encryption, and attempts at forgoing civil ATC communication completely.
A. Web Tracker Blocking
One approach to limiting the privacy leaks of aircraft tracking is through block lists, 
which instruct the companies operating aircraft tracking websites to hide the aircraft 
on the list from public view. The most popular example of such a list is the Blocked 
Aircraft Registration Request (BARR) program, originally run by the National 
Business Aviation Association (NBAA) but now maintained by the FAA [31]. A 
BARR block places a restriction on the feed of aircraft send out by the FAA, which 
is used as a source by flight trackers. Table 6 shows that in our sample 85.0% of all 
military aircraft and 61.6% of all government aircraft were being filtered on the most 
popular flight tracking website (FlightRadar24). This indicates a clear awareness of a 
privacy impact through flight tracking by a majority of these state actors. 
TABLE 6: PERCENTAGE OF IDENTIFIABLE MILITARY AND GOVERNMENT AIRCRAFT BLOCKED 






































Despite the popularity of the blocking approach, it is wholly ineffective against our 
threat model. As illustrated in the previous section, any passive actor with control over 
the raw data obtained from ATC sensors has full access to an unfiltered view of the 
airspace, including any government and military aircraft. Yet, for unknown reasons, 
18 of all 106 tracked governments (17%) do not ask any of their aircraft to be blocked, 
forgoing even these basic mitigations.
B. Pseudonyms
A more comprehensive solution to the described tracking problem consists of 
pseudonymous identifiers that thwart an attacker’s ability to correlate flight tracks 
with each other and with a specific aircraft. 
For aircraft call signs, this is generally feasible for all considered technologies; 
changing a call sign before or during a flight is technically straightforward and often 
legally possible. For example, there are online services such as FltPlan.com [32], 
which offer randomized call signs to private operators, and both commercial and 
military operators are known to change their call signs regularly depending on an 
aircraft’s mission. For the ICAO 24-bit identifier, the case is very different, as the pilot 
or operator cannot easily change it. The ICAO allows for a manual change in case of 
sensitive missions [33], yet we do not see this option in wide operation by government 
or military aircraft as our results in the previous section show.
ADS-B can alternatively be served over a newly developed data link, the Universal 
Access Transceiver (UAT), which offers a built-in privacy mechanism that generates 
a non-conflicting, random, temporary ICAO 24-bit identifier to avoid third-party 
tracking. However, it has been shown that this implementation is flawed and does not 
successfully disable aircraft tracking over time [34]. Furthermore, it is only in use by 
general aviation aircraft within the US airspace and as such not a quick fix for any 
other operator.
Finally, regardless of identifier, it has been shown that it is possible to fingerprint 
ADS-B transponders on the physical and link layer levels, which, in sufficient 
granularity, would circumvent even properly implemented pseudonyms [35]. 
C. Encryption
As mentioned previously, the use of encrypted communication would be the most 
effective countermeasure to the described data leakages. Unauthorized access to both 
movement data and other information can be stopped through the use of symmetric 
or asymmetric encryption as it is in current use in many wireless communication 
technologies.
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As with any distributed security solution, implementing a public-key infrastructure 
is costly and requires thoughtful, security-conscious design. Especially in the case 
of aircraft, which must be able to communicate with unexpected ground stations, 
keeping credentials up-to-date for all communications partners is a challenge. Secure 
ACARS, available since 2001 [36], provides such an option, and not only to military 
and government operators. However, we have not seen Secure ACARS in use in 
the wild; in our data set of 1,749,142 messages from all three data links, we never 
recorded a single message of this type.3 We speculate that the fact that it comes at a 
surcharge to the ACARS service impedes its adoption.
This assumption is supported by the fact that there are several proprietary encryption 
solutions in use for ACARS, which are not standardized, but potentially come at a 
cheaper running cost. Unfortunately, many such solutions are insecure, quickly 
broken and provide no more security than clear-text messages against any interested 
adversary. One such example is discussed by Smith et al. [12], who show that it is 
in wide use even in government and military aircraft. In our dataset, we found that 
1.78% of the observed military and 11.36% of the observed government aircraft 
used this obfuscation method, a serious lapse of operational security. In principle, 
however, there is no fundamental obstacle to developing a secure proprietary ACARS 
solution for exclusive use by a state’s sensitive aircraft as long as compatibility with 
the existing system is ensured.
While ACARS messages can be encrypted by the user’s choice, this is not possible for 
both ADS-B and SSR. As has been analyzed previously, the current technological lock-
in does not allow for a quick encryption solution for these protocols [15]. While there 
are military equivalents to civil SSR and ADS-B in use and under development (NATO 
STANAG 4193, SSR Modes 4 and 5), due to obvious secrecy requirements, very few 
details are publicly available. As Mode 5 is believed to provide full confidentiality 
using strong encryption, its use would indeed fully mitigate the information leakage 
of ATC movement data. However, due to the lack of independent scrutiny, it is not 
possible to make any reliable statements on the security of the system.
Unfortunately, even for those military operators with access to encrypted protocols, 
the preference of civil ATC authorities for open systems and maximum compatibility 
precludes any proprietary solutions as long as they are flying in civil airspace [14]. In 
short, all operators must be aware that using any current civil ATC technology will 
leak information immediately and widely.
D. Switch off civil ATC communication
The final mitigation option for military and government aircraft operators is to not use 
civil ATC communications. For ACARS, this is fairly simple, as it is not a required 
3 A distinct set of message labels is reserved in the ACARS standard for Secure ACARS messages, enabling 
us to detect their presence even where it is not possible to decrypt them.
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technology in controlled airspace and some operators choose to forgo ACARS for cost 
reasons, including entire airlines. Yet, as shown above, many sensitive aircraft use 
unencrypted ACARS, presumably for operational reasons.
When considering ADS-B and SSR, the picture is much more complex. Aircraft are 
still not required to broadcast their precise position using ADS-B. As long as the 
technology is not mandated for state aircraft in (mostly Western) civil airspaces, there 
are many operators who choose to delay the upgrade in the first place for reasons of 
cost, convenience, or indeed privacy. Overall, only around 6.7% of all government 
aircraft but 57.1% of the military aircraft in our sample did not yet use ADS-B, which 
is in line with previous research [11]. Naturally, this is only a solution in the very 
short term and the consequences of upgrading will have to be addressed in the very 
near future.
7. dIscussIon
We have demonstrated that tracking aircraft using civil ATC systems allows us to 
glean significant intelligence that the aircraft operators or users might not be interested 
in sharing.  Indeed, with a relatively low level of skill and equipment used by a purely 
passive attacker, this combination of public data sources can reveal much more than 
where an aircraft is. Even though options exist to mitigate the problem, they are 
largely ineffective against a reasonably persistent attacker. Naturally, this generates 
some recommendations for how to improve the state of privacy in aviation. In the 
short term, regulation provides a possible key to allowing relevant actors to protect 
their privacy. Governments would have to legally restrict and regulate those entities 
(private and commercial) that are sharing data about aircraft movements for which a 
reasonable effort at privacy has been made. This would need to be a more concerted 
effort than the BARR scheme, which is, to some extent, opt-in. 
In the longer term, technical solutions should be developed to provide guarantees of 
privacy. For example, a robust pseudonym system would go a long way to limiting 
the ability to track aircraft over time, similar to the concept of Temporary Mobile 
Subscriber Identity (TMSI) in cellular networks. There is no critical technical or 
procedural need to have a consistent, publicly known identifier for aircraft — there 
is in fact evidence of aircraft being prescribed alternative ICAO identifiers by the 
authorities in situations such as sensitive military flights [33]. Doing away with the 
inflexible current system in favor of a more transient one would in turn de-correlate 
consecutive flights by a given aircraft. This measure alone would greatly reduce the 
impact of ATC-based flight tracking. 
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Hence, in our opinion, the only way to effectively create the opportunity for privacy 
in ATC systems is through the combination of technical and regulatory measures. 
Regulatory measures can cover the case of data generated by state entities, but 
technical measures are needed to stop passive observers from easily collecting 
significant amounts of data. 
As discussed in [14], there is currently a preference for open systems in aviation, but 
this is not necessarily wise if a good level of security and privacy is required. Parallels 
can be drawn to the creation of the Internet in that, initially, open systems allowed 
easy integration and global interaction between different networks. However, in the 
longer term, malicious parties have resulted in both a desire and need for securing 
all communications. Aviation networks carry bigger safety risk, so should aim for 
similar, if not greater, levels of security than the Internet currently uses. 
8. conclusIon
The findings we have presented in this work conclusively prove that it is possible to 
collect, process, and ultimately exploit, a trove of open source air traffic communication 
data for intelligence purposes. While examining all potential use cases for such data is 
out of the scope of a single paper, we believe that our proof of concept is sufficient to 
raise awareness of the issue among all concerned stakeholders.
It has also become clear that traditional ways of protecting the privacy of aircraft 
owners are all but obsolete in the era of cheap software-defined radio receivers, and 
relying on them should be done with extreme caution. Military and nation state actors 
have superior means and resources to protect their operational privacy and security 
in some cases, as evidenced by the existence of encrypted communications solutions. 
However, the requirement to be able to communicate with civil ATC negates at least 
some of this advantage as illustrated in this work. Consequently, only a change to those 
civil communication technologies will lead to comprehensive privacy improvements 
for those who seek it. In the meantime, many actors will be able to exploit the openly 
available information gained in this domain for their purposes.
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FeedRank: A Tamper-
resistant Method for the 
Ranking of Cyber Threat 
Intelligence Feeds
Abstract: Organizations increasingly rely on cyber threat intelligence feeds to protect 
their infrastructure from attacks. These feeds typically list IP addresses or domains 
associated with malicious activities such as spreading malware or participating 
in a botnet. Today, there is a rich ecosystem of commercial and free cyber threat 
intelligence feeds, making it difficult, yet essential, for network defenders to quantify 
the quality and to select the optimal set of feeds to follow. Selecting too many or low-
quality feeds results in many false alerts, while considering too few feeds increases 
the risk of missing relevant threats. Naïve individual metrics like size and update rate 
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1. IntroductIon
States, organizations, companies and individuals are faced with ever-growing cyber 
threats. The most prominent among these threats include phishing or spam campaigns, 
malware distribution and DDoS attacks [1] [2]. To mitigate these threats, Cyber Threat 
Intelligence Feeds (CTIFs, also known as blacklists or block lists) are a major source 
of information for most network defenders [3]. The CTIF ecosystem is currently very 
large and complex [4] and for reliable protection, network defenders need to correlate 
data from multiple CTIFs [1].
However, while selecting the best set of CTIFs is crucial to maximizing efficiency, it 
is also difficult as there is no easy way to objectively compare CTIFs. In fact, network 
defenders often only evaluate feeds individually based on naïve metrics such as the 
feed’s size. While these metrics allow for a rough assessment, they do not allow 
conclusions about the combination of multiple feeds and – as we will show in this 
paper – they are easy to manipulate for a dishonest CTIF provider in order to pretend 
a higher quality and thus increase its impact and revenue.
give a somewhat good overview about a feed, but they do not allow conclusions about 
its quality and they can easily be manipulated by feed providers.
In this paper, we present FeedRank, a novel ranking approach for cyber threat 
intelligence feeds. In contrast to individual metrics, FeedRank is robust against 
tampering attempts by feed providers. FeedRank’s key insight is to rank feeds 
according to the originality of their content and the reuse of entries by other feeds. 
Such correlations between feeds are modelled in a graph, which allows FeedRank 
to find temporal and spatial correlations without requiring any ground truth or an 
operator’s feedback. 
We illustrate FeedRank’s usefulness with two characteristic examples: (i) selecting the 
best feeds that together contain as many distinct entries as possible; and (ii) selecting 
the best feeds that list new entries before they appear on other feeds. We evaluate 
FeedRank based on a large set of real feeds. The evaluation shows that FeedRank 
identifies dishonest feeds as outliers and that dishonest feeds do not achieve a better 
FeedRank score than the top-rated real feeds.
Keywords: cyber threat intelligence, intelligence feeds, cyber attacks, malware, 
botnets, situational awareness
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Problem statement. In this paper, we address the problem of finding an objective, 
tamper-resistant ranking algorithm that allows well-grounded selections of high quality 
CTIFs. We determine the quality of a feed by three key properties: completeness, 
accuracy and speed. That is, an ideal CTIF lists all malicious entities, does not list 
non-malicious entities and updates its entries promptly. In particular, we address the 
following research questions:
• How can the quality of a CTIF be estimated in a robust and scalable way? 
Achieving this is challenging because there is no ground truth to compare 
it with. Hence, one cannot rely on standard metrics such as precision and 
recall.
• How can the structure of the CTIF ecosystem be evaluated and how do 
existing CTIFs differ in terms of completeness, accuracy and speed? In 
particular, do CTIF providers cluster in groups or is there a large diversity 
regarding the reported threats among the different providers? 
• Can we identify individual CTIFs that consistently outperform others and 
CTIFs that seem to lack behind or borrow information from other feeds? 
Specially, what are good metrics to identify outperformers and tampering-
attempts by a subset of the feeds? 
FeedRank. We present FeedRank, a novel metric for the ranking of CTIFs. The 
key idea behind FeedRank is to model the correlations between CTIFs as a graph 
and to obtain the ranking by applying algorithms to this graph. This way, FeedRank 
quantifies the relative performance among CTIFs and is able to evaluate the quality of 
feeds without a ground truth. At its core, FeedRank bears similarities with collective 
intelligence approaches or PageRank [5], an algorithm to rank websites that is used 
by Google. 
The setting for ranking CTIFs bears similarities with the ranking of websites by search 
engines in the following aspects:
• Websites can contain arbitrary content (including dummy keywords to 
improve their ranking).
• Websites can contain links to any other website.
• There is no ground truth for the quality of websites.
• A website to which many other websites refer to is likely to be important.
Similar properties hold for CTIFs:
• CTIFs can contain arbitrary entries.
• CTIFs can copy entries from any other CTIF.
• There is no ground truth for the quality and validity of CTIF entries.
• A CTIF whose entries appear in other CTIFs is likely to be of high quality.
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Despite these similarities, applying website ranking algorithms (such as PageRank) 
to CTIFs is challenging because of the particular semantic of the CTIF application 
domain. The key idea to apply website ranking algorithms to CTIFs is to model 
correlations between CTIFs in a graph. In particular, while PageRank uses the web 
graph (a graph that models the links between websites), FeedRank uses a correlation 
graph to model common entries in CTIFs and the time at which they appear in each 
of the considered CTIFs. The correlation graph provides us with the foundation to 
assess a CTIF’s quality as we argue that a CTIF whose entries later appear on many 
other feeds has a high quality (like a website with many incoming links is assumed to 
be important). However, since the correlation graph alone does not allow conclusions 
about the completeness of a particular CTIF, FeedRank also performs an analysis of 
the contribution of each CTIF. 
Contributions. The main contributions of this paper are:
• A tamper-resistant approach to rank CTIFs at scale (Section 3) based on:
 ° correlations between CTIFs (Section 3B); and 
 ° the individual contribution of each CTIF (Section 3C).
• A comprehensive evaluation based on large sets of freely available CTIFs 
(Section 4).
• Two case-studies to demonstrate useful use-cases of FeedRank (Section 5).
2. eValuatIng cyber threat 
IntellIgence feeds
In this section, we provide an overview over Cyber Threat Intelligence Feeds (CTIFs) 
and identify key properties that characterize good CTIFs, sketch traditional evaluation 
metrics and identify strategies for how dishonest CTIF providers can tamper with 
them.
A. Cyber Threat Intelligence Feeds
In general, CTIFs are collections of Indicators of Compromise (IOC) that characterize 
malicious or non-malicious endpoints or activities. In this paper, we focus on feeds 
that list IP addresses associated with malicious activities (such as sending spam or 
hosting phishing sites). However, the obtained results are also applicable to other 
types of feeds.
CTIFs are available from a variety of commercial and non-commercial providers and 
can cover one or multiple types of threats (e.g. spam or phishing). The feeds are 
typically provided in real time; that is, the contents are updated continuously or with 
a certain frequency. New entries may be added when, for example, an endpoint is 
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found to behave maliciously and removed if the malicious activity has stopped. CTIFs 
obtain information about malicious endpoints in various ways. For example, malicious 
activity can be detected by email providers, honeypots, CERTs or by manual reports 
from users. CTIFs can also copy or fuse information from other CTIFs. 
B. Properties of High Quality Feeds
An ideal CTIF is complete, accurate and fast. To be complete, the CTIF needs to 
contain all malicious endpoints at a given time. To be accurate, the CTIF must not list 
benign endpoints. To be fast, the completeness and accuracy property must hold at any 
given point in time, i.e., an endpoint must appear exactly during the time it behaves 
maliciously. This ideal state is obviously difficult to reach in practice, as there always 
exist malicious endpoints that have not yet been identified as such.
C. Individual Feed Metrics
Naïve metrics which evaluate each CTIF individually are easy to calculate and widely 
used. Examples of such individual metrics include the feed’s size, the update frequency 
and the number of entries that are added or removed (cf. Table I). However, a major 
problem with individual metrics is that they provide little insight about the quality 
of a CTIF without a ground truth (i.e. a way to objectively verify the correctness 
of the feed’s contents). Even worse, all the listed individual metrics can easily be 
manipulated by adding or removing entries to/from a CTIF (cf. Table I). 
With FeedRank, we present an advanced and tamper-resistant ranking metric that does 
not require a ground truth. As we will describe in the following sections, analyzing 
the correlations of CTIFs allows reasoning about the feed’s completeness, accuracy 
and speed.
TABLE I: EXAMPLES OF INDIVIDUAL FEED METRICS. THESE METRICS DO NOT ALLOW 
CONCLUSIONS ABOUT A FEED’S QUALITY AND CAN BE MANIPULATED BY THE FEED PROVIDER.
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3. feedranK
In this section, we present the design goals and an overview of FeedRank. Further, 
we describe the two core components of FeedRank in more detail and explain why 
FeedRank is robust against tampering attempts.
A. Overview
FeedRank allows us to identify high quality CTIFs, while at the same time being 
robust against tampering attempts from CTIF providers, by combining the contribution 
analysis and the correlation graph (see Table II).
TABLE II: KEY PROPERTIES OF HIGH QUALITY CTIFS AND 
HOW THEY ARE REPRESENTED IN FEEDRANK.
 
FeedRank operates in three steps (see Figure 1). First, it collects snapshots of considered 
CTIFs; second it builds a feed correlation graph and performs a contribution analysis; 
and third, it computes a score for each considered CTIF. 
FIGURE 1: FEEDRANK OPERATES IN THREE STEPS: IT COLLECTS SNAPSHOTS OF CTIFS, COMPUTES 
A CORRELATION GRAPH AND A CONTRIBUTION ANALYSIS AND OUTPUTS A RANKING.
I. Feed Collection. As an input, FeedRank requires at least two snapshots of each 
considered feed. A snapshot consists of the timestamp and all entries of a CTIF. For 
the most accurate results, the time between the two snapshots should be long enough 
such that all CTIFs provide an update of the entries. The set of considered feeds can 
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be specified by the operator who uses FeedRank. It should contain all the CTIFs that 
the operator considers using in their environment.
II. a) Correlation Graph. Based on the snapshots, FeedRank builds a correlation 
graph. The nodes in this graph correspond to the CTIFs and the (directed) edges 
represent correlations between them. 
II. b) Contribution Analysis. For each CTIF, FeedRank computes a contribution 
metric that measures the CTIF’s contribution to the total number of listed entries.
III. Feed Rating. FeedRank runs an algorithm similar to PageRank on the correlation 
graph. This, together with the results from the contribution analysis, assigns each feed 
a score and allows to rank them.
B. Correlation Graph
The correlation graph is used to model correlations between CTIFs. It is a directed 
graph where the vertices represent feeds and the weighted edges describe correlations 
between them. Two CTIFs (X and Y) are connected with a directed edge from X to Y 
if X contains entries that were contained in Y before they appeared in X. This means 
that X implicitly confirms the respective entries from Y. In other words: both feeds 
classify the entries as malicious, and Y was faster in listing them, which makes it more 
likely that Y is accurate with respect to these entries. 
The weight of this edge is determined by the percentage of entries that appear first in 
Y and are later mentioned by X. For example, if Y contains 20 entries and 10 of them 
appear later on X, the weight of the edge would be 50% as this is the percentage of 
entries in Y that were confirmed by X.
Figure 2 illustrates an example of a correlation graph with 3 feeds with the following 
characteristics:
• B confirms 100% of the entries in A (i.e. every entry that appears in A later 
appears in B)
• C confirms 10% of the entries in A and 20% of the entries in B (i.e. 10% of 
the entries in A and 20% of the entries in B appear later in C)
In this example, feed A achieves the highest score according to the correlation graph 
and would thus be considered as the most valuable feed. The intuitive explanation 
for this is that all of A’s entries are confirmed by B and no other feed is faster than A. 
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FIGURE 2: EXAMPLE OF THE FEEDRANK GRAPH METRIC. IT RANKS FEEDS ACCORDING TO THE 
AMOUNT OF ENTRIES THAT ARE CONFIRMED BY OTHER FEEDS (E.G. B CONFIRMS 100% OF THE 
ENTRIES IN A).
To determine a ranking of CTIFs in the correlation graph, we apply the PageRank 
algorithm [5]. PageRank is a ranking algorithm for websites (famously used by 
Google) and is based on a graph that models the hyperlinks between websites. Besides 
the web graph, PageRank requires two additional parameters: the damping factor and 
a convergence condition. 
The damping factor d in PageRank describes the probability with which a user 
browsing at a certain website will click on any of the links to visit another website. 
For FeedRank, we calculate the damping factor depending on the average path length 
l (i.e., the average number of CTIFs that subsequently list an entry) of all entries that 
appear in at least two CTIFs within the analyzed dataset. From l, we calculate the 
probability that an entry “propagates” to another feed – along the lines of a user that 
clicks on a link to move to another website – as:
Being an iterative algorithm, PageRank further requires a convergence condition. The 
convergence condition in PageRank specifies the maximal delta between the graph 
score of all nodes (i.e. the precision of the result).
C. Contribution Analysis
The contribution metric is the result of the contribution analysis and measures the 
relative contribution of a single CTIF compared to the complete set of analyzed feeds. 
Therefore, it provides the foundation to select a subset of the analyzed feeds that 
together have a maximal contribution. 
FeedRank’s contribution analysis works as follows. First, it computes the complete 
set of all listed entries, i.e., the union of all entries listed in the considered feeds at any 
of the recorded snapshots. For each entry, it determines the feed that listed the entry 
first, and assigns the entry to that feed. In case multiple feeds add an entry at the same 
time, the entry is assigned to the biggest feed. The resulting contribution metric is then 
computed as the percentage of entries that each feed contributes to the complete set.
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D. Tamper-resistance
In this section, we explain why FeedRank is robust against an unfair CTIF which tries 
to manipulate its rank. Since a CTIF provider can arbitrarily choose the contents of its 
feed, there are no guarantees about the validity of entries. 
At a high level, we distinguish between the following tampering strategies:
• Adding entries that are not contained in the original CTIF.
• Removing of entries from the original CTIF.
• Replacing existing entries by other values (i.e. pretend updates).
For each of these strategies, the dishonest CTIF provider needs to choose the entries 
that will be added or removed. This can be done in at least the following ways:
• At random: New entries are generated randomly and randomly chosen 
entries are removed from the feed. 
• Based on the contents of another CTIF: A dishonest CTIF can copy a subset 
or all entries from one or multiple other CTIFs and thus copy the behavior 
of these CTIFs.
The manipulation strategies mentioned above work well for individual metrics (as 
described in Section 2. C) but, as we explain in the following, they do not work with 
FeedRank.
A dishonest CTIF that tries to manipulate its FeedRank score by adding entries is 
not successful because: (i) if the added entries are chosen randomly, they will not be 
confirmed by other feeds with very high probability; (ii) if the added entries are copied 
from another CTIF, this is considered as if the dishonest feed confirms the other feed’s 
entries and can therefore help the other feed, but not the dishonest feed. Obviously, a 
feed that copies entries from another feed is always slower in listing these entries. If 
a dishonest CTIF tries to improve its score by removing entries, each of the removed 
entries is either of high quality (i.e. it is confirmed by other feeds) or of low quality 
(it does not appear on other feeds). If a CTIF removes high quality entries, this lowers 
its ranking because a smaller percentage of its entries are confirmed. If it removes 
low quality entries, its overall quality increases and it (deservedly) obtains a better 
ranking.
A dishonest CTIF that both adds and removes entries faces the union of the limitations 
mentioned above. FeedRank does not measure the update frequency of CTIFs and 
therefore a higher update frequency does not help to improve the score. Instead, 
FeedRank is run with a certain frequency and based on the feed’s contents at the time 
of execution. Therefore, as long as the update frequency of a CTIF is larger than or 
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equal to the execution frequency of FeedRank, increasing the update frequency does 
not change the FeedRank score.
While FeedRank is robust against a small percentage of dishonest CTIFs, it can be 
susceptible to manipulation attempts by many colluding CTIFs. However, this is 
hardly feasible in practice because it would require many CTIFs to become dishonest 
and it only works if the user considers all of them when running FeedRank (it is easy 
for a single entity to publish a large number of dishonest feeds, but it is unlikely that 
a user would consider all of them). Such a set of colluding CTIFs can be identified by 
doing basic cluster analysis based on the considered feeds and the correlation graph 
(we show this in Section 4B).
4. eValuatIon
In this section, we use real CTIFs to compare FeedRank with individual metrics and 
show its tamper-resistance. In the following subsections, we describe and visualize 
the dataset and show the evaluation results.
A. Dataset and Methodology
To evaluate FeedRank, we use both real CTIFs which we collected over a timespan of 
almost 12 days and synthetic CTIFs with which we simulated the impact of tampering 
strategies. Below, we provide more details about both types of feeds.
1) Collecting Real Feeds
For a comprehensive dataset, we fetched the feeds listed in Table III at regular intervals 
(60 min) during almost 12 days in 2017. In this way, we obtained 277 snapshots 
representing the activity of 27 feeds with a total of around 40 million entries. These 
snapshots allowed us to analyze correlations between feeds at a granularity of an hour. 
Some of the snapshots were incomplete because our collection infrastructure was 
unable to fetch them due to connectivity issues, database overload or rate limiting by 
the CTIF provider. The feed collection functionality was implemented in Python on 
top of the stix [6] and libtaxii [7] modules. The collected feeds were normalized and 
stored in an Elasticsearch database to facilitate analysis. We anonymized the feeds as 
it is not our goal to provide a ranking of particular feed providers, but to demonstrate 
the practicality of our algorithm.
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TABLE III: EVALUATED FEEDS. WE ANALYZE 27 FREELY 
AVAILABLE CTIFS (LISTED IN ALPHABETICAL ORDER HERE).
2) Generating Dishonest Feeds
To capture the effect of dishonest feeds, we considered two strategies: listing random 
entries and imitating high-ranked feeds.
I. Adding random entries: Adding random entries is a straightforward approach for 
a dishonest feed to improve its rank because it makes the feed appear larger and more 
up-to-date. Particularly because random entries are unlikely to be contained in other 
feeds, thus the tampering feed is the first to report them. 
Adding random entries can be risky for a CTIF provider as it can increase the false 
positive rate, especially if an entry maps to a popular non-malicious service. However, 
by choosing unused (or rarely used) IP addresses or domains, a dishonest CTIF 
provider can cheat with a low risk of being detected.
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We call a synthetic feed that follows such a strategy “RandomFeed” and generate it by 
choosing 50k IP addresses uniformly at random at each time unit (i.e. 1 hour). 
II. Copying entries from high-reputation feeds: For this case, we generate 
“CopyFeed” by assuming that it copies all entries from the two best-ranked feeds 
with a delay of one time unit (i.e. 1 hour). By doing so, CopyFeed becomes the most 
complete feed but it lacks speed as it is never the first to announce any entry.
3) Parameters
PageRank, which is part of the graph ranking, requires the specification of a damping 
factor and a convergence condition. As we explained in Section 3B, we compute 
the damping factor as d=1-1/l where l is the average path length. For the evaluated 
dataset, the average path length is 2.87, which leads to a damping factor of 0.65. 
For the convergence condition, we choose a maximum delta (i.e. the precision of the 
results) of 10-6.
B. FeedRank Dataset Baseline
In this section, we illustrate our dataset and the input of FeedRank with Figure 3 and 
Figure 4 after listing basic properties of each analyzed CTIF in Table IV. 
TABLE IV: SIZE OF THE EVALUATED CTIFS.
For a first insight in correlations in our dataset, we use Figure 3 to visualize a clustering 
of the evaluated feeds according to the number of common entries. That is, we run the 
Stoer-Wagner HCS (highly connected subgraphs) clustering algorithm [8] on a graph 
where the nodes represent feeds and the edges connect feeds with common entries 
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and are assigned a weight that equals the number of common entries. In Figure 3, we 
observe four clusters:
• One big cluster containing 7 (out of 27) feeds of different providers.
• Two smaller clusters consisting of 2 and 3 feeds from the same provider.
• One small cluster of two feeds (F11 and F15) where the number of common 
elements corresponds to the size of the smaller feed. This depicts an example 
of a feed (F15) that most likely contains a subset of the entries from another 
feed (F11).
Even though this clustering is not directly contained in the FeedRank algorithm, it 
shows that there are indeed correlations between the analyzed feeds.
In Figure 4, we show the correlation graph for the evaluated feeds. As explained in 
Section 3. B, this graph consists of nodes representing the feeds and directed, weighted 
edges that describe the percentage of confirmed entries from another feed.
FIGURE 3: EVALUATED FEEDS CLUSTERED BY THE NUMBER OF COMMON ELEMENTS. ABOUT 
25% OF ALL FEEDS ARE CONTAINED IN ONE CLUSTER. FEEDS FROM THE SAME PROVIDERS ARE 
CONTAINED IN SMALLER CLUSTERS AND F15 DOES NOT LIST ELEMENTS THAT ARE NOT IN F11.
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FIGURE 4: CORRELATION GRAPH FOR THE EVALUATED FEEDS. AS AN EXAMPLE, THE LARGEST 
FEED (F1) AND ALL ITS IN- AND OUTGOING EDGES ARE HIGHLIGHTED. THE EDGE LABEL 
DENOTES THE PERCENTAGE OF ENTRIES THAT A FEED CONFIRMS.
C. FeedRank vs. Individual Metrics
In this experiment, we compare the ranking obtained by individual metrics with the 
ranking according to FeedRank (see Table V). In Table VI, we show the ranking for 
all real feeds. The listed overall rank corresponds to the ranking according to the 
combination of all individual (or FeedRank) metrics. In this non-malicious case, we 
observe that the ranking according to the two metrics are strongly correlated (with a 
Spearman correlation coefficient of ρ = 0.81).
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TABLE V: EVALUATED FEED METRICS.
TABLE VI: RANKING WITH INDIVIDUAL METRICS COMPARED WITH FEEDRANK. THE RANKINGS 
ARE STRONGLY CORRELATED (ρ = 0.81).
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D. Tamper-resistance
In this experiment, we evaluate the impact of RandomFeed and CopyFeed on the 
ranking. As the results in Table VII show, the dishonest feeds can obtain very good 
ranks (rank 1 for RandomFeed and rank 3 for CopyFeed) according to individual 
metrics, but not for FeedRank (rank 16 and 20).
TABLE VII: RANKING IN THE PRESENCE OF DISHONEST FEEDS. RANDOMFEED AND COPYFEED 
CAN TAMPER WITH WITH INDIVIDUAL METRICS, BUT NOT WITH FEEDRANK.
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5. case-study
In this section, we come back to the two use-cases mentioned initially – network 
defenders that want to: (i) select the best feeds that together contain as many distinct 
entries as possible; and (ii) select the best feeds that list new entries before they appear 
on other feeds.
A. Prioritizing Completeness
To find a set of CTIFs that covers as many entries as possible (i.e. is as complete as 
possible) while not being susceptible to tampering attempts, FeedRank is used as 
follows. First, we compute the ranking solely according to the contribution. Since 
this ranking ignores the correlations, it is not tamper resistant and a CTIF that adds 
random entries can achieve a good rank. In a second step, we ensure tamper-resistance 
by excluding CTIFs whose graph score is below a user-defined percentile. Intuitively, 
the choice of this percentile reflects how many dishonest feeds the user expects. Here, 
we use the fifth percentile; that is, we assume that feeds whose graph metric is in the 
upper 95% are non-malicious.
In Figure 5, we plot the contribution of all collected CTIFs. As the figure shows, 
considering a small subset of all feeds is enough to cover a large percentage of all 
entries (e.g. the best 5 feeds together cover 80% of all entries). The figure also shows 
that by only looking at a feed’s size it is not possible to derive the feed’s contribution. 
FIGURE 5: CONTRIBUTION OF ALL EVALUATED CTIFS. SELECTING 5 FEEDS IS ENOUGH TO 
COVER 80% OF ALL REPORTED IPS.
In Tables VIII and IX, we show the ranking in the presence of dishonest feeds.
RandomFeed has a high contribution score because its entries are most likely not listed 
on any other feed. However, because the vast majority of them are not confirmed by 
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any other feed, the graph score is very low. In particular, the graph score is below the 
5th percentile, which is why the feed is not eligible to be used. CopyFeed has a poor 
contribution score because it is never the first feed to list any entry. However, because 
the copied entries originate from highly ranked feeds, CopyFeed deservedly achieves 
a good graph score.
TABLE VIII: RANKING ACCORDING TO THE CONTRIBUTION METRIC IN THE PRESENCE OF 
RANDOMFEED. THE GRAPH METRIC IS USED TO EXCLUDE POTENTIALLY DISHONEST FEEDS.
339
TABLE IX: RANKING ACCORDING TO THE CONTRIBUTION METRIC IN THE PRESENCE OF 
COPYFEED. THE GRAPH METRIC IS USED TO EXCLUDE POTENTIALLY DISHONEST FEEDS.
B. Prioritizing Speed
In this case study, a network defender wants to select CTIFs such that new entries 
are available as early as possible. For this, we rank the feeds according to the graph 
metric (that is, we ignore the contribution). FeedRank’s correlation graph models the 
order in which entries appear in the feeds. Therefore, a feed that scores well in the 
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graph metric is one that is fast in including new entries. In contrast to computing the 
added entries for each feed individually, FeedRank ensures that it is impossible for a 
dishonest feed to tamper with the ranking. 
In Table X, we show the resulting ranking with and without the dishonest feeds. 
RandomFeed appears at the very end of the ranking because its entries are not 
confirmed by other feeds. CopyFeed achieves a better rank because it copies the 
entries of highly ranked feeds with only a one-hour delay. By doing so, it is faster in 














In this section, we first summarize the answers to the research questions, then discuss 
additional aspects of and choices that we made in the design of FeedRank.
A. Research Questions
Our research questions listed in Section 1 relate to the estimation of the quality of 
CTIFs, the CTIF ecosystem and the tamper-resistance of the evaluation metrics.
CTIF quality estimation. We use a graph-based correlation analysis together with 
a contribution analysis to measure correlations between CTIFs and the individual 
contribution of each CTIF. This allows us to estimate the relative quality of each CTIF 
with respect to all other analyzed CTIFs without requiring a ground truth.
CTIF ecosystem. Our correlation analysis allows finding clusters of highly correlated 
CTIFs and shows that most of the evaluated feeds are contained in the same cluster 
(i.e. most of the feeds overlap in terms of their entries but differ in terms of speed).
Tamper resistance. Our evaluation shows that correlation and contribution are 
tamper-resistant metrics for ranking CTIFs. While FeedRank produces a ranking that 
is strongly correlated with the ranking according to individual metrics in the absence 
of dishonest feeds, only FeedRank allows to identify dishonest feeds and to prevent 
them from achieving a good rank.
B. Speed of Dishonest Feeds vs. Execution Interval of FeedRank
For our evaluation, we use hourly snapshots and assume that the dishonest CopyFeed 
copies entries with a delay of one hour. If the delay were to be shorter than the snapshot 
interval, FeedRank could not determine whether CopyFeed and the two copied 
(legitimate) feeds listed the entries simultaneously or not. To prevent this inaccuracy, 
we envision the following mechanisms:
• The time between two snapshots can be decreased, which makes it more 
likely to be faster than dishonest feeds.
• CTIF providers can provide FeedRank with exclusive access to updates 
shortly before they are published.
• CTIF providers can add a few random (non-malicious and inactive) entries 
to their feeds to detect if another feed copies them (if these entries appear on 
another feed, it is highly likely that they were copied).
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C. Evaluating CTIFs Instead of Evaluating Entries in CTIFs
With FeedRank, we assess the quality of CTIFs as a whole and not the quality of 
individual entries. With this, FeedRank provides the foundation to select CTIFs for 
deployment. The problem of evaluating the quality of particular entries is orthogonal 
to our work, but could be approached with a similar technique (e.g. by building a 
graph that models individual entries). From a network defender’s point of view, the 
advantages of scoring threat intelligence at the level of CTIFs instead of individual 
entries are that: (i) reporting an IOC is delayed if an entry first needs to be verified by 
multiple feeds; and (ii) scoring CTIFs can be done once before deciding which feeds 
to use, which reduces operational and potential subscription costs.
D. Choice of the Evaluated Feeds
For our evaluation, we used a generic threat model and included a large set of freely 
available feeds covering different domains (e.g. generic, malware or phishing). 
Generally speaking, the set of considered CTIFs should contain all feeds that are 
suitable for the network defender’s purpose. For example, a network defender that 
wants to select CTIFs for a spam filter should only consider feeds in this domain to 
get the most meaningful results.
Evaluating CTIFs for a more specific threat model or including commercial feeds is 
possible without modifying FeedRank but it is out of the scope of this paper.
7. related worK
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to rank CTIFs based on their correlations 
and to consider potential manipulation strategies from CTIF providers. However, 
there has been previous work in the area of evaluating CTIFs and applying graph-
based ranking algorithms in other domains.
A. Analysis and Evaluation of CTIFs
Sheng et al. study the effectiveness of phishing blacklists [9] and find that blacklists 
are ineffective when protecting users against phishing attacks because most phishing 
campaigns only last for a short time and blacklists are too slow in reacting.
Kührer and Holz describe a CTIF parser system [10] that records a large number of 
CTIFs and allows users to compute intersections between feeds and to query entries 
(e.g. domains). Entries that are contained in a large number of feeds are considered 
as being dishonest with high certainty. In later work [11], Kührer et al. propose a 
mechanism to identify parked domains and sinkholes (i.e. malicious domains that are 
identified and mitigated) in CTIFs.
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Metcalf and Spring present an analysis of CTIFs over multiple years [12]. Similar 
to our approach, they analyze individual and combined features of CTIFs. However, 
they do not address the issue of dishonest CTIF providers that attempt to manipulate 
the rankings.
The Ponemon Institute found in a survey [3] that the application of threat intelligence 
is considered as very important for running secure systems but they did not investigate 
in the quality or the ecosystem of threat intelligence providers.
B. Graph-based Ranking
Page and Brin developed PageRank to rank websites [5]. They showed that the 
problem of ranking websites can be transferred to a graph problem and thus provided 
the foundation of transferring problems with several connected parties to graph 
problems.
Since then, concepts similar to PageRank have been applied to various problems, 
including to:
• Predict future relevance of scientific articles [13].
• Rank authors and publications [14].
• Rank correspondents according to their degree of expertise [15].
• Find influential users [16] and important content [17] in social networks.
8. conclusIon and future worK
The core concept of FeedRank is to model temporal correlations between feeds in a 
graph structure and to rank feeds based on this graph and the individual contribution 
of each feed. In contrast to traditional metrics that are applied to feeds individually, 
FeedRank is robust against tampering attempts by potentially dishonest feed providers.
In the evaluation and two case studies, we use data from 27 real feeds and show that 
FeedRank allows a reliable ranking even in the presence of dishonest feeds. For future 
work, we suggest using FeedRank to track the rankings of CTIFs over time. This will 
provide insights in the long-term behavior of CTIFs. Further, FeedRank could be 
extended by additional metrics and applied to related problems such as the evaluation 
of single entries in CTIFs.
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HTTP Security Headers 
Analysis of Top One 
Million Websites
Abstract: We present research on the security of the most popular websites, ranked 
according to Alexa’s top one million list, based on an HTTP response headers analysis. 
For each of the domains included in the list, we made four different requests: an 
HTTP/1.1 request to the domain itself and to its “www” subdomain and two more 
equivalent HTTPS requests. Redirections were always followed. A detailed discussion 
of the request process and main outcomes is presented, including X.509 certificate 
issues and comparison of results with equivalent HTTP/2 requests. 
The body of the responses was discarded, and the HTTP response header fields were 
stored in a database. We analysed the prevalence of the most important response 
headers related to web security aspects. In particular, we took into account Strict-
Transport-Security, Content-Security-Policy, X-XSS-Protection, X-Frame-Options, 
Set-Cookie (for session cookies) and X-Content-Type. We also reviewed the contents 
of response HTTP headers that potentially could reveal unwanted information, like 
Server (and related headers), Date and Referrer-Policy.
This research offers an up-to-date survey of current prevalence of web security policies 
implemented through HTTP response headers and concludes that most popular sites 
tend to implement it noticeably more often than less popular ones. Equally, HTTPS 
sites seem to be far more eager to implement those policies than HTTP only websites. 
A comparison with previous works show that web security policies based on HTTP 
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1. IntroductIon
The main goal of this research is to assess the current adoption rate of security policies 
based on HTTP response headers on the most popular Internet websites. Declarative 
web security through HTTP response headers constitute a powerful and easy way 
to enhance website security, while relatively little effort is required from website 
operators. It has been a recurrent research topic, aided by the fact that the nature of the 
World Wide Web makes data publicly accessible to any interested party and that the 
WWW itself is continuously growing and evolving. 
Besides measuring security headers adoption in popular websites, we set out to 
understand it in a deeper way by trying to find correlations between adoption rates 
and variables like HTTPS usage and popularity rank position. We want to gain insight 
into why and how policies based on HTTP headers are adopted. As will be shown, 
the most popular a website is, the more likely it will apply security through HTTP 
headers. Those sites also tend to be more prone to favouring HTTPS protocol over 
HTTP.
Regarding the structure of this paper, in the first section we present a brief literature 
review concerning different past security analysis and current online efforts. Next, 
we proceed to describe in detail the data set that served as the basis for this research. 
We then show our results for all analysed HTTP response headers, and we conclude 
with a “conclusions” section where we summarize our findings and a last section on 
planned future work.
2. related worK
Extensive analysis of Content Security Policy (CSP) adoption among the top one 
million websites is provided by Ying et al. (2015). It was found that CSP is used in less 
than 0.2% of the sites, and oftentimes incorrectly. They also investigated other relevant 
security related headers. In particular, they found that X-XSS-Protection, X-Frame-
Options and Strict-Transport-Security headers were implemented, respectively, in 
about 4.4%, 4.1% and 1% of the websites they analysed. Despite the low adoption rate 
of HTTP security related headers found by Ying et al., their results show a noticeable 
Keywords: web security, HTTP headers, top one million websites survey, X.509 
certificate, HTTP/2, HTTPS, HTTP Strict Transport Security, Content Security Policy 
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increase in the adoption rates observed over research done previously by Weissbacher 
et al. (2014). In fact, they conducted the first CSP adoption study of the Top One 
Million websites in 2012-2014 and found that CSP was used in less than 0.1% of 
sites. Other security-related HTTP headers, like X-XSS-Protection, X-Frame-Options 
and Strict-Transport-Security were seen on 4.6%, 4.1% and 0.3% of the websites, 
respectively. Although both of these papers primarily concentrate on CSP adoption 
rate and related implementation issues, they analysed other security headers as a by-
product.
Chang et al. (2017) investigated the “redirection trail”, which basically consists of 
a set of pairs, each one formed by the Location header combined with redirection 
HTTP status codes. Combining this redirection trail with other data readily available, 
like protocol and host, allowed the researchers to evaluate the security of the Top 
One Million websites. They found that 20.5% of them contained some configuration 
inconsistency related to redirection requests that could be exploited by the adversary. 
Sood et al.(2011) conducted a research in 2011 among the world’s top 43 banks. They 
found that none of them implemented the HTTP security related headers available at 
that time. 
Response HTTP header analysis from a security standpoint is also present outside 
academic literature. Scott Helme’s (2017) website has published multiple times 
research on security headers prevalence and HTTPS adoption in the Alexa Top One 
Million websites. The latest one we know of, at the time of this writing (October 
2017), is from August 2017. He has been reporting positive trends of adoption rates 
of most common HTTP headers. Additionally, his website (IO) provides a public tool 
that enables checking of security headers for any website. Based on these results, 
the tool assigns a given grade, from A to F, for the provided website. A similar tool 
is provided by Mozilla Observatory that also gathers statistics from executed checks 
and estimates that about 10% of the checked websites follow good practices regarding 
security header configuration (Mozobs). April King (2017) has conducted similar 
research on Alexa Top One Million websites and found similar results about positive 
trends.
3. the data set
A. URL Set
This research makes use of Alexa “top one million” website list (1M) as the source 
for domains to be analysed. For each domain contained in the list, we made four 
HTTP/1.1 requests: to http://domain, https://domain, http://www.domain and https://
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www.domain. Timeout for connection establishment was set to 60 seconds, and 
response timeout was also set to 60 seconds.
B. Data collection approach
We developed a custom Python tool based on Python requests library (Pyreq). After 
an HTTP/1.1 response arrived, only HTTP response headers and status code were 
saved to a relational database. The response body was disregarded. In order to mimic 
real users, we set User-Agent and other request headers to match exactly those of 
the Mozilla Firefox browser (version 50.0 on Ubuntu 17.04). For all the requests we 
followed redirections, saved them all, and created convenient relationships between 
them. Finally, duplicate URL requests that arose from redirections were removed 
from the dataset.
Preliminary testing revealed that using Certification Authorities (CA) and 
Intermediaries lists bundled inside Ubuntu were not sufficient for HTTPS requests. 
Therefore, we made use of public CA lists Mozilla CA (Mozca) and Mozilla 
Intermediaries (Mozinter) (they are both internally used by the Firefox browser). 
Several full scans were performed during August and September 2017, and we always 
updated website and CA lists right before the scanning process. In this paper we will 
exclusively refer and analyse data gathered between September 1st and 4th, 2017. 
After the scan was completed, we retried those websites that had failed all of our four 
requests, since it just might indicate temporary network issues.
C. Data Overview
Our final dataset contained 3.135.962 recorded responses with unique URLs (either 
the protocol, the domain or the subdomain was different). At least one response was 
received from 975.729 websites (97.5% of all one million domains). Only 2.558 
websites were successfully processed during the retrying process (to allow for 
network issues). We observed large amounts, up to 1.4 million, of duplicate URL 
records caused by redirection to an already visited URL. They were all removed from 
the database. We obtained about 27% more responses from www-subdomains than 
from direct domain requests.
For our current analysis we have considered only unique URL responses with HTTP 
response status code 200, which amounts to 1.478.750 records.
 
D. Data quality
The Alexa top one million list was chosen because it is a large list, but not “too large”, 
thus data collection can still be achieved in a few days or less. Moreover, the list 
contains the most popular websites, an attractive target for attackers and security 
researchers alike. As pointed out previously, it has been repeatedly used in various 
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web security surveys. Alternative lists, like the ones by Majestic (Majestic) or Cisco 
(Umbrella) also provide one million most popular sites, although to compare our work 
with previous results we have adhered to Alexa’s list. 
However, Alexa’s list, despite its usefulness, has some caveats. It makes use of 
proprietary ranking and domain processing algorithms not fully disclosed and we 
have observed inconsistencies within the list: it contains many domains that cannot be 
accessed directly (typically because there is no DNS entry for them, like in cloudfront.
net), but can be through the www-subdomain. Additionally, a significant set of entries 
in the list are actually subdomains (most common websites are tumblr.com, blogspot.
com and wordpress.com with 5.698, 2.904 and 2.696 respective subdomains). 
Although content is different on these subdomains, these platforms usually provide 
little to no control for header configuration to final website authors. In fact, all of their 
subdomains will share the same security headers. Even some apparently unrelated 
domains will share the same headers configuration because they are hosted by these 
providers, although their domain name is totally unrelated to the hosting server.
E. Response Codes
Status code distribution observed in the responses for both HTTP and HTTPS requests 
are presented in Tables 1 and 2. As clearly seen from these data, most websites seem 
to prefer the www subdomain to the plain domain name, regardless of the protocol 
(47% of HTTP sites and up to 63% for HTTPS ones). As for redirections, we have 
observed that 45.7% of HTTP domain requests redirect to the corresponding www 
subdomain, and 15.5% of HTTPS domain requests point to the www subdomain. Most 
of the remaining requests are server-side errors either intermittent or permanent (e.g., 
web servers which are not properly configured to handle the domain or subdomain 
requests).




























TABLE 2. STATUS CODES FOR HTTPS REQUESTS
F. HTTPS Subset
Our data set allowed for a detailed analysis of HTTPS deployment since we stored 
all failed requests and their associated error messages. The result for over two million 
HTTPS requests are presented in the Figure 1.
FIGURE 1. HTTPS RESPONSES
Only about half of the scanned domains and www subdomains (47.7%) are properly 
configured for HTTPS. That number includes 24.2% of sites that are actually 
responding with 200 OK status code and a substantial number of redirects and HTTP 
errors (23.5%). 
Many sites, 23.2% of all HTTPS requests, do not respond to HTTPS at all, either 
because of the TCP connection being refused, timeout or missing DNS records. 
We found a sizeable number of cases, 29.1% of all HTTPS requests, where it was 
possible to establish a TCP connection on port 443, but HTTPS ultimately failed. The 
reason for failure is related to verification errors (mostly expired certificates, self-




























protocols) and hostname mismatching. A 29.1% rate is remarkable: it implies that 
a large number of web servers are already somehow configured to handle HTTPS 
requests, but have mostly missed the step of acquiring and installing the correct X.509 
certificate (even though nowadays it is possible to quickly obtain a certificate for 
free, for example from the highly popular “Let’s Encrypt” (Lets) online certification 
authority). 
Regarding handshake errors, 5.1% of all HTTPS requests, we found that there is a 
small number of websites that work properly when requested by the real Mozilla 
Firefox browser but not by our software. We traced back that behaviour to outdated 
and misconfigured server sites that are still supported by the browser for backwards 
compatibility, but not by the OpenSSL 1.0.2g library we used in our scanning software.
Host name mismatching happens in about 14.8% of all HTTPS requests we made. That 
can happen because there is no Subject Alternative Name (SAN) and the requested 
host does not match certificate’s Common Name (CN) or because, even though 
CN and SAN are both present, the hostname does not match either of them. This 
latter cause is more common (12.7%) than the former (2.1%). Name mismatching is 
typically found in shared environments where several websites run on a single server 
that oftentimes issues a “default” SSL certificate (as with the well-known shared 
hosting provider Hostgator). The most common reason for name mismatching is that 
CN is set to either www.domain or *.domain, and therefore certificate validation fails 
for the https://domain request (like the high ranked website ups.com).
G. HTTP/2 Analysis
Our data gathering procedure, and the subsequent response headers analysis, is entirely 
based on HTTP/1.1 requests. However, HTTP/2 is quickly growing in popularity 
and it may replace HTTP/1.1 as the main web protocol in the near future. Different 
protocol versions might be somehow correlated with different security settings (due, 
for example, to different security awareness). That raises the question whether there 
are different response headers, or different headers values, in HTTP/1.1 and HTTP/2 
data subsets. To answer this question, we used the same Alexa top one million websites 
list (1M) and followed the same data gathering approach, but this time making an 
additional HTTP/2 request to each website’s domain and www-subdomain. We made 
use of Python hyper library (Hyper). If an HTTP/2 request was successful, we made 
the equivalent HTTP/1.1 request to the same URL and compared the HTTP headers 
and their values for both responses. To simplify HTTP header comparison, we did not 
follow redirects and did not analyse response status codes. Furthermore, we did not 
take into account the fact that multiple backends can serve a single domain or www 
subdomain (in principle, those servers could have different configurations and that 
might produce different HTTP headers).1
1 Those backends could be either serving requests using single IP address or multiple IP addresses, but we 
chose not to manipulate to which IP addresses HTTP requests are being sent. 
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The resulting dataset consists of 746.758 records, totalling 211.638 unique domains 
that support HTTP/2 protocol (21% of all Alexa top one million websites). This 
percentage is a bit higher than the figure reported by the w3techs portal, 17%, as the 
HTTP/2 support rate across all the world wide web (W3tech). However, it is coherent 
with the fact that we are analysing most popular websites, not all existing ones. The 
failure rate of HTTP/1.1 requests to same domain following successful HTTP/2 
requests is insignificant (0.26%).
1) Missing headers
We analysed the top 10 HTTP headers missing from HTTP/2 responses but present 
in HTTP/1.1 responses, and vice versa. The results, header names and their missing 
count in their counterpart protocol requests, are presented in Table 3. As might be 
expected, most significant differences are related to headers used in establishing 
and maintaining the HTTP/1.1 connection (those headers are unneeded in HTTP/2). 
Fortunately, none of these missing headers are related to any security issue. 
Regarding security related headers, some may be missing in one version of the 
protocol, but present in the other, although the numbers are insignificant in all cases. 
For example, X-XSS-Protection response header is missing in 28 HTTP/2 requests 
that issue it in the equivalent HTTP/1.1 requests. Similarly, 45 HTTP/1.1 requests did 
not contain that header, although it was present in the equivalent HTTP/2 ones. We 
found that no common misconfiguration pattern is distinguishable, and most common 
cause could be attributed to responses coming from different backends serving the 
same domain name, but different protocol.



































2) Different values in HTTP headers
The top 20 response headers that carry different values in equivalent HTTP/1.1 and 
HTTP/2 requests are presented in Table 4. 
TABLE 4. RESPONSE HEADERS VALUES COMPARISON
Set-Cookie differences are due to different session identifiers. The differences in 
the response headers Cf-Ray, X-Cache, X-Varnish, Via, X-amz-cf-id, X-Served-By, 
X-Timer, X-Contextid, X-Servedby, X-Request-Id, X-Via and X-Cache-Hits are due to 
debug information, usually set by cloud providers and caching frontend servers. Date, 
Expires and Last-Modified response headers contain timestamps that are usually one 
second apart, in agreement with the fact that the requests are made consecutively. 
Content-Encoding differences are due to Brotli, the compression algorithm used for 
HTTP/2. Differences in the Vary header value are related to different compression 
algorithms. Content-Length variations are caused by the dynamic nature of the 
generated content. Nevertheless, none of these headers can be related to any security 
risk, and the variations are meaningless from the point of view of our security analysis.
Regarding security related headers, only Content-Security-Policy and X-XSS-
Protection showed any significant count difference in 401 and 358 of the requests, 
respectively. Almost all of the CSP differences lie either in nonce tokens or report URI 
identifiers. X-XSS-Protection differences can be always traced back to different report 
URL’s found in the value of the header. 
Server header values show some differences between the protocol versions and 


































Missing in HTTP/2 Missing in HTTP/1.1
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openresty, Tengine, kinsta-nginx). For example, 68.6% of HTTP/2 requests carried 
nginx as the Server value, but openresty for the equivalent HTTP/1.1 requests (77.2% 
of these cases correspond to tumblr.com subdomains). However, in about 400 cases 
we identified obvious attempts to try to conceal the server name by removing the 
header or changing it to an undescriptive one in one of the protocol version, but not 
in the alternative one. 
In summary, regarding versions 1.1 and 2 of the HTTP protocol, no significant HTTP 
response headers variations were found from the security perspective. The only 
noticeable risk that shows some correlation with protocol version is information 
leakage via Server response header. Additionally, a potential security risk could arise 
due to inconsistent configuration management across sets of backend servers (which 
still could be useful to an attacker). However, this issue requires further investigation 
and lies outside the current research.
4. httP resPonse headers analysIs
As stated previously, the evaluation of the security of the websites is done through an 
analysis of the HTTP headers sent from the web server. Some HTTP headers, among 
all possible server-side headers, were devised to instruct the web browser to protect the 
web application against certain security threads. Accordingly, their analysis constitute 
the basis of our current research. Additionally, a few HTTP server-side headers may 
carry information about the web application that potentially can help an attacker to 
perform malicious actions. They will also be analysed as part of our research. 
The headers involved in each group are the following:
Security headers:
• Strict-Transport-Security










We have deliberately excluded HTTP Public Key Pinning (HPKP) from our research. 
Standardized in IETF 7469, HPKP provides a mechanism by which the TLS protocol 
is protected against Certification Authority (CA) attacks and spoofed certificates. 
However, it is well known that its implementation poses considerable risks for website 
operators. It is currently supported by Chrome, Firefox and Opera. Nevertheless, 
Google has recently announced that it will deprecate it in Chrome in May 2018, and 
soon thereafter it will be completely removed Palmer 2017. Research by Scott Helme 
(2017) regarding his own analysis of Alexa Top One Million sites indicates that it 
is usually implemented wrongly by website operators. Security expert Ivan Ristic 
(2016) has also pointed out similar concerns about HPKP. 
Subresource Integrity (SRI) has been sometimes taken into account in the context 
of top one million analysis (see Mozilla Observatory (Mozobs) or recent April King 
results (l2017). By specifying a hash token together with the URL of any given 
resource on a web page, a browser can check that the resulting content obtained from 
actually downloading the resource has not been unexpectedly altered. This technique 
is effective, for example, against attackers manipulating JavaScript libraries located 
in Content Delivery Networks. Chrome, Firefox and Opera already implement this 
feature. SRI is a relatively new protective mechanism, and current recommendation 
is from 2016 (SRI). Despite the undeniable interest in measuring its current adoption 
rate among the top one million websites, it entails parsing the HTML content found in 
the body of the HTTP responses, and it lies outside the scope of the current research, 
centred around HTTP response headers analysis.
A. Security Headers
1) Strict-Transport-Security Header
HTTP Strict-Transport-Security header (or HSTS, for short) allows a web server 
to inform the browser that all subsequent connections for all requests should be 
established exclusively through HTTPS, never through HTTP, using a valid certificate. 
It helps prevent several man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks that may arise in different 
situations. Some common vulnerable situations are the following: 
• A user types in a URL in the browser address bar. By default, this URL will 
be requested by the browser through an HTTP connection, not an HTTPS 
one.
• By means of social engineering techniques, a user is tricked into clicking 
on an HTTP link, instead of an HTTPS one, therefore initiating the HTTP 
request that can be captured by the MITM. 
• An attacker sends a fake certificate, hoping that the user will accept it by 
clicking through the warnings displayed by the browser.
• Forgotten HTTP links scattered throughout the web pages. 
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All of these vulnerable situations can be avoided by the web application just by issuing 
this header. In fact, no other server header or web application configuration exists 
that can prevent these kind of MITM attacks (at least, regarding the first two cases). 
That makes HSTS a key protective server-side header. The header specification was 
published in 2012, (RFC 6797). 
By parsing the scanning data obtained from the top one million web sites we have 
found that most websites do not issue any HSTS header. The aggregated results can 
be seen in Fig 2. 
FIGURE 2. HSTS IMPLEMENTATION RATE AS A FUNCTION OF WEBSITE POPULARITY
It is readily appreciated that highly popular sites tend to implement HSTS more often 
than those sites that are less popular. Nearly 38% of top one thousand sites implement 
HSTS, while only 17.5% of top one million HTTPS websites implement it. This trend 
will be recurrent for all headers analysed in this research: the most popular a site is, 
the more security headers it will tend to implement. 
Our numbers are comparable to the ones published by Helme (2017), who reports 
a 7.3% penetration rate. The difference is due to the fact that Helme’s results are 
referred to the whole dataset, just not to the HTTPS sites (about 40% of all websites). 
Our 17.5% HSTS implementation rate becomes 7.0% when referred to the whole 
dataset. April (2017) reports a 4.4% adoption rate in June 2017 (also referred to the 
whole dataset). We believe, however, that HSTS rates should be referred to the HTTPS 
subset, since HSTS does make sense in HTTP only sites.
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Only about 2% of HTTP websites redirect to an HTTPS site while simultaneously 
enforcing HSTS policy. Finally, a small number of sites (0.7%) make use of HTTP 
protocol and respond with a status code of 200, instead of responding with a redirection 
300 code.
3) Content-Security-Policy Header
Content-Security-Policy (CSP) is a key response header that provides strong defence 
mechanisms against Cross Site Scripting (XSS) and other client-side injection attacks 
by whitelisting allowed sources and disabling certain insecure JavaScript features. It 
can also be used to prevent attacks against HTTPS, mostly those related to inadvertent 
HTTP links within HTTPS web pages. It has been standardized by W3C, originally in 
2012 (CSP Level 1), then revised and augmented in 2015 (CSP Level 2) and currently 
undergoing a third revision (CSP Level 3). CSP is currently supported by all major 
browsers, with the exception of Microsoft Internet Explorer which uses the alternative 
X-Content-Security-Policy header.
The header directives, up to 16 in CSP2, offer the possibility of a fine-grained 
configuration, although at the cost of having to deal with non-trivial setup choices. In 
fact, due to the growing complexity of client-side scripting code and the large number 
of different assets handled by web applications (up to hundreds or even thousands 
of different resources requested from within a given page), the adoption of a CSP 
policy may result in unexpected glitches. Therefore, most implementation guidelines 
recommend starting to implement CSP by making use of the related Content-Security-
Policy-Report-Only response header that allows web administrators to test their CSP 
policies before they are fully enforced without risking unwanted web application 
behaviour. 
Our results show that CSP is scarcely implemented in HTTPS sites (3.4%) and hardly 
in HTTP sites (0.4%). The figures for Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only usage 
are even smaller (0.3% and 0.1% respectively). Globally, including both HTTP and 
HTTPS sites, CSP is implemented in 1.6% and CSP report only version in just 0.2% of 
sites. On the other hand, the implementation rate of CSP with respect to the popularity 
rank follows the same pattern as with other headers: more popular sites choose to 
issue the CSP header more often than less popular ones. These findings can be easily 
appreciated in Figure 3:
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FIGURE 3. CSP IMPLEMENTATION RATE AS A FUNCTION OF WEBSITE POPULARITY
Our results are similar to the ones by Helme (2017), from August 2017, about 2.0% 
globally, while significantly higher than April’s (l2017), 0.04% in June 2017.
We have also observed that there are significant differences between the directives 
used in HTTP and HTTPS sites. In fact, for HTTP sites, frameAncestors (48.27%), 
scriptSrc (35.96%) and defaultSrc (35.72%) are the most common directives. 
However, HTTPS sites typically issue different directives. The most common ones 
being: upgradeInsecureRequests (61.79%), reportUri (53.34%) and defaultSrc 
(20.37%). 
On the other hand, it is interesting to note that the CSP report only version seems to 
differ from fully enforcing CSP. In fact, the most common directives in HTTP sites 
are reportUri (94.68%), blockAllMixedContent (81.73%), defaultSrc (13.53%). And 
for HTTPS sites, most common CSP report only directives are reportUri (94.68%), 
blockAllMixedContent (81.73%), defaultSrc (13.53%). 
4) X-XSS-Protection Header
This header is responsible for toggling off the XSS filter implemented by most 
current browsers (except, notably, Firefox). By default, the XSS filter is enabled, but 
website administrators can disable it by setting its value to zero (X-XSS-Protection: 
0), possibly to prevent the browser from interfering with the desired behaviour of the 
web application. Web sites that issue that header, and set its value to zero, risk being 
vulnerable to reflected XSS attacks. Content Security Policy, and in particular CSP 
level 2 contains a directive, “reflected-xss”, that completely replaces this header.
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Our scanning results for the full one million set show that about 12% of HTTPS sites 
and 6% of HTTP sites set this header. Most of the times the header is issued so that 
the browser is granted the right to apply its XSS filter, but in 3% of HTTP sites, and 
nearly 2% of HTTPS sites, the configuration is such that the sites deny permission to 
apply the filter. Therefore, as expected, HTTPS sites tend to be more concerned with 
security. In a similar way, the more popular a site is, the more it will tend to set the 
header, and will mostly do it so that the browser is granted the right to enable its filter. 
Both trends can be appreciated in Figure 4.
FIGURE 4. X-XSS-PROTECTION IMPLEMENTATION 
RATE AS A FUNCTION OF WEBSITE POPULARITY
Our findings are in agreement with a global implementation rate of [Helme2017], 
9.3%, and [April2017], 8.1% (none of them break up implementation rates by protocol 
or popularity of website).
5) X-Frame-Options Header
This header, standardized in RFC 7034, is used to instruct a browser whether a 
given web page or resource is allowed to appear within a Frame, iFrame or Object, 
thereby avoiding frame based attacks, like “clickjacking” (for example, rydstedt or 
OWASPxfo). As with X-XSS-Protection, this header is superseded by CSP, which 
contains a directive, “frame-ancestors”, that completely replaces X-XSS-Protection 
header. There are three “options”, or directives, defined for this header: deny, same-
origin and allow-from.
The results from our scanning survey show once more that HTTPS sites are prone to 
add this header more often than HTTP sites, 17.38% and 7.48%, respectively. For the 
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sites that choose to issue this header, the most common directives found are “same-
origin” (86% in HTTP and 91% in HTTPS) and “deny” (12% in HTTPS and 7% in 
HTTP). Again, highly popular sites make use of this protection more often than less 
popular sites as can be readily appreciated in Figure 5:
FIGURE 5. X-FRAME-OPTIONS IMPLEMENTATION RATE AS A FUNCTION OF WEBSITE POPULARITY
These results do not essentially deviate from those of Helme (2017), 12.4% or April 
(2017), 11%.
6) Set-Cookie Header
This header is used by web sites to send cookies to the client side as part of the 
response message. Supported by all browsers, its current syntax was standardized by 
IETF RFC 6265. From the security perspective, the interest on this header lies on the 
“session cookies”, i.e., those cookies that are set from the server side with the purpose 
of establishing a “session” between client and server (the stateless HTTP protocol 
was devised without any built-in session mechanism). In principle, cookies can be 
sent from the server to the browser without any particular security risk, unless they 
are session cookies. These cookies constitute a major target of many web application 
attacks, and therefore, we have tackled their study as part of the current research. 
In order to prevent session hijacking and other web attacks that usually proceed 
through Cross Site Scripting or MITM attacks, it is generally agreed that session 
cookies should, at least, carry the directives “HttpOnly”, for both HTTP and HTTPS 
sites, and “Secure”, for HTTPS sites. HttpOnly offers protection against cookies being 
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accessed from client-side scripts (and therefore stolen under XSS attacks) and the 
Secure flag prevents the cookies from being captured through an unintended HTTP 
connection.
However, not all cookies need to be protected by HttpOnly or Secure flags, only 
session ones. Given the fact that session cookies need not carry any flag or follow any 
rules that distinguish them from non-session cookies, we have tried to tell them apart, 
and therefore assess the presence of the mentioned flags, by parsing the Set-Cookie 
value and search there for the token “sess” (case insensitively). While this is far from 
being a satisfactory criterion, our research shows that most of “highly probable” 
session cookies can be identified this way. Table 5 shows most frequent cookie names 
observed in the responses obtained from our data set:
TABLE 5. MOST COMMON COOKIE NAMES
Cloud Flare ID cookie, __cfuid, cannot be considered properly as a web site session 
cookie (and indeed does not meet our criteria), while PHP sessions, ASP.NET sessions 
and Java based sessions are identified using this “sess” token technique. Taking all 
together, we can assume that 53.6% of all cookies received from server side are 
properly identified as being, or not, a session cookie. A further inspection analysing 
the 250 most popular cookie names proved that the “sess” token technique was enough 
to tell apart session cookies from ordinary cookies, up to that level of “cookie name 
popularity”.
Our results show that, regarding HTTP sites, about 49.4% of them set a session cookie 
within the response to our first request, but 55.4% of those cookies do not set the 
HttpOnly flag. Regarding HTTPS sites, 42.7% do not set HttpOnly flag and up to 
80.7% of them do not make use of the Secure flag. The following graphs exhibit the 
same pattern found in other security headers: HTTPS sites and popular sites seem to 












FIGURE 6. SESSION COOKIES. HTTPONLY DIRECTIVE AS A FUNCTION OF WEBSITE POPULARITY
FIGURE 7. SESSION COOKIES. SECURE DIRECTIVE AS A FUNCTION OF WEBSITE POPULARITY
Finally, the “SameSite” cookie attribute recently implemented by Chrome and Opera, 
but still lacking in all other browsers, is an interesting flag currently defined under 
IETF draft (2016). It helps prevent Cross Site Request Forgery and cookie hijacking 
by instructing the browser not to send a cookie with that attribute to any request other 
than same-site requests. Although a very promising attribute, given its novelty and 
lack of widespread implementation, it is understandable that only 0.05% of HTTPS 
sites and 0.01% of HTTP sites make use of the flag.
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7) X-Content-Type-Options Header
This header was defined to protect browsers from MIME sniffing vulnerabilities, by 
which an attacker may trick the browser into executing content that was not meant 
to be executed by the web application. These kinds of attacks make use of the fact 
that, under some circumstances, browsers do not follow the MIME type indicated in 
the Content-Type header. It is implemented by all major browsers, after Microsoft 
introduced it in IE8. The only allowed directive for this header is “nosniff”. 
The results follow the same pattern observed in other security headers: HTTPS sites 
set X-Content-Type-Options more often that HTTP ones (roughly, 16% vs 8%) and 
popular web sites do it also more often than less popular ones, as shown in the next 
figure:
FIGURE 8. X-CONTENT-TYPE-OPTIONS ADOPTION 
RATE AS A FUNCTION OF WEBSITE POPULARITY
Helme (2017) reports an adoption rate of 11.6%, whereas April (2017) finds 9.4%, 
global rates. 
C. Information Revealing Headers
1) Server Header (and other related server-side headers)
The Server header, defined as part of the RFC 7231 for HTTP/1.1 protocol, is a server-
side header originally devised to inform a browser about software used in the web 
application. Although it is not mandatory, it is issued by most web sites (according to 
our scanning results, more than 90% of sites set this header). It typically contains the 
name and version of the web server on which the web application is running.
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By itself, the presence of this header as part of an HTTP response does not pose any 
security thread. However, it may help an attacker to easily obtain the web server name, 
version and additional information, for example, the name of the CMS supporting the 
web application. There are currently many “fingerprinting” tools that can be used to 
obtain that information, regardless of the presence of the Server header. They include 
well known utilities like command line command nmap, dedicated tool httprint or 
web utilities like Netcraft that can reveal valuable information to any attacker willing 
to make use of known vulnerabilities and their corresponding exploits. 
The interest of this header from the point of view of the current research is twofold: on 
the one hand, the Server header provides fast and valuable information to those attacks 
that rely on large scale Internet web site scanning to find potential victims. On the 
other hand, we want to study statistical correlation between this header and other web 
site variables, specifically domain popularity and protocol (HTTP / HTTPS) in order 
to help obtain a more accurate picture of the security of the sites we have analysed.
It should be taken into account that other HTTP headers, besides Server, can carry 
information regarding web server and other relevant software. In particular, we 
have taken into account the following additional headers: X-Powered-By, X-AspNet-
Version, X-AspNetMvc-Version and X-Varnish. We have combined the information 
carried by these headers, if present, with the one in the Server header, nearly always 
present, in order to try to find the web server name and version. The results are shown 
in next figure.
FIGURE 9. WEB SERVER INFORMATION AS A FUNCTION OF WEBSITE POPULARITY
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From last figure it is clearly appreciated two tendencies: a) HTTPS sites tend to be 
more restrictive than HTTP served sites on the information they provide, at least 
regarding Server and related headers, and b) the more popular a given domain is, the 
less information it will probably leak. The overall picture, however, shows that a huge 
amount of Internet web sites (at least, over 85% of them) expose their web server info 
through their HTTPS headers. Our statistics indicates that, within those sites with 
recognizable web server, most popular web server is Apache HTTP server (46% of 
sites) followed by nginx (38% of sites) and IIS (14%). 
Another common header, X-Powered-By header, appears in 48% of responses from 
sites and typically (66% of cases) contains the PHP version used to develop the web 
site.
2) Date Header
This header, defined as part of HTTP/1.1 specification, RFC 7231, contains the date 
and time at which the response message was originated. In our research this header 
is set in over 99% of all responses. It is, in fact, the most common header seen in 
responses. Although it is not related to any significant security attack, server-side date 
and time play an important role as part of the logging information needed to analyse 
security incidents (see, for example, Prodromou 2016). Inaccurate timestamps will 
yield unreliable logging records, and therefore making then inappropriate for forensics 
tasks. 
We see the general trends observed previously: a) HTTPS sites seem to run on more 
precisely configured servers than HTTP ones and b) the more popular a site is, the 
more secure it tends to be configured.
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FIGURE 10. SITES THAT SHOW TIME OFFSET IN DATE 
RESPONSE HEADER AS A FUNCTION OF WEBSITE POPULARITY
3) Referer and Referer-Policy Headers
The Referer -sic- header, specified by RFC7231 allows the browser to inform the web 
server to which the request is made about the URI from where the user made that 
request. It is meant to provide information that can be processed on the server side 
for logging or commercial analysis, for example, getting to know where customers 
typically come from when reaching a given site. This header is also commonly used 
as a key component of web tracking technologies. 
In principle, Referer header poses a privacy concern, not a security one, since it reveals 
information to a third party that a user might not want to be revealed. Sometimes, 
however, a URL may carry sensitive information, for example, a session token or a 
capability indicator [Cap2014], and under such circumstances the Referer header may 
pose a security risk. Both, privacy and possible security risks, have led to the proposal 
of a Referrer-Policy header (see W3C Editor’s draft at 2017). This header, currently 
implemented by all major browsers, allows a website to control the information 
carried by the Referer header in a rather fine-grained manner. It defines up to eight 
different directives. 
Our scanning database indicates that Referrer-Policy header is scarcely implemented. 
Only 0.05% of HTTP responses, and 0.33% of HTTPS responses, contain some form 
of a valid Referrer-Policy. The distribution of the different policies can be seen in 
Table 6.
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TABLE 6. REFERER DIRECTIVES
Finally, the P3P header, related to users’ privacy settings, was not included as part of 
this study since it is not implemented by any major browser other than Microsoft IE 
and Edge. However, it is still being issued by 7.5% of the sites (6.9% of HTTP sites 
and 8.4% of HTTPS ones).
5. conclusIons
We have presented a new analysis of implementation rate in Alexa’s top one million 
websites of web security policies based on HTTP response headers. A careful data 
gathering process was carried out to collect HTTP response headers from four different 
requests for each domain in the list: http://domain, http://www.domain, https://domain 
and https://www.domain. Redirections were followed. HTTPS issues were examined, 
finding in particular that a sizeable number of sites, 29.1% of all HTTPS requests 
made, exhibit some incorrect TLS configuration. They are typically X.509 certificate 
errors, as the leading causes for TLS misconfiguration are name mismatching and 
verification errors (self-signed certificates, untrusted CA’s or expired certificates). 
We also compared HTTP response headers obtained from HTTP/1.1 and HTTP/2 
equivalent requests and found that, besides some connection related headers, response 
headers show no significant differences.
We repeatedly showed that security policies based on HTTP response headers are 
always far more common in HTTPS websites that in HTTP sites. Those policies are 
also noticeably more commonly implemented among highly popular sites than not 
so popular ones. In fact, for all security headers analysed here, when implementation 






























In particular, we have found that HTTP Strict Transport Security policy is implemented 
in about 38% among top one thousand HTTPS sites, but only 17.5% considering all 
top one million websites. Content Security Policy, despite its powerful prevention 
capability against Cross Site Scripting and other vulnerabilities, remains poorly 
implemented at a global 1.6% among all one million websites. HTTPS sites show 
a markedly larger adoption rate, 3.4%, whereas HTTP sites hardly implement this 
policy, only 0.4% of them. Session cookies were also analysed and we found that 
about 50% of sites do not set their HttpOnly flag (55.4 % of HTTP sites and 42.7% of 
HTTPS sites) and and the Secure directive is issued for the session cookies in about 
19.3% of all HTTPS sites. Although not so relevant as these headers, other security-
related response headers were analysed (X-Frame-Options, X-XSS-Protection and 
X-ContentType-Options). We also analysed information leakage from web servers 
through their Server and other related response headers and, again, we found that 
information leakage is more common among less popular and HTTP sites than in 
highly popular and HTTPS sites.
All in all, security policies based on HTTP headers remain low. They are slightly 
increasing when compared to the figures reported by previous researches during 
2017 (Helme 2017, April 2017), but still well below satisfactory rates. Notably 
higher implementation rates observed in the most popular sites suggests that security 
awareness could be influenced by factors like business size. Alternatively, it may be 
argued that security-aware websites tend to thrive better. 
6. future worK
The authors plan to expand the current research in several ways. The survey offers a 
picture of certain web security policies implemented by the top one million websites 
at a given time (September 2017) and a periodical repetition of the scanning process 
will be interesting, as it will show how the adoption of these policies are evolving. 
Following similar initiatives like the ones by Mozilla Observatory and Scott Helme, 
the authors plan to assign a “global” scoring (e.g., from A to F) for each website 
and generate the corresponding global statistics and their correlation to HTTPS and 
site popularity ranking. However, our initial work on this area shows that it is far 
from obvious how to assign relative weights to each of the analysed HTTP headers 
and we firmly believe that further work is needed, taking into account, at least, web 
vulnerability prevalence statistics.
Additionally, we are currently exploring the possibility of considering more variables 
in our work, like website country and Content Distribution Network usage and how 
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it relates to web security policies based on HTTP response headers. Finally, we deem 
interesting to study Subresource Integrity current adoption resources.
7. references
Alexa’s Top One Million Websites, https://s3.amazonaws.com/alexa-static/top-1m.csv.zip.
Li Chang, Hsu-Chun Hsiao, Wei Jeng, Tiffany Hyun-Jin Kim and Wei-Hsi Lin, “Security Implications of 
Redirection Trail in Popular Websites Worldwide”, in Proceedings of the 26th International Conference on 
World Wide Web (WWW ’17), 2017, pages 1491-1500. International World Wide Web Conferences Steering 
Committee, Republic and Canton of Geneva, Switzerland. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1145/3038912.3052698.
Cisco Umbrella 1 Million, https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2016/12/14/cisco-umbrella-1-million/.
Scott Helme, “I am giving up on HPKP”, blog post, 24 August 2017, https://scotthelme.co.uk/im-giving-up-on-
hpkp/.
Scott Helme, “Alexa Top 1 Million Analysis - August 2017”, blog post, 29 August 2017, https://scotthelme.
ghost.io/alexa-top-1-million-analysis-aug-2017/.
Scott Helme, “Daily scans of the top one million sites”, https://scans.io/study/scott-top-one-million.
Httprint web server fingerprinting tool, http://www.net-square.com/httprint.html.
Hyper: HTTP/2 for Python, https://python-hyper.org/en/latest/.
Internet Engineering Task Force, “HTTP Header Field X-Frame-Options”, IETF Informational, RFC 7034, 
October 2013, https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7034.
Internet Engineering Task Force, “HTTP State Management Mechanism”, IETF Standard, RFC 6265, April 
2011, https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6265.
Internet Engineering Task Force, “HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS)”, IETF Standard, RFC 6797, 
November 2012, https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6797.
Internet Engineering Task Force, “Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Semantics and Content”, IETF 
Standard, RFC 7231, June 2014, https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7231.
Internet Engineering Task Force, “Public Key Pinning Extension for HTTP”, IETF Standard, RFC 7469, April 
2015, https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7469.
Internet Engineering Task Force, “Same-Site Cookies”, IETF Internet-Draft Standard, 20 June 2016, https://
tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-httpbis-cookie-same-site-00.
April King, “Analysis of the Alexa Top 1M sites (June 2017)”, 13 June 2017, https://pokeinthe.io/2017/06/13/
state-of-security-alexa-top-one-million-2017-06/.
Let’s Encrypt - Free SSL/TLS Certificates, https://letsencrypt.org/.
Majestic Million database, https://blog.majestic.com/development/majestic-million-csv-daily/.
Mozilla HTTP Observatory Website, https://mozilla.github.io/http-observatory-website/.
Mozilla Included CA Certificate List, https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA/Included_Certificates.
Mozilla Intermediate Certificates, https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA/Intermediate_Certificates.
370
Netcraft Site Report, http://toolbar.netcraft.com/site_report.
Nmap, https://nmap.org/.
OWASP, Clickjacking Defence Cheat Sheet, https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Clickjacking_defence_Cheat_
Sheet.
Chris Palmer, “Intent to deprecate and remove HPKP”, forum post, 27 October 2017, https://groups.google.
com/a/chromium.org/forum/#!msg/blink-dev/he9tr7p3rZ8/eNMwKPmUBAAJ.
Agathoklis Prodromou, “Using logs to investigate a web application attack”, blog post, 11 May 2016, https://
www.acunetix.com/blog/articles/using-logs-to-investigate-a-web-application-attack/.
Requests: HTTP for humans. v2.18.4 Python library, http://docs.python-requests.org/en/master/.
Ivan Ristic, “Is HTTP Public Key Pinning dead?”, blog post, 6 September 2016, https://blog.qualys.com/
ssllabs/2016/09/06/is-http-public-key-pinning-dead.
Gustav Rydstedt, Elie Bursztein, Dan Boneh and Collin Jackson, “Busting Frame Busting: a Study of 
Clickjacking Vulnerabilities at Popular Sites”, in IEEE Oakland Web 2.0 Security and Privacy (W2SP 
2010), https://crypto.stanford.edu/~dabo/pubs/papers/framebust.pdf.
[IO] Security Headers Website, https://securityheaders.io/.
Aditya Sood and Richard Enbody, “The state of HTTP declarative security in online banking websites”, in 
Computer Fraud & Security, Volume 2011, Issue 7, July 2011, pages 11-16. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/
S1361-3723(11)70073-2.
Usage of HTTP/2 for websites, W3Techs, https://w3techs.com/technologies/details/ce-http2/all/all.
Michael Weissbacher, Tobias Lauinger and William Robertson, “Why Is CSP Failing? Trends and Challenges in 
CSP Adoption”, in Research in Attacks, Intrusions and Defenses. RAID 2014. Lecture Notes in Computer 
Science, vol 8688. Springer, Cham. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-11379-1_11.
World Wide Web Consortium, “Content Security Policy 1.0” (CSP1), W3C Working Group Note, 19 February 
2015, discontinued, https://www.w3.org/TR/CSP1/.
World Wide Web Consortium, “Content Security Policy Level 2” (CSP2), W3C Recommendation, 15 December 
2016, https://www.w3.org/TR/CSP2.
World Wide Web Consortium, “Content Security Policy Level 3” (CSP3), W3C Working Draft, 13 September 
2016, https://www.w3.org/TR/CSP/.
World Wide Web Consortium, “Good Practices for Capability URLs”, W3C First Public Working Draft, 18 
February 2014, https://www.w3.org/TR/capability-urls/.
World Wide Web Consortium, “Referrer Policy”, W3C Candidate Recommendation, 26 January 2017, https://
www.w3.org/TR/referrer-policy/.
World Wide Web Consortium, “Subresource Integrity”, W3C Recommendation, 23 June 2016, https://www.
w3.org/TR/SRI/.
Ming Ying and Shu Qin Li, “CSP adoption: current status and future prospects”, in Security and Communication 
Networks, Vol 9, Issue 17, 25 November 2016, pages 4557-4573. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1002/sec.1649.
371
On the Effectiveness of 
Machine and Deep Learning 
for Cyber Security
Abstract: Machine learning is adopted in a wide range of domains where it shows its 
superiority over traditional rule-based algorithms. These methods are being integrated 
in cyber detection systems with the goal of supporting or even replacing the first level 
of security analysts. Although the complete automation of detection and analysis is 
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1. IntroductIon
The appeal and pervasiveness of machine learning (ML) is growing. Existing methods 
are being improved, and their ability to understand and answer real issues is highly 
appreciated. These achievements have led to the adoption of machine learning in 
several domains, such as computer vision, medical analysis, gaming and social media 
marketing [1]. In some scenarios, machine learning techniques represent the best 
choice over traditional rule-based algorithms and even human operators [2]. This 
trend is also affecting the cyber security field where some detection systems are being 
upgraded with ML components [3]. Although devising a completely automated cyber 
defence system is yet a distant objective, first level operators in Network and Security 
Operation Centres (NOC and SOC) may benefit from detection and analysis tools 
based on machine learning. This paper is specifically addressed to security operators 
and aims to assess the current maturity of these solutions, to identify their main 
limitations and to highlight some room for improvement.
Our study is based on an extensive review of the literature and on original experiments 
performed on real, large enterprises and network traffic. Other academic papers 
compare ML solutions for cyber security by considering one specific application (e.g.: 
[4], [3], [5]) and are typically oriented to Artificial Intelligence (AI) experts rather 
than to security operators. In the evaluation, we exclude the commercial products 
based on machine learning (or on the abused AI term) because vendors do not reveal 
their algorithms and tend to overlook issues and limitations. First, we present an 
original taxonomy of machine learning cyber security approaches. Then, we map the 
identified classes of algorithms to three problems where machine learning is currently 
applied: intrusion detection, malware analysis, spam and phishing detection. Finally, 
we analyse the main limitations of existing approaches. Our study highlights pros and 
cons of different methods, especially in terms of false positive or false negative alarms. 
Moreover, we point out a general underestimation of the complexity of managing ML 
architectures in cyber security caused by the lack of publicly available and labelled 
with the due diligence. We present an analysis, addressed to security specialists, of 
machine learning techniques applied to the detection of intrusion, malware, and spam. 
The goal is twofold: to assess the current maturity of these solutions and to identify 
their main limitations that prevent an immediate adoption of machine learning cyber 
detection schemes. Our conclusions are based on an extensive review of the literature 
as well as on experiments performed on real enterprise systems and network traffic.
Keywords: machine learning, deep learning, cyber security, adversarial learning
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data for training, and by the time required for fine-tuning operations in a domain 
characterized by continuous change. We also consider recent results emphasizing the 
effectiveness of adversarial attacks [6] [5] in evading ML detectors. The evidenced 
drawbacks pave the way to future improvements that ML components require before 
being fully adopted in cyber defence platforms.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 proposes our original taxonomy of ML 
algorithms applied to cyber security. Section 3 outlines the three classes of cyber 
security problems considered in this paper and Section 4 compares and evaluates ML 
solutions for cyber security. Section 5 concludes the paper with some final remarks. 
2. classIfIcatIon of machIne learnIng 
algorIthms for cyber securIty
Machine learning includes a large variety of paradigms in continuous evolution, 
presenting weak boundaries and cross relationships. Furthermore, different views and 
applications may lead to different classifications. Hence, we cannot refer to one fully 
accepted taxonomy from literature, but we prefer to propose an original taxonomy 
able to capture the differences among the myriad of techniques that are being applied 
to cyber detection, as shown in Figure 1. This taxonomy is specifically oriented to 
security operators and avoids the ambitious goal of presenting the ultimate classification 
that can satisfy all AI experts and application cases. The first discriminant evidenced 
in Figure 1 is between the traditional ML algorithms, which today can be referred 
to as Shallow Learning (SL), in opposition to the more recent Deep Learning 
(DL). Shallow Learning requires a domain expert (that is, a feature engineer) who 
can perform the critical task of identifying the relevant data characteristics before 
executing the SL algorithm. Deep Learning relies on a multi-layered representation 




1 For a detailed list of existing ML algorithms, see: https://cran.r-project.org/web/views/MachineLearning.
html
FIGURE 1. CLASSIFICATION OF ML ALGORITHMS FOR CYBER SECURITY APPLICATIONS.
SL and DL approaches can be further characterized by distinguishing between 
supervised and unsupervised algorithms. The former techniques require a training 
process with a large and representative set of data that have been previously classified 
by a human expert or through other means. The latter approaches do not require a pre-
labelled training dataset. In this section, we consider and compare the most popular 
categories of ML algorithms, which appear as the leaves of the classification tree in 
Figure 1. We remark that each category can include dozens of different techniques1.
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A. Shallow Learning
1) Supervised SL algorithms
• Naïve Bayes (NB). These algorithms are probabilistic classifiers which make 
the a-priori assumption that the features of the input dataset are independent 
from each other. They are scalable and do not require huge training datasets 
to produce appreciable results.
• Logistic Regression (LR). These are categorical classifiers that adopt a 
discriminative model. Like NB algorithms, LR methods make the a-priori 
independency assumption of the input features. Their performance is highly 
dependent on the size of the training data.
• Support Vector Machines (SVM). These are non-probabilistic classifiers 
that map data samples in a feature space with the goal of maximizing the 
distance between each category of samples. They do not make any assumption 
on the input features, but they perform poorly in multi-class classifications. 
Hence, they should be used as binary classifiers. Their limited scalability 
might lead to long processing times.
• Random Forest (RF). A random forest is a set of decision trees, and 
considers the output of each tree before providing a unified final response. 
Each decision tree is a conditional classifier: the tree is visited from the top 
and, at each node, a given condition is checked against one or more features 
of the analysed data. These methods are efficient for large datasets and excel 
at multiclass problems, but deeper trees might lead to overfitting. 
• Hidden Markov Models (HMM). These model the system as a set of states 
producing outputs with different probabilities; the goal is to determine the 
sequence of states that produced the observed outputs. HMM are effective 
for understanding the temporal behaviour of the observations, and for 
calculating the likelihood of a given sequence of events. Although HMM 
can be trained on labelled or unlabelled datasets, in cyber security they have 
mostly been used with labelled datasets.
• K-Nearest Neighbour (KNN). KNN are used for classification and can be 
used for multi-class problems. However, both their training and test phase 
are computationally demanding as to classify each test sample, they compare 
it against all the training samples.
• Shallow Neural Network (SNN). These algorithms are based on neural 
networks, which consist in a set of processing elements (that is, neurons) 
organized in two or more communicating layers. SNN include all those types 
of neural networks with a limited number of neurons and layers. Despite the 
existence of unsupervised SNN, in cyber security they have mostly been 
used for classification tasks.
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2) Unsupervised SL algorithms
• Clustering. These group data points that present similar characteristics. Well 
known approaches include k-means and hierarchical clustering. Clustering 
methods have a limited scalability, but they represent a flexible solution 
that is typically used as a preliminary phase before adopting a supervised 
algorithm or for anomaly detection purposes. 
• Association. They aim to identify unknown patterns between data, making 
them suitable for prediction purposes. However, they tend to produce an 
excessive output of not necessarily valid rules, hence they must be combined 
with accurate inspections by a human expert.
B. Deep Learning
All DL algorithms are based on Deep Neural Networks (DNN), which are large neural 
networks organized in many layers capable of autonomous representation learning.
1) Supervised DL algorithms
• Fully-connected Feedforward Deep Neural Networks (FNN). They are 
a variant of DNN where every neuron is connected to all the neurons in 
the previous layer. FNN do not make any assumption on the input data and 
provide a flexible and general-purpose solution for classification, at the 
expense of high computational costs.
• Convolutional Feedforward Deep Neural Networks (CNN). They are a 
variant of DNN where each neuron receives its input only from a subset of 
neurons of the previous layer. This characteristic makes CNN effective at 
analysing spatial data, but their performance decreases when applied to non-
spatial data. CNN have a lower computation cost than FNN.
• Recurrent Deep Neural Networks (RNN). A variant of DNN whose 
neurons can send their output also to previous layers; this design makes them 
harder to train than FNN. They excel as sequence generators, especially their 
recent variant, the long short-term memory.
2) Unsupervised DL algorithms
• Deep Belief Networks (DBN). They are modelled through a composition of 
Restricted Boltzmann Machines (RBM), a class of neural networks with no 
output layer. DBN can be successfully used for pre-training tasks because 
they excel in the function of feature extraction. They require a training 
phase, but with unlabelled datasets.
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• Stacked Autoencoders (SAE). They are composed by multiple 
Autoencoders, a class of neural networks where the number of input and 
output neurons is the same. SAE excel at pre-training tasks similarly to 
DBN, and achieve better results on small datasets.
3. aPPlIcatIons of machIne learnIng 
algorIthms to cyber securIty
We consider the three areas where most cyber ML algorithms are finding application: 
intrusion detection, malware analysis, and spam detection. An outline of each field is 
presented below.
Intrusion detection aims to discover illicit activities within a computer or a network 
through Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS). Network IDS are widely deployed in 
modern enterprise networks. These systems were traditionally based on patterns 
of known attacks, but modern deployments include other approaches for anomaly 
detection, threat detection [7] and classification based on machine learning. Within the 
broader intrusion detection area, two specific problems are relevant to our analysis: 
the detection of botnets and of Domain Generation Algorithms (DGA). A botnet 
is a network of infected machines controlled by attackers and misused to conduct 
multiple illicit activities. Botnet detection aims to identify communications between 
infected machines within the monitored network and the external command-and-
control servers. Despite many research proposals and commercial tools that address 
this threat, several botnets still exist. DGA automatically generate domain names, 
and are often used by an infected machine to communicate with external server(s) by 
periodically generating new hostnames. They represent a real threat for organizations 
because, through DGA which relies on language processing techniques, it is possible 
to evade defences based on static blacklists of domain names. We consider DGA 
detection techniques based on ML.
Malware analysis is an extremely relevant problem because modern malware can 
automatically generate novel variants with the same malicious effects but appearing 
as completely different executable files. These polymorphic and metamorphic features 
defeat traditional rule-based malware identification approaches. ML techniques can be 
used to analyse malware variants and attributing them to the correct malware family.
Spam and phishing detection includes a large set of techniques aimed at reducing 
the waste of time and potential hazard caused by unwanted emails. Nowadays, 
unsolicited emails, namely phishing, represent the preferred way through which an 
attacker establishes a first foothold within an enterprise network. Phishing emails 
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include malware or links to compromised websites. Spam and phishing detection is 
increasingly difficult because of the advanced evasion strategies used by attackers to 
bypass traditional filters. ML approaches can improve the spam detection process.
TABLE 1. APPLICATION OF ML TO CYBER SECURITY PROBLEMS.
In Table 1 we report the main ML algorithms that have been proposed to address the 
previously identified cyber security problems. In this table, rows report the family 
of algorithms presented in Section 2, while columns denote cyber issues. Each cell 
indicates which ML algorithms are used for each problem; empty cells denote that, to 
the best of our knowledge, there is no proposal for that class of problems. From this 
table, it emerges that SL algorithms are applied to all considered problems. Supervised 
DL algorithms find wide application to malware analysis, less to intrusion detection; 
spam detection relies only on unsupervised DL algorithms. Despite its relatedness to 
natural language processing [2], no DL algorithm is applied to DGA detection. As 
expected, the overall number of algorithms based on DL is considerably smaller than 
those based on SL. Indeed, DL proposals based on huge neural networks are more 
recent than SL approaches. This gap opens many research opportunities.
Finally, we highlight a significant difference among supervised and unsupervised 
approaches: the former algorithms are used for classification purposes and can 
implement complete detectors; the latter techniques perform ancillary activities [35]. 
Unsupervised SL algorithms are often used for grouping data with similar characteristics 
independently of predefined classification criteria, and excel at identifying useful 













































































In this section we present seven issues that must be considered before deciding whether 
to apply ML algorithms in NOC and SOC. We can anticipate that, at the current 
state-of-the-art, no algorithm can be considered fully autonomous with no human 
supervision. We substantiate each issue through experimental results from literature 
or original experiments performed on large enterprises. We begin by describing the 
testing environments of our experiments, and the metrics considered for evaluation. 
The experiments focus on DGA Detection and Network Intrusion Detection, and 
leverage two ML algorithms: Random Forest and Feedforward Fully Connected Deep 
Neural Network.
For DGA Detection, we compose two labelled training datasets containing both DGA 
and non-DGA domains. The former dataset contains DGA created through known 
techniques, while the latter contains DGA created using more recent approaches. 
Non-DGA domains are randomly chosen among the Cisco Umbrella top-1 million. 
We report the meaningful metrics of the training datasets in Table 2. Moreover, we 
build a testing dataset of 10,000 domains extracted evenly from each of the training 
datasets. We also rely on a real and unlabelled dataset composed of almost 20,000 
domains contacted by a large organization. The features extracted for this dataset are: 
n-gram normality score [36]; meaningful characters ratio [36]; number-to-character 
ratio; vowel-to-consonant ratio; and domain length. These datasets are used to train 
and test a self-developed Random Forest classifier composed of 100 decision trees 
leveraging the CART (classification and regression tree) algorithm.
TABLE 2. TRAINING DATASETS FOR DGA DETECTION EXPERIMENTS.
For Network Intrusion Detection, we use three labelled real training datasets 
composed of benign and malicious network flows2 collected in a large organization 
of nearly 10,000 hosts. The labels are created by flagging as malicious those flows 
that raised alerts by the enterprise network IDS and reviewed by a domain expert. 
Meaningful metrics of these training datasets are reported in Table 3. We also generate 
a testing dataset of 50,000 flows evenly extracted among the training datasets. The 
considered features for these datasets include: source/destination IP address, source/
destination port, number of incoming/outgoing bytes and packets, TCP flags, protocol 
used, duration of the flow and list of alerts raised. These datasets are used to test 
and train two self-developed classifiers, one based on Random Forests and one on 














Feedforward Fully-connected Deep Neural Network. Different topologies have been 
considered for each algorithm. The RF is composed by 100 decision trees leveraging 
the CART algorithm. For the FNN, the overall number of neurons ranges from 128 
to 16,384, distributed between 2 to 16 layers; the hidden layers leverage the ReLU 
activation function, whereas the output layer uses a sigmoid activation function.
TABLE 3. TRAINING DATASETS FOR NETWORK INTRUSION DETECTION EXPERIMENTS. 
The quality of each classifier is measured through common performance metrics, 
namely Precision, Recall, F1-score, which are computed as follows:
where TP, FP, and FN denote true positives, false positives, and false negatives, 
respectively. For completeness, we consider a true positive to be a correct detection 
of a malicious sample. Precision indicates how much a given approach is likely to 
provide a correct result. Recall is used to measure the detection rate. The F1-score 
combines Precision and Recall into a single value. We do not rely on Accuracy3 
because, in a real organization, the number of legitimate events is several orders of 
magnitude greater than illegitimate events. Hence, all the Accuracy values are close 
to 1 and these results prevent capturing the true effectiveness of a classifier. Finally, 
to reduce the possibility of biased results, each evaluation metric is computed after 
performing 10-fold cross validation.
A. Shallow vs Deep Learning
Deep Learning is known to outperform Shallow Learning in some applications, 
such as computer vision [2]. This is not always the case for cyber security where 
some well configured SL algorithms may prevail, even given the DL proposals are 
scarce with respect to SL techniques in this domain. Just to give an example, we 
experimentally compare the performance of the two self-developed classifiers for 
Network Intrusion Detection, one based on RF (Shallow Learning) and another based 
on FNN (Deep Learning). Both are trained with the third dataset described in Table 3 
and tested on the network intrusion detection testing dataset. To obtain more refined 
results, we repeat the training and test phase of these classifiers multiple times using 
different topologies. In Table 4, we show the classification results achieved by each 
method; for the FNN we report the results obtained by the best topology consisting 






in 1.024 neurons spread across 4 hidden layers. The RF classifier performed better 
than the FNN, with an F1-score of nearly 0.8, against the 0.6 obtained by the FNN. 
Our takeaway is that security administrators should not be charmed by the alluring 
neuronal multi-layer approach offered by Deep Learning, as some of these methods 
might still be immature for cyber security.
TABLE 4. COMPARISON BETWEEN DL AND SL CLASSIFIERS.
B. General vs specific detectors
Products based on machine learning are often promoted by vendors as catch-all 
solutions to a broad array of cyberattacks. However, unbiased experimental results 
show that ML algorithms may provide superior performance when they focus on 
specific threats instead of trying to detect multiple threats at once. We devise multiple 
intrusion detection systems based on the self-developed RF classifiers for network 
intrusion detection, each focusing on a specific type of attack, such as buffer overflows, 
malware infection, DoS. The training dataset for each classifier is based on the third 
dataset presented in Table 3. We train and test each classifier, and then compare their 
classification results with the classifier described in the first row of Table 4 that is our 
baseline. Table 5 shows the Precision, Recall and F1-score of the six classifiers that 
obtained the best results, alongside the baseline reported in the bottom row. These 
attack-specific classifiers obtain promising results on real traffic data with F1-scores 
of over 0.95, while the ‘general-purpose’ classifier performs significantly poorly. We 
conclude that entrusting a single ML detector to identify malicious flows is an enticing 
but as yet unfeasible goal. On the other hand, by having multiple detectors, each 
focusing on one attack type, it is possible to produce a defensive scheme with superior 
detection capabilities.
TABLE 5. CLASSIFICATION RESULTS FOR ATTACK-SPECIFIC 



































C. Vulnerability to adversarial attacks
Competent adversaries use novel strategies to evade detectors based on machine 
learning algorithms [5]. These activities, namely adversarial attacks, may attack the 
integrity, the availability, or the privacy of the target system [6]. Integrity violations 
evade a classification or a clustering algorithm by producing attacks classified as 
licit activities. Availability violations produce a multitude of normal events that are 
classified as an attack thus causing detectors to raise a huge amount of false alarms. 
Privacy violations let the attacker acquire information on the target network by 
exploiting the defensive ML algorithm. Moreover, recent advances in Deep Learning 
led to the development of generative adversarial networks (GAN) [37], which are 
DNN capable of automatically producing adversarial samples against a target ML 
system.
TABLE 6. DETECTION RATES OF THE RF CLASSIFIER AGAINST DIFFERENT DGA TECHNIQUES [36].
To demonstrate the effectiveness of a GAN in evading classifiers we analyse the 
case study of DeepDGA [36]. The authors initially train an RF classifier to detect 
DGA using known datasets, and then show that this classifier identifies DGA with 
good detection rates. Then, they develop a GAN to generate domains that evade such 
classifier. Results are presented in Table 6, where the first ten rows show the detection 
rate against ten real DGA, while the last row denotes the detection rate against samples 
generated by the DeepDGA GAN. We observe that the performance of the classifier 



























TABLE 7. DETECTION RATES OF THE RF CLASSIFIER AGAINST DIFFERENT DGA BEFORE AND 
AFTER HARDENING [36].
To counter adversarial attacks, novel proposals introduce the paradigm of adversarial 
learning [6], in which adversarial samples are included in the training dataset to 
harden the ML detector. As an example, authors in [36] demonstrate the advantages 
of adversarial learning by enriching the training set of the classifier with adversarial 
samples produced by the GAN. Table 7 compares the detection rates of the RF classifier 
before and after this hardening process. Cells with a grey background represent the 
DGA for which the detection rate improved after adversarial learning (it should be 
noted that the dataset used for this test is different than that used for the experiments 
reported in Table 6). Detection rates for 8 out of 10 DGA families improved, thus 
showing the validity of adversarial learning.
D. Selection of a machine learning algorithm
Unbiased comparison of the effectiveness of two ML algorithms requires that they 
are both trained on the same training dataset and tested on the same dataset [3]. 
Even though many cyber security proposals rely on few and old public datasets, 
their results are not comparable due to several causes: the two algorithms consider 
different features; one or both algorithms may implement pre-filtering operations 
that alter the training dataset; and they may use a different split between test and 
training dataset. For these reasons, meaningful comparisons between detection 
performance in literature are extremely difficult. For example, papers such as [4] and 
[5] discuss ML methods for two cyber security problems, but they do not consider the 
different training and testing environments of the analysed works. Hence, although 
some solutions achieve higher accuracy than others, it is possible that results change 
significantly under different training settings. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that a 



































Security administrators should be aware of this issue, and should thoroughly question 
the evaluation methodology before accepting the performance results of different 
machine learning algorithms.
E. False positives and false negatives
The implicit cost of a misclassification in the cyber security domain is a serious 
problem. False positives in malware classification and intrusion detection annoy 
security operators and hinder remediation in case of actual infection. In phishing 
detection, they might cause important, legitimate messages to not be delivered to end 
users. In contrast, failing to detect malware, a network intrusion or a phishing email 
can compromise an entire organization. We explore this problem by considering the 
performance of ML solutions devoted to malware analysis and phishing detection 
[27], while we perform an original experiment for intrusion detection that is oriented 
to detect DGA in a real, large enterprise. 
For malware analysis, we consider the approach in [24] that proposes an original and 
effective method for malware classification. This paper contains a detailed analysis 
and comparison of different ML techniques which were trained and tested on the 
same datasets, thus satisfying the requirements for valid comparison of different 
techniques. Hence, we deem this paper to be a good representation of the state-of-
the-art of ML for determining the family to which a malware sample belongs. The 
evaluation is performed on the DREBIN dataset;4 for large malware families the 
proposed approach, which outperforms all other baselines, obtains an F1-score of 
0.95, whereas for small malware families it achieves an F1-score of 0.89.
For phishing detection, we report the results described in [27] that, to the best of our 
knowledge, is the only paper on phishing email detection which compares different 
ML algorithms against the same comprehensive dataset. Therefore, we consider this 
work as a valid overview of the efficacy of different ML methods. The authors created 
a custom dataset of ~3,000 phishing emails on which several ML classifiers were 
tested: the best results were obtained by RF (lowest false positives) and LR (lowest 
false negatives), obtaining an F1-score of 0.90 and 0.89, respectively. 
The scenario for intrusion detection is different, as modern solutions can achieve 
higher Accuracy scores [3]. Although near-perfect Accuracy may seem an appreciable 
result, the massive amounts of events generated daily in a large enterprise account for 
hundreds to thousands of false positives that need to be manually triaged by security 
operators. We highlight this problem through an original experiment. We consider 
two DGA detectors based on the self-developed Random Forest classifiers trained on 
the first and second datasets of Table 2, respectively. We then validate them on the 
real domain dataset. Results are summarized in Table 8 which presents the number 
4 DREBIN dataset: https://www.sec.cs.tu-bs.de/~danarp/drebin/
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of domains that are flagged as DGA by both classifiers, alongside its percentage on 
the total amount of domains included in the dataset. We can observe that the two 
classifiers obtain comparable detection performances on real traffic data, as they 
both signal about 400 domains. However, manual inspection revealed that they were 
not DGA, hence all the domains flagged as DGAs are actually false positives. As 
anticipated, even a false positive rate of 2% can account to hundreds of false alarms 
in a real organization. 
TABLE 8. PERFORMANCE OF THE DGA DETECTION CLASSIFIERS WHEN USED ON REAL DATA.
Despite these apparently promising results which are well beyond acceptable levels in 
other fields such as image recognition, these approaches are affected by an excessive 
number of false positives and false negatives to be considered for cyber defences 
without human supervision.
F. Re-training issues
A well-known limitation of traditional detection approaches based on static detection 
rules is the need for frequent and continuous updates (e.g., daily updates of antivirus 
definitions). A similar issue also influences advanced ML approaches; reliance on 
outdated training datasets leads to poor detection performance. This is a critical 
problem for all supervised learning approaches requiring labelled training datasets; 
the manual creation of similar datasets is an expensive process because they need to 
be sufficiently large and comprehensive to allow the algorithm to learn the difference 
between the classes. Furthermore, these operations are error prone and may lead 
to incorrect classifications. Finally, most organizations are unwilling to share their 
internal network data. This scenario leads to an overall scarcity of publicly available 
and labelled data for cyber security, thus rendering periodic retraining extremely 
difficult or impossible. 
To show the detrimental effects of obsolete training sets, we perform an experiment 
comparing the performance of two instances of the same self-developed RF classifier 
for DGA detection. The first and second instances are trained with the first and second 
datasets reported in Table 2. Both classifiers are tested against the same synthetic 
domain dataset described in Section 4. We report the results in Table 9, which shows 
the Precision, Recall and F1-score obtained by the two classifiers for DGA detection. 





it obtains an F1-score for DGAs of 0.89 against 0.33. These results demonstrate that 
classifier performances are extremely sensitive to the freshness of the training set.
TABLE 9. PERFORMANCE OF THE DGA DETECTION CLASSIFIERS WHEN TRAINED ON OUTDATED 
AND RECENT DATASETS.
G. Deployment process 
Security solutions based on ML achieve appreciable detection rates only if the training 
dataset is appropriate and the parameters of the algorithms are finely tuned. In most 
scenarios, these operations are still executed empirically and represent a resource 
intensive task that presents several risks. If these steps are not performed rigorously 
and/or training is not based on the right datasets, the results are underwhelming. We 
highlight these issues through a set of ML experiments applied to network intrusion 
detection. The goal is to show the considerably different results achieved by the same 
ML algorithm in different environments where either the number of features or the 
training dataset is changed. To this purpose, we rely on the RF classifier for network 
intrusion detection. We train it using the third dataset reported in Table 3 by choosing 
5, 7, 10 or 12 features, selected through a feature agglomeration process; the testing 
phase is performed on the test dataset. We report the Precision, Recall and F1-score 
for the five sets of features in Table 10, where we observe that the same classifier 
yields different results, especially with regards to its Recall, with values ranging from 
0.57 to 0.74.
TABLE 10. PERFORMANCE OF THE INTRUSION DETECTION CLASSIFIER WHEN TRAINED WITH 
DIFFERENT FEATURES.
Then, we keep the number of features fixed at 12 and we repeat the training process 
two more times by using the first and then the second dataset reported in Table 3, and 
then test them on the same testing dataset. Table 11 reports the Precision, Recall and 
F1-score for the three training datasets. These results confirm that the Recall between 


































TABLE 11. PERFORMANCE OF THE INTRUSION DETECTION CLASSIFIER WHEN TRAINED ON 
DIFFERENT DATASETS.
5. conclusIons
Machine and deep learning approaches are increasingly employed for multiple 
applications and are being adopted also for cyber security, hence it is important to 
evaluate when and which category of algorithms can achieve adequate results. We 
analyse these techniques for three relevant cyber security problems: intrusion detection, 
malware analysis and spam detection. We initially propose an original taxonomy of 
the most popular categories of ML algorithms and show which of them are currently 
applied to which problem. Then we explore several issues that influence the application 
of ML to cyber security. Our results provide evidence that present machine learning 
techniques are still affected by several shortcomings that reduce their effectiveness 
for cyber security. All approaches are vulnerable to adversarial attacks and require 
continuous re-training and careful parameter tuning that cannot be automatized. 
Moreover, especially when the same classifier is applied to identify different threats, 
the detection performance is unacceptably low; a possible mitigation can be achieved 
by using different ML classifiers for detecting specific threats. Deep learning is still at 
an early stage and no final conclusion can be drawn. Significant improvements may be 
expected, especially considering the recent and promising development of adversarial 
learning. Our takeaway is that machine learning techniques can support the security 
operator activities and automate some tasks, but pros and cons must be known. The 
autonomous capabilities of ML algorithms must not be overestimated, because the 
absence of human supervision can further facilitate skilled attackers to infiltrate, steal 
data, and even sabotage an enterprise. 
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Screen Watermarking for 
Data Theft Investigation 
and Attribution
Abstract: Organizations not only need to defend their IT systems against external 
cyber attackers, but also from malicious insiders, that is, agents who have infiltrated 
an organization or malicious members stealing information for their own profit. In 
particular, malicious insiders can leak a document by simply opening it and taking 
pictures of the document displayed on the computer screen with a digital camera. 
Using a digital camera allows a perpetrator to easily avoid a log trail that results from 
using traditional communication channels, such as sending the document via email. 
This makes it difficult to identify and prove the identity of the perpetrator. Even a 
policy prohibiting the use of any device containing a camera cannot eliminate this 
threat since tiny cameras can be hidden almost everywhere.
To address this leakage vector, we propose a novel screen watermarking technique 
that embeds hidden information on computer screens displaying text documents. The 
watermark is imperceptible during regular use, but can be extracted from pictures 
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1. IntroductIon
Organizations not only need to protect their proprietary information from external 
attackers but also from insiders [17], i.e., agents infiltrating the organization 
or malicious employees. To this end, data loss prevention (DLP) solutions are 
increasingly deployed. State-of-the-art DLP software can either be configured only 
to log or additionally to block users’ actions, such as accessing the Internet, sending 
emails, printing, taking screenshots or accessing external media. Consequently, data 
leakage via these conventional communication channels can either be prevented or 
there is at least a log trail that shows a perpetrator’s actions. This log trail can be 
used as evidence against the malicious insider in forensic investigations. However, 
DLP systems cannot prevent insiders from taking pictures of a computer screen with 
a digital camera. Any employee who is authorized to open a particular document on 
their computer screen can leak the contained information by taking a picture and 
sharing it with unauthorized parties. Using a camera allows a perpetrator to easily 
avoid a log trail, as DLP software cannot detect if a document is being photographed. 
This makes it difficult to identify and prove the identity of the perpetrator based on 
a recovered leaked picture. Smartphones with cameras have become ubiquitous and 
new technologies like digital glasses or lenses are gaining momentum, making this 
data leakage threat difficult to control [23]. Even a policy prohibiting the use of any 
device containing a camera cannot eliminate this threat since tiny cameras can be 
hidden almost everywhere.
We introduce a content-agnostic watermarking approach for textual information 
displayed on computer screens. The watermark is imperceptible during regular use 
but can be extracted a posteriori from pictures of documents shown on the screen. 
place and time of the data leak from recovered leaked pictures. Our approach takes 
advantage of the fact that the human eye is less sensitive to small luminance changes 
than digital cameras. We devise a symbol shape that is invisible to the human eye, but 
still robust to the image artifacts introduced when taking pictures. We complement 
this symbol shape with an error correction coding scheme that can handle very high 
bit error rates and retrieve watermarks from cropped and compressed pictures. We 
show in an experimental user study that our screen watermarks are not perceivable by 
humans and analyze the robustness of our watermarks against image modifications.
Keywords: data theft, investigation, attribution, screen watermarking, malicious 
insiders, infiltration
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This enables an organization to reconstruct the place and time of the data leak from 
recovered leaked pictures, which greatly facilitates the forensic investigation of data 
breaches involving leaked pictures of screens. Our contributions are:
• an analysis of the data leakage channel computer screen – digital camera 
(§3);
• a watermarking schema specifically developed and optimized for this 
leakage channel (§4); and
• a comprehensive evaluation of the suggested watermarking system – 
including a user study (§5) – and a discussion of attacks against our 
attribution approach (§6).
2. related worK
One can distinguish between watermarking solutions for multimedia files and 
approaches for text documents. Our scenario shows characteristics of both domains. 
Watermarks need to be imperceptible on screens showing textual contents and must 
be retained in pictures of the text.
Basic approaches for images simply place watermarks in the least significant bits 
of individual pixels of an image [20,2,13]. The resulting small color variations are 
imperceptible to humans, but most smart phone cameras also cannot capture color 
variations of individual screen pixels, as we found in preliminary experiments. Caronni 
[5] encodes the watermark by changing the brightness of multiple contiguous pixels, 
which is similar to our approach. However, his approach requires the original image 
for extraction of the watermark, while we do not require the original image. Most 
advanced multimedia watermarking methods operate in a transformed domain, such 
as an image’s frequency spectrum [7,18,19]. This allows them to embed unnoticeable 
watermarks by introducing slight modifications in the frequency spectrum. This results 
in noise patterns in the spatial domain. This noise is not noticeable in colorful images 
but is usually well visible on text documents [12,1]. Therefore, image watermarking 
approaches operating in a transformed domain are not suitable for the task at hand.
Existing approaches for watermarking of text documents modify the text directly. 
Jalil et al. [9] distinguish between image-based, syntactic, and semantic approaches. 
Image-based approaches [4,3] adapt the typesetting of the text. Syntactic and semantic 
approaches modify the text itself. They fragment the text into blocks of words or 
letters, which are then moved or replaced. However, we have to assume that employees 
can edit documents. In this case, they will probably notice such text modifications. 
Furthermore, the integration of text-based watermarks is computational-expensive 
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2 Our methodology could also be applied to other scenarios where information needs to be transported in 
pictures or screenshots.
and can hardly be embedded in real-time. Hence, text modifications are unsuitable 
for our scenario.
Piec et al. [16] develop a real-time screen watermarking approach for embedding 
watermarks into screenshots. Screenshots retain colors perfectly and no geometric 
distortions occur, which allows them to use standard QR codes with their build-in 
standard error correction for embedding the watermarks. In contrast, we use custom 
watermark symbols and error correction codes such that our approach not only 
works for screenshots, but also for pictures of computer screens, in which various 
image artifacts are present. Kuhn et al. [11] analyzed in their seminal work various 
approaches to tamper with as well as eavesdrop on information by modifying and 
analyzing electromagnetic radiation. However, their work analyzes skilled attackers 
who use hardware to process electromagnetic radiation, while we focus on an attacker 
using a commodity camera. Petitcolas et al. [14] present criteria for benchmarking 
watermark approaches and an overview of attacks against watermarks [15].
Printer stenography is related to our approach. For instance, color laser manufacturers 
encode the date and time a document was printed with tiny yellow dots on print-
outs, which cannot be seen unless the print-out is magnified [24]. Recently, it was 
reported that printer identification code helped to identify the whistleblower Reality 
Winner in 2017 [25]. Unlike printer stenography, we encode our hidden information 
on computer screens.
3. Problem statement and aPProach
A. Problem Statement
State-of-the-art security measures cannot prevent insiders from breaching sensitive 
documents by taking pictures of their computer screens. Taking pictures leaves no 
log trail that identifies the perpetrator. As a result, it is very difficult to identify the 
perpetrator based on a recovered leaked picture. We approach this problem with 
respect to the two scenarios2 depicted in Figure 1. Both scenarios have in common 
that: (i) an insider (attacker) takes a picture of sensitive information displayed on a 
screen and (ii) a forensic investigator can access the recovered picture and needs to 
identify the attacker based on the picture. In scenario M1, investigators get access to 
the original, unmodified picture of the camera, e.g., because it was found during a 
police raid. In scenario M2, investigators only see a modified version of the picture 
as it has been published.
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FIGURE 1. USAGE SCENARIOS: AN INSIDER TAKES A PICTURE OF A COMPUTER SCREEN WHICH 
IS LATER RECOVERED, EITHER THE ORIGINAL PICTURE (MODEL M1) OR A MODIFIED VERSION 
OF IT (MODEL M2). THE WATERMARK IS THEN EXTRACTED TO DETERMINE WHEN AND WHERE 
THE PICTURE WAS TAKEN.
B. Approach
We approach this security threat by embedding hidden watermarks in computer 
screens. Our watermarks encode information such as the time and the workstation 
(location). A picture of a watermarked computer screen carries this information. If 
investigators get access to the (modified) photograph, they can decode this information 
and identify the perpetrator by verifying who was logged in at the workstation at the 
time. Watermarking text documents, images, and videos to trace their dissemination 
is a well-established technique (see §2), but the threat scenario of an insider taking 
pictures of sensitive data displayed on a screen poses several problems, which make 
established watermarking techniques unsuitable for this task. In particular:
(a) as the attacker can take a picture at any time, there is no controlled release 
process and the watermark must be present on any document displayed on 
the screen at any time;
(b) the watermark must be unnoticeable on text documents, but still be robust 
against the image artifacts introduced when taking photos of a computer 
screen; and
(c) the approach should allow for blind extraction, i.e., watermark extraction 
without the original document.3
While traditional text watermarking approaches encode data by modifying individual 
text passages, we embed information by overlaying a pattern of slightly brighter/darker 
areas to approach challenge (a). The corresponding overlay mask is independent of 
the content displayed on the screen and can thus be pre-computed. This makes our 
watermarking process suitable for real-time embedding. To handle challenge (b), we 
develop watermarking symbols that are based on the fact that the human eye, especially 
in light color areas [6], is insensitive to small continuous brightness gradients [2], 
3 Alternatively, one would have to record all Desktop interactions resulting in major privacy issues.
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while digital cameras capture small changes in brightness well. Further, we modify 
the design of a traditional convolutional coder and use evolutionary algorithms for 
deriving optimized generator polynomials in order to handle the high error rates 
caused by image artifacts. We use redundancy and split our watermarks into sub-
watermarks to allow extractions of partly corrupted watermarks. Furthermore, we 
store cryptographic checksums in our watermarks to allow bit error corrections. To 
approach challenge (c), we develop an algorithm for blind symbol extraction that is 
based on the observation that the background color is clearly dominating in typical 
text documents, allowing us to use local reference brightness values for the symbol 
decoding.
4. desIgn
Figure 2 shows the workflow of the proposed watermarking system. The embedding 
process will interact with the graphics card on the watermarked end host (not 
implemented in the prototype used for this evaluation), while an investigator 
conducts the extraction using standalone software. We assume that a graphic card 
implementation of the embedding process does not lead to a noticeable increase in 
CPU usage or power consumption. Even if this assumption does not hold, the user has 
no baseline for these characteristics that allow them to identify that screen watermarks 
exist.
Watermark embedding involves the following steps:
(1) Logging: This module creates a bitstring that identifies the end host, user, and a 
point in time. 
(2) Checksum (see §4.C): This module calculates a cryptographic checksum 
(incorporating a secret user key) for error detection and integrity checking. The 
checksum block is appended to the payload and the resulting protected payload is 
provided to the encoder.
(3) Encoding (see §4.B): The protected payload is encoded using an adapted 
convolutional encoder.
(4) Embedding (see §4.A): Watermark symbols representing the encoded data are 
generated and placed on the computer’s screen.
The extraction of a watermark involves these modules:
(1) Extraction (see §4.A): The watermark symbols are extracted from the recovered 
picture.
(2) Decoding (see §4.B): The encoded data is decoded using the Viterbi algorithm 
[21] in order to extract the protected payload.
(3) Checksum/logging (see §4.C): The logging system stores which user was logged in 
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at the extracted time and location. The corresponding secret user key is retrieved from 
a database and the cryptographic checksum is verified. If the checksum is correct, the 
location and time are returned, otherwise the extraction fails with an error.
 
FIGURE 2. WATERMARKING OF A COMPUTER SCREEN (TOP) AND EXTRACTION FROM A 
PHOTOGRAPH (BOTTOM). THE PAYLOAD CONSISTS OF P BITS. THE CHECKSUM MODULE 
APPENDS A CHECKSUM TO THE PAYLOAD. THE ENCODING MODULE TRANSFORMS THE 
PROTECTED PAYLOAD INTO SIX WATERMARK BLOCKS. THIS PROCESS IS REVERSED DURING 
THE WATERMARK EXTRACTION.
A. Watermarking Symbols for Computer Screens
We introduce watermarking symbols that are a hybrid between traditional text and 
image watermarking symbols. We operate in the spatial domain, similar to existing 
text watermarking approaches. This way, the visible artifacts caused by embedding 
watermarks in a transformed domain are avoided. Still, we avoid the processing-
intensive and thus slow text parsing by not changing or moving the text but by 
overlaying a pattern of slightly brighter and darker areas. Similarly to Caronni [5], 
we change the brightness of multiple contiguous pixels, which makes our symbols 
more robust against image artifacts and modifications. However, Caronni’s symbol 
embedding does not allow for blind extraction. To solve this problem, we apply a 
form of pseudo-differential amplitude modulation. That is, instead of comparing the 
color values between the watermarked and the original image at the same position in 
the image, we compare, for each watermark symbol separately, the color within the 
watermark symbol to the color in the surrounding area. Further, we use circular patterns 
and soften their shapes by introducing white noise that causes as a smooth gradient 
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between the watermark center and the surrounding area to avoid sharp contrasts that 
can become visible on the homogeneous backgrounds in text documents.
The key steps for embedding and extracting watermarks are as follows:
Symbol embedding. Embedding watermark symbols is a two-step process: (i) we 
calculate an overlay mask of slightly brighter/darker areas (symbols) and (ii) the 
watermarking system applies this mask to the screen output. We point out that (i) can 
be pre-computed, thus only (ii) is time critical.
Overlay mask. The symbol shape that we use for our approach is shown in Figure 
3(a). Every symbol represents one bit. To embed a binary “0”, we make the center of 
the symbol slightly brighter; and to embed a “1”, we make the center slightly darker. 
A watermark consists of a matrix of these symbols. While the brightness of the inner-
most circle of the symbol (r1 in Figure 3(a)) is adapted, a smooth gradient and white 
noise are applied to the area A2 to avoid any sharp brightness changes. The watermark 
decoder compares the background in A1 to the background in A3 to tell which binary 
value the symbol represents. To facilitate the manual extraction of watermarks, the 
software can further be configured to mark the corners of watermarks using small black 
markers, which look similar to pixel errors. A photograph of a resulting watermark for 
an intensity Imax = 2 is show in Figure 3(b). Figure 3(c) highlights the watermarking 
symbols for illustration.
Applying the overlay mask. The application of the overlay mask is quite similar 
to applying a screen color profile. It requires only local brightness modifications, 
resulting in a very lightweight embedding process that can be parallelized on a GPU.
Symbol extraction. The extraction of a watermarking symbols from photographs 
takes place during forensic investigations and is the reverse of the symbol embedding. 
In contrast to the symbol embedding, this process is not time critical. To extract 
watermark symbols from a picture, the picture is de-skewed, the watermark symbols 
are located and the color values of the center of each individual symbol are compared 
to the surrounding area.
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FIGURE 3. A SINGLE WATERMARK SYMBOL (A) AND PICTURES OF A WATERMARKED SCREEN: 
ORIGINAL (B) AND WITH HIGHLIGHTED SYMBOLS (C).
B. Encoding of Data in Watermarks
The proposed approach uses error-correcting convolutional codes to achieve a high 
robustness against incorrectly transmitted symbols. More than one thousand watermark 
symbols (“physical” bits) fit on a typical screen area of at least 1.024M pixels for our 
largest symbol size of 32x32 pixels, but we will only need to transport few data bits 
in a typical setup, therefore we can introduce a high degree of redundancy. Still, this 
large coding budget is required for a high robustness because error correcting codes 
for watermarks must be able to operate on short payloads and be robust against various 
errors [10]. In particular, one has to compensate for cropped images and a very high 
symbol error rate due to image artifacts. We achieve robustness against cropping by 
modifying the design of a traditional convolutional encoder and optimizing the error 
correcting polynomials for short payloads using evolutionary algorithms.
Instead of generating one large watermark, the output of the different generator 
polynomials used by the encoder is decoupled. This generates multiple smaller, 
independent sub-watermarks (blocks). Each block carries the complete payload 
(including a checksum), which allows the decoder to arbitrarily combine the blocks 
for extracting the payload. That is, on the one hand, one block with few bit errors can 
already be sufficient to reconstruct the payload. On the other hand, if multiple blocks 
are available, the decoder can arbitrarily combine these to an optimal combination 
to compensate for higher bit-error-rate (BER), which leads to very powerful error 
correcting capabilities. The difference between our and a traditional encoder is 
illustrated in Figure 4. The traditional encoder merges the output of all generator 
polynomials to one codeword. In contrast, our design partitions the outputs into 
smaller sub-watermarks, each with a coding rate of R = 0.5 (termination not included). 
Combining all sub-watermarks corresponds to the traditional decoder. For decoding 
the data, we use the common Viterbi algorithm [21].
 
(c) The same picture with 
watermark symbols highlighted.
(b) Unmodified picture of 
a watermarked screen.
(a) A single watermark 
symbol.
400
FIGURE 4. INSTEAD OF MERGING THE OUTPUTS OF THE DIFFERENT GENERATORS (A), WE USE 
EACH OUTPUT FOR A SEPARATE WATERMARK (B).
C. Cryptographic Checksum for Error Detection and Integrity Checking
As convolutional codes offer only limited capabilities in detecting errors, a Cyclic 
Redundancy Check (CRC) [22] is often included in communication protocols to detect 
decoding errors. We use a cryptographic checksum instead, which additionally allows 
us to verify the integrity of the extracted message. The checksum block is calculated 
on the concatenation of the payload and a randomly chosen secret key ku. Every user 
u has its own secret key ku assigned. This protects against accepting a maliciously or 
accidentally modified message.
5. eValuatIon
We use the following terms throughout the evaluation.
• Symbol: A symbol is a circular area on the screen that represents one raw bit.
• Block: As outlined in §4.B, we split a watermark into multiple self-contained 
blocks. A block is a collection of s symbols.
• Symbol size: The size of a single symbol (as shown in Figure 3(a)) in pixels.
• Watermark intensity: the intensity tells how much brighter or darker the 
symbols are than the surrounding background. We measure the intensity as 
tuple (Δr, Δg, Δb). The Δ-values are added to or subtracted from the red, 
green and blue color channel, respectively.
In general, the stronger the watermarks, the more reliable is the watermarking 
process. But stronger watermarks are also easier to perceive by humans and therefore 
more disturbing. Thus, we aim to find an operation point at which the watermarks are 
imperceptible to humans during regular use, but the watermarks can still be reliably 
extracted from photographs. We evaluate in the following the perceptibility, bit error 
rates, robustness to image transformation and overall performance of the watermarks.
(a) Traditional encoder (b) Our encoder
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A. Perceptibility of Embedded Watermarks
1) Setup I
We conduct a user study with 17 adult test subjects working in the defense industry. 
The aim of the study is to measure and elaborate the visibility of watermarks for 
different intensities. We embed watermarks of different intensities into a text 
document; some watermarks are placed in areas with text, while others are placed 
in a way such that they are not covered by any text. The document is displayed on 
a Samsung SynchMaster SA450 22 inch screen with a resolution of 1680 x 1050 
pixels. The study participants were told that the study was on watermarks, but they 
did not know what the watermarks looked like. The subjects were asked to read the 
document. After reading the article, the subjects had to point out which watermarks 
they could see.
2) Results I
The results of the experiment are presented in Table I. The table distinguishes between 
watermarks placed on areas where there was no text (background) and watermarks 
placed in regions with text. All subjects recognized the control watermarks with 
intensity (20,20,20). But already half of all subjects did not recognize watermarks with 
intensity (10,10,10) if placed in areas with text. No test subject noted the watermarks 
of intensity (3,3,3) in text areas. On the other hand, in areas without text, 7 out of 17 
subjects spotted watermarks of intensity (3,3,3). The watermarks of intensity (1,1,0) 
were never identified by any study participant. There is an additional interesting 
insight not shown in the table. We found that watermarks at the top of the screen were 
perceived significantly more often than their counterparts at the bottom of the screen. 
We inspected the screen that was used and found that color contrasts were stronger at 
the top of the screen than at the bottom.
In summary, we conclude from this study that (i) one can use considerably higher 
intensities for watermarks concealed by text and (ii) fine-tuning the intensity of 
watermarks for different screen regions can be beneficial in order to compensate for 
the inhomogeneous contrast representation of computer screens.
TABLE I. PERCEPTIBILITY FOR WATERMARKS OF DIFFERENT INTENSITIES. THE PERCEPTION 





















on white background in regions with text
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B. Bit error rates
1) Setup II
We measure the bit error rate (BER), i.e., the ratio of symbols that are incorrectly 
extracted, for different hardware devices. We focus on watermarks that are located in 
areas with text. We embed watermarks of intensity (2,2,2) in a text document with font 
size 10pt, display the text document on a Lenovo T430s such that the watermarks cover 
the whole screen, and we take pictures with different cameras. This laptop features a 
Twisted Nematic (TN) panel with a resolution of 1600 × 900 pixel. We use a different 
device for this experiment than for the user study. However, we compared the low 
contrast characteristics of the panels and found them to be very similar.4 We measure 
the BER for three different symbol sizes and four smartphone cameras: Lumia920, 
SonySk17i, SamsungNexus, and MotorolaXT910. We place two (three for symbol 
size 20×20) randomly generated watermarks in the document such that they cover the 
whole screen and take five pictures with each configuration.
2) Results II
The results for the smallest and largest symbol sizes are shown in Figure 5. Each data 
point represents the BER for a single watermark. For reference, the right column in 
each figure shows the BER for symbols directly extracted from a screenshot. We use 
a screenshot for comparison to measure the influence of the image artifacts caused 
by taking photographs of the screen. There is a clear trend towards lower BER for 
larger symbol sizes. This is because pixels representing text are filtered during symbol 
extraction and more pixels remain after filtering for larger symbols, making the 
approach more robust. The screenshots also show some bit errors for the two smaller 
symbol sizes. We confirm this finding by measurements conducted on a watermarked 
document without any text (not shown in the Figure). For a blank document, the 
photographs of all symbol sizes achieve a BER of around 0.05 and the screenshots 
do not exhibit any errors. The user study already showed that contrasts were stronger 
on the top than on the bottom of the screen. We verified this finding by analyzing the 
topology of bit errors in Figure 6(a). Indeed, the BER is lower at the top of the screen 
than at the bottom.
In summary, we conclude that larger symbols are better for watermarks in text areas. 
For a symbol size of 32×32, we achieve a median BER between 0.12 and 0.25, the 
maximum BER is 0.28.
 
4 We tested three different TN panels and one PVA panel. The low contrast characteristics of all these 
devices were similar.
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FIGURE 5. BIT ERROR RATES (BER) FOR WATERMARKS IN TEXT AREAS FOR THE SMALLEST 
AND LARGEST EVALUATED SYMBOL SIZES AND FOUR CAMERAS, AS WELL AS A REGULAR 
SCREENSHOT FOR COMPARISON. THE BER FOR A SCREENSHOT IS ZERO FOR 32 × 32 SYMBOLS. 
FIVE PHOTOS HAVE BEEN TAKEN FOR EACH CONFIGURATION.
C. Robustness to Image Transformations
We evaluate in the following the robustness of our approach to image transformations 
in regard to scaling and color adjustments.
1) Setup III
To simulate a scenario in which images are compressed before being leaked, in this 
experiment we compress the pictures taken with the mobile phones by a factor of four. 
This means that the width and height of each image is halved. The resulting pixels 
are interpolated. A reduction by a factor of four can be considered as a worst-case 
scenario with respect to image compression for the pictures analyzed in this work, 
because further decreasing the resolution would make the text in the document very 
hard to read. Thus, it is unlikely that an attacker would further compress the images.
2) Results III
The resulting BER for a symbol size of 32 × 32 are shown in Figure 6(b). Resizing the 
images increases the BER by 10 to 15 percentage points compared to their original 
images, resulting in an average BER of approximately 25%.
(b) Symbol size 32 × 32.(a) Symbol size 20 × 20.
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FIGURE 6. INHOMOGENEOUS ERROR DISTRIBUTIONS DUE TO DISPLAY CHARACTERISTICS 
(LEFT) AND BER FOR RESIZED IMAGES (RIGHT).
D. Overall Performance
1) Setup V
We calculated the BER for different scenarios in the previous subsections of 
the evaluation. As the last step of the evaluation, we now relate the BER and the 
percentage of the available watermarked area to the probability that the transported 
data can be successfully extracted from a watermark. For this evaluation, we assume 
that a watermark capacity of p = 40 bit is required to encode a user identifier and a 
timestamp; a payload of p = 40 bits results in a protected payload of length k = 72 bits 
and s = (k + m - 1) * n = 172 symbols per block (see Figure 2). The parameter m=15 
represents the length of the used shift register for the convolutional encoder and n=2 
represents the number of output bits per input bit. We measure the performance of 
the applied convolutional coding by conducting a Monte Carlo Simulation with 6000 
runs. Bit errors are modeled as i.i.d according to the given BER.
2) Results V
The results are shown in Figure 7(b). Every line in this Figure shows the performance 
of our approach for a different average BER. To give an example, the blue triangle in 
the upper center of the plot shows that for a BER of 0.25 and 3 recovered watermark 
blocks, the probability that the data can be successfully extracted from a watermark 
is around 85%.
We first focus on pictures without color modifications (raw images). As shown in 
Figure 5(b), the BER for a symbol size of 32 x 32 is always below 20% for three out 
of the four mobile devices. Putting this number into Figure 7(b), we see that three 
out of six watermark blocks are sufficient to decode the data in this case. For the 
Lumia920, the average BER is 25%, thus we need four to six watermark blocks to 
(b) BER for resized images of 
watermarked text. Symbol size 32 × 32.
(a) Ratio of correctly extracted symbols 
in text areas on a Lenovo T430s.
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successfully extract the data with high likelihood. The maximum observed BER is 
28%. The probability that the payload can be successfully extracted for this case is at 
least 98%, as Figure 7(b) shows.
Resizing pictures results in a BER of around 30% (see Figure 6(b)). Figure 7(b) shows 
that the data can be extracted with a probability of 98% for a BER of 30%. Contrast 
and brightness changes and automatic color enhancements resulted in a BER below 
25% (see Figure 7(a)). Already four out of six watermark blocks are sufficient to 
reconstruct the embedded data in 99% of cases.
We conclude that we can recover the watermarks from unmodified photographs 
for all tested smartphones. The Lumia920 introduces a bit error rate of 25%, which 
reduces the robustness to image modifications, such that 2/3 of the watermark blocks 
of cropped images are required. For the other three smartphones, we can scale down 
the image by a factor of four or increase the contrast and brightness by 10% and still 
extract the encoded data. Watermarked pictures taken with these smartphones are also 
very robust to cropping of the raw image, only 50% of the watermark blocks are 
required to extract the watermark.
FIGURE 7. ERROR RATES FOR MODIFIED PICTURES (LEFT) 
AND OVERALL PERFORMANCE (RIGHT).
(b) Overall performance. The y-axis 
shows the probability that the data en-
coded in a watermark can be extracted 
depending on the number of available 
watermark blocks and the Bit Error 
Rate (BER).
(a) The first column shows the BER on 
the original pictures. The other columns 
show the resulting BER after applying 
GIMP’s automatic color enhancement, 
GIMP’s white balance function and 




An attacker who is aware of the fact that computer screens are watermarked could 
try to use our watermarking approach to hold another employee liable for a leaked 
picture. First, an attacker could attempt to create a fake watermark that contains 
the identifier of an employee E. However, the attacker also needs to generate the 
correct cryptographic checksum, which is based on a secret key ku, otherwise the 
watermarking system rejects the watermark (see §4.C). An attacker does not know ku, 
so they can only guess what the correct checksum is. The odds for guessing the correct 
checksum is in the order of one in one billion for a 32-bit checksum and six embedded 
watermark blocks.
Second, an insider could use an unlocked workstation to access the critical information 
or even access the information with stolen credentials. To detect such a case, one 
could combine our watermarking approach with biometric techniques that identify the 
employee currently using a workstation [8].
Third, an insider could take a picture of a document while another employee views 
the document on their screen. To investigate such and similar cases one would need 
to complement our approach with CCTV cameras monitoring the office environment. 
After extracting time and location from a watermark, an investigator could check the 
surveillance camera recordings of the corresponding office.
Finally, in order to frame an employee E, a skilled attacker could take a picture of E’s 
screen, extract the watermark from the picture, and embed it into a picture showing 
a document that E is not supposed to access. The watermark would show where and 
when the attacker took the picture. This information can be compared against the logs 
generated by our logging module (see §4), which would show that E never accessed 
the document. Further, CCTV cameras could identify the attacker.
7. conclusIon
In conclusion, our proposed watermarking scheme applies imperceptible low-
intensity watermarks to the screen. The information embedded with our technique 
can later be retrieved from photographs or screenshots. We develop a coding scheme 
based on convolutional codes, which complements the watermarking technique and 
can cope with the particular challenges of screen watermarking, such as high error 
rates, inhomogeneous error distributions (caused by the underlying hardware) and 
partial pictures of screens. We conduct a user study showing that our watermarks are 
imperceptible during regular use and demonstrate in various experiments that our 
407
watermarks are robust regarding resizing and basic image manipulations. In future 
work, we will investigate possible attacks against screen watermarks, e.g. by taking 
advantage of physical screen characteristics, and corresponding protection methods.
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Neural Network and 
Blockchain Based Technique 
for Cyber Threat Intelligence 
and Situational Awareness
Abstract: Protecting Critical Infrastructure (CI) against increasing cyber threats has 
become as crucial as it is complicated. To be effective in identifying and defeating cyber 
attacks, cyber analysts require novel distributed detection and reaction methodologies 
based on information security techniques that can automatically analyse incident 
reports and securely share analysis results between Critical Infrastructure stakeholders. 
Our goal is to provide solutions in real-time that could replace human input for cyber 
incident analysis tasks (triage) to classify cyber incident reports, find related reports in 
a fast and scalable way, eliminate irrelevant information, and automate reporting life-
cycle management. Our effective and fast incident management method is based on 
artificial intelligence and can support cyber analysts in establishing cyber situational 
awareness, and allow them to quickly adopt suitable countermeasures in the case 
of an attack. In this paper, we evaluate deep autoencoder neural network supported 
by Blockchain technology as a system for incident classification and management, 
and assess its accuracy and performance. This approach should reduce the number 
of manual operations and save storage space. We used a Blockchain smart contract 
technique to provide an automated trusted system for incident management workflow 
that allows automatic acquisition, classification and enrichment of incident data. We 
demonstrate how the presented techniques can be applied to support incident handling 
tasks performed by security operation centres.
Keywords: cyber threat intelligence, neural network, blockchain
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1. IntroductIon
Cyber Situational Awareness (SA) [1] is a perception of security and threat situations 
coupled with current and future impact assessment. In recent years, researchers in the 
SA field have created increasingly complex tools across many application domains. 
Speed of events, data overload, and meaning underload [2] make real-time SA of 
cyber operations very difficult to evaluate. Addressing data that is often vague and 
imprecise, we have to rely on imperfect information to detect real attacks and to 
prevent an attack from happening through appropriate risk management. Security 
Operation Centre (SOC) analysts receive a huge amount of daily threat reports. These 
analysts face challenges finding relevant information in large, complex data sets when 
exploring data to discover patterns and insights and following organisation business 
processes, such as proper acquisition, use, archiving and disposal of threat reports. 
For humans to be effective in identifying and defeating cyber attacks, novel tools that 
can fill the gap between cyber data and situation comprehension are highly desired. 
The research presented here is designed to aid in developing a system (see Figure 1) 
that will automatically support a cyber analyst by analysing and classifying incoming 
cyber incidents by searching similar high severity cyber incidents that could affect 
cyber SA, and by life-cycle management of the incident. 
Analysis is triggered by a cyber incident report generated by one of the stakeholders 
in the CI network. The incident analysis can be performed for large amounts of data 
by using a solid knowledge base (KB), and employing one of the available incident 
analysis tools. A deep autoencoder (AE) method can be used to analyse existing KB 
or particular large dataset. The primary purpose of designing a deep autoencoder for 
SA is to increase the speed of sharing highly severe information and to enable fast 
and trustworthy cyber incident classification, without the need for substantial human 
involvement. In our study, we compare existing cyber threat intelligence tools and 
techniques, describe automatic cyber intelligence analysis approach using a deep 
autoencoder neural network, and present evaluation results. We leverage expertise 




FIGURE 1. THE OVERVIEW OF ESTABLISHING THE CYBER SITUATIONAL AWARENESS USING 
NEURAL NETWORKS (AE) AND SMART CONTRACTS FOR INFORMATION CLASSIFICATION AND 
LIFE-CYCLE MANAGEMENT.
The primary contribution of this work is a real-time solution that could replace human 
input for a huge number of cyber incident analysis tasks. Another is a methodology, 
developed to improve information organization and access in cyber security 
information systems based on automatic classification of cyber security documents 
according to their expected threat level. We hypothesise that the application of Smart 
Contracts based on the existing Blockchain technology Ethereum [3] can solve some 
SA problems. The main purpose of designing Smart Contracts for SA is to enable rapid 
and trusted cyber incident classification and management, without the need for a large 
centralised authority. We propose that Smart Contracts based on decentralised assets 
such as Ethereum can reduce effort for incident life-cycle management and manual 
analysis costs. Novel techniques that can automatically make predefined decisions 
obvious by using Smart Contracts can help identify and defeat cyber attacks.
In our context, a Smart Contract basically is a piece of software that fixes and verifies 
negotiated behaviour and cannot be manipulated because it is distributed and executed 
on multiple nodes on a Blockchain. Another value of using Smart Contracts is that 
once deployed, it can function automatically, without the need for human interaction. 
In our proposed threat intelligence analysis system, we describe the incident handling 
procedure and instructions using a Smart Contract programming language (Solidity) 
and upload this Smart Contract to a Blockchain instance (a private Ethereum network). 
The source code of the Smart Contract defines instructions and rules; for our system, 
we created ‘Acquisition’, ‘Use’, ‘Archival’ and ‘Disposal’ Smart Contracts (see Figure 
1). The state of the Smart Contracts is stored on the Blockchain and is transparent and 
accessible to all registered community members. The Smart Contract code is executed 





execution. The execution of the Smart Contract results in an update of the contract’s 
state (BLOCKn+2) on the Blockchain that is synchronised with every participating 
user (CI1-CIn) through standard peer-to-peer mechanisms and a Proof-of-Work-based 
consensus mechanism. An incident report produced by one of the users (security 
expert protecting CIs) goes through the Smart Contracts and is handled automatically, 
according to the programmed instructions.
The management system is aimed at the automatic management of threat reports 
provided by threat analysis tools such as CAESAIR,1 IntelMQ2, or MISP3 and 
should provide effective decision support for a SOC operator. Compared to manual 
classification, automatic classification by threat level can significantly support and 
accelerate reaction time of an SOC analyst. For example, the Collaborative Analysis 
Engine for the Situational Awareness and Incident Response (CAESAIR) tool [4] 
supports various security information correlation techniques and provides customizable 
import capabilities from a multitude of security-relevant sources. These sources 
include a custom repository, open source intelligence (OSINT) feeds and IT-security 
bulletins, as well as a standardised vulnerability library (Common Vulnerabilities and 
Exposures – CVE). CVEs are especially important for Smart Contracts with regard 
to likelihood assessments based on game theory [5] that implements risk scoring [6]. 
Employing CAESAIR with CVE scoring [7] and extending it by automated tagging 
can provide valuable input for information classification and life-cycle management. 
Such a system can be implemented using Smart Contracts created for a particular 
organization. Each institution may have multiple classification profile definitions 
dependent on the network, CI and the role of the cyber analyst.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of related work and 
concepts. Section 3 explains the cyber incident classification workflow. The cyber 
incident life cycle issues are covered in Section 4, Section 5 presents the experimental 
setup, applied methods end evaluation and Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. related worK
Threat intelligence in the cyber security (CS) realm is provided by a number of 
cyber incident analysis tools. For example, the CAESAIR tool provides analytical 
support for security experts carrying out cyber incident handling tasks on national 
and international levels, and facilitates the identification of implicit relations between 
available pieces of information. IntelMQ is an open source tool collaboratively 
developed by Austrian CERT and other parties aiming at parsing and correlating 
cyber incidents. MISP, the Malware Information Sharing Platform is another open 
source tool that performs automatic data correlation by finding relationships between 
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attributes and indicators from malware, attack campaigns, or analysis. It incorporates 
an indicator database to store technical and non-technical information about malware 
samples, incidents, attackers and intelligence; and a sharing functionality to facilitate 
data exchange using different models of distribution.
The autoencoder approach is widely used for different analytical tasks. A machine 
learning framework based on recursive autoencoders [8] can be used for sentence-level 
prediction of sentiment label distributions. A very deep autoencoder [9] is employed for 
content-based image retrieval. In our approach, we are using this method for similarity 
searches. The advantage of the autoencoder method is that it learns automatically 
from examples. The autoencoder makes use of neural networks which are already in 
use by latent semantic analysis for text categorization [10] to reduce dimensionality 
and to improve performance. Another application [11] employs an artificial neural 
network to improve text classifier scalability. Classification methods implemented in 
the previously mentioned threat intelligence tools suffer from large vector sizes and 
are less effective as the number of incidents rise. The main drawback of existing text 
classification methods, such as SVM [12], Word Embeddings Neural Networks or the 
Gensim tool is that they require a huge database for training to provide meaningful 
results, but expected SOCs datasets are not large enough for such semantic-based tasks. 
Another common disadvantage of these techniques is the lack of results transparency 
due to employing vectors containing real-valued numbers. These tools provide results, 
but it is difficult to explain how the results were calculated. In particular, the SVM 
approach is limited by the choice of the kernel. Another disadvantage is the inability 
to handle unknown words or words which were not included previously in the training 
vocabulary. Consequently, for the particular use case of threat incident classification 
task for SOCs, we suggest using the autoencoder solution that scales well because of 
the small vector size while maintaining a high level of accuracy.
Multiple researchers are developing an automated technology that will support an 
information classification system. An attempt to classify the relationships between 
documents and concepts [13] employs principles of ontology. To improve information 
organization and access in construction management, a methodology [14] was 
developed based on automatic hierarchical classification of construction project 
documents according to project components. A survey of various cyber attacks and 
their classification [15] attempted to develop an ontology for cyber security incidents. 
They classify by characteristics, and by purpose and motivations. Additionally, cyber 
attacks can be classified based on the severity of involvement, scope, or network 
types with multiple sub classification terms. Contrary to this approach, we classify 
only by threat level that can differ from organisation to organisation. Our goal is to 
focus human expert resources on the most urgent incidents important for a particular 
organisation. An information life-cycle model described in [16] is also applicable to 
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the CS domain. Cyber incident reports are acquired, analysed and become outdated. 
Effective automatic classification, retention and disposal policies can mitigate risks 
to data and make information management more effective. Classification of data 
enables a company or SOC to focus their resources toward the most valuable or urgent 
incidents and to handle less valuable incidents, automatically saving time and other 
costs. 
Because members of a CI network do not necessarily trust each other, do not have a 
central authority and have a need to store and share the life-cycle state of the incident, 
we suggest a Blockchain-based solution for life-cycle management. An overview of 
the Blockchain technology and its potential to facilitate money transactions, Smart 
Contracts design, automated banking ledgers and digital assets is provided in [17]. 
A Blockchain platform comparison [18] discusses five general-use Blockchain 
platforms and looks at how Blockchain technology can be used in applications outside 
of Bitcoin to build custom applications on top of it. This comparison suggests that 
Ethereum is currently the most suitable and well-established platform. Therefore, 
for cyber incident analysis we employ an Ethereum Blockchain (specifically, the 
Pyethereum implementation), which supports a focused Smart Contracts testing 
environment without the need of mining. In the proposed system, we intend to apply 
Smart Contracts for cyber incident classification and life-cycle management, which is 
unique for the given domain.
3. cyber IncIdent classIfIcatIon 
usIng autoencoder
For our study, we assume that a cyber expert is responsible for a CI and detects 
suspicious behaviour in the system. The expert needs more information to select the 
correct mitigation strategy. She must collect and analyse all the available information 
related to ongoing and previous attacks for the particular use case, and transform it into 
actionable intelligence. Security information such as incident reports, vulnerability 
alerts, advisories, bulletins etc., usually come in the form of semi-structured text 
documents. Acquiring cyber threat intelligence from such documents requires 
manually reviewing and discerning what significant information they can find, and 
identifying implicit correlations among them in order to estimate their impact and 
outline possible mitigation strategies. To avoid this manual effort, the CIs expert can 
provide an incident report as an input to a deep autoencoder and receive a threat 
report back if it has sufficient severity. An automatic approach delivers a significant 
improvement in terms of personnel costs when compared to manual cyber incident 
handling. As a result, an analyst has the up-to-date SA status and we ensure fast and 
scalable information exchange and enrichment.
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The idea behind applying the autoencoder approach is that we can map N-dimensional 
data onto the M orthogonal directions in which the data have the most variance and 
form a lower dimensional subspace. The acceptable drawback of this conversion is 
that in the remaining orthogonal directions we lose information about the original data 
point location.
 
FIGURE 2. THE WORKFLOW FOR CLASSIFICATION AND LIFE-CYCLE MANAGEMENT OF CYBER 
INCIDENT USING AUTOENCODER AND SMART CONTRACTS.
We employ a deep autoencoder that was trained as described in the workflow shown 
in Figure 2. The workflow execution starts with reading the incident report (1) and 
parsing the report content. Input data along with the expert profile settings, which 
are specific to the organisation, are converted to a binary vector using the ‘bag of 
words’ technique (2) and after the normalization step (3) passed to the autoencoder 
in encoded form (4). In this step, we compile the words most used in documents. The 
remaining vector is comprised of word counts irrespective of order. For simplicity, 
we use a binary count where we mark 1 if a word count is bigger than 0, and 0 if the 
given word is not present in an original document. Additionally, we ignore stop words 
(words with no discriminatory power, such as common articles and prepositions, that 
we do not need in analysis). To achieve reasonable performance and scalability, we 
reduce each vector to a much smaller vector that still comprises enough information 
about the content of the document. In the next step, we train the neural network to 
reproduce its input vector as its output. This forces it to compress as much information 
as possible into the 10 numbers in the central bottleneck. These 10 numbers are then a 
result of deep autoencoder training and a good way to compare documents (5) in a fast 
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and scalable way using the cosine similarity method. In the next step, we merge the 
detected related incidents with institutional settings and decide which priority level 
(see Equation 1) should be applied to the given incident. The compressed vectors are 
stored on the hidden level of neural network (see Table 1).
𝑃 = 𝑓(𝐼𝑟, 𝑊𝑟, 𝑊𝑜, 𝑇𝑠, 𝑊𝑠)            (1)
Equation 1 shows the incident priority level P that returns the value – either 0 
that corresponds to ‘Low’ or 1 representing ‘High’. Priority level is a function of 
aggregated incident evaluation metrics, which depend on basis indicators, such as 
‘number of related incidents’ 𝐼𝑟, ‘number of related words’ 𝑊𝑟, ‘number of original 
words’ 𝑊𝑜, ‘detected significant terms’ 𝑇𝑠 and ‘vulnerability score’ 𝑉𝑠.
4. cyber IncIdent management 
usIng smart contracts
We evaluate the application of Smart Contracts to classify and manage incident 
reports labelled by the autoencoder as a high priority threat. Smart Contracts can be 
used to estimate that the reported cyber incident is of high relevance, to remove it 
after some predefined time, to tag it by acquisition, to search by tag, to assign access 
rights (confidential, private, sensitive, public), to periodically check data integrity 
(preventing manual or hardware corruption), or to determine data provenance. Our goal 
is to save storage space, improve performance and to keep information up-to-date in a 
trustworthy way by leveraging the distributed nature of Blockchain technology. Once 
a Smart Contract is triggered, the analysis result is automatically propagated among 
all participants through inherent Blockchain mechanisms. One of the advantages of 
this approach is that Smart Contracts cannot be changed or compromised without 
being detected (through hashed transactions) and that the messages can be verified 
to originate from a trusted source (through public key encryption). After incident 
acquisition, a Smart Contract performs the classification of a report by threat level, 
stores the obtained threat level on a Blockchain and initiates the life-cycle management 
process for the given incident. In the next step, this report will be used, archived and 
disposed. 
We employ four Smart Contracts for cyber incident processing, as depicted in Figure 
2. The workflow execution after the classification steps performed by the autoencoder 
proceeds with the analysis of an incident report by reading and parsing the report 
content enriched with the classification results (6). Input data, along with organization-
specific expert profile settings, are passed to the first Smart Contract ‘acquisition’ (7), 
which employs one of the threat intelligence tools. Classification occurs by employing 
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incident text, split by words or phrases, specific terms separated by low, middle and 
high threat relevance. We compute risk points, counting how many of terms are 
included in the incident report for each threat level. For threat level calculation, we 
either estimate threat level by applying thresholds for each level or we employ the 
weighted method from Formula 2, where we additionally multiply the calculated 
points on each threat level with a constant which represents the weight of the related 
threat level. The threat level scale ranges from 1 to 3, where 1 is ‘low threat’ and 3 is 
‘high threat’. Risk points RP is a sum of high risk points 𝐻𝑟𝑝 multiplied by high threat 
weight 𝐻𝑇𝑤, middle risk points 𝑀𝑟𝑝 multiplied by middle threat weight 𝑀𝑇𝑤 and low 
risk points 𝐿𝑟𝑝 multiplied by low threat weight 𝐿𝑇𝑤.
Where 𝐻𝑇𝑤 = 3, 𝑀𝑇𝑤 = 2, 𝐿𝑇𝑤= 1 and 𝐻𝑇𝑡= 10, 𝑀𝑇𝑡= 3. Threat level 𝑇1 can be inferred 
using high threat 𝐻𝑇𝑡 and middle threat 𝑀𝑇𝑡 thresholds and weighted risk points 𝑅𝑃 
from Formulas 2 and 3. The acquisition step (7) is split into different tasks. Automatic 
classification by threat level defines one of three threat levels: ‘high’ level requires 
fast reaction and mediation steps, triage process; ‘medium’ level assumes detection 
of ‘Indicator of Corruption’ (IoC) or metrics that indicate possible vulnerabilities, 
and requires SW update; and ‘low’ level addresses regular cyber security information 
and logs, and requires attention but should not necessary be a threat. Tagging means 
that specific tags can be assigned to a report to make it easier to find, shift or remove 
later. Removing personal information from the incident report to protect personal data 
may be required (by the European GDPR) before storing a normalised version of the 
incident. In the ‘using’ step (8), the workflow supports an automated similarity search, 
status and provenance retrieval, and enrichment with data and metadata periodic 
check for data integrity (using the hash of the incident report). Finally, depending 
on the threat level after some period of time, the incident can be archived (step 9) or 
removed e.g. by date or by tag (step 10).
We believe that this automatic smart-contracts-based approach would substantially 
support incident classification and management and could be used by analysts for the 
defence of CI. The suggested method would make SA analysis less cost-intensive and 
would perform with higher throughput. However, as is typical in this area, a human-
based approach performs with higher accuracy. 
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5. exPerImental eValuatIon
In the evaluation section, we measure how accurate our automated computations are 
and how long it takes for the deep autoencoder to make its calculations. Additionally, 
we report on measurements of the automated cyber incident classification and 
how long it takes for Smart Contracts to be executed and validated. We carried out 
measurements for several incident reports. The goal of this evaluation was to leverage 
the domain expert knowledge base for cyber incident classification and management 
as described in the workflow (see Figure 2), pointing out threat level relevant for SA.
A. Evaluation Data Set
The cyber analyst’s goal is to prioritise a detected cyber incident, either to mitigate it 
or to perform some other cyber incident response. For this test, we assumed that our 
CI is a financial organisation that employs MS Office products on Windows OS and 
using software products such as Internet Explorer, Firefox, Adobe, etc. The dataset 
used was aggregated from OSINT sources on the Internet. The dataset contained 
5,850 training documents and 584 test documents. We evaluated cyber incident reports 
from the ‘seclists’ feed4 from the last three years addressing four report categories. 
The ‘fulldisclosure’ category contained messages from the public, a vendor-neutral 
forum for detailed discussion of vulnerabilities and exploitation techniques, as well as 
tools, papers, news, and events of interest to the community. The ‘bugtraq’ category 
is a general security mailing list. The ‘pen-test’ category discloses techniques and 
strategies that would be useful to anyone with a practical interest in security and 
network auditing. The ‘nmap-dev’ category comprises an unmoderated technical 
development forum for debating ideas, patches, and suggestions regarding proposed 
changes to Nmap5 and related projects. The specific cyber security terms were obtained 
from the CS glossary.6 We anticipated that employing the described autoencoder and 
Smart Contracts approach should classify cyber incidents among a very large number 
of incident reports facilitating further cyber analysis and incident management. 
B. Experimental Results and Interpretation
This evaluation took place on an Intel Core i7-3520M 2.66GHz computer using 
Python on Ubuntu OS. We performed a total of 10 training iterations (epochs) for the 
autoencoder. The autoencoder training and accuracy calculation process took about 
262 seconds (see Figure 3). This figure shows that loss and validation loss decreased 
and accuracy and validation accuracy increased with each epoch. A final accuracy of 







FIGURE 3. ACCURACY AND LOSS CHARACTERISTICS BY AUTOENCODER TRAINING.
The neural network used a total of 502,000 parameters during the autoencoder training. 
The summary of the neural network training is presented in the Table 1. The neural 
network is composed of 1 input layer and 5 hidden layers. The number of neurons in 
these layers range from 10 to 2,000. Most layers use a rectified linear unit (ReLU) as 
an activation function. The last decoding layer employs a sigmoid activation function.
TABLE 1. SUMMARY OF THE DEEP AUTOENCODER TRAINING PROCESS.
The autoencoder model simply maps an input to its reconstruction. To achieve this, 
we first train an autoencoder until it reaches the stable train/validation loss value. The 
deep autoencoder system starts the SA analysis with incident content retrieval, which 
is converted to an input vector by using word counts. This input vector then goes 
through encoding in multiple hidden layers and is reconstructed to an output layer 





































the middle layer of the autoencoder model with the smallest number of neurons (10). 
Therefore, we retrieved trained 10-number-long IDs for each of the 584 test vectors 
and iterated this over all of the document vectors (10-numbers-long each) calculating a 
cosine similarity value for each document. For instance, the trained vector of the query 
incident report ‘bugtraq-2017-Aug-1.txt’ containing 10 numbers is [-8.73114914e-
10, 1.01575899e+01, 2.12457962e-09, 1.29858088e+00, 2.67755240e-09, 
9.32977295e+00, 4.54857439e-01, -5.82076609e-11, 8.55403137e+00, 5.52972779e-
09]. This vector can be used for fast and scalable similarity search. Computation 
demonstrated that, for the given incident report, the first three most similar documents 
are: ‘nmap-dev-2017-q2-8.txt, fulldisclosure-2017-Jan-68.txt, fulldisclosure-2015-
Oct-71.txt’. During the correlation calculation using the deep autoencoder, there was a 
minor fluctuation of accuracy value in the last epochs (between 0.942 and 0.943). This 
is because the autoencoder employs a restricted Boltzmann machine (RBM), which 
treats the word counts as probabilities and makes use of random values in calculations. 
Therefore, it is possible that the highest level of accuracy can be achieved before all of 
the epochs are calculated (epoch 4 in our case).
 
TABLE 2. EXCERPT OF CLASSIFICATION RESULTS FOR CYBER INCIDENT REPORTS BY THEIR 
ACQUISITION USING SMART CONTRACTS.
In the test scenario, we investigated incident reports from ‘seclists’ CS feed to 
classify those by threat level and to automatically manage them from acquisition 
to disposal without involvement of human analyst (see Table II). Due to the large 

























































































































































demonstrate typical cases. Query incident ID in ‘seclists’ terms is presented in the 
first column. The second column shows the first of the detected related incident IDs. 
The similarity score for found related incidents for selected examples is nearly 1.0. 
In the third column, we show a number of detected common words between query 
and found incidents. Column ‘Source’ depicts an incident source that can be a person 
or an organisation. The next four columns are related to Smart Contracts and show 
assigned Blockchain ID, consumed time, number of significant terms and threat level. 
The experimental results are represented in Figure 4 and show the distribution of 
threat incident reports over the last three years, respective of high, middle, and low 
threat levels. Each incident category is flagged by an assigned colour. The Y axis is 
a range of the number of incidents and the X axis is a time scale split into quarters. 
The figure shows that the most productive category for high (up to 325) and low (up 
to 215) threats is a ‘bugtraq’ category, whereas ‘nmap-dev’ (93) and ‘fulldisclosure’ 
(97) are dominating middle threat reports. For a given period of time, most active 
phase for all levels is from ‘Q4-2015’ to ‘Q3-2016’. Visualization of incident reports 
provides an analyst with a quick and descriptive SA picture. To focus on a particular 
area, the analyst can perform fine tuning, adjust the time scale or select a particular 
category or source.
FIGURE 4. PLOT FOR DISTRIBUTION OF THREAT INCIDENT REPORTS OVER LAST THREE YEARS 
FOR DIFFERENT THREAT LEVELS SHARED QUARTERLY.
As a use case scenario, assume that SOC has received an incident report from 
Vulnerability Lab in January 2017. On receiving this report, our Smart Contract 
triggers automatic analysis and classification of this incident report. According to 
Table 2, we see that this incident is assigned a Smart Contract identifier 3419 and the 
contract identifies 13 significant terms. Going through the contract logic we estimate 
both the regular and the weighted threat level as a ‘high threat’ (3). That means it 
should be handled soonest and with highest priority. The incident is automatically 
tagged and enriched with additional data from CS feeds and tools. Links to similar 
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incidents are established. All this facilitates the triage process for a cyber analyst and 
performs analysis steps that are usually done manually. According to the evaluated 
classification level, Smart Contract defines timestamps for automated archival and 
disposal of incident data. Therefore, a cyber analyst does not need to worry about the 
incident life-cycle and can focus their resources on triage for urgent cases.
The smallest duration for one Smart Contract operation was 0.252 seconds from 
Blockchain ID 7994 report and the longest operation time 0.677 report with ID 3419. 
This difference can be explained by the different report sizes (we calculate hash for 
report content) and different risk points numbers (3 for ID 7994 vs. 13 for ID 3419). 
This evaluation also gives a simple overview of detected significant terms, such as 
‘attack’, ‘hack’, ‘phishing’ for high threat incidents, ‘access’, ‘authentication’, and 
‘encode’ for middle threat incidents and ‘key’, ‘capability’, and ‘investigation’ for low 
level threats. Having a Smart Contract ID, the analyst is able to retrieve status data 
of a particular incident report from Blockchain using Smart Contract (e.g. by hash, 
provenance, time, tags, owner).
TABLE 3. OVERVIEW ABOUT AGGREGATED THREAT 
REPORTS FOR DIFFERENT THREAT CATEGORIES.
The category overview experimental results are presented in Table 3 which shows 
the distribution of high, middle and low threat level incidents for different incident 
categories. This table demonstrates that most incident reports (2,429) come from 
the ‘nmap-dev’ category, followed by ‘fulldisclosure’ (1,872) and ‘bugtraq’ (1,447). 
Most of incident reports belong to the low threat level (2,461) but the report number 
classified as high threat is also high (1,967). Most high threat level reports come 
from the ‘fulldisclosure’ (724) and ‘bugtraq’ (758) categories. That means that these 
categories should be addressed first by incident management.
C. Evaluation Effectiveness
We can see that, in general, the autoencoder training accuracy improves with every 
iteration (epoch) from 0.674 at the beginning to 0.942 at the end, which is sufficiently 
good; whereas training loss (error) of original information decreases from 0.691 to 
































original inputs, but it is an acceptable rate. Similarly, validation accuracy is in the 
range between 0.616 and 0.915. Validation loss decreases from 0.684 to 0.220.
FIGURE 5. ROC SPACE PLOT.
The classification effectiveness for high priority incidents can be determined in terms 
of a Relative Operating Characteristic (ROC) using the labelled ground truth query 
dataset. SA analysis divided the provided incident reports into two groups: ‘high’ and 
‘low priority’ by associated expert parameters and thresholds for each category; e.g. 
for the ‘fulldisclosure’ category the provided algorithm detected 229 true positive 
incidents, 14 true negative reports, one false positive incident and two false negative 
documents. The primary statistical performance metrics for ROC evaluation are 
sensitivity (0.991) or true positive rate and false positive rate (0.059). The associated 
ROC value is represented by the point (0.059, 0.991). The ROC space (see Figure 5) 
demonstrates that the calculated FPR and TPR values for the evaluated categories are 
located very close to the so called perfect classification point (0, 1). The calculation 
results demonstrate that the calculated similarity score values for the query documents 
are located very close to the labelled classification. These results demonstrate that an 
automatic approach for cyber incident classification of the method described is very 
effective and is a significant improvement on manual analysis. Therefore, an analysis 
method based on deep autoencoder techniques can be suggested as an effective method 
for incident classification, and as a supporting method to establish cyber SA. The 
results of the analysis confirm our hypothesis that an automated approach is able to 
reliably classify incidents, thus making analysis of a large number of cyber incidents 
a feasible and affordable process. However, further research is required to improve the 
decision and accuracy metrics of this method. 
424
6. conclusIons
In this work, we have presented an automated approach to classify and manage 
incident reports for establishing cyber situational awareness using a deep autoencoder 
neural network for classification and a Smart Contracts technique provided by 
Blockchain technology for incident management. The developed system should 
assist cyber analysts by protecting Critical Infrastructures against increasing cyber 
threats. The main contribution of this work is a real-time solution that could replace 
human input for a large number of cyber incident analysis tasks in order to facilitate 
cyber incident classification, eliminate irrelevant information and focus on important 
information to promptly perform mitigation steps. Another contribution is the use 
of the Smart Contract techniques to provide an automated trusted system for an 
incident management life-cycle that allows automatic acquisition, classification, use, 
archiving, and disposal. An additional advantage of this approach is a reduction of 
human analysis costs. Ultimately, our research will lead to the creation of automated 
security assessment tools with more effective handling of cyber incidents.
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Abstract: This paper describes CyGraph, a prototype tool for improving network 
security posture, maintaining situational understanding in the face of cyberattacks, 
and focusing on protection of mission-critical assets. CyGraph captures complex 
relationships among entities in the cyber security domain, along with how mission 
elements depend on cyberspace assets. Pattern-matching queries traverse the graph 
of interrelations according to user-specified constraints, yielding focused clusters of 
high-risk activity from the swarm of complex interrelationships. Analytic queries 
are expressed in CyGraph Query Language (CyQL), a domain-specific language 
for expressing graph patterns of interest, which CyGraph translates to the backend 
native query language. CyGraph automatically infers the structure of its underlying 
graph model through analysis of the ingested data, which it presents to the user for 
generating queries in an intuitive way. CyGraph has been experimentally validated in 
both enterprise and tactical military environments.
Keywords: common operating picture, situational understanding, mission assurance, 
graph analytics
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1. IntroductIon
Through centuries of experience and modern advances in technology, military 
commanders can rely on a fairly sophisticated common operating picture (COP) of 
the kinetic battlespace. However, significant challenges remain for extending the 
COP to include cyberspace as an operational domain [1]. Such an extended COP is 
needed for achieving appropriate levels of resilience to attack, maintaining situational 
awareness and understanding, and providing command and control of cyber (and joint 
cyber/kinetic) operations [2]. A cyber-extended COP needs to support the analysis of 
complex interactions among disparate data for decision making.
This paper describes CyGraph, a prototype tool for improving cyber resilience, 
maintaining situational awareness in the face of cyberattacks, and focusing on 
protection of mission-critical assets. CyGraph builds rich graph models from various 
network and host data sources, fusing isolated data and events into a unified model. 
From this, cyber operators can apply powerful graph queries that uncover multi-
step graph reachability from threats to key cyber assets, as well as other patterns 
of cyber risk. In this way, the tool correlates and prioritizes alerts in the context of 
vulnerabilities and key assets. CyGraph analytics extract ‘needle in haystack’ patterns 
of cyber risk focused on mission assets, with interactive visualization of query results, 
giving a common operating picture of cyberspace.
Traditional graph formulations with entities (vertices) and relationships (edges) of a 
single homogeneous type lack the expressiveness required for representing the rich 
structures involved in analyzing cyber risk. CyGraph employs property graphs, i.e., 
attributed, multi-relational graphs with vertices and edges having arbitrary properties 
[3]. Property graphs have the power needed for expressing a range of heterogeneous 
vertex and edge types, which arise from combining data from a variety of sources into 
a coherent unified cyber security graph model.
Unlike previous graph-based tools that focus on specific analytic use cases against 
fixed data models, CyGraph employs a schema-free design with a property-graph data 
model. The specific security data model is defined implicitly, according to how source 
data are transformed to a property graph. To help analysts more easily work with 
such complex models, CyGraph automatically infers the underlying data model for 
a populated graph. It’s domain-specific query language provides a simplifying layer 
of abstraction from the native query language of the graph database implementation.
CyGraph has been tested in military environments, including at the enterprise 
backbone and tactical command levels. In this paper, for sensitivity reasons, we 
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describe CyGraph analytics through simulated data; these datasets mimic patterns 
that we have observed in real data.
2. PreVIous worK
There has been considerable previous work in graph-based approaches to cyber 
security. For example, a review in 2013 [4] describes hundreds of papers that employ 
various kinds of graph representations for security, with over 30 categories just for 
the specific case of modelling network attacks and defenses with acyclic graphs. A 
more recent study [5] examines over 50 proposed graph-based security models, each 
having key differences in representation. The state of practice has reached a level of 
maturity such that various off-the-shelf tools (both commercial and governmental) 
have emerged for graph analytics in operational environments [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] 
[12] [13].
The wide range of proposed graph representations address the fundamental issue 
that classical graph algorithms alone are insufficient for solving analytic problems 
in cyberspace. Instead, specific data models are needed that capture the structure and 
semantics of the various kinds of entities and their relationships. But a significant 
limitation of the current generation of tools is that they have fixed data models, which 
limits their scope and ability to adapt to changes in operational environments and 
analytic requirements.
The idea of leveraging graph database technology for cyber security analysis is 
first explored in 2015 [14]. A proof-of-concept version of the CyGraph tool, which 
is implemented as a Java-based application running on a single host, is described 
[15] [16]. The proof-of-concept tool was applied for some security use cases, using 
simulated data or isolated examples of real operational data [17] [18]. A particular 
limitation of these preliminary examples is that mission functional dependency 
relationships are analyzed separately from cyberspace relationships.
Based on our initial success in proving the CyGraph concept, we have developed 
a more mature and capable CyGraph tool. This advanced prototype is a web-based 
(JavaScript) client-server application, distributed across three machines (user web 
browser as GUI, middle-tier intermediary service, and back-end database service). 
Leveraging this architecture, we have implemented multiple technologies for the 
CyGraph back-end graph database, including support for Apache Rya [19] within the 
Big Data Platform (BDP) [20] developed by the US Defense Information Systems 
Agency (DISA). The advanced CyGraph prototype also integrates with the Elastic 
Stack [21] (for Neo4j) or Accumulo [22](for DISA BDP) for scalable data ingest and 
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intermediate storage. A high-level overview of this tool architecture is described in 
[2], although no specific analytic results are given there.
The new web-based CyGraph tool has been validated using real data in operational 
network environments, at enterprise-level scale. The analytic examples that we 
describe in this paper are abstracted versions of the kinds of results we obtained 
for real data (abstracted here to protect the sensitive real data). This includes the 
development and validation of joint models for cyberspace and mission functions, 
e.g., for showing mission risk and/or impact as we describe. The present work also 
experimentally validates that CyGraph’s loosely-coupled client-server architecture 
can support multiple back-end graph persistence technologies, while insulating the 
front-end functionality from the choice of back-end implementation. This in turn 
provides flexibility in matching the analytic architecture to the performance and 
scaling requirements for a given organization.
3. cygraPh model
We begin by defining the formal structures that form the basis of an instance of a 
CyGraph model. A graph G = (N, E) is a pair of sets of nodes and edges. The edges 
are, themselves, ordered pairs of nodes (n1, n2) from N. A property graph is a graph in 
which the nodes and edges come equipped with attributes, that is, arbitrary key/value 
pairs describing properties of the elements. We generally assume that nodes and edges 
have some minimal structure. Namely, nodes have attributes for a unique identifier 
and a type. Edges also have an attribute describing their type. They additionally have 
attributes identifying their source and destination nodes. Additional attributes may 
include such things as location information, mission criticality, or traffic packet counts.
A CyGraph model instance is defined by the properties attributed to the nodes and 
edges, as well as any constraints that may be in effect. Typically, particular property 
graphs conforming to a CyGraph model instance are progressively built from 
heterogeneous data sources with records containing information about the nodes and 
edges. Rather than requiring a fixed schema for the data sources, CyGraph applies 
data transformations that map elements of the source data to nodes, edges, and their 
properties. Thus, these data transformations implicitly define an instantiated CyGraph 
model.
To better understand how a property graph is built, consider the process of reading 
in a record r from a data source. Assume the graph built so far is G = (N, E), and the 
transform T extracts information about two nodes, n1 and n2, and an edge e between 
them. The new graph is G’ = (N ∪ {n1, n2}, E ∪ {e}), where the properties of n1, n2, 
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and e are defined by the transform T. If n1 or n2 was already in N then we simply 
update their properties according to any extra information contained in record r. 
In general, any property (of nodes or edges) that has potential analytic value (in the 
sense of constraining graph queries) can be included as a node or edge property. The 
type for a node or edge can then be defined as an arbitrary function of its properties. 
Thus, the node and edge types depend on the source data, via the transformation to a 
CyGraph property graph.
For example, alerts from Host Based Security System (HBSS) [23] yield node types 
describing the category of the alert for the destination node, e.g., whether they are 
reconnaissance events (such as port scans) or represent actual host compromise. 
Network flow records yield the region in which the node is located (US, non-US, 
country of concern) or indicate that the node is key terrain (based on knowledge 
of services hosted there and mission dependencies). This transform prioritizes type 
information from HBSS alerts over the other two, so that if a host is in the US and 
is compromised, it is simply identified as compromised. One could easily define a 
different transform that extracts a type in the Cartesian product of the types defined by 
each data source. The choice of transform depends on the sort of questions one wants 
answered regarding the graph (i.e., the analytic queries).
Once CyGraph has constructed the property graph from its data sources, an analyst 
can explore the graph with queries expressed in CyGraph Query Language (CyQL), 
a domain-specific query language. An important aspect of graph structure pertains to 
reachability. CyQL allows for the specification of structural features of trajectories 
through a graph. When a query Q is applied to a graph G it results in a (possibly empty) 
subgraph G’ ⊆ G. This matching subgraph is then displayed in the user interface.
A directed trajectory is an alternating sequence of nodes and edges (n0, e1, n1,…, ek, 
nk) in which, for every 0 < i ≤ k, the source of ei is ni-1 and the destination is ni. An 
undirected trajectory is similar, except for any edge ei, its source and destination may 
be ni and ni-1 respectively. The length of a trajectory is the number of edges. The graph 
of a trajectory is ({n0,…,nk}, {e1,…,ek}) in which the sequence information has been 
forgotten. A trajectory t is a trajectory of graph G = (N, E), if the trajectory’s graph (N’, 
E’) is a subgraph of G (i.e. N’ ⊆ N and E’ ⊆ E).
CyQL specifies trajectories by constraining the number of hops, and the types of the 
initial node, the end node, and the edges. Queries are built from the following clauses 
with their associated semantics:
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• hops($numHops): A trajectory satisfies this clause if its length is 
$numHops.
• hops($minHops,$maxHops): A trajectory satisfies this clause if its 
length is between $minHops and $maxHops (inclusive).
• startType($type): Trajectory (n0, e1,…,nk) satisfies this clause if n0 is 
of type $type.
• endType($type): Trajectory (n0, e1,…,nk) satisfies this clause if nk is of 
type $type.
• startId($id): Trajectory (n0, e1,…,nk) satisfies this clause if the unique 
node identifier u(n0) of node n0 is equivalent to $id.
• endId($id): Trajectory (n0, e1,…,nk) satisfies this clause if the unique 
node identifier u(nk) of node nk is equivalent to $id.
• edgeTypes($types): A trajectory satisfies this clause if each edge is of 
one of the types in the comma separated list $types.
• undirected(): By default, satisfying trajectories must be directed. 
When this clause is used, undirected trajectories also satisfy the query.
A CyQL clause is a concatenated sequence of such clauses. A trajectory t satisfies a 
CyQL query Q (written t | = Q) if it satisfies all of the clauses. The result of applying 
Q to graph G is simply the union of all trajectories of G that satisfy Q. That is: 
Q(G) = {t ∈ trajectories of G: t | = Q}.
CyQL provides a key aspect of risk analysis in CyGraph. In terms of the semantics 
of attack paths, query trajectory through the property graph corresponds to multi-step 
attack (or attack reachability) through the network. Conceptually, the aspects of CyQL 
can be organized as shown in Figure 1.
FIGURE 1. GRAPH TRAJECTORY PATH CONSTRAINTS IN CYGRAPH QUERY LANGUAGE (CYQL)
The left side of Figure 1 represents elements of risk within a network; i.e., things 
that we are protecting against. By specifying such risk elements as constraints on the 
starting points of a query traversal, trajectories represent ‘downstream’ relationships 
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emanating from risk points. Conversely, the right side represents high-valued assets 
within the environment; i.e., things that we are trying to protect. Defining those 
things as constraints on the traversal ending points cause paths to be focused on 
those assets as reachable from the risky elements. CyQL clauses that occur between 
these starting and ending extremes generally serve to constrain path trajectories in 
particular ways that help tune analytic focus; e.g., for managing the trade-off between 
comprehensiveness of query results and cognitive overload.
CyQL queries involve identifying trajectories that start from nodes representing risk 
elements, and end in nodes representing priorities for protection. The set of trajectories 
can be further refined by specifying additional traversal constraints regarding the edge 
types or total path length. This serves to focus an analyst’s attention on the relationships 
that matter the most. By visualizing the results of CyQL queries, CyGraph allows 
users to quickly identify known risky patterns or anomalous structures that warrant 
further investigation.
For example, given the appropriate data sources, CyQL makes it straightforward to 
identify the set of hosts with vulnerabilities that reside within the same connected 
component as a key cyber asset. By limiting the query to vulnerable hosts within two 
hops of key cyber assets, one can more easily identify the vulnerable hosts that pose 
the greatest risks. Queries may also help to identify clusters within the graph that have 
interesting properties. A highly connected cluster of hosts with host-based alerts may 
be an indication of vigorous adversarial exploration and exploitation.
4. cygraPh archItecture
CyGraph ingests data from various sources and normalizes it. It then transforms the 
elements of the normalized model into a graph model specific to the cyber security 
domain. Graph queries are issued from the client front end (translated from CyQL 
to native query language in a middle-tier service) and then executed on the backend 
database. The resulting query matches are then visualized in the web client (browser).
In this agile architecture, the graph model is defined by how the data sources are 
transformed into a property graph, rather than conforming to a predetermined schema. 
Model extensions are simply the creation of additional of nodes, relationships, and 
properties in the property graph model, and require no schema changes or other 
database renormalizing. CyGraph supports two options for backend data storage and 
query processing:
• Neo4j graph database [24] with normalized data in Elasticsearch [21].
• Apache Rya [19] RDF store with normalized data in Apache Accumulo [22].
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Each of these options is available as open-source software, and (with the exception 
of Rya) have commercial support available. The second option (Rya+Accumulo) is 
available as part of DISA’s Big Data Platform (BDP) [20].
In the CyGraph front-end analyst dashboard, graph pattern-matching queries are 
expressed in CyQL, which CyGraph compiles to Cypher [25] (for Neo4j) or SPARQL 
[26] (for Rya). This presents a simplifying layer of abstraction, designed specifically 
for the desired risk analysis, freeing the analyst from learning a complex general-
purpose query language.
Typical inputs to CyGraph fall under four categories:
1. Network Infrastructure. This captures the configuration and policy aspects 
of the network environment.
2. Security Posture. Specification of network infrastructure is combined with 
vulnerability data to map potential attack paths through the network.
3. Cyber Threats. This captures events and indicators of actual cyberattacks, 
which are correlated with security posture to provide context for risk analysis 
and attack response.
4. Mission Dependencies. This captures how elements of enterprise missions 
depend on cyber assets.
CyGraph relies on other tools and data sources to build its cyber security graphs. For 
example, the TVA/Cauldron tool [6] [7] [8] [9] can build network attack graphs from 
host vulnerabilities, firewall rules and network topology. CyGraph can ingest data for 
both potential and actual threats, including Splunk [27], Wireshark [28], the National 
Vulnerability Database (NVD) [29], and Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and 
Classification (CAPEC) [30]. For capturing mission dependencies on cyber assets 
[17] [18], CyGraph ingests models developed through other tools [16], including 
Crown Jewels Analysis (CJA) [31] and Cyber Command System (CyCS) [32].
The CyGraph implementation is schema-free, so the model is decoupled from the 
storage implementation. The particular way in which the data is transformed to a 
property graph determines an instantiated CyGraph model. So, for example, not all of 
the data sources in the four categories listed above are necessarily needed for useful 
analysis – often only a single data source is ingested.
Data is continually streaming in that must be analysed for cyber risk correlation 
and prioritization by CyGraph. Leveraging the open source Elastic Stack, the Beats 
platform provides agents for gathering data, with Logstash for transformation and 
ingest into Elasticsearch. A CyGraph web service then creates a property graph model 
and imports it into the CyGraph graph data base (Neo4j).
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There is a similar analytic flow for CyGraph deployment on BDP, in which data 
streams are processed by Apache Storm [33], stored in Accumulo [22] and queried in 
Rya [19]. In this analytic flow, the CyGraph data model is mapped to RDF. The result 
of a query is a combination of alerts, network flows and vulnerabilities represented 
as graph nodes and edges. The matching subgraphs for queries are typically orders of 
magnitude smaller than the full graph stored in Neo4j or Rya.
5. cygraPh oPeratIon
After ingesting data from various sources, CyGraph maps the data to a property graph 
stored in a graph database. It automatically infers the underlying graph model through 
inspection of the graph database. It then presents the model to the user in the browser 
user interface as an interactive graph visualization.
The analyst can interact with this graph model to generate queries in the domain-
specific CyQL query language. In particular, user-selected combinations of edge types 
(diamonds) populate the CyQL edgeTypes($types) clause, which specifies edge 
types to be matched in a query. For example, edges of type IN define relationships 
between Machine nodes and Domain nodes, i.e., network machine membership in 
protection domains (e.g., subnets) [14].
Core clauses in CyQL define patterns of reachability through a graph, i.e., 
hops($numHops), hops($minHops,$maxHops), startType($type), 
endType($type), startId($id), endId($id), edgeTypes($type), 
and undirected(). CyQL includes other features for matching patterns in the 
cyber security domain [15], including keywords for host names, IP addresses, subnet 
address ranges, arbitrary Boolean combinations of clauses and wildcards in parameter 
values. CyGraph queries are stored for sharing and reuse.
Once a query is executed, CyGraph displays the query results, as shown in Figure 
2. Each query submission creates a new query pane, with tabs for selecting panes. 
The query results (matched subgraph) are visualized in a main panel. Optionally, the 
properties for selected nodes or edges are displayed below the graph visualization.
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FIGURE 2. CYGRAPH WEB USER INTERFACE (QUERY RESULTS)
One of the user-interface options is to cluster elements of the visualized graph in 
particular ways, i.e., by user-selected nodes, incoming or outgoing edges for a node, 
or by node type. This is illustrated in Figure 3.
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FIGURE 3. CLUSTERING NODES IN GRAPH QUERY VISUALIZATION
The top of Figure 3 is a query result, before clustering is applied. In the middle, 
clustering is applied via a node property denoting mission functions. At the bottom 
of the figure, additional clustering is applied, based on a node property denoting key 
terrain. Visually, such a clustering merges a set of nodes to a single one, with adjacent 
edges to other (non-clustered) nodes preserved. This kind of interactive visual 
clustering helps manage the complexity of graph analytics in CyGraph. For example, 
in Figure 3, clustering the mission and key terrain nodes helps focus attention on the 
alert destinations (triangles) and vulnerable hosts (ellipses) that are potential risks.
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For time-varying models, CyGraph can dynamically visualize the evolving graph 
state. This is shown in Figure 4. This capability depends on time stamps being defined 
for edges during the ingestion process. Then, when a query result has a time defined 
for each edge, the user interface enables the timeline feature. This feature builds a 
time tick for each discrete event (unique value of time in the query result edge set). 
The timeline then provides video controls (e.g., play, single step forward/back, speed) 
for displaying the graph as edges appear over time.
FIGURE 4. INTERACTIVE TIMELINE FOR VISUALIZING GRAPH EVOLUTION OVER TIME
6. examPle cygraPh analytIcs
In this section, we describe a number of example applications of CyGraph for security 
analytics. These examples all use simulated data sets (thus avoiding sensitivity issues), 
which are designed to mimic patterns that we have observed in real datasets.
The first example (Figure 5) is based on intrusion detection alerts. CyGraph 
automatically infers the model (top left of the figure) from the populated graph. Nodes 
are typed as either Compromised (for destinations of alerts reporting compromise) 
or IpAddress (sources/destinations for other general kinds of alerts), rendered as in 
the legend. An edge is one or more alerts from source to destination. 
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FIGURE 5. GRAPH MODEL BASED ON INTRUSION ALERTS
One use for risk analysis is identifying attack reachability in a particular direction, 
consistent with adversary lateral movement. This pattern is expressed in the CyQL 
query language via the hops($numHops) clause, as examined in Figure 6.
The upper left of Figure 6 shows the results for the full (unconstrained) query. The 
other portions of the figure show query results for hops(2) (upper right), hops(3) 
(lower left), and hops(4) (lower right). Queries with larger values of $numHops 
are more tightly constrained, in the sense of matching deeper traversal. Smaller (more 
loosely constrained) values of $numHops yield larger matching subgraphs. 
Operationally, an analyst can adjust trajectory depth according to analytic need. One 
can begin with a larger value of $numHops to discover deep network infiltration as 
a higher-priority incident. Then, as deeper-level (and more rarely occurring) incidents 
are resolved, more shallow ones can be investigated. For example, an organization can 
set the trajectory depth such that there are available resources available to investigate 
the resulting graph query match.
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FIGURE 6. GRAPH QUERY RESULTS FOR DIFFERENT TRAJECTORY DEPTHS 
Clauses in CyGraph can be combined for further constraining query results. 
Semantically, this is a conjunction (Boolean AND), in the sense that conditions in 
all clauses must match in the query results. This is examined in Figure 7. Here, we 
combine the hops() clause with endType(), which constrains matching paths to 
end with a node of type Compromised.
As a use case for operational security, this example focuses on a more severe intrusion 
alert category as the locus of potential lateral movement by an adversary. Comparing 
the upper left of Figure 7 (no endType constraint) with the upper right of Figure 
6 (with endType constraint), we see the result of constraining the endType (for 
trajectory depth 2). The query result is much smaller, with all trajectories ending at 
nodes of type Compromised. In terms of security analysis, this focuses on paths 
leading to (reportedly) compromised hosts, e.g., for investigating events leading up 
to those in question. We see the same kind of result for Figure 7 (upper right) versus 
Figure 6 (lower left), this time with a trajectory depth of 3. For alert response, this is 
tracing the investigation deeper into the potential attack.
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We now consider a more complex CyGraph example, shown in Figure 8. Like real-
world data, such an unconstrained graph visualization is difficult to understand in 
its entirety. This underscores the need for CyGraph to extract ‘needle in haystack’ 
patterns of cyber risk, focused on mission protection.
FIGURE 7. MULTIPLE CLAUSES IN QUERIES
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FIGURE 8. GRAPH POPULATED FROM MISSION FUNCTIONS, INTRUSION ALERTS, NETWORK 
FLOWS, AND HOST VULNERABILITIES
The graph in Figure 8 is populated via a process that transforms host vulnerabilities, 
network flows, intrusion alerts and mission functional dependencies (i.e., the data 
sources in Figure 9) to a property-graph model. CyGraph automatically infers the 
model from the populated graph database, which is the right side of Figure 9.
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FIGURE 9. GRAPH VISUALIZATION LEGEND, DATA SOURCES, AND GRAPH MODEL FOR FIGURE 8
In this model, mission nodes are connected to one another (and to key cyber terrain) 
in terms of their dependencies (from ‘provides’ to ‘needs’). Alert edges connect 
source and destination nodes of various types: key terrain, compromised (assumed 
vulnerable), vulnerable (not compromised), and other general alerts sources and 
destinations. General addresses observed in network flows which are not associated 
with alerts are connected to each other and to alert addresses via flow edges. In this 
way, network flows serve to fill in potential gaps from adversary activity not detected 
by intrusion detection (false negatives).
We now apply queries to the graph in Figure 8, in which various combinations of 
CyQL clauses match subgraphs of interest for analyzing this richer security model. 
These query clauses generally follow the pattern of constraining paths to start at risky 
elements and end at high-value mission elements, with intermediate constraints that 
tune analytic focus. Our examples here also demonstrate another kind of strategy for 
operational security – tightly constraining queries to initially focus on riskier patterns, 
then subsequently relaxing constraints to uncover new patterns of the next higher 
priority.
The top of Figure 10 is the query result for a significantly risky pattern – reported 
compromises that lead to mission functions within three steps. This query result shows 
that a compromised node is the source of another alert whose destination is key cyber 
terrain which supports a mission function. There is also traffic flow (dashed arrow) to 
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another key terrain node that supports a mission function. The traffic from KT 2 to KT 
6 might warrant deeper inspection for potential missed detections (false negatives).
In the bottom of Figure 10, query constraints are relaxed somewhat to expand the 
analytic scope. In particular, the unlimited trajectory depth via hops(*) admits 
paths of any depth leading to mission nodes, and startType(AlertSrc) 
has paths starting at alert sources (any severity of alert) rather than compromised 
destinations. This query result shows additional alert trajectories (all starting from 
node a), including ones that end on vulnerable hosts, which have traffic to other key 
terrain supporting other mission functions.
 
FIGURE 10. RISKY PATHS TO MISSION FUNCTIONS
Next, we apply the undirected() clause of CyQL, which explores nearness 
by ignoring path directionality. This is shown in Figure 11. Here, we again apply 
startType(Compromised), along with endType(KeyTerrain), which 
stops at key terrain rather than going beyond to mission functions that depend on 
them. We also apply a more constrained hops(1,2) that admits only paths of depths 
one or two.
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FIGURE 11. IGNORING DIRECTIONALITY IN QUERIES
This query finds compromise-related paths in addition to those in Figure 10. This 
includes nine compromised nodes that communicate with key terrain KT 7, which 
we find by having the query end at key terrain rather than mission functions. As we 
show in Figure 12, key terrain KT 7 does not have a known mission function that it 
supports, so this query identifies risk to such nodes. The query in Figure 11 also finds 
compromised node p.8, which communicates with KT 1. In this case, the network flow 
has KT 1 as the source (e.g., the initiator of the flow). By ignoring directionality, this 
admits the possibility of general communication types, e.g., involving attacks against 
client-side vulnerabilities.
The left side of Figure 12 shows all mission dependencies in this graph model. 
Mission dependencies are represented as edges of type MISSION, between key 
terrain or mission functions, oriented from ‘provides’ to ‘needs.’ Thus, the CyQL 
clause edgeType(MISSION), with no other query conditions, finds all such 
dependencies. Formally, because there is no hops clause, the query result is the union 
of edges rather than path trajectories.
The right side of Figure 12 finds all vulnerable hosts that are relevant to a particular 
mission function. The clause startType(Vulnerable) causes paths to start 
at vulnerable nodes. The clause endId(‘function 4’) causes paths to end at 
function 4. The hops(*) allows paths of any depth.
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FIGURE 12. ALL MISSION DEPENDENCIES (LEFT) AND VULNERABILITIES FOR A PARTICULAR 
MISSION FUNCTION (RIGHT)
7. summary and conclusIons
Maintaining situational understanding and a common operating picture in cyberspace 
requires making sense of complex relationships among aspects as varied as security 
posture, cyber threats, security alerts, and mission dependencies on cyber assets. The 
volume and complexity of data needed for security operations are far too large for 
manual inspection or analysis. These challenges multiply with the need to go beyond 
considering isolated events, matching single-step rules, or generating summary 
statistics, which yield limited insight into complex adversary actions.
CyGraph creates a unified multi-relational graph model of cyber terrain, events, 
and mission dependencies. This rich repository of relationships among cyberspace 
and mission elements supports advanced analytic and visual capabilities. Through 
pattern-matching queries, CyGraph discovers clusters of high-risk activity from the 
swarm of complex interrelationships. This allows cyber operators to more easily 
understand evolving cyberattack situations, and to recommend best courses of action 
to commanders. By including mission dependencies on cyber assets, CyGraph shows 
how cyberspace activities influence mission success.
In CyGraph, domain-specific graph queries extract nuggets of important patterns 
from the swarm of data through query clauses that fine-tune graph path trajectories 
during query matching. These queries uncover multi-step graph reachability from 
vulnerabilities and threats to key cyber assets and mission functions. The domain-
specific language provides a layer of abstraction that simplifies the operational burden. 
CyGraph also infers the underlying data model from a populated graph database, 
presenting that to the analyst to further aid in formulating queries.
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CyGraph has a schema-free data model for flexibility in combining various types 
of relationships, aimed at addressing a wide variety of analytical questions. It is 
implemented as a 3-tier client-server web application with a graph database or triple 
store backend and interactive graphical interface in the browser. CyGraph employs a 
combination of powerful graph-based queries and advanced interactive visualization. 
It thus provides a significant capability to enable the storage and processing of diverse, 
mission-relevant cyber data at scale while making the technology readily accessible 
to cyber analysts. This in turn enables more accurate and rapid decision making for 
command and control.
CyGraph includes a number of custom capabilities for interactively visualizing and 
navigating graph query results. This includes clustering nodes according to various 
criteria, and dynamic rendering of time-varying graph evolution. Overall, these 
analytic and visual capabilities enable the discovery and understanding of ‘needle in 
haystack’ patterns of cyber risk focused on mission assets.
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